draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-introspection-response-07.txt   draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-introspection-response-08.txt 
Open Authentication Protocol T. Lodderstedt, Ed. Open Authentication Protocol T. Lodderstedt, Ed.
Internet-Draft yes.com AG Internet-Draft yes.com AG
Intended status: Standards Track V. Dzhuvinov Intended status: Standards Track V. Dzhuvinov
Expires: March 1, 2020 Connect2id Ltd. Expires: March 22, 2020 Connect2id Ltd.
Aug 29, 2019 Sep 19, 2019
JWT Response for OAuth Token Introspection JWT Response for OAuth Token Introspection
draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-introspection-response-07 draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-introspection-response-08
Abstract Abstract
This draft proposes an additional JSON Web Token (JWT) based response This specification proposes an additional JSON Web Token (JWT)
for OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection. secured response for OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements Notation and Conventions . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Requirements Notation and Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Requesting a JWT Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Resource server management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. JWT Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. Requesting a JWT Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Client Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5. JWT Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Authorization Server Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6. Client Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7. Authorization Server Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.1. Cross-JWT Confusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.2. Token Data Leakage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8.1. Cross-JWT Confusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.3. Keeping Token Data Confidential from OAuth Clients . . . 7 8.2. Token Data Leakage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.4. Logging and Audit of Introspection Activity . . . . . . . 7 8.3. Keeping Token Data Confidential from OAuth Clients . . . 10
6.5. Data Minimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8.4. Logging and Audit of Introspection Activity . . . . . . . 10
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.1. OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata Registration . 8 11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.1.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 11.1. OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata Registration 11
8.2. OAuth Authorization Server Metadata Registration . . . . 8 11.1.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.2.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 11.2. OAuth Authorization Server Metadata Registration . . . . 12
8.3. OAuth Token Introspection Response . . . . . . . . . . . 9 11.2.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.3.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 11.3. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 11.3.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Appendix A. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix A. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection [RFC7662] specifies a method for a OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection [RFC7662] specifies a method for a
protected resource to query an OAuth 2.0 authorization server to protected resource to query an OAuth 2.0 authorization server to
determine the state of an access token and obtain data associated determine the state of an access token and obtain data associated
with the access token. This allows deployments to implement with the access token. This enables deployments to implement opaque
identifier-based access tokens in an interoperable way. access tokens in an interoperable way.
The introspection response, as specified in OAuth 2.0 Token The introspection response, as specified in OAuth 2.0 Token
Introspection [RFC7662], is a plain JSON object. However, there are Introspection [RFC7662], is a plain JSON object. However, there are
use cases where the resource server requires stronger assurance that use cases where the resource server requires stronger assurance that
the authorization server issued the access token, including cases the authorization server issued the token introspection response for
where the authorization server assumes liability for the token's an access token, including cases where the authorization server
content. An example is a resource server using verified person data assumes liability for the content of the token introspection
response. An example is a resource server using verified person data
to create certificates, which in turn are used to create qualified to create certificates, which in turn are used to create qualified
electronic signatures. electronic signatures.
In such use cases it may be useful or even required to return a In such use cases it may be useful or even required to return a
signed JWT as the introspection response. This specification extends signed JWT [RFC7519] as the introspection response. This
the token introspection endpoint with the capability to return specification extends the token introspection endpoint with the
responses as JWTs. capability to return responses as JWTs.
1.1. Requirements Notation and Conventions 2. Requirements Notation and Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
2. Requesting a JWT Response 3. Resource server management
The authorization server (AS) and the resource server (RS) maintain a
strong two-way trust relationship. The resource server relies on the
authorization server to obtain authorization, user and other data as
input to its access control decisions and service delivery. The
authorization server relies on the resource server to handle the
provided data appropriately.
In the context of this specification, the Token Introspection
Endpoint is used to convey such security data and potentially also
privacy sensitive data related to an access token.
In order to process the introspection requests in a secure and
privacy-preserving manner, the authorization server MUST be able to
identify, authenticate and authorize resource servers.
To support encrypted token introspection response JWTs, the
authorization server MUST also be provided with the respective
resource server encryption keys and algorithms.
The authorization server MUST be able to determine whether an RS is
the audience for a particular access token and what data it is
entitled to receive, otherwise the RS is not authorized to obtain
data for the access token. The AS has the discretion how to fulfil
this requirement. The AS could, for example, maintain a mapping
between scopes values and resource servers.
The requirements given above imply that the authorization server
maintains credentials and other configuration data for each RS.
One way is by utilizing dynamic client registration [RFC7591] and
treating every RS as an OAuth client. In this case, the
authorization server is assumed to at least maintain "client_id" and
"token_endpoint_auth_method" with complementary authentication method
metadata, such as "jwks" or "client_secret". In cases where the AS
needs to acquire consent to transmit data to a RS, the following
client metadata fields are recommended: "client_name", "client_uri",
"contacts", "tos_uri", "policy_uri".
The AS MUST restrict the use of client credentials by a RS to the
calls it requires, e.g. the AS MAY restrict such a client to call the
token introspection endpoint only. How the AS implements this
restriction is beyond the scope of this specification.
This specification further introduces client metadata to manage the
configuration options required to sign and encrypt token
introspection response JWTs.
