draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes-18.txt   rfc8702.txt 
LAMPS WG P. Kampanakis Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) P. Kampanakis
Internet-Draft Cisco Systems Request for Comments: 8702 Cisco Systems
Updates: 3370 (if approved) Q. Dang Updates: 3370 Q. Dang
Intended status: Standards Track NIST Category: Standards Track NIST
Expires: March 19, 2020 September 16, 2019 ISSN: 2070-1721 January 2020
Use of the SHAKE One-way Hash Functions in the Cryptographic Message Use of the SHAKE One-Way Hash Functions in the Cryptographic Message
Syntax (CMS) Syntax (CMS)
draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes-18
Abstract Abstract
This document updates the "Cryptographic Message Syntax Algorithms" This document updates the "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
(RFC3370) and describes the conventions for using the SHAKE family of Algorithms" (RFC 3370) and describes the conventions for using the
hash functions in the Cryptographic Message Syntax as one-way hash SHAKE family of hash functions in the Cryptographic Message Syntax as
functions with the RSA Probabilistic signature and ECDSA signature one-way hash functions with the RSA Probabilistic Signature Scheme
algorithms. The conventions for the associated signer public keys in (RSASSA-PSS) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA).
CMS are also described. The conventions for the associated signer public keys in CMS are also
described.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
This Internet-Draft will expire on March 19, 2020. Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8702.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.1. Terminology
2.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2. Identifiers
3. Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3. Use in CMS
4. Use in CMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.1. Message Digests
4.1. Message Digests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.2. Signatures
4.2. Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.2.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures
4.2.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.2.2. ECDSA Signatures
4.2.2. ECDSA Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.3. Public Keys
4.3. Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.4. Message Authentication Codes
4.4. Message Authentication Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4. IANA Considerations
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5. Security Considerations
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 6. References
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 6.1. Normative References
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 6.2. Informative References
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Appendix A. ASN.1 Module
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Acknowledgements
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Authors' Addresses
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1. Change Log
[ EDNOTE: Remove this section before publication. ]
o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-18:
* Minor ASN.1 changes.
o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-17:
* Minor updates for EDNOTE accuracy.
o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-16:
* Minor nits.
* Using bytes instead of bits for consistency.
o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-15:
* Minor editorial nits.
o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-14:
* Fixing error with incorrect preimage resistance bits for SHA128
and SHA256.
o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-13:
* Addressing comments from Dan M.'s secdir review.
* Addressing comment from Scott B.'s opsdir review about
references in the abstract.
o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-12:
* Nits identified by Roman, Barry L. in ballot position review.
o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-11:
* Minor nits.
* Nits identified by Roman in AD Review.
o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-10:
* Updated IANA considerations section to request for OID
assignments.
o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-09:
* Fixed minor text nit.
* Updates in Sec Considerations section.
o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-08:
* id-shake128-len and id-shake256-len were replaced with id-
sha128 with 32 bytes output length and id-shake256 with 64
bytes output length.
* Fixed a discrepancy between section 3 and 4.4 about the KMAC
OIDs that have parameters as optional.
o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-07:
* Small nit from Russ while in WGLC.
o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-06:
* Incorporated Eric's suggestion from WGLC.
o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-05:
* Added informative references.
* Updated ASN.1 so it compiles.
* Updated IANA considerations.
o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-04:
* Added RFC8174 reference and text.
* Explicitly explained why RSASSA-PSS-params are omitted in
section 4.2.1.
* Simplified Public Keys section by removing redundant info from
RFCs.
o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-03:
* Removed paragraph suggesting KMAC to be used in generating k in
Deterministic ECDSA. That should be RFC6979-bis.
* Removed paragraph from Security Considerations that talks about
randomness of k because we are using deterministic ECDSA.
* Completed ASN.1 module and fixed KMAC ASN.1 based on Jim's
feedback.
* Text fixes.
o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-02:
* Updates based on suggestions and clarifications by Jim.
