--- 1/draft-ietf-rtcweb-stun-consent-freshness-12.txt	2015-05-13 20:15:00.360139770 -0700
+++ 2/draft-ietf-rtcweb-stun-consent-freshness-13.txt	2015-05-13 20:15:00.380140253 -0700
@@ -1,23 +1,23 @@
 
 RTCWEB                                                        M. Perumal
 Internet-Draft                                                  Ericsson
 Intended status: Standards Track                                 D. Wing
-Expires: November 5, 2015                                R. Ravindranath
+Expires: November 14, 2015                               R. Ravindranath
                                                                 T. Reddy
                                                            Cisco Systems
                                                               M. Thomson
                                                                  Mozilla
-                                                             May 4, 2015
+                                                            May 13, 2015
 
                     STUN Usage for Consent Freshness
-              draft-ietf-rtcweb-stun-consent-freshness-12
+              draft-ietf-rtcweb-stun-consent-freshness-13
 
 Abstract
 
    To prevent sending excessive traffic to an endpoint, periodic consent
    needs to be obtained from that remote endpoint.
 
    This document describes a consent mechanism using a new Session
    Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) usage.
 
 Status of This Memo
@@ -28,21 +28,21 @@
    Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
    Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
    working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
    Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
 
    Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
    and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
    time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
    material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
 
-   This Internet-Draft will expire on November 5, 2015.
+   This Internet-Draft will expire on November 14, 2015.
 
 Copyright Notice
 
    Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
    document authors.  All rights reserved.
 
    This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
    Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
    (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
    publication of this document.  Please review these documents
@@ -196,25 +196,26 @@
 
    While TCP affords some protection from off-path attackers ([RFC5961],
    [RFC4953]), there is still a risk an attacker could cause a TCP
    sender to send forever by spoofing ACKs.  To prevent such an attack,
    consent checks MUST be performed over all transport connections,
    including TCP.  In this way, an off-path attacker spoofing TCP
    segments can not cause a TCP sender to send once the consent timer
    expires (30 seconds).
 
    An endpoint that is not sending any application data does not need to
-   maintain consent.  However, failure to send could cause any NAT or
-   firewall mappings for the flow to expire.  Furthermore, having one
-   peer unable to send is detrimental to many protocols.  Absent better
-   information about the network, an endpoint SHOULD maintain consent if
-   there is any possibility that a flow might be needed again.
+   maintain consent.  However, not sending any traffic could cause NAT
+   or firewall mappings to expire.  Furthermore, having one peer unable
+   to send is detrimental to many protocols.  Absent better information
+   about the network, if an endpoint needs to ensure its NAT or firewall
+   mappings do not expire, it can be done using keepalive or other
+   techniques (see Section 10 of [RFC5245] and see [RFC6263]).
 
    After consent is lost for any reason, the same ICE credentials MUST
    NOT be used on the affected 5-tuple again.  That means that a new
    session, or an ICE restart, is needed to obtain consent to send.
 
 4.2.  Immediate Revocation of Consent
 
    In some cases it is useful to signal that consent is terminated
    rather than relying on a timeout.