4. Requesting a JWT Response
A resource server requests to receive a JWT introspection response by A resource server requests to receive a JWT introspection response by
including an Accept header with content type "application/jwt" in the including an Accept header with content type "application/jwt" in the
introspection request. introspection request.
The following is a non-normative example request: Authentication at the token introspection endpoint can utilize client
authentication methods or a separate access token issued to the
resource server. Whether a resource server is required to
authenticate is determined by the respective RS-specific policy at
the AS.
The following is a non-normative example request using client
authentication:
POST /introspect HTTP/1.1 POST /introspect HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com Host: server.example.com
Accept: application/jwt Accept: application/jwt
Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
token=2YotnFZFEjr1zCsicMWpAA token=2YotnFZFEjr1zCsicMWpAA
3. JWT Response If required by its policy, the authorization server MUST authenticate
the caller and check its authorization to use the token introspection
endpoint.
The introspection endpoint responds with a JWT, setting the Content- 5. JWT Response
Type header to "application/jwt".
This JWT MUST contain the claims "iss" and "aud" in order to prevent The introspection endpoint responds with a JWT, setting the "Content-
misuse of the JWT as ID or access token (see Section 6.1). Type" header to "application/jwt". This JWT is a cryptographically
protected representation of the token introspection response as
specified in [RFC7662].
This JWT MAY furthermore contain all claims defined in the "OAuth Note: Although the JWT format is widely used as an access token
Token Introspection Response" registry established by [RFC7662]. format, the JWT returned in the introspection response is not an
alternative representation of the introspected access token and is
not intended to be used as an access token.
JWT metadata values, such as "iat", might differ between the token
introspection response in JWT format and the introspected access
token (see below).
This specification registers the "application/token-
introspection+jwt" media type, which is used as value of the "typ"
header parameter of the JWT to indicate that the payload is a token
introspection response.
If the access token is invalid, expired, has been revoked, or is not
intended to be consumed by the calling resource server (audience),
the authorization server MUST set the value of the response claim
"active" to "false". Otherwise, this claim is set to "true".
If the access token is considered active, it MUST contain the claims
"iss" and "aud" in order to prevent misuse of the JWT as an ID or
access token (see Section 8.1).
The "iss" MUST be set to the issuer URL of the AS.
The value of the "aud" claims MUST identify the resource server
receiving the token introspection response.
If the AS adds the following claims to the token introspection
response their meaning is defined as follows:
iat The "iat" claim indicates when the introspection response was
issued by the AS.
exp The "exp" claim indicates when the access token passed in the
introspection request will expire.
jti The "jti" claim is a unique identifier for the access token
passed in the introspection request. This identifier MUST be
stable for all introspection calls for a given access token.
Further content of the introspection response is determined by the
RS-specific policy at the AS.
If possible, the AS MUST narrow down the "scope" value to the scopes
relevant to the particular RS.
The JWT formatted introspection response MAY contain further claims,
especially the claims defined in the "OAuth Token Introspection
Response" registry established by [RFC7662] and the "JSON Web Token
Claims" registry established by [RFC7519].
This includes claims from the "JSON Web Token Claims" registry that
are commonly used in [OpenID.Core] and can be applied to the resource
owner. These claims can serve to identify the resource owner as a
natural person or to provide a required contact detail, such as an
e-Mail address or phone number. When transmitting such claims the AS
acts as an identity provider in regard to the RS.
The AS determines based on the RS-specific policy what claims about
the resource owner to return in the token introspection response.
