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ACE Working Group                                             J. Cuellar
Internet-Draft                                             P. Kasinathan
Intended status: Standards Track                              Siemens AG
Expires: July 6, 2018                                           D. Calvo
                                            Atos Research and Innovation
                                                         January 2, 2018


             Privacy-Enhanced-Tokens (PAT) profile for ACE
          draft-cuellar-ace-pat-priv-enhanced-authz-tokens-06

Abstract

   This specification defines PAT, "Privacy-Enhanced-Authorization-
   Tokens", an efficient protocol and an unlinkable-token construction
   procedure for client authorization in a constrained environment.
   This memo also specifies a profile for ACE framework for
   Authentication and Authorization.  The PAT draft uses symmetric
   cryptography, proof-of-possession (PoP) for a key owned by the client
   that is bound to an OAuth 2.0 access-token.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on July 6, 2018.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect



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   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  PAT Overview and Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  PAT Protocol  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.1.  RS<->AS: Security-association-Setup . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.2.  [C->RS : Resource-Request]  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.3.  [RS->C : Un-Authorized-Request(AS-Info)]  . . . . . . . .   7
     4.4.  C<->AS : Security-Association-Setup . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.5.  C->AS : Access-Request  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.6.  C<-AS : Access-Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       4.6.1.  Access-Token construction:  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       4.6.2.  Verifier or PoP key construction: . . . . . . . . . .  13
     4.7.  C->RS : Resource-Request  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     4.8.  RS->C : Resource-Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       4.8.1.  RS Response-codes to C RES-REQ: . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     4.9.  Construction of Derived-Tokens (DT) . . . . . . . . . . .  19
       4.9.1.  C->RS: Resource-Request via DT  . . . . . . . . . . .  19
       4.9.2.  RS->C : Resource-Response to DT . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     5.1.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   8.  Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     8.1.  Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   Appendix A.  ACE profile Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24

1.  Introduction

   Three well-known problems in constrained environments are the
   authorization of clients to access resources on servers, the
   realization of secure communication between nodes, and the
   preservation of privacy.  The reader is referred for instance to [I-
   D.ietf-ace-actors], [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz] and [KoMa2014].  This
   memo describes a way of constructing Tokens from an initial secret
   that can be used by clients and resource servers (or in some cases,
   more generally by arbitrary nodes) to delegate client authentication
   and authorization in a constrained environment to trusted and
   unconstrained authorization servers.



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   This draft uses the architecture of [draft-ietf-ace-actors] and [I-
   D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz], designed to help constrained nodes in
   authorization-related tasks via less-constrained nodes.  Terminology
   for constrained nodes is described in [RFC7228].  A device (Client)
   that wants to access a protected resource on a constrained node
   (Resource Server) first has to gain permission in the form of a token
   from the Authorization Server.  This memo also specifies a profile of
   the ACE framework [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].

   The main goal of the PAT is to present methods for constructing
   authorization tokens efficiently with privacy features such as
   unlinkability.  The CoAP protocol [RFC7252] MAY be used as the
   application layer protocol.  The draft uses symmetric Proof-of-
   Possession keys [I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-architecture], CBOR web tokens
   (CWT) [draft-ietf-ace-cbor-web-token-05] claims to represent security
   claims together with CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) [I-
   D.ietf-cose-msg] and Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) [RFC
   7049].

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

   In this document, these words will appear with that interpretation
   only when in ALL CAPS.  Lower case uses of these words are not to be
   interpreted as carrying [RFC2119] significance.

   Terminology for entities in the architecture is defined in OAuth 2.0
   [RFC6749] and [I-D.ietf-ace-actors], such as client (C), resource
   server (RS), resource owner (RO), resources (R) and the authorization
   server (AS).

   o  Access-Token (AT): the access token is a token prepared by the AS
      for C.  It represents the privileges granted by the RO to the C to
      perform actions over the Resources (R) on an RS.

   o  Token (Tk): this token is prepared by the C, presented to the RS
      to access the resources (R) on RS.  The Tk contains all
      information needed by the RS to verify that it was granted by AS.
      The Client derives Tk from the AT.

   In version-5 of PAT draft the token names -- AT and Tk -- and their
   purposes were harmonized with [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].






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3.  PAT Overview and Features

   The PAT protocol is designed to work with ACE framework [I-D.ietf-
   ace-oauth-authz] and ACE actors [I-D.ietf-ace-actors].  In this
   specification we assume the following:

   o  A Resource Server (RS) has one or more resources (R) and it is
      registered with an Authorization Server (AS)

   o  The Authorization Server (AS) provides access-tokens for the
      clients to access resources of RS.  The corresponding Resource
      Owner (RO) of the RS MAY assign allowed-permissions for the
      Clients in the AS.

   o  The RS is offline after commissioning, i.e., RS cannot make any
      introspective queries to the AS to verify the authorization
      information provided by the C.

   o  A Client (C) is either registered with an AS or it knows how to
      reach the RS for accessing the required resources.

      *  To access a resource on a Resource Server (RS), a Client (C)
         should request an access-token (AT) from AS, either directly or
         using its Client Authorization Server (CAS).  For the sake of
         simplicity, this memo does not include the actor CAS.

