draft-ietf-v6ops-addr-select-req-07.txt   rfc5221.txt 
IPv6 Operations Working Group A. Matsumoto Network Working Group A. Matsumoto
Internet-Draft T. Fujisaki Request for Comments: 5221 T. Fujisaki
Intended status: Informational NTT Category: Informational NTT
Expires: November 13, 2008 R. Hiromi R. Hiromi
Intec NetCore
K. Kanayama K. Kanayama
Intec Netcore INTEC Systems
May 12, 2008 Requirements for Address Selection Mechanisms
Requirements for address selection mechanisms
draft-ietf-v6ops-addr-select-req-07.txt
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Abstract Abstract
There are some problematic cases when using the default address There are some problematic cases when using the default address
selection mechanism which RFC 3484 defines. This document describes selection mechanism that RFC 3484 defines. This document describes
additional requirements co-working with RFC 3484 to solve the additional requirements that operate with RFC 3484 to solve the
problems. problems.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction ....................................................2
2. Requirements of Address Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Requirements of Address Selection ...............................2
2.1. Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. Effectiveness ..............................................2
2.2. Timing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.2. Timing .....................................................2
2.3. Dynamic Behavior Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.3. Dynamic Behavior Update ....................................3
2.4. Node-Specific Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.4. Node-Specific Behavior .....................................3
2.5. Application-Specific Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.5. Application-Specific Behavior ..............................3
2.6. Multiple Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.6. Multiple Interface .........................................3
2.7. Central Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.7. Central Control ............................................3
2.8. Next-hop Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.8. Next-Hop Selection .........................................3
2.9. Compatibility with RFC 3493 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.9. Compatibility with RFC 3493 ................................4
2.10. Compatibility and Interoperability with RFC 3484 . . . . . 5 2.10. Compatibility and Interoperability with RFC 3484 ..........4
2.11. Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.11. Security ..................................................4
3. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3. Security Considerations .........................................4
3.1. List of threats introduced by new address-selection 3.1. List of Threats Introduced by New Address-Selection
mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Mechanism ..................................................4
3.2. List of recommendations in which security mechanism 3.2. List of Recommendations in Which Security Mechanism
should be applied . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Should Be Applied ..........................................5
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4. Normative References ............................................5
5. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Appendix A. Appendix. Revision History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
Today, the RFC 3484 [RFC3484] mechanism is widely implemented in Today, the RFC 3484 [RFC3484] mechanism is widely implemented in
major OSs. However, in many sites, the default address-selection major OSs. However, in many sites, the default address-selection
rules are not appropriate, and cause a communication failure. PS rules are not appropriate, and cause a communication failure. The
[I-D.ietf-v6ops-addr-select-ps] lists problematic cases that resulted problem statement (PS) document [RFC5220] lists problematic cases
from incorrect address selection. that resulted from incorrect address selection.
Though RFC 3484 made the address-selection behavior of a host Though RFC 3484 made the address-selection behavior of a host
configurable, typical users cannot make use of that because of the configurable, typical users cannot make use of that because of the
complexity of the mechanism and lack of knowledge about their network complexity of the mechanism and lack of knowledge about their network
topologies. Therefore, an address-selection autoconfiguration topologies. Therefore, an address-selection autoconfiguration
mechanism is necessary, especially for unmanaged hosts of typical mechanism is necessary, especially for unmanaged hosts of typical
users. users.
This document contains requirements for address-selection mechanisms This document contains requirements for address-selection mechanisms
that enable hosts to perform appropriate address selection that enable hosts to perform appropriate address selection
automatically. automatically.
2. Requirements of Address Selection 2. Requirements of Address Selection
Address-selection mechanisms have to fulfill the following eleven Address-selection mechanisms have to fulfill the following eleven
requirements. requirements.