The AS MUST ensure that the release of any privacy-sensitive data is
legally based.
The following is a non-normative example response (with line breaks The following is a non-normative example response (with line breaks
for display purposes only): for display purposes only):
HTTP/1.1 200 OK HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/jwt Content-Type: application/jwt
eyJraWQiOiIxIiwiYWxnIjoiUlMyNTYifQ.eyJzdWIiOiJaNU8zdXBQQzg4UXJBa eyJ0eXAiOiJ0b2tlbi1pbnRyb3NwZWN0aW9uK2p3dCIsImFsZyI6IlJTMjU2In0.eyJ
ngwMGRpcyIsImF1ZCI6Imh0dHBzOlwvXC9wcm90ZWN0ZWQuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXRcL pc3MiOiJodHRwczovL3NlcnZlci5leGFtcGxlLmNvbS8iLCJhdWQiOiJzNkJoZFJrcX
3Jlc291cmNlIiwiZXh0ZW5zaW9uX2ZpZWxkIjoidHdlbnR5LXNldmVuIiwic2Nvc QzIiwianRpIjoidDFGb0NDYVpkNFh2NE9SSlVXVlVlVFpmc0toVzMwQ1FDcldERGp3W
GUiOiJyZWFkIHdyaXRlIGRvbHBoaW4iLCJpc3MiOiJodHRwczpcL1wvc2VydmVyL Hk2dyIsImFjdGl2ZSI6dHJ1ZSwic2NvcGUiOiJyZWFkIHdyaXRlIGRvbHBoaW4iLCJl
mV4YW1wbGUuY29tXC8iLCJhY3RpdmUiOnRydWUsImV4cCI6MTQxOTM1NjIzOCwia eHAiOjE1MTQ3OTc5NDIwMDAsImlhdCI6MTUxNDc5NzgyMjAwMCwiY2xpZW50X2lkIjo
WF0IjoxNDE5MzUwMjM4LCJjbGllbnRfaWQiOiJsMjM4ajMyM2RzLTIzaWo0Iiwid iczZCaGRSa3F0MyIsInN1YiI6Ilo1TzN1cFBDODhRckFqeDAwZGlzIiwiZ2l2ZW5fbm
XNlcm5hbWUiOiJqZG9lIn0.HEQHf05vqVvWVnWuEjbzUnPz6JDQVR69QkxgzBNq5 FtZSI6IkpvaG4iLCJmYW1pbHlfbmFtZSI6IkRvZSIsImJpcnRoZGF0ZSI6IjE5ODItM
kk-sK54ieg1STazXGsdFAT8nUhiiV1f_Z4HOKNnBs8TLKaFXokhA0MqNBOYI--2u DItMDEifQ.mnGNVJJwMaMR-drVHIyjOd7S5mScHT5tYC_sLdeaS9C4pkmiOgwHNGah9
nVHDqI_RPmC3p0NmP02Xmv4hzxFmTmpgjSy3vpKQDihOjhwNBh7G81JNaJqjJQTR w_15kbotjDckotJNHpNTQCcE5nRC29L_jz5hSCNTMmK62fJdEcq0QVuCL_roeHzc-s1
v_1dHUPJotQjMK3k8_5FyiO2p64Y2VyxyQn1VWVlgOHlJwhj6BaGHk4Qf5F8DHQZ bjU2V2Qme6_2468zqcuhf1fhcieWxx9bDwFFwk3su0qdoF9RBa0HobWzy1ENU6MjiKH
1WCPg2p_-hwfINfXh1_buSjxyDRF4oe9pKy6ZB3ejh9qIMm-WrwltuU1uWMXxN6e vmrnd5PkJenn1rJEt0EQTUuVE0vh2tQGhxbaZkQ34mLLgES5TCuBK7ALDXhT4aGCzxg
S6tUtpKo8UCHBwLWCHmJN7KU6ZojmaISspdS23lELAlyw 3jLprs_jYTjCq2kugptseKaxsvti0TxOxmxLPcuy5xRxHDUzV2h9_VWVJRgM8y0vhLN
v9XKDe4EQqaIFLA_YD4TBeyPV7Sm4xMQ-2OsSmAz0E2BY_b_s0WrFN2K8tspQhj2mnG
v7Zz8O3zeE2gC59JR56aU_SNspGPbt8GvTwuL5ZZTCmiWKUzQ0ev4zVthUczQmK53dx
Zl6ZxBfIRPV5k1GTPyEPbWehizbJT4JBSLlk-l8JvJcfL2USLtJgMLH1D01fww0IqN1
ofHeHFUmZWB_LR7kGaJ8Kx_a9z4CaaVesW8jzgSmwA8K_pv9yJqqjnUhsh51c49OAgn
cqwAahGrUhrN0dIBrd6sRXU3AiRpaah0MMNcjR2UJbEZKwnMyHTkBQAeZAe9vO9pKV8
JOd0ziYBpAbEpYGE4p3wog4
The example response contains the following JSON document: The example response header contains the following JSON document:
{ {
"sub": "Z5O3upPC88QrAjx00dis", "typ": "token-introspection+jwt",
"aud": "https://protected.example.net/resource", "alg": "RS256"
"scope": "read write dolphin", }
"iss": "https://server.example.com/", The example response payload contains the following JSON document:
"active": true,
"exp": 1419356238, {
"iat": 1419350238, "iss":"https://server.example.com/",
"client_id": "l238j323ds-23ij4", "aud":"s6BhdRkqt3",
"given_name": "John", "jti": "t1FoCCaZd4Xv4ORJUWVUeTZfsKhW30CQCrWDDjwXy6w",
"family_name":"Doe", "active":true,
"birthdate":"1982-02-01" "scope":"read write dolphin",
"exp":1514797942000,
"iat":1514797822000,
"client_id":"s6BhdRkqt3",
"sub":"Z5O3upPC88QrAjx00dis",
"given_name":"John",
"family_name":"Doe",
"birthdate":"1982-02-01"
} }
Depending on the specific resource server policy the JWT is either Depending on the specific resource server policy the JWT is either
signed, or signed and encrypted. If the JWT is signed and encrypted signed, or signed and encrypted. If the JWT is signed and encrypted
it MUST be a Nested JWT, as defined in JWT [RFC7519]. it MUST be a Nested JWT, as defined in JWT [RFC7519].
Note: If the resource server policy requires a signed and encrypted Note: If the resource server policy requires a signed and encrypted
response and the authorization server receives an unauthenticated response and the authorization server receives an unauthenticated
request containing an Accept header with content type other than request containing an Accept header with content type other than
"application/jwt", it MUST refuse to serve the request and return an "application/jwt", it MUST refuse to serve the request and return an
HTTP status code 400. This is done to prevent downgrading attacks to HTTP status code 400. This is done to prevent downgrading attacks to
obtain token data intended for release to legitimate recipients only obtain token data intended for release to legitimate recipients only
(see Section 6.2). (see Section 8.2).