   Based on the above assumptions, a simple PAT message flow can be
   described as follows: a C may perform a resource-request to RS
   without a valid access-token, the RS will reject and it may provide
   AS information to the C in the response.  The C performs an Access-
   Request to AS to ask for an AT that allows accessing the required
   resource (R) on RS.  The AS checks if C is allowed to access the
   resource (R) on RS or not, based on permissions assigned by the RO.
   If C has sufficient permissions, then AS generates an Access-Token
   (AT) plus proof-of-possession (PoP) key bounded to the access-token
   and a common secret (K) between AS and RS.  AS sends both the AT and
   the PoP key to C via a secure channel.  How this secure channel is
   created between AS and C is out of the scope of this draft.  After
   receiving AT and PoP key, C performs a resource-request to RS by
   constructing token (Tk) from AT or by deriving Token.  The RS can
   construct its own version of the PoP key from the AT and verifies the
   received AT.  If it is valid, RS encrypts the response with the PoP
   key.  At the end of this phase, both C and RS has established a
   common derived secret, the PoP key.  Later, C can generate unlinkable
   tokens (Tk) from the initial AT as described in Section 4.9.

   In particular, PAT is designed to be used in contexts where
   unlinkability (privacy) and efficiency are the main goals: the tokens



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   (Tk) convey only the assurance of the authorization claims of the
   clients.  In particular, the procedure described in Section 4.9
   enables the Tokens (Tk) to be constructed in such a way that they do
   not leak information about the correspondence of messages to the same
   Client or from the same access-token (AT).  For example, if an
   eavesdropper observes the messages from different Clients to and from
   the Resource Servers, the protocol does not give him information
   about which messages correspond to the same Client.  Of course, other
   information like the IP-addresses or the contents themselves of the
   requests/responses from lower-layer protocols may leak some
   information, and this can be treated separately via other methods.

   The main features of PAT protocol are described below:

   o  The PAT method allows a RO, or an Authorization Server (AS) on its
      behalf, to authorize one or several clients (C) to access
      resources (R) on a constrained Resource Server (RS).  The C can
      also be constrained devices.  The Access-Token (AT) response from
      AS to C MUST be performed via secure channels.

   o  The RO is able to decide (if he wishes: in a fine-grained way)
      which client under which circumstances may access the resources
      exposed by the RS.  This can be used to provide consent (in terms
      of privacy) from RO.

   o  The Access-Tokens (AT) are crafted in such a way that the client
      can derive Tokens (Tk) that allow demonstrating to RS its
      authorization claims.  The message exchange between C and RS for
      the presentation of the tokens MAY be performed via insecure
      channels to enforce efficiency.  But the payload content -- if the
      Client is performing a POST/PUT/DELETE request -- from C to RS or
      the response payload from RS to C MUST be encrypted.

   o  The RS can derive the PoP key from the AT, which is received
      attached to the Resource Request message, and it encrypts the
      response using it.

   o  The tokens (Tk) do not provide any information about any
      associated identities such as identifiers of the clients, of
      access-tokens (AT) and of the resource-server.

   o  The tokens (Tk) are supported by a "proof-of-possession" (PoP) key
      and the initial access-token (AT).  The PoP key allows an
      authorized entity (a client) to prove to the verifier (here, the
      RS), that C is indeed the intended authorized owner of the token
      and not simply the bearer of the token.





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   To be coherent with ACE Authorization framework [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-
   authz], this draft also specifies an ACE profile to use PAT and for
   efficient encoding it uses CWT and COSE.  The PAT profile is signaled
   when the C requests token from the AS or via RS in response to
   unauthorized request response.  The PAT profile will cover all the
   requirements described in [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].

4.  PAT Protocol

   The detailed description of PAT protocol is presented in this
   Section 4.  The PAT protocol includes three actors: the RS, the C,
   and the AS.  PAT message flow is shown in Figure 1.  Messages in
   [square brackets] mean they are optional.

        ,-.                      ,--.                          ,--.
        |C|                      |RS|                          |AS|
        `+'                      `+-'                          `+-'
         |                        | 1 Security-Association-Setup|
         |                        | <--------------------------->
         |                        |                             |
         |    2 [Resource-REQ]    |                             |
         |------------------------>                             |
         |                        |                             |
         |3 [Un-Auth-REQ(AS-Info)]|                             |
         |<------------------------                             |
         |                        |                             |
         |             4 Security-Association-Setup             |
         |<----------------------------------------------------->
         |                        |                             |
         |                     5 Access-REQ                     |
         |------------------------------------------------------>
         |                        |                             |
         |                     6 Access-RSP                     |
         |<------------------------------------------------------
         |                        |                             |
         |     7 Resource-REQ     |                             |
         |------------------------>                             |
         |                        |                             |
         |     8 Resource-RSP     |                             |
         |<------------------------                             |
        ,+.                      ,+-.                          ,+-.
        |C|                      |RS|                          |AS|
        `-'                      `--'                          `--'

        Figure 1: PAT protocol message flow

   The following subsections describe the message flow in more detail,
   especially how the messages and tokens with PoP are constructed.