* Started ASN.1 module.
o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-01:
* Significant reorganization of the sections to simplify the
introduction, the new OIDs and their use in CMS.
* Added new OIDs for RSASSA-PSS that hardcodes hash, salt and
MGF, according the WG consensus.
* Updated Public Key section to use the new RSASSA-PSS OIDs and
clarify the algorithm identifier usage.
* Removed the no longer used SHAKE OIDs from section 3.1.
o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-00:
* Various updates to title and section names.
* Content changes filling in text and references.
o draft-dang-lamps-cms-shakes-hash-00:
* Initial version
2. Introduction 1. Introduction
The "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)" [RFC5652] is used to "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)" [RFC5652] describes syntax used
digitally sign, digest, authenticate, or encrypt arbitrary message to digitally sign, digest, authenticate, or encrypt arbitrary message
contents. "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Algorithms" [RFC3370] contents. "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Algorithms" [RFC3370]
defines the use of common cryptographic algorithms with CMS. This defines the use of common cryptographic algorithms with CMS. This
specification updates RFC3370 and describes the use of the SHAKE128 specification updates RFC 3370 and describes the use of the SHAKE128
and SHAKE256 specified in [SHA3] as new hash functions in CMS. In and SHAKE256 specified in [SHA3] as new hash functions in CMS. In
addition, it describes the use of these functions with the RSASSA-PSS addition, it describes the use of these functions with the RSA
signature algorithm [RFC8017] and the Elliptic Curve Digital Probabilistic Signature Scheme (RSASSA-PSS) signature algorithm
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [X9.62] with the CMS signed-data content [RFC8017] and the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)
type. [X9.62] with the CMS signed-data content type.
In the SHA-3 family, two extendable-output functions (SHAKEs), In the SHA-3 family, two extendable-output functions (SHAKEs),
SHAKE128 and SHAKE256, are defined. Four other hash function SHAKE128 and SHAKE256, are defined. Four other hash function
instances, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and SHA3-512, are also instances (SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and SHA3-512) are also
defined but are out of scope for this document. A SHAKE is a defined but are out of scope for this document. A SHAKE is a
variable length hash function defined as SHAKE(M, d) where the output variable-length hash function defined as SHAKE(M, d) where the output
is a d-bits-long digest of message M. The corresponding collision is a d-bit-long digest of message M. The corresponding collision and
and second-preimage-resistance strengths for SHAKE128 are second-preimage-resistance strengths for SHAKE128 are min(d/2,128)
min(d/2,128) and min(d,128) bits, respectively (Appendix A.1 [SHA3]). and min(d,128) bits, respectively (see Appendix A.1 of [SHA3]). And
And the corresponding collision and second-preimage-resistance the corresponding collision and second-preimage-resistance strengths
strengths for SHAKE256 are min(d/2,256) and min(d,256) bits, for SHAKE256 are min(d/2,256) and min(d,256) bits, respectively. In
respectively. In this specification we use d=256 (for SHAKE128) and this specification, we use d=256 (for SHAKE128) and d=512 (for
d=512 (for SHAKE256). SHAKE256).
A SHAKE can be used in CMS as the message digest function (to hash A SHAKE can be used in CMS as the message digest function (to hash
the message to be signed) in RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA, message the message to be signed) in RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA, as the message
authentication code and as the mask generation function (MGF) in authentication code, and as the mask generation function (MGF) in
RSASSA-PSS. This specification describes the identifiers for SHAKEs RSASSA-PSS. This specification describes the identifiers for SHAKEs
to be used in CMS and their meaning. to be used in CMS and their meanings.
2.1. Terminology 1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
3. Identifiers 2. Identifiers
This section identifies eight new object identifiers (OIDs) for using This section identifies eight new object identifiers (OIDs) for using
SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 in CMS. SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 in CMS.