4. Client Metadata 6. Client Metadata
The authorization server determines what algorithm to employ to The authorization server determines what algorithm to employ to
secure the JWT for a particular introspection response. This secure the JWT for a particular introspection response. This
decision can be based on registered metadata parameters for the decision can be based on registered metadata parameters for the
resource server, supplied via dynamic client registration with the resource server, supplied via dynamic client registration [RFC7591]
resource server posing as the client, as defined by this draft. with the resource server acting as a client, as specified below.
The parameter names follow the pattern established by OpenID Connect The parameter names follow the pattern established by OpenID Connect
Dynamic Client Registration [OpenID.Registration] for configuring Dynamic Client Registration [OpenID.Registration] for configuring
signing and encryption algorithms for JWT responses at the UserInfo signing and encryption algorithms for JWT responses at the UserInfo
endpoint. endpoint.
The following client metadata parameters are introduced by this The following client metadata parameters are introduced by this
specification: specification:
introspection_signed_response_alg OPTIONAL. JWS [RFC7515] algorithm introspection_signed_response_alg OPTIONAL. JWS [RFC7515] algorithm
("alg" value) as defined in JWA [RFC7518] for signing ("alg" value) as defined in JWA [RFC7518] for signing
introspection responses. If this is specified, the response introspection responses. If this is specified, the response
will be signed using JWS and the configured algorithm. The will be signed using JWS and the configured algorithm. The
default, if omitted, is "RS256". default, if omitted, is "RS256".
introspection_encrypted_response_alg OPTIONAL. JWE [RFC7516] introspection_encrypted_response_alg OPTIONAL. JWE [RFC7516]
algorithm ("alg" value) as defined in JWA [RFC7518] for algorithm ("alg" value) as defined in JWA [RFC7518] for
encrypting introspection responses. If this is specified, content key encryption. If this is specified, the response
the response will be encrypted using JWE and the configured will be encrypted using JWE and the configured content
algorithm. The default, if omitted, is that no encryption is encryption algorithm
performed. If both signing and encryption are requested, the ("introspection_encrypted_response_enc"). The default, if
response will be signed then encrypted, with the result being omitted, is that no encryption is performed. If both signing
a Nested JWT, as defined in JWT [RFC7519]. and encryption are requested, the response will be signed
then encrypted, with the result being a Nested JWT, as
defined in JWT [RFC7519].
introspection_encrypted_response_enc OPTIONAL. JWE [RFC7516] introspection_encrypted_response_enc OPTIONAL. JWE [RFC7516]
algorithm ("enc" value) as defined in JWA [RFC7518] for algorithm ("enc" value) as defined in JWA [RFC7518] for
authenticated encryption of introspection responses. The content encryption of introspection responses. The default,
default, if omitted, is "A128CBC-HS256". Note: This if omitted, is "A128CBC-HS256". Note: This parameter MUST
parameter MUST NOT be specified without setting NOT be specified without setting
"introspection_encrypted_response_alg". "introspection_encrypted_response_alg".
Resource servers may register their public encryption keys using the Resource servers may register their public encryption keys using the
"jwks_uri" or "jwks" metadata parameters. "jwks_uri" or "jwks" metadata parameters.
5. Authorization Server Metadata 7. Authorization Server Metadata
Authorization servers SHOULD publish the supported algorithms for Authorization servers SHOULD publish the supported algorithms for
signing and encrypting the JWT of an introspection response by signing and encrypting the JWT of an introspection response by
utilizing OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata [RFC8414] utilizing OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata [RFC8414]
parameters. parameters. Resource servers use this data to parametrize their
client registration requests.
The following parameters are introduced by this specification: The following parameters are introduced by this specification:
introspection_signing_alg_values_supported OPTIONAL. JSON array introspection_signing_alg_values_supported OPTIONAL. JSON array
containing a list of the JWS [RFC7515] signing algorithms containing a list of the JWS [RFC7515] signing algorithms
("alg" values) as defined in JWA [RFC7518] supported by the ("alg" values) as defined in JWA [RFC7518] supported by the
introspection endpoint to sign the response. introspection endpoint to sign the response.
introspection_encryption_alg_values_supported OPTIONAL. JSON array introspection_encryption_alg_values_supported OPTIONAL. JSON array
containing a list of the JWE [RFC7516] encryption algorithms containing a list of the JWE [RFC7516] encryption algorithms
("alg" values) as defined in JWA [RFC7518] supported by the ("alg" values) as defined in JWA [RFC7518] supported by the
introspection endpoint to encrypt the response. introspection endpoint to encrypt the content encryption key
for introspection responses (content key encryption).
introspection_encryption_enc_values_supported OPTIONAL. JSON array introspection_encryption_enc_values_supported OPTIONAL. JSON array
containing a list of the JWE [RFC7516] encryption algorithms containing a list of the JWE [RFC7516] encryption algorithms
("enc" values) as defined in JWA [RFC7518] supported by the ("enc" values) as defined in JWA [RFC7518] supported by the
introspection endpoint to encrypt the response. introspection endpoint to encrypt the response (content
encryption).