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   A PAT message sent from actor A to actor B is represented using the
   following notation: "A -> B : Message Name"

4.1.  RS<->AS: Security-association-Setup

   This memo assumes that the Resource Server (RS) and its
   Authentication Server (AS) share a long term shared secret (K), i.e.,
   a shared key which MAY be implemented via USB (out of band methods)
   when device commissioning -- out of scope --. The shared secret (K)
   is used both by the AS and the RS to create proof-of-possession keys
   (PoP keys or verifiers).

   We can also assume that the CAS and AS share a secure connection if
   CAS exist as an actor, e.g., DTLS.  During the commissioning phase,
   RS registers the cryptographic algorithms and the parameters it
   supports.  The internal clock of RS can be synchronized with the AS
   during the commissioning phase.  Also, PAT supports the use of
   Lightweight Authenticated Time (LATe) Synchronization Protocol [I.D-
   draft-navas-ace-secure-time-synchronization].

4.2.  [C->RS : Resource-Request]

   Initially, a C may not have a valid access-token (AT) to access a
   protected resource (R) hosted in RS.  The C might not also know the
   corresponding AS-information to request AT from AS.  In this
   scenario, C may send a Resource-Request message to RS without a valid
   Token (Tk).

   To enable resource discovery, RS may expose the URI "/.well-known/
   core" as described in [RFC6690], but this resource itself MAY be
   protected.  Thus, C can optionally make a CoAP GET request to the URI
   "/.well-known/core".

4.3.  [RS->C : Un-Authorized-Request(AS-Info)]

   Once RS receives a resource request from a C, it checks:

   o  If C has attached a valid token (Tk) or not to the request.  If C
      does not have a valid token (Tk), then RS MUST respond to C with
      4.01 (Unauthorized request).  Optionally, RS may include
      information about AS (AS-Info) which includes additional
      parameters (AS address) to reach the /token endpoint exposed by
      the AS.  Note: this message is sent to any unauthorized Client,
      therefore it is recommended to include as less information as
      possible to identify AS.

   o  If C has a valid access token, but not for the requested resource
      then RS MUST respond with 4.03 (Forbidden)



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   o  If C has a valid access token, but not for the method requested
      then RS MUST respond with 4.05 (Method Not Allowed)

   o  If C has a valid access token, then RS must follow the procedure
      described in Section 4.8 to create a valid response to C.

   Figure 2 shows the sequence of messages with detailed CoAP types
   between C and RS for the above Un-Authorized-Request:

       ,-.          ,--.
       |C|          |RS|
       `+'          `+-'
        |            |  ,---------------------------.
        | 1 Res-REQ  |  |Header:GET                 |
        |----------->|  |Type:Confirmable           |
        |            |  |URI-Path:.well-known/core  |
        |            |  `---------------------------'
        |            |  ,---------------------------.
        |            |  |Header: 4.01 Unauthorized  |
        | 2 Res-RSP  |  |Type: Acknowledgement      |
        |<-----------|  |content-type:              |
        |            |  |application/cbor           |
        |            |  |Payload:{AS-Info,params}   |
       ,+.          ,+-.`---------------------------'
       |C|          |RS|
       `-'          `--'
      Figure 2:  C<->RS Resource-Request and Unauthorized as response

   The RS MAY send an Unauthorized response with additional information
   such as AS-Info and parameters (params).  To mitigate attacks based
   on time synchronization, the Lightweight Authenticated Time (LATe)
   synchronization protocol [I.D-draft-navas-ace-secure-time-
   synchronization] MAY be used.  In section 6.2 of [I.D-draft-navas-
   ace-secure-time-synchronization] Possible Scenarios, the scenario 1.2
   of suits PAT protocol, an example of it is shown in figure 3.

   The response payload MAY include AS information (AS-info) and LATe
   time synchronization's TIC information object such as key-reference
   ID (kid) shared secret between RS and AS, a nonce to prevent replay
   attacks and the message authentication codes (MAC) algorithm
   [optional] used for producing the MAC.  It is recommended for RS to
   create a MAC tag for TIC parameters.

   Figure 3 shows RS example response message to C encoded using CBOR
   [RFC7049] with pat-type="UnAuthReq".






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       Header: 4.01 (Unauthorized)
       Content-Type: application/cbor+pat;
                     pat-type="UnAuthReq"
       Payload:
       {
        AS-Info: "coaps://as.example.com/token",
        #protected
        TIC params:
        {
         nonce: 'rs-nonce..',
         kid: '..',
         [alg]: '..'
         TAG: '..'
        }
       }

       Figure 3: AS information + LATe time synchronization payload

4.4.  C<->AS : Security-Association-Setup

   Before sending an access-request message, C must establish a secure
   channel with the AS.  The C may be registered with the AS, as
   described in [I-D.ietf.ace-oauth-authz] or the C MAY have received
   AS-Info from RS as the answer to a previous Un-Authorized-Request.