2.1. Effectiveness 2.1. Effectiveness
The mechanism can modify RFC 3484 default address-selection behavior The mechanism can modify RFC 3484 default address-selection behavior
at nodes. As documented in PS [I-D.ietf-v6ops-addr-select-ps], the at nodes. As documented in the PS [RFC5220], the default rules
default rules defined in RFC 3484 do not work properly in some defined in RFC 3484 do not work properly in some environments.
environments. Therefore, the mechanism has to be able to modify the Therefore, the mechanism has to be able to modify the address-
address-selection behavior of a host, and to solve the problematic selection behavior of a host and to solve the problematic cases
cases described in the PS document. described in the PS document.
2.2. Timing 2.2. Timing
Nodes can perform appropriate address selection when they select Nodes can perform appropriate address selection when they select
addresses. addresses.
If nodes need to have address-selection information to perform If nodes need to have address-selection information to perform
appropriate address selection, then the mechanism has to provide a appropriate address selection, then the mechanism has to provide a
function for nodes to obtain the necessary information beforehand. function for nodes to obtain the necessary information beforehand.
The mechanism should not degrade usability. The mechanism should not The mechanism should not degrade usability. The mechanism should not
enforce long address-selection processing time upon users. enforce long address-selection processing time upon users.
Therefore, forcing every consumer user to manipulate address Therefore, forcing every consumer user to manipulate the address-
selection policy table is usually not an acceptable solution. So, in selection policy table is usually not an acceptable solution. So, in
this case, some kind of autoconfiguration mechanism is desirable. this case, some kind of autoconfiguration mechanism is desirable.
2.3. Dynamic Behavior Update 2.3. Dynamic Behavior Update
The address-selection behavior of nodes can be dynamically updated. The address-selection behavior of nodes can be dynamically updated.
When the network structure changes and the address-selection behavior When the network structure changes and the address-selection behavior
has to be changed accordingly, a network administrator can modify the has to be changed accordingly, a network administrator can modify the
address-selection behavior of nodes. address-selection behavior of nodes.
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2.6. Multiple Interface 2.6. Multiple Interface
The mechanism can support those nodes equipped with multiple The mechanism can support those nodes equipped with multiple
interfaces. The mechanism has to assume that nodes have multiple interfaces. The mechanism has to assume that nodes have multiple
interfaces and makes address selection of those nodes work interfaces and makes address selection of those nodes work
appropriately. appropriately.
2.7. Central Control 2.7. Central Control
The address selection behavior of nodes can be centrally controlled. The address-selection behavior of nodes can be centrally controlled.
A site administrator or a service provider could determine or could A site administrator or a service provider could determine or could
have effect on the address-selection behavior at their users' hosts. have an effect on the address-selection behavior at their users'
hosts.
2.8. Next-hop Selection 2.8. Next-Hop Selection
The mechanism can control next-hop-selection behavior at hosts or The mechanism can control next-hop-selection behavior at hosts or
cooperate with other routing mechanisms, such as routing protocols cooperate with other routing mechanisms, such as routing protocols
and RFC 4191 [RFC4191]. If the address-selection mechanism is used and RFC 4191 [RFC4191]. If the address-selection mechanism is used
with a routing mechanism, the two mechanisms have to be able to work with a routing mechanism, the two mechanisms have to be able to work
synchronously. synchronously.
2.9. Compatibility with RFC 3493 2.9. Compatibility with RFC 3493
The mechanism can allow an application that uses the basic socket The mechanism can allow an application that uses the basic socket
interface defined in RFC 3493 [RFC3493] to work correctly. That is, interface defined in RFC 3493 [RFC3493] to work correctly. That is,
with the basic socket interface the application can select with the basic socket interface the application can select
appropriate source and destination addresses and can communicate with appropriate source and destination addresses and can communicate with
the destination host. This requirement does not necessarily mean the destination host. This requirement does not necessarily mean
that OS protocol stack and socket libraries should not be changed. that OS protocol stack and socket libraries should not be changed.