6. Security Considerations 8. Security Considerations
6.1. Cross-JWT Confusion 8.1. Cross-JWT Confusion
JWT introspection responses and OpenID Connect ID Tokens are Token introspection responses in JWT format, access tokens in JWT
syntactically similar. An attacker could therefore attempt to format, and OpenID Connect ID Tokens are syntactical similar.
impersonate an end-user at a OpenID Connect relying party by passing Attackers could try to utilize this fact and attempt to use a token
the JWT as an ID token. introspection response as access token when invoking a resource
server or as ID Token when logging into at a OpenID Connect RP.
Such an attack can be prevented like any other token substitution Any relying party processing the "typ" JWT header element should
attack. The authorization server MUST include the claims "iss" and detect the attack since token introspection responses in JWT format
"aud" in each JWT introspection response, with the "iss" value set to set this header to the value "token-introspection+jwt".
the authorization server's issuer URL and the "aud" value set to the Unfortunately, this is not a well established practice yet.
resource server's identifier. This allows a correctly implemented
OpenID Connect relying party to detect substitution by checking the
"iss" and "aud" claims as described in Section 3.1.3.7. of
[OpenID.Core]. Relying parties SHOULD also use and check the "nonce"
parameter and claim to prevent token and code replay.
Resource servers utilizing JWTs to represent self-contained access As an alternative approach, such an attack can be prevented like any
tokens could be susceptible to replay attacks. Resource servers other token substitution attack by restricting the audience of the
should therefore apply proper counter measures against replay as JWT. As specified in Section 5, the authorization server includes
described in [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics], section 2.2. the claims "iss" and "aud" in each JWT introspection response, with
the "iss" value set to the authorization server's issuer URL and the
"aud" value set to the resource server's identifier. Any recipient
of an JWT MUST check these values in order to detect substitution
attacks.
OpenID Connect RPs are additionally expected to use and check the
"nonce" parameter and claim to prevent token and code replay.
Resource servers MUST additionally apply the countermeasures against
replay as described in [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics], section 3.2.
JWT Confusion and other attacks involving JWTs are discussed in JWT Confusion and other attacks involving JWTs are discussed in
[I-D.ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp]. [I-D.ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp].
6.2. Token Data Leakage 8.2. Token Data Leakage
The authorization server MUST use Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.2 The authorization server MUST use Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.2
(or higher) per [RFC7525] in order to prevent token data leakage. (or higher) per BCP 195 [RFC7525] in order to prevent token data
leakage.
To prevent introspection of leaked tokens and to present an To prevent introspection of leaked tokens and to present an
additional security layer against token guessing attacks the additional security layer against token guessing attacks the
authorization server may require all requests to the token authorization server MAY require all requests to the token
introspection endpoint to be authenticated. As an alternative or as introspection endpoint to be authenticated. As an alternative or as
an addition to the authentication, the intended recipients may be set an addition to the authentication, the intended recipients MAY be set
up for encrypted responses. up for encrypted responses.
In the latter case, confidentiality is ensured by the fact that only In the latter case, confidentiality is ensured by the fact that only
the legitimate recipient is able to decrypt the response. An the legitimate recipient is able to decrypt the response. An
attacker could try to circumvent this measure by requesting a plain attacker could try to circumvent this measure by requesting a plain
JSON response, using an Accept header with the content type set to, JSON response, using an Accept header with the content type set to,
for example, "application/json" instead of "application/jwt". To for example, "application/json" instead of "application/jwt". To
prevent this attack the authorization server MUST NOT serve requests prevent this attack the authorization server MUST NOT serve requests
with content type other than "application/jwt" if the resource server with a content type other than "application/jwt" if the resource
is set up to receive encrypted responses (see also Section 3). server is set up to receive encrypted responses (see also Section 5).
6.3. Keeping Token Data Confidential from OAuth Clients 8.3. Keeping Token Data Confidential from OAuth Clients
Authorization servers with a policy that requires token data to be Authorization servers with a policy that requires token data to be
kept confidential from OAuth clients must require all requests to the kept confidential from OAuth clients must require all requests to the
token introspection endpoint to be authenticated. As an alternative token introspection endpoint to be authenticated. As an alternative
or as an addition to the authentication, the intended recipients may or as an addition to the authentication, the intended recipients may
be set up for encrypted responses. be set up for encrypted responses.
6.4. Logging and Audit of Introspection Activity 8.4. Logging and Audit of Introspection Activity
Authorization servers with a policy that requires token introspection Authorization servers with a policy that requires token introspection
activity to be logged and audited must require all requests to the activity to be logged and audited must require all requests to the
token introspection endpoint to be authenticated. token introspection endpoint to be authenticated.
6.5. Data Minimization 9. Privacy Considerations
The authorisation server determines the token data a resource server The token introspection response can be used to transfer personal
is allowed to see based on the resource server's client_id and identifiable information from the AS to the RS. The AS MUST ensure a
suitable token data, e.g. the scope value. legal basis exists for the data transfer before any data is released
to a particular RS. The way the legal basis is established might
vary among jurisdictions and MUST consider the legal entities
involved.
7. Acknowledgements For example, the classical way to establish the legal basis is by
explicit user consent gathered from the resource owner by the AS
during the authorization flow.