   The AS may have an access-control list defined by the RO for the
   authorized clients.  With this access-control list, AS can verify if
   the client is allowed to establish a secure connection or not.  If RO
   granted enough privileges to the client to access the requested
   resource (R) in RS, then AS establishes a confidential channel with
   C.  How this secure connection (e.g., a DTLS channel) should be
   established is out of the scope of this memo.

   Notice that, it is important to ensure that the connection between AS
   and C MUST be reliable and secure since the PAT protocol relies on
   the fact that the messages exchanged between C and AS are protected
   and confidential.  If the Client is also a constrained device, then C
   may use DTLS-profile as described in [I.D-draft-gerdes-ace-dtls-
   authorize] to create the secure channel with the AS.

4.5.  C->AS : Access-Request

   Once C establishes a secure communication channel with AS, C sends an
   access-request (ACC-REQ) message to AS to the endpoint /token
   requesting an access token for RS as described in [I-D.ietf.ace-
   oauth-authz].





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   Optionally, the C includes as part of the Access-Request Message the
   details about the resources (R) or their corresponding URI with the
   operations it needs to access or perform on RS.  If not AS should
   prepare an access token with default permissions.  Fine grained
   access to resources (R) of RS depends on the infrastructure or
   services the RS offers.  For example, if RS exposes different
   resources such as temperature and humidity, a generic access token
   may be granted by AS to C to access both resources on RS.  On the
   other hand, the application developer or administrator may decide the
   access-rights based on application requirements.

   Figure 4 shows an access-request message sent from C to AS to get an
   access token.  The "aud" represents a specific resource R
   ("tempSensor") and "scope" represents the allowed actions that C aims
   to perform as described in [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz] using CWT [I-
   D.ietf-ace-cbor-web-token].  The Scope parameter can be designed
   based on application requirements i.e., it can be "read" or "write"
   or methods such as "GET|POST" etc.  If RS has included TIC
   information for time synchronization, then the C MUST include TIC
   object, including the MAC -- if included -- without any changes in
   the payload for access request.

   How the client authenticates itself against the AS is out of the
   scope of this draft.  Nevertheless, in the following example, the
   client presents the Client_Credentials i.e., password based
   authentication by presenting its client_secret (see section 2.3.1. of
   [RFC6749]).
























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             Header: POST (Code=0.02)
             Uri-Host: "coaps://as.example.com"
             Uri-Path: "token"
             Content-Type: "application/cbor+cwt+late ;
             late-type=tic"
             Payload:
             {
               "grant_type" : "client_credentials",
               "client_id": "client123",
               "client_secret": "Secret123",
               "aud" : "tempSensor",
               "scope": "GET|POST",
               ... omitted for brevity ...
               TIC params:
               {.. [if exist] ..
               nonce:'rs-nonce..', # same rs-nonce sent by RS
               kid: '..'
               }
               TAG: .. # TIC MAC tag produced by RS
                         using the shared key k with AS.
             }
             Figure 4: Example Client Access-Request message to AS

4.6.  C<-AS : Access-Response

   When AS receives an access-request message from a C, AS validates it
   and performs the following actions:

   o  If the access request from C is valid (i.e., operations are
      covered by the privileges defined by the RO), then AS prepares the
      Access-Token (AT) and sends it with COAP response code 2.01
      (Created).

   o  If the Access-Request from C contains LATe time synchronization
      TIC information object, then an appropriate response with TOC
      information object is included in the response as described in
      [I.D-draft-navas-ace-secure-time-synchronization].

   o  If the client request is invalid then AS MUST send appropriate
      COAP error response code as specified in [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-
      authz].

   The Figure 5 shows the Access-Request from C to AS and the Access-
   Response from AS to C.







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              ,-.          ,--.
              |C|          |AS|
              `+'          `+-'
               |   1 DTLS   |
               |<----------->
               |            |
               |            |  ,------------------------.
               |            |  |Header:POST(code=0.02)  |
               |2 Access-REQ|  |content-type:           |
               |------------>  |application/cbor        |
               |            |  |URI-Path: token         |
               |            |  |Payload:{ACC-REQ}       |
               |            |  `------------------------'
               |            |  ,-----------------------------.
               |3 Access-RSP|  |Header: Created (code=2.01)  |
               |<------------  |content-type:                |
               |            |  |application/cbor             |
               |            |  |Payload:{ACC-RSP}            |
              ,+.          ,+-.`-----------------------------'
              |C|          |AS|
              `-'          `--'

                 Figure 5: Access-Request and Access-Response

   The AS constructs the Access-Token (AT) and the verifier (the
   symmetric PoP key) as the answer for a valid access request from C.
   The contents of the access-response (ACC-RSP) payload are logically
   split into two parts: the Access-Token (AT) and the Verifier
   (Symmetric PoP key).

4.6.1.  Access-Token construction:

   o  The Access-Token is constructed by AS using the CWT claim
      parameters.  It represents the permissions granted to the Client.

      *  "iss" (issuer): AS identity

      *  "aud" (audience): resource server URI or specific resource URI
         for a fine-grained procedure.

