--- 1/draft-ietf-v6ops-ra-guard-03.txt 2009-11-28 11:12:47.000000000 +0100 +++ 2/draft-ietf-v6ops-ra-guard-04.txt 2009-11-28 11:12:47.000000000 +0100 @@ -1,89 +1,95 @@ v6ops Working Group E. Levy-Abegnoli Internet-Draft G. Van de Velde Intended status: Informational C. Popoviciu -Expires: November 29, 2009 Cisco Systems +Expires: June 1, 2010 Cisco Systems J. Mohacsi NIIF/Hungarnet - May 28, 2009 + November 28, 2009 IPv6 RA-Guard - + + +Abstract + + It is particularly easy to experience "rogue" routers on an unsecured + link [reference4]. Devices acting as a rougue router may send + illegitimate RAs. Section 6 of SeND [RFC3971] provides a full + solution to this problem, by enabling routers certification. This + solution does, however, require all nodes on an L2 network segment to + support SeND, as well as it carries some deployment challenges. End- + nodes must be provisioned with certificate anchors. The solution + works better when end-nodes have access to a Certificate Revocation + List server, and to a Network Time Protocol server, both typically + off-link, which brings some bootstrap issues. + + When using IPv6 within a single L2 network segment it is possible and + sometimes desirable to enable layer 2 devices to drop rogue RAs + before they reach end-nodes. In order to distinguish valid from + rogue RAs, the L2 devices can use a spectrum of criterias, from a + static scheme that blocks RAs received on un-trusted ports, or from + un-trusted sources, to a more dynamic scheme that uses SeND to + challenge RA sources. + + This document reviews various techniques applicable on the L2 devices + to reduce the threat of rogue RAs. Status of this Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the - provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. This document may contain material - from IETF Documents or IETF Contributions published or made publicly - available before November 10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the - copyright in some of this material may not have granted the IETF - Trust the right to allow modifications of such material outside the - IETF Standards Process. Without obtaining an adequate license from - the person(s) controlling the copyright in such materials, this - document may not be modified outside the IETF Standards Process, and - derivative works of it may not be created outside the IETF Standards - Process, except to format it for publication as an RFC or to - translate it into languages other than English. + provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. - This Internet-Draft will expire on November 29, 2009. + This Internet-Draft will expire on June 1, 2010. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal - Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of - publication of this document (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info). - Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights - and restrictions with respect to this document. - -Abstract - - It is particularly easy to experience "rogue" routers on an unsecured - link [reference4]. Devices acting as a rougue router may send - illegitimate RAs. Section 6 of SeND [RFC3971] provides a full - solution to this problem, by enabling routers certification. This - solution does, however, require all nodes on an L2 network segment to - support SeND, as well as it carries some deployment challenges. End- - nodes must be provisioned with certificate anchors. The solution - works better when end-nodes have access to a Certificate Revocation - List server, and to a Network Time Protocol server, both typically - off-link, which brings some bootstrap issues. - - When using IPv6 within a single L2 network segment it is possible and - sometimes desirable to enable layer 2 devices to drop rogue RAs - before they reach end-nodes. In order to distinguish valid from - rogue RAs, the L2 devices can use a spectrum of criterias, from a - static scheme that blocks RAs received on un-trusted ports, or from - un-trusted sources, to a more dynamic scheme that uses SeND to - challenge RA sources. + Provisions Relating to IETF Documents + (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of + publication of this document. Please review these documents + carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect + to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must + include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of + the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as + described in the BSD License. - This document reviews various techniques applicable on the L2 devices - to reduce the threat of rogue RAs. + This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF + Contributions published or made publicly available before November + 10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this + material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow + modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process. + Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling + the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified + outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may + not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format + it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other + than English. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Model and Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Stateless RA-Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4. Stateful RA-Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.1. State Machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.2. SeND-based RA-Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5. RA-Guard Use Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8