It is also possible that the legal basis is established out of band,
e.g. in an explicit contract or by the client gathering the resource
owner's consent.
If the AS and the RS belong to the same legal entity (1st party
scenario), there is potentially no need for an explicit user consent
but the terms of service and policy of the respective service
provider MUST be enforced at all times.
In any case, the AS MUST ensure that the scope of the legal basis is
enforced throughout the whole process. The AS MUST retain the scope
of the legal basis with the access token, e.g. in the scope value,
and the AS MUST determine the data a resource server is allowed to
receive based on the resource server's identity and suitable token
data, e.g. the scope value.
10. Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Petteri Stenius, Neil Madden, Filip Skokan, We would like to thank Petteri Stenius, Neil Madden, Filip Skokan,
and Tony Nadalin for their valuable feedback. Tony Nadalin, and Remco Schaar for their valuable feedback.
8. IANA Considerations 11. IANA Considerations
8.1. OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata Registration 11.1. OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata Registration
This specification requests registration of the following client This specification requests registration of the following client
metadata definitions in the IANA "OAuth Dynamic Client Registration metadata definitions in the IANA "OAuth Dynamic Client Registration
Metadata" registry [IANA.OAuth.Parameters] established by [RFC7591]: Metadata" registry [IANA.OAuth.Parameters] established by [RFC7591]:
8.1.1. Registry Contents 11.1.1. Registry Contents
o Client Metadata Name: "introspection_signed_response_alg" o Client Metadata Name: "introspection_signed_response_alg"
o Client Metadata Description: String value indicating the client's o Client Metadata Description: String value indicating the client's
desired introspection response signing algorithm. desired introspection response signing algorithm.
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 4 of [[ this specification ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 6 of [[ this specification ]]
o Client Metadata Name: "introspection_encrypted_response_alg" o Client Metadata Name: "introspection_encrypted_response_alg"
o Client Metadata Description: String value specifying the desired o Client Metadata Description: String value specifying the desired
introspection response encryption algorithm (alg value). introspection response content key encryption algorithm (alg
value).
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 4 of [[ this specification ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 6 of [[ this specification ]]
o Client Metadata Name: "introspection_encrypted_response_enc" o Client Metadata Name: "introspection_encrypted_response_enc"
o Client Metadata Description: String value specifying the desired o Client Metadata Description: String value specifying the desired
introspection response encryption algorithm (enc value). introspection response content encryption algorithm (enc value).
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 4 of [[ this specification ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 6 of [[ this specification ]]
8.2. OAuth Authorization Server Metadata Registration 11.2. OAuth Authorization Server Metadata Registration
This specification requests registration of the following values in This specification requests registration of the following values in
the IANA "OAuth Authorization Server Metadata" registry the IANA "OAuth Authorization Server Metadata" registry
[IANA.OAuth.Parameters] established by [RFC8414]. [IANA.OAuth.Parameters] established by [RFC8414].
8.2.1. Registry Contents 11.2.1. Registry Contents
o Metadata Name: "introspection_signing_alg_values_supported" o Metadata Name: "introspection_signing_alg_values_supported"
o Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of algorithms o Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of algorithms
supported by the authorization server for introspection response supported by the authorization server for introspection response
signing. signing.
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 5 of [[ this specification ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 7 of [[ this specification ]]
o Metadata Name: "introspection_encryption_alg_values_supported" o Metadata Name: "introspection_encryption_alg_values_supported"
o Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of algorithms o Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of algorithms
supported by the authorization server for introspection response supported by the authorization server for introspection response
encryption (alg value). content key encryption (alg value).
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 5 of [[ this specification ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 7 of [[ this specification ]]
o Metadata Name: "introspection_encryption_enc_values_supported" o Metadata Name: "introspection_encryption_enc_values_supported"
o Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of algorithms o Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of algorithms
supported by the authorization server for introspection response supported by the authorization server for introspection response
encryption (enc value). content encryption (enc value).
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 5 of [[ this specification ]]
8.3. OAuth Token Introspection Response
This specification requests registration of the following claim
values as defined in [OpenID.Core], Section 5.1, in the IANA "OAuth
Token Introspection Response" registry. [IANA.OAuth.Parameters]
established by [RFC7662].
8.3.1. Registry Contents
o Name: "name"
o Description: End-User's full name in displayable form including
all name parts, possibly including titles and suffixes, ordered
according to the End-User's locale and preferences.
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s):[OpenID.Core], Section 5.1
o Name: "given_name"
o Description: Given name(s) or first name(s) of the End-User. Note
that in some cultures, people can have multiple given names; all
can be present, with the names being separated by space
characters.
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s):[OpenID.Core], Section 5.1
o Name: "family_name"
o Description: Surname(s) or last name(s) of the End-User. Note
that in some cultures, people can have multiple family names or no
family name; all can be present, with the names being separated by
space characters.
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s):[OpenID.Core], Section 5.1
o Name: "middle_name"
o Description: Middle name(s) of the End-User. Note that in some
cultures, people can have multiple middle names; all can be
present, with the names being separated by space characters. Also
note that in some cultures, middle names are not used.