      *  "exp" (Expiration Time): token expiration time

      *  "iat" (Issued At): token issued at time by AS

      *  "cti" CWT ID should be unique for every Access-Token.

      *  "scp" (Scope): Note that scp is not a CWT claim.  It can
         specify allowed methods such as GET, POST, PUT or DELETE.



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   Other CWT claims are optional.  It is recommended to avoid the CWT
   claim "sub" (subject) as it exposes client identity.

4.6.2.  Verifier or PoP key construction:

   o  Verifier (Symmetric PoP key): G (K, Access-Token).  The Client
      will use the Verifier as the key material to communicate with the
      RS, i.e., if C wants to encrypt its payload, it uses the verifier
      as the key.

      *  G: the MAC algorithm which is used to create the verifier, we
         propose Poly1305 [RFC7539].  Notice that G is a function which
         takes two parameters (key, data) as input and it produces a
         keyed digest as the output

      *  K: the shared key between AS and RS

      *  Access-Token: constructed using CWT claims as explained before

   It is of special importance that the Access-Response message with the
   access token and the verifier MUST be sent to C through a secure
   channel -- in our example we considered a DTLS channel between C and
   AS --.

   The time-synchronization between AS and RS MAY be implemented based
   on the application requirements using [I.D-draft-navas-ace-secure-
   time-synchronization].

   The AS should specify required parameters as described in [I-D.ietf-
   ace-oauth-authz] such as the type of token, etc.  Also, if the
   Access-Request from C does not include any profile, AS MUST signal
   the C to use appropriate or default profile that is supported by RS.

   If the access-request message includes LATe TIC information, then AS
   MUST prepare TOC information and included it in the response.  A MAC
   tag for TOC is created and appended in the response to prevent the
   client from tampering TOC information.

   Figure 6 shows the example of an Access-Response sent from AS to C
   after successful validation of C's credentials which were presented
   using an Access-Request message.










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            Header: 2.01 (Created)
            Content-Type: application/cbor+cwt+pat; pat-type="tk"
            Location-Path: token/...
            Payload:
            {
               "access token": b64'SlAV32hkKG ...
               {
                "iss": https://as.example.com
                "aud": "tempSensor",
                "scp": "read",
                "iat": 1...,
                "cti": "..", # Unique can be a Sequence Number
                "exp": 5...,
                "alg": "chacha20/poly1305",
                "profile": "ace_pat"
               }
              "cnf":
              {
               COSE_Key: {
                 "kty": "symmetric",
                 "kid": h'...
                 "k": b64'jb3yjn...  #[verifier]
               }
              }
             TOC:{
               as_time: '..',
               nonce: 'rs-nonce..',
               }
             tag: '..' #TOC tag
            }

        Figure 6: Example Access-Response message sent from AS to C
            with detailed CWT params and payload info

4.7.  C->RS : Resource-Request

   Once C receives the Access-Response from AS, C can construct a token
   (Tk) which will demonstrate that C has got the sufficient
   authorization to access resources (R) in RS.

   A new Token (Tk) MUST be attached to each RES-REQ sent to RS by C.
   If payload data are included, then C should encrypt them using the
   verifier as key and optionally it can include an Authentication Hash
   (AuthHash= Hash(verifier+C_nonce)).  PAT profile provides necessary
   recommendations by using AEAD (e.g., chach20/poly1305) algorithm.

   o  As an example if C performs:




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      *  A CoAP GET() without payload.  In this case, the request from C
         MAY be sent un-encrypted since it does not include confidential
         data, but the response from RS with payload MUST be always
         encrypted and only the valid C MUST be able to decrypt it.

      *  A CoAP POST(), a CoAP PUT() or a CoAP DELETE() request with
         payload MUST be protected and encrypted by using the AEAD
         algorithm specified in the Access Token (AT).  PAT profile
         proposes to use ChaCha20-Poly1305-AEAD authenticated encryption
         mechanism, while using the Verifier (PoP key) as the key and a
         nonce.  The AuthHash MAY be protected by using it as Additional
         Authentication Data (AAD) in the AEAD algorithm.

   The RS MUST implement /authz-info endpoint to allow any Client to
   transfer the token (Tk) as described in [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].
   The Resource-Request message with valid Token (Tk) shall be
   constructed from AT by C and it should be sent to RS in the following
   way:

   o  Figure 7 shows the example of Client Resource-Request:

          Request:
          Content-Type: application/cose+cbor+pat;
                     pat-type="AuthReq";
          Message:
          {  CoAP request: GET/POST/PUT/DELETE
             Uri-Host "coap://rs.example.com"
             uri-path: /authz-info
             payload:
             {
               Token:
                  {
                   Access Token(AT), # Tk encapsulates the AT from AS
                   AuthHash=Hash(verifier+nonce), #optional for GET
                   nonce,
                   #Chach20/Poly1305(Verifier,nonce,
                          AAD=AuthHash, payload)
                   Payload:{
                       # if exist
                       }
                  }
              }
          }

      Figure 7: RES-REQ from C using /authz-info implemented at RS

   Figure 7 shows the detailed example of GET RES-REQ to the endpoint
   /authz-info implemented at RS as described in [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-



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   authz].  This option enables the C to transport the token (Tk) to the
   RS.  After receiving the request, RS verifies the token (Tk): RS can
   construct its own version of verifier or PoP-key by performing
   G(K,AT) from the access-token (AT); and RS checks whether
   AuthHash=Hash(verifier+nonce) is valid or not.  If Tk and AuthHash
   are valid, then RS sends an encrypted response using the verifier
   (PoP key).

   o  Figure 8 shows the GET request from C to RS described in [I-
      D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz], with pat-type="AuthReq".