Two object identifiers for SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 hash functions are Two object identifiers for SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 hash functions are
defined in [shake-nist-oids] and we include them here for defined in [shake-nist-oids], and we include them here for
convenience. convenience.
id-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) id-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) 2 11 } nistAlgorithm(4) 2 11 }
id-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) id-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) 2 12 } nistAlgorithm(4) 2 12 }
In this specification, when using the id-shake128 or id-shake256 In this specification, when using the id-shake128 or id-shake256
algorithm identifiers, the parameters MUST be absent. That is, the algorithm identifiers, the parameters MUST be absent. That is, the
identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, the OID. identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, the OID.
[I-D.ietf-lamps-pkix-shake] [ EDNOTE: Update reference with the RFC [RFC8692] defines two identifiers for RSASSA-PSS signatures using
when it is published. ] defines two identifiers for RSASSA-PSS SHAKEs, which we include here for convenience.
signatures using SHAKEs which we include here for convenience.
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) 30 } security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) 30 }
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) 31 } security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) 31 }
The same RSASSA-PSS algorithm identifiers can be used for identifying The same RSASSA-PSS algorithm identifiers can be used for identifying
public keys and signatures. public keys and signatures.
[I-D.ietf-lamps-pkix-shake] [ EDNOTE: Update reference with the RFC [RFC8692] also defines two algorithm identifiers of ECDSA signatures
when it is published. ] also defines two algorithm identifiers of using SHAKEs, which we include here for convenience.
ECDSA signatures using SHAKEs which we include here for convenience.
id-ecdsa-with-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) id-ecdsa-with-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) 32 } security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) 32 }
id-ecdsa-with-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) id-ecdsa-with-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) 33 } security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) 33 }
The parameters for the four RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA identifiers MUST be The parameters for the four RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA identifiers MUST be
absent. That is, each identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one absent. That is, each identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one
component, the OID. component, the OID.
Two object identifiers for KMACs using SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 as In [shake-nist-oids], the National Institute of Standards and
defined in by the National Institute of Standards and Technology Technology (NIST) defines two object identifiers for Keccak message
(NIST) in [shake-nist-oids] and we include them here for convenience. authentication codes (KMACs) using SHAKE128 and SHAKE256, and we
include them here for convenience.
id-KmacWithSHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) id-KmacWithSHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) 2 19 } nistAlgorithm(4) 2 19 }
id-KmacWithSHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) id-KmacWithSHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) 2 20 } nistAlgorithm(4) 2 20 }
The parameters for id-KmacWithSHAKE128 and id-KmacWithSHAKE256 are The parameters for id-KmacWithSHAKE128 and id-KmacWithSHAKE256 are
OPTIONAL. OPTIONAL.
Section 4.1, Section 4.2.1, Section 4.2.2 and Section 4.4 specify the Sections 3.1, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, and 3.4 specify the required output
required output length for each use of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 in length for each use of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 in message digests,
message digests, RSASSA-PSS, ECDSA and KMAC. RSASSA-PSS, ECDSA, and KMAC.
4. Use in CMS 3. Use in CMS
4.1. Message Digests 3.1. Message Digests
The id-shake128 and id-shake256 OIDs (Section 3) can be used as the The id-shake128 and id-shake256 OIDs (see Section 2) can be used as
digest algorithm identifiers located in the SignedData, SignerInfo, the digest algorithm identifiers located in the SignedData,
DigestedData, and the AuthenticatedData digestAlgorithm fields in CMS SignerInfo, DigestedData, and the AuthenticatedData digestAlgorithm
[RFC5652]. The OID encoding MUST omit the parameters field and the fields in CMS [RFC5652]. The OID encoding MUST omit the parameters
output length of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 as the message digest MUST be field and the output length of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 as the message
32 or 64 bytes, respectively. digest MUST be 32 or 64 bytes, respectively.
The digest values are located in the DigestedData field and the The digest values are located in the DigestedData field and the
Message Digest authenticated attribute included in the Message Digest authenticated attribute included in the
signedAttributes of the SignedData signerInfo. In addition, digest signedAttributes of the SignedData signerInfos. In addition, digest
values are input to signature algorithms. The digest algorithm MUST values are input to signature algorithms. The digest algorithm MUST
be the same as the message hash algorithms used in signatures. be the same as the message hash algorithms used in signatures.