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s):[OpenID.Core], Section 5.1
o Name: "nickname"
o Description: Casual name of the End-User that may or may not be
the same as the given_name. For instance, a nickname value of
Mike might be returned alongside a given_name value of Michael.
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s):[OpenID.Core], Section 5.1
o Name: "preferred_username"
o Description: Shorthand name by which the End-User wishes to be
referred to at the RP, such as janedoe or j.doe. This value MAY
be any valid JSON string including special characters such as @,
/, or whitespace.
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s):[OpenID.Core], Section 5.1
o Name: "profile"
o Description:URL of the End-User's profile page. The contents of
this Web page SHOULD be about the End-User.
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s):[OpenID.Core], Section 5.1
o Name: "picture"
o Description: URL of the End-User's profile picture. This URL MUST
refer to an image file (for example, a PNG, JPEG, or GIF image
file), rather than to a Web page containing an image. Note that
this URL SHOULD specifically reference a profile photo of the End-
User suitable for displaying when describing the End-User, rather
than an arbitrary photo taken by the End-User.
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s):[OpenID.Core], Section 5.1
o Name: "website"
o Description: URL of the End-User's Web page or blog. This Web
page SHOULD contain information published by the End-User or an
organization that the End-User is affiliated with.
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s):[OpenID.Core], Section 5.1
o Name: "email"
o Description: End-User's preferred e-mail address. Its value MUST
conform to the [RFC5322] "addr-spec" syntax.
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s):[OpenID.Core], Section 5.1
o Name: "email_verified"
o Description: True if the End-User's e-mail address has been
verified; otherwise false. When this Claim Value is true, this
means that the OP took affirmative steps to ensure that this
e-mail address was controlled by the End-User at the time the
verification was performed. The means by which an e-mail address
is verified is context-specific, and dependent upon the trust
framework or contractual agreements within which the parties are
operating.
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s):[OpenID.Core], Section 5.1
o Name: "gender"
o Description:End-User's gender. Values defined by this
specification are female and male. Other values MAY be used when
neither of the defined values are applicable.
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s):[OpenID.Core], Section 5.1
o Name: "birthdate"
o Description:Time the End-User's information was last updated. Its
value is a JSON number representing the number of seconds from
1970-01-01T0:0:0Z as measured in UTC until the date/time.
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s):[OpenID.Core], Section 5.1 o Specification Document(s): Section 7 of [[ this specification ]]
o Name: "zoneinfo"
o Description: String from zoneinfo [zoneinfo] time zone database 11.3. Media Type Registration
representing the End-User's time zone. For example, Europe/Paris
or America/Los_Angeles.
o Change Controller: IESG This section registers the "application/token-introspection+jwt"
media type in the "Media Types" registry [IANA.MediaTypes] in the
manner described in [RFC6838], which can be used to indicate that the
content is a token introspection response in JWT format.
o Specification Document(s):[OpenID.Core], Section 5.1 11.3.1. Registry Contents
o Name: "locale" o Type name: application
o Description: End-User's locale, represented as a BCP47 [RFC5646] o Subtype name: token-introspection+jwt
language tag. This is typically an ISO 639-1 Alpha-2 [ISO639-1]
language code in lowercase and an ISO 3166-1 Alpha-2 [ISO3166-1]
country code in uppercase, separated by a dash. For example, en-
US or fr-CA. As a compatibility note, some implementations have
used an underscore as the separator rather than a dash, for
example, en_US; Relying Parties MAY choose to accept this locale
syntax as well.
o Change Controller: IESG o Required parameters: N/A
o Specification Document(s):[OpenID.Core], Section 5.1 o Optional parameters: N/A
o Name: "phone_number" o Encoding considerations: binary; A token introspection response is
a JWT; JWT values are encoded as a series of base64url-encoded
values (with trailing '=' characters removed), some of which may
be the empty string, separated by period ('.') characters.
o Description: End-User's preferred telephone number. [E.164] is o Security considerations: See Section 7 of this specification
RECOMMENDED as the format of this Claim, for example, +1 (425)
555-1212 or +56 (2) 687 2400. If the phone number contains an
extension, it is RECOMMENDED that the extension be represented
using the [RFC3966] extension syntax, for example, +1 (604)
555-1234;ext=5678.
o Change Controller: IESG o Interoperability considerations: N/A
o Specification Document(s):[OpenID.Core], Section 5.1 o Published specification: Section 4 of this specification
o Name: "phone_number_verified" o Applications that use this media type: Applications that produce
and consume OAuth Token Introspection Responses in JWT format
o Description: True if the End-User's phone number has been o Fragment identifier considerations: N/A
verified; otherwise false. When this Claim Value is true, this
means that the OP took affirmative steps to ensure that this phone
number was controlled by the End-User at the time the verification
was performed. The means by which a phone number is verified is
context-specific, and dependent upon the trust framework or
contractual agreements within which the parties are operating.