            Header: GET
            Content-Type: application/cose+cbor+pat;
                          pat-type="AuthReq";
            Uri-Host: "coap://rs.example.com"
            Uri-Path: /authz-info
            Payload:
            { token: {
               "access token": .. {
                 "aud": "tempSensor"
                 "scp": "read"
                 ... #CWT omitted for brevity.
               }
               "nonce": ..
               "AuthHash": .. #[AuthHash=hash(verifier+nonce)]
              }
              TOC:{
              time:'as-time',
              nonce:'rs-nonce',# rs-nonce from RS TOC object
              } tag: '..' #TOC tag
            }

            Figure 8: Example of valid GET RES-REQ from C to RS
                including time-sync using endpoint /authz-info.

   The C performs a GET request to "tempSensor" using CWT claim "aud",
   and together C also transfers the Token (Tk) to the RS.  PAT allows
   performing both RES-REQ and transferring authorization information in
   RES-REQ.  In the next example we show how to perform a resource
   request if the C performs a POST request with encrypted payload
   information.

   o  Figure 9 shows an example of POST Resource-Request from C to RS
      described in [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz], with pat-type="AuthReq".







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            Header: POST (Code=0.02)
            Content-Type: application/cose+cbor+pat;
                         cose-type="encrypt0";
                         "pat-type="AuthReq";
           Uri-Host: "coap://rs.example"
           Uri-Path: /authz-info
           Payload:
           {# COSE
               token: {
               "access token": .. {
                   "aud": "firmwareUpd"
                   "scp": "write"
                   ... CWT omitted for brevity,
                   }
               "nonce": ..  # nonce
               "AuthHash": .. #[AuthHash=hash(verifier+nonce)]
                TOC:{
                    time:'as-time',
                    nonce:'rs-nonce', # rs-nonce from RS TIC
                    } tag: '..' #TOC tag
               }
           # COSE_Encrypt0 + COSE_MAC0 Protected
               ciphertext:{
               #Chacha20/Poly1305 AEAD payload using
                   # key=verifier,
                   # nonce=..,
                   # AAD=AuthHash
                   },
               tag: ..
           }

           Figure 9: Example of valid POST request from C to RS

   Figure 9 shows the POST Resource-Request from C to RS where the Uri-
   Path "/authz-info" allows the authorized client to perform firmware
   upgrade on the RS using the CWT claim "aud:firmwareUpd".  PAT
   recommends protecting sensitive information such as the payload using
   AEAD algorithm (chacha20/poly1305).  The client should use Verifier
   or PoP key as the key, a nonce, and AuthHash as AAD.

4.8.  RS->C : Resource-Response

   When the RES-REQ with a token (Tk) arrives from C to RS, RS MUST
   evaluate the resource request and the token (Tk) in the following
   order:

   o  Step 0: Check whether the contents of Tk are derived from an
      access-token (AT) or not.



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   o  Step1: If Tk contains the access-token (AT) from AS, extract AT.
      Extract nonce and Authentication Hash (AuthHash) from the request
      message.

      *  Step1.1: (If available) Verify the freshness of the sequence
         number (cti) in the access token presented by AS.

      *  Step1.2: Generate the verifier by computing G(K, access token)
         where K is the shared key between AS and RS.

      *  Step1.3: Compute a verification hash as Hash(verifier+nonce)
         and compare the result with AuthHash for correctness.

      *  Step1.4: Check if the access token has valid CWT parameters
         such as "aud", "scp", "exp", "nbf", etc for the requested
         resource or action to be performed.

      *  Step1.5: (IF available) Synchronize RS internal clock using TOC
         object as described in [I.D-draft-navas-ace-secure-time-
         synchronization].

   o  Step2: If the token is valid, RS should create a temporary
      internal state as shown in table 1 below with details of CWT
      claims "cti","exp","scp"", and the verifier (PoP key).