2.10. Compatibility and Interoperability with RFC 3484 2.10. Compatibility and Interoperability with RFC 3484
The mechanism is compatible with RFC 3484. Now that RFC 3484 is The mechanism is compatible with RFC 3484. Now that RFC 3484 is
widely implemented, it may be most preferrable that a new address widely implemented, it is preferable that a new address selection
selection mechanism does not conflict with the address selection mechanism does not conflict with the address selection mechanisms
mechanisms defined in RFC 3484. defined in RFC 3484.
If the solution mechanism changes or replaces the address selection If the solution mechanism changes or replaces the address-selection
mechanism defined in RFC 3484, interoperability has to be retained. mechanism defined in RFC 3484, interoperability has to be retained.
That is, a host with the new solution mechanism and a host with the That is, a host with the new solution mechanism and a host with the
mechanism of RFC 3484 have to be interoperable. mechanism of RFC 3484 have to be interoperable.
2.11. Security 2.11. Security
The mechanism works without any security problems. Possible security The mechanism works without any security problems. Possible security
threats are described in Security Considerations section of this threats are described in the Security Considerations section of this
document. document.
3. Security Considerations 3. Security Considerations
3.1. List of threats introduced by new address-selection mechanism 3.1. List of Threats Introduced by New Address-Selection Mechanism
There will be some security incidents when combining these There will be some security incidents when combining the requirements
requirements described in Section 2 into a protocol. In particular, described in Section 2 into a protocol. In particular, there are 3
there are 3 types of threats, "Leakage", "Hijacking", and "Denial of types of threats: leakage, hijacking, and denial of service.
Services".
1. Tapping from malicious nodes to collect the network policy 1. Leakage: Malicious nodes may tap to collect the network policy
information and leak them to unauthorized parties. information and leak it to unauthorized parties.
2. Hijacking of nodes made possible by malicious injection of
illegitimate policy information: RFC 3484 defines both of source 2. Hijacking: Nodes may be hijacked by malicious injection of
illegitimate policy information. RFC 3484 defines both a source
and destination selection algorithm. An attacker able to inject and destination selection algorithm. An attacker able to inject
malicious policy information could redirect packets sent by a malicious policy information could redirect packets sent by a
victim node to an intentionally chosen server that would scan the victim node to an intentionally chosen server that would scan the
victim node activities to find out exploit code. Once exploit victim node activities to find vulnerable code. Once vulnerable
code is found the attacker can take control of the victim node. code is found, the attacker can take control of the victim node.
3. Denial of Service Attack on the ability of nodes to communicate
in the absence of the address selection policy: An attacker could
launch a flooding attack on the controller to prevent it to
deliver the address selection policy information to nodes, thus
preventing these nodes to appropriately communicate in the
absence of that information.
3.2. List of recommendations in which security mechanism should be 3. Denial of Service: This is an attack on the ability of nodes to
applied communicate in the absence of the address-selection policy. An
attacker could launch a flooding attack on the controller to
prevent it from delivering the address selection policy
information to nodes, thus preventing those nodes from
appropriately communicating.
The source address selection protocol should be afforded security 3.2. List of Recommendations in Which Security Mechanism Should Be
services listed below. It is preferable that these security services Applied
are afforded via use of existing protocols (e.g., IPsec).
The address selection mechanism should be afforded security services
listed below. It is preferable that these security services are
afforded via use of existing protocols (e.g., IPsec).
1. Integrity of the network policy information itself and the 1. Integrity of the network policy information itself and the
messages exchanged in the protocol. This is a countermeasure messages exchanged in the protocol. This is a countermeasure
against "Leakage", "Hijacking", and "Denial of Services". against leakage, hijacking, and denial of service.
2. Authentication and authorization of parties involved in the
protocol. This is a countermeasure against "Leakage" and
"Hijacking".
4. IANA Considerations
This document has no actions for IANA.
5. References
5.1. Normative References 2. Authentication and authorization of parties involved in the
protocol. This is a countermeasure against Leakage and
Hijacking.
[I-D.ietf-v6ops-addr-select-ps] 4. Normative References
Matsumoto, A., Fujisaki, T., Hiromi, R., and K. Kanayama,
"Problem Statement of Default Address Selection in Multi-
prefix Environment: Operational Issues of RFC3484 Default
Rules", draft-ietf-v6ops-addr-select-ps-05 (work in
progress), April 2008.