When true, the phone_number Claim MUST be in [E.164] format and
any extensions MUST be represented in [RFC3966] format.
o Change Controller: IESG o Additional information:
o Specification Document(s):[OpenID.Core], Section 5.1 * Magic number(s): N/A
o Name: "address" * File extension(s): N/A
o Description: End-User's preferred postal address. The value of * Macintosh file type code(s): N/A
the address member is a JSON [RFC8259] structure containing some
or all of the members defined in [OpenID.Core], Section 5.1.1.
o Change Controller: IESG o Person & email address to contact for further information: Torsten
Lodderstedt, torsten@lodderstedt.net
o Specification Document(s):[OpenID.Core], Section 5.1 o Intended usage: COMMON
o Name: "updated_at"
o Description: Time the End-User's information was last updated. o Restrictions on usage: none
Its value is a JSON number representing the number of seconds from
1970-01-01T0:0:0Z as measured in UTC until the date/time.
o Change Controller: IESG o Author: Torsten Lodderstedt, torsten@lodderstedt.net
o Specification Document(s):[OpenID.Core], Section 5.1 o Change controller: IESG
9. References o Provisional registration? No
9.1. Normative References 12. References
[E.164] Standardization, I. O. F., "E.164: The international 12.1. Normative References
public telecommunication numbering plan", 2010,
<https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-E.164-201011-I/en>.
[I-D.ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp] [I-D.ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp]
Sheffer, Y., Hardt, D., and M. Jones, "JSON Web Token Best Sheffer, Y., Hardt, D., and M. Jones, "JSON Web Token Best
Current Practices", draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-06 (work in Current Practices", draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-06 (work in
progress), June 2019. progress), June 2019.
[I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]
Lodderstedt, T., Bradley, J., Labunets, A., and D. Fett, Lodderstedt, T., Bradley, J., Labunets, A., and D. Fett,
"OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practice", draft-ietf- "OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practice", draft-ietf-
oauth-security-topics-13 (work in progress), July 2019. oauth-security-topics-13 (work in progress), July 2019.
[ISO3166-1] [IANA.MediaTypes]
Standardization, I. O. F., "ISO 3166-1:1997. Codes for the IANA, "Media Types",
representation of names of countries and their <http://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types>.
subdivisions -- Part 1: Country codes", 2013,
<https://www.iso.org/standard/63545.html>.
[ISO639-1]
Standardization, I. O. F., "ISO 639-1:2002 Codes for the
representation of names of languages -- part 1: Alpha-2
Code", 2002, <https://www.iso.org/standard/22109.html>.
[OpenID.Core] [OpenID.Core]
Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., Medeiros, B. D., and Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., Medeiros, B. D., and
C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0 incorporating C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0 incorporating
errata set 1", Nov 2014, errata set 1", Nov 2014,
<http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>. <http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>.
[OpenID.Registration] [OpenID.Registration]
Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., and M. Jones, "OpenID Connect Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., and M. Jones, "OpenID Connect
Dynamic Client Registration 1.0 incorporating errata set Dynamic Client Registration 1.0 incorporating errata set
1", Nov 2014, <https://openid.net/specs/ 1", Nov 2014, <https://openid.net/specs/
openid-connect-registration-1_0.html>. openid-connect-registration-1_0.html>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3966] Schulzrinne, H., "The tel URI for Telephone Numbers", [RFC6838] Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type
RFC 3966, DOI 10.17487/RFC3966, December 2004, Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3966>. RFC 6838, DOI 10.17487/RFC6838, January 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6838>.
[RFC5322] Resnick, P., Ed., "Internet Message Format", RFC 5322,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5322, October 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5322>.
[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web [RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>. 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.
[RFC7516] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)", [RFC7516] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",
RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015, RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>.
[RFC7518] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518, [RFC7518] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518,
skipping to change at page 16, line 13 skipping to change at page 15, line 32
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7591>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7591>.
[RFC7662] Richer, J., Ed., "OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection", [RFC7662] Richer, J., Ed., "OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection",
RFC 7662, DOI 10.17487/RFC7662, October 2015, RFC 7662, DOI 10.17487/RFC7662, October 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7662>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7662>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259>.
[RFC8414] Jones, M., Sakimura, N., and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0 [RFC8414] Jones, M., Sakimura, N., and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0
Authorization Server Metadata", RFC 8414, Authorization Server Metadata", RFC 8414,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8414, June 2018, DOI 10.17487/RFC8414, June 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8414>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8414>.
9.2. Informative References 12.2. Informative References
[IANA.OAuth.Parameters] [IANA.OAuth.Parameters]
IANA, "OAuth Parameters", IANA, "OAuth Parameters",
<http://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters>. <http://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters>.
Appendix A. Document History Appendix A. Document History
[[ To be removed from the final specification ]] [[ To be removed from the final specification ]]
-08
o made difference between introspected access token and
introspection response clearer
o defined semantics of JWT claims overlapping between introspected
access token and introspection response as JWT
o added section about RS management
o added text about user claims including a privacy considerations
section
o removed registration of OpenID Connect claims to "Token
Introspection Response" registry and refer to "JWT Claims"
registry instead
o added registration of "application/token-introspection+jwt" media
type as type identifier of token introspection responses in JWT
format
o more changed to incorporate IESG review feedback
-07 -07
o fixed wrong description of "locale" o fixed wrong description of "locale"
o added references for ISO and ITU specifications o added references for ISO and ITU specifications
-06 -06
o replaced reference to RFC 7159 with reference to RFC 8259 o replaced reference to RFC 7159 with reference to RFC 8259
 End of changes. 90 change blocks. 
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