   The RS internal state table which is shown in Table1 also includes
   "next cti".  The next cti (cti x) value is computed as the Hash of
   previous cti (cti x-1) and the verifier.  The purpose of this is
   explained in the section Section 4.9.

      |------------+-----------+-------+-------+-----------------------|
      | Verifier   | cti_x-1   | exp   | scp   | next cti (cti_x)      |
      |------------+-----------+-------+-------+-----------------------|
      | G(k,AT)    | cti_x0=   | of AT | of AT | cti_x1=               |
      |            | cti of AT |       |       | hash(cti_x0,Verifier) |
      |------------+-----------+-------+-------+-----------------------|
      Table 1: RS Internal state table of access-tokens and RS_nonce

   o  Step 3: If the token is valid, then RS decrypts the payload from
      the client (if exist) Verifier (PoP key).

   o  Step 4: After that, RS prepares the response and encrypts the
      payload with a fresh nonce, PoP key.  Only the Client (C) with a
      valid key (the Verifier) can decrypt the payload:







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4.8.1.  RS Response-codes to C RES-REQ:

   o  If the token (Tk) is valid -- as discussed above --, then RS MUST
      respond with payload-data as described above with the appropriate
      response code as described in [RFC7252].  For example, to a POST
      request with 2.01 (created) or 2.04 (changed).

   o  If the token (Tk) is invalid, then RS MUST respond with code 4.01
      (Unauthorized)

   o  If the token (Tk) is valid but does not match the "aud" or
      resource C is requesting for then RS MUST respond with code 4.03
      (Forbidden)

4.9.  Construction of Derived-Tokens (DT)

   The objectives to create Derived-Tokens (DT) are:

   o  To produce Unlinkable Tokens (Tk).  It is not efficient for the
      client to request a new access-token (AT) from AS everytime.
      Also, if C uses the same access-token (AT) from AS, the identity
      of the client can be identified via the AT CWT claim "cti" (token
      identity).

   o  To reduce token (Tk) size (efficiency in transport) that the
      client must send to RS /authz-info in every resource request.

   o  To create tokens (Tk) that may have limited access to protected-
      resources -- fine-grained resource access tokens -- from the
      original access-tokens (AT) that could grant more privileges to
      protected-resources on RS.  For example, an access-token (AT)
      could provide permissions to access all protected-resources on RS
      via CWT claims audience "aud" and scope "scp".  The client could
      derive a Token (Tk) providing access to a reduced set of
      protected-resources available on RS from the initial AT.

4.9.1.  C->RS: Resource-Request via DT

   The Client receives an encrypted response from RS after its first
   RES-REQ with the access-token (AT) from AS.

   The Client creates a new Derived-Token(DT) using CWT claims as
   described below.  In order to minimize the data size, we use only the
   claims which are required.

   o  Client MAY prepare a DT with a subset of scope "scp" operations
      that the client received from the initial Access-Token (AT).  It
      creates the first derived "cti_x1" by Hash("cti_x0 + verifier")



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      from the CWT claim "cti" of the original access-token (AT).  The
      subsequent derivation of "cti_x" can be performed by a generic
      function "cti_x = Hash(cti_x-1 + verifier)".  Note that the
      derived-token (DT) MUST include all the necessary CWT claims such
      as "cti_x", "aud", "exp", "scp".  All other CWT claims are
      optional.

   o  Client creates the AuthHash=(verifer+nonce).

   o  Client prepares encrypted content using verifier as the key -- if
      there is any payload --.

   o  Note: in the Additional Authenticated data (AAD), the C includes
      AuthHash and the derived-token (DT), so that the payload cannot be
      misused/exchanged with another RES-REQ or nonce.

               Header: POST (Code=0.02)
               Content-Type: application/cbor+cwt+cose++pat;
                            cose-type="encrypt0";
                            "pat-type="AuthReq";
              Uri-Host: "coap://rs.example"
              Uri-Path: /firmware
              Payload:
              {# COSE
                  token: {derived-token(DT):
                      "aud": "firmwareUpd",
                      "exp": ..
                      "scp": "write",
                      "cti": Hash(cti_x+verifier)
                      # cti_x=Hash(cti_x-1+verifier).
                      }
                  "nonce": ..  # new nonce
                  "AuthHash": h'bfa03.. #[Hash=(verifier+nonce)]
              # COSE_Encrypt0 + COSE_MAC0 Protected
                  ciphertext:{
                  #Chacha20/Poly1305 AEAD payload using
                      # key=verifier,
                      # nonce=..,
                      # AAD=AuthHash,DT
                      h'....omitted for brevity
                  },
                  tag: h'... omitted for brevity
              }

              Figure 12: Example of valid Resource-Request
              from C to RS using a derived-token(DT)





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4.9.2.  RS->C : Resource-Response to DT

   After receiving the Token (Tk) which encapsulates the derived Token
   (DT) from C, RS performs the following Steps.  If any of them fails,
   then RS must send an UnAuthorized response to C, and C must use the
   first AT, which was received from the AS, or request a new AT based
   on the resource owner (RO) configuration:

   o  RS extracts CWT claim cti (cti_x) from the Derived-Token (DT) and
      checks if it exists in its internal state table.  If RS finds the
      cti_x, then RS uses the corresponding verifier, "cti_x-1, "exp",
      and "scp" to perform the validation of next steps.

   o  RS checks that cti_x= Hash (cti_x-1+verifier)

   o  RS checks that AuthHash == Hash(verifier+nonce)

   o  RS checks that the permissions are valid using "scp" and
      expiration time "exp"

   o  RS updates the new cti_x-1, cti_x in its internal state table

   o  RS creates an encrypted response to be sent to C with a payload
      including payload-data.