[RFC3484] Draves, R., "Default Address Selection for Internet [RFC3484] Draves, R., "Default Address Selection for Internet
Protocol version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 3484, February 2003. Protocol version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 3484, February 2003.
[RFC3493] Gilligan, R., Thomson, S., Bound, J., McCann, J., and W. [RFC3493] Gilligan, R., Thomson, S., Bound, J., McCann, J., and W.
Stevens, "Basic Socket Interface Extensions for IPv6", Stevens, "Basic Socket Interface Extensions for IPv6", RFC
RFC 3493, February 2003. 3493, February 2003.
[RFC4191] Draves, R. and D. Thaler, "Default Router Preferences and [RFC4191] Draves, R. and D. Thaler, "Default Router Preferences and
More-Specific Routes", RFC 4191, November 2005. More-Specific Routes", RFC 4191, November 2005.
5.2. Informative References [RFC5220] Matsumoto, A., Fujisaki, T., Hiromi, R., and K. Kanayama,
"Problem Statement for Default Address Selection in
Appendix A. Appendix. Revision History Multi-Prefix Environments: Operational Issues of RFC 3484
Default Rules", RFC 5220, July 2008.
01:
Other than policy table distribution approach, the solution
section included several solutions discussed at 67th IETF meeting.
02:
The description and evaluation of solution approaches were
separated into a new document called
draft-arifumi-v6ops-addr-select-sol-00.
03:
Security Considerations section was rewritten according to
comments from SECDIR.
04:
A new requirement item "Compatibility with RFC 3493" was added,
which reflected a comment from Remi Denis-Courmont at the v6ops
mailing list.
05:
A new requirement item "Security" was added. Security
Considerations section was rewritten according to comments from
SECDIR.
06:
A new requirement item "Compatibility and Interoperability with
RFC 3484" was added in response to comments from Tim Polk.
07:
A couple of textual and typographical changes were made in
response to comments from Alfred Hoenes.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Arifumi Matsumoto Arifumi Matsumoto
NTT PF Lab NTT PF Lab
Midori-Cho 3-9-11 Midori-Cho 3-9-11
Musashino-shi, Tokyo 180-8585 Musashino-shi, Tokyo 180-8585
Japan Japan
Phone: +81 422 59 3334 Phone: +81 422 59 3334
Email: arifumi@nttv6.net EMail: arifumi@nttv6.net
Tomohiro Fujisaki Tomohiro Fujisaki
NTT PF Lab NTT PF Lab
Midori-Cho 3-9-11 Midori-Cho 3-9-11
Musashino-shi, Tokyo 180-8585 Musashino-shi, Tokyo 180-8585
Japan Japan
Phone: +81 422 59 7351 Phone: +81 422 59 7351
Email: fujisaki@nttv6.net EMail: fujisaki@nttv6.net
Ruri Hiromi Ruri Hiromi
Intec Netcore, Inc. Intec Netcore, Inc.
Shinsuna 1-3-3 Shinsuna 1-3-3
Koto-ku, Tokyo 136-0075 Koto-ku, Tokyo 136-0075
Japan Japan
Phone: +81 3 5665 5069 Phone: +81 3 5665 5069
Email: hiromi@inetcore.com EMail: hiromi@inetcore.com
Ken-ichi Kanayama Ken-ichi Kanayama
Intec Netcore, Inc. INTEC Systems Institute, Inc.
Shinsuna 1-3-3 Shimoshin-machi 5-33
Koto-ku, Tokyo 136-0075 Toyama-shi, Toyama 930-0804
Japan Japan
Phone: +81 3 5665 5069 Phone: +81 76 444 8088
Email: kanayama_kenichi@intec-si.co.jp EMail: kanayama_kenichi@intec-si.co.jp
Full Copyright Statement Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008). Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).
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retain all their rights. retain all their rights.
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