draft-ietf-rtcweb-stun-consent-freshness-12.txt		draft-ietf-rtcweb-stun-consent-freshness-13.txt
	RTCWEB M. Perumal		RTCWEB M. Perumal
	Internet-Draft Ericsson		Internet-Draft Ericsson
	Intended status: Standards Track D. Wing		Intended status: Standards Track D. Wing
	Expires: November 5, 2015 R. Ravindranath		Expires: November 14, 2015 R. Ravindranath
	T. Reddy		T. Reddy
	Cisco Systems		Cisco Systems
	M. Thomson		M. Thomson
	Mozilla		Mozilla
	May 4, 2015		May 13, 2015
	STUN Usage for Consent Freshness		STUN Usage for Consent Freshness
	draft-ietf-rtcweb-stun-consent-freshness-12		draft-ietf-rtcweb-stun-consent-freshness-13
	Abstract		Abstract
	To prevent sending excessive traffic to an endpoint, periodic consent		To prevent sending excessive traffic to an endpoint, periodic consent
	needs to be obtained from that remote endpoint.		needs to be obtained from that remote endpoint.
	This document describes a consent mechanism using a new Session		This document describes a consent mechanism using a new Session
	Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) usage.		Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) usage.
	Status of This Memo		Status of This Memo
	skipping to change at page 1, line 39		skipping to change at page 1, line 39
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on November 5, 2015.		This Internet-Draft will expire on November 14, 2015.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	skipping to change at page 5, line 19		skipping to change at page 5, line 19
	While TCP affords some protection from off-path attackers ([RFC5961],		While TCP affords some protection from off-path attackers ([RFC5961],
	[RFC4953]), there is still a risk an attacker could cause a TCP		[RFC4953]), there is still a risk an attacker could cause a TCP
	sender to send forever by spoofing ACKs. To prevent such an attack,		sender to send forever by spoofing ACKs. To prevent such an attack,
	consent checks MUST be performed over all transport connections,		consent checks MUST be performed over all transport connections,
	including TCP. In this way, an off-path attacker spoofing TCP		including TCP. In this way, an off-path attacker spoofing TCP
	segments can not cause a TCP sender to send once the consent timer		segments can not cause a TCP sender to send once the consent timer
	expires (30 seconds).		expires (30 seconds).
	An endpoint that is not sending any application data does not need to		An endpoint that is not sending any application data does not need to
	maintain consent. However, failure to send could cause any NAT or		maintain consent. However, not sending any traffic could cause NAT
	firewall mappings for the flow to expire. Furthermore, having one		or firewall mappings to expire. Furthermore, having one peer unable
	peer unable to send is detrimental to many protocols. Absent better		to send is detrimental to many protocols. Absent better information
	information about the network, an endpoint SHOULD maintain consent if		about the network, if an endpoint needs to ensure its NAT or firewall
	there is any possibility that a flow might be needed again.		mappings do not expire, it can be done using keepalive or other
			techniques (see Section 10 of [RFC5245] and see [RFC6263]).
	After consent is lost for any reason, the same ICE credentials MUST		After consent is lost for any reason, the same ICE credentials MUST
	NOT be used on the affected 5-tuple again. That means that a new		NOT be used on the affected 5-tuple again. That means that a new
	session, or an ICE restart, is needed to obtain consent to send.		session, or an ICE restart, is needed to obtain consent to send.
	4.2. Immediate Revocation of Consent		4.2. Immediate Revocation of Consent
	In some cases it is useful to signal that consent is terminated		In some cases it is useful to signal that consent is terminated
	rather than relying on a timeout.		rather than relying on a timeout.
End of changes. 5 change blocks.
	9 lines changed or deleted		10 lines changed or added
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