  |---------+--------------+---------+-------+-------+-----------------|
  | msg#    | Verifier (V) | cti_x-1 | exp   | scp   | cti_x=          |
  |         |              |         |       |       | Hash(cti_x-1+V) |
  |---------+--------------+---------+-------+-------+-----------------|
  | 0       | G(K,AT)      |    0x00 | of AT | of AT | 0xAB =          |
  |         |              |         |       |       | Hash(0x00+V)    |
  |---------+--------------+---------+-------+-------+-----------------|
  | 1 (upd) | G(k,AT)      |    0xAB | of AT | of AT | 0xFF =          |
  |         |              |         |       |       | Hash(0xAB+V)    |
  |---------+--------------+---------+-------+-------+-----------------|
  Table 2: RS updating only two parameters in its
  internal stating table 1

   The Table 2 shows the RS internal state table with an example.

5.  Security Considerations

   TBD








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5.1.  Privacy Considerations

   The CoAP messaging layer parameters such as token and message-id can
   be used for matching a specific request and response.  TBD

6.  IANA Considerations

   TBD

7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
   Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC7252] Shelby, Z., Hartke, K. and Borman, C., "The Constrained
   Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252, June 2014.

   [RFC6347] Rescorla E. and Modadugu N., "Datagram Transport Layer
   Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, January 2012.

   [RFC7539] Y.  Nir and A.  Langley: ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IETF
   Protocols, RFC7539, May 2015

   [I-D.ietf-ace-actors] Gerdes, S., Seitz, L., Selander, G., and C.
   Bormann, "An architecture for authorization in constrained
   environments", draft-ietf-ace-actors-0 (work in progress), March
   2017.

   [I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-architecture] Hunt, P., Richer, J., Mills, W.,
   Mishra, P., and H.  Tschofenig, "OAuth 2.0 Proof-of-Possession (PoP)
   Security Architecture", draft-ietf-oauth-pop-architecture-08 (work in
   progress), July 2016.

   [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz] Seitz, L., Selander, G., Wahlstroem, E.,
   Erdtman, S., and H.  Tschofenig, "Authorization for the Internet of
   Things using OAuth 2.0", draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz-06 (work in
   progress), March 2017.

   [I-D.ietf-cose-msg] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption
   (COSE)", draft-ietf-cose-msg-24 (work in progress), November 2016.

   [I.D-draft-navas-ace-secure-time-synchronization] Navas, G.,
   Selander, G., Seitz, L., "Lightweight Authenticated Time (LATe)
   Synchronization Protocol", draft-navas-ace-secure-time-
   synchronization-00 (work in progress), October 2016.




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7.2.  Informative References

   [KoMa2014] Kohnstamm, J. and Madhub, D., "Mauritius Declaration on
   the Internet of Things", 36th International Conference of Data
   Protection and Privacy Comissioners, October 2014.

   [RFC7228]  Bormann, C., Ersue, M., and A.  Keranen, "Terminology for
   Constrained-Node Networks", RFC 7228, DOI 10.17487/RFC7228, May 2014,
   <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7228>

   [RFC6690]  Shelby, Z., "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Link
   Format", RFC 6690, DOI 10.17487/RFC6690, August 2012,
   <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6690>.

   [I.D-draft-gerdes-ace-dtls-authorize] Gerdes, S., Begmann, O.,
   Bormann, C., Selander, G., Seitz, L.  Datagram Transport Layer
   Security (DTLS) Profile for Authentication and Authorization for
   Constrained Environments (ACE), draft-gerdes-ace-dtls-authorize-01,
   March 2017.

   [I-D.ietf-ace-cbor-web-token] Jones, M., Tschofenig, H., Erdtman, S.,
   CBOR Web Token (CWT), draft-ietf-ace-cbor-web-token-05 (work in
   progress), June 2017..

8.  Acknowledgement

   This draft is the result of collaborative research in the RERUM EU
   funded project and has been partly funded by the European Commission
   (Contract No. 609094).  The authors thank Ludwig Seitz for reviewing
   the previous version of the draft.

8.1.  Copyright Statement

   Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as authors
   of the code.  All rights reserved.

   Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
   modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to the license
   terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License set forth in
   Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF
   Documents <http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info)>.

Appendix A.  ACE profile Registration

   TBD






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                 |----------------------+-----|
                 | ACE profile template | PAT |
                 |----------------------+-----|
                 | Profile name         | TBD |
                 | Profile Description  | TBD |
                 | Profile ID           | TBD |
                 |----------------------+-----|
                 Table2: ACE profile registration template

Authors' Addresses

   Jorge Cuellar
   Siemens AG
   Otto-Hahn-Ring 6
   Munich, Germany  81739

   Email: jorge.cuellar@siemens.com


   Prabhakaran Kasinathan
   Siemens AG
   Otto-Hahn-Ring 6
   Munich, Germany  81739

   Email: prabhakaran.kasinathan@siemens.com


   Daniel Calvo
   Atos Research and Innovation
   Poligono Industrial Candina
   Santander, Spain  39011

   Email: daniel.calvo@atos.net


















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