4.2. Signatures 3.2. Signatures
In CMS, signature algorithm identifiers are located in the SignerInfo In CMS, signature algorithm identifiers are located in the SignerInfo
signatureAlgorithm field of SignedData content type and signatureAlgorithm field of signed-data content type and
countersignature attribute. Signature values are located in the countersignature attribute. Signature values are located in the
SignerInfo signature field of SignedData content type and SignerInfo signature field of signed-data content type and
countersignature attribute. countersignature attribute.
Conforming implementations that process RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA with Conforming implementations that process RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA with
SHAKE signatures when processing CMS data MUST recognize the SHAKE signatures when processing CMS data MUST recognize the
corresponding OIDs specified in Section 3. corresponding OIDs specified in Section 2.
When using RSASSA-PSS or ECDSA with SHAKEs, the RSA modulus or ECDSA When using RSASSA-PSS or ECDSA with SHAKEs, the RSA modulus or ECDSA
curve order SHOULD be chosen in line with the SHAKE output length. curve order SHOULD be chosen in line with the SHAKE output length.
Refer to Section 6 for more details. Refer to Section 5 for more details.
4.2.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures 3.2.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures
The RSASSA-PSS algorithm is defined in [RFC8017]. When id-RSASSA- The RSASSA-PSS algorithm is defined in [RFC8017]. When id-RSASSA-
PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 specified in Section 3 is PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 (specified in Section 2) is
used, the encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the used, the encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the
AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, id-RSASSA- AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component: id-RSASSA-
PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256. [RFC4055] defines RSASSA- PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256. [RFC4055] defines RSASSA-
PSS-params that are used to define the algorithms and inputs to the PSS-params that are used to define the algorithms and inputs to the
algorithm. This specification does not use parameters because the algorithm. This specification does not use parameters because the
hash, mask generation algorithm, trailer and salt are embedded in the hash, mask generation algorithm, trailer, and salt are embedded in
OID definition. the OID definition.
The hash algorithm to hash a message being signed and the hash The hash algorithm used to hash a message being signed and the hash
algorithm as the mask generation function used in RSASSA-PSS MUST be algorithm as the mask generation function used in RSASSA-PSS MUST be
the same: both SHAKE128 or both SHAKE256. The output length of the the same: both SHAKE128 or both SHAKE256. The output length of the
hash algorithm which hashes the message SHALL be 32 (for SHAKE128) or hash algorithm that hashes the message SHALL be 32 (for SHAKE128) or
64 bytes (for SHAKE256). 64 bytes (for SHAKE256).
The mask generation function takes an octet string of variable length The mask generation function takes an octet string of variable length
and a desired output length as input, and outputs an octet string of and a desired output length as input, and outputs an octet string of
the desired length. In RSASSA-PSS with SHAKEs, the SHAKEs MUST be the desired length. In RSASSA-PSS with SHAKEs, the SHAKEs MUST be
used natively as the MGF function, instead of the MGF1 algorithm that used natively as the MGF, instead of the MGF1 algorithm that uses the
uses the hash function in multiple iterations as specified in hash function in multiple iterations, as specified in Appendix B.2.1
Section B.2.1 of [RFC8017]. In other words, the MGF is defined as of [RFC8017]. In other words, the MGF is defined as the SHAKE128 or
the SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 with input being the mgfSeed for id-RSASSA- SHAKE256 with input being the mgfSeed for id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 and
PSS- SHAKE128 and id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256, respectively. The mgfSeed id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256, respectively. The mgfSeed is an octet string
is the seed from which mask is generated, an octet string [RFC8017]. used as the seed to generate the mask [RFC8017]. As explained in
As explained in Step 9 of section 9.1.1 of [RFC8017], the output Step 9 of Section 9.1.1 of [RFC8017], the output length of the MGF is
length of the MGF is emLen - hLen - 1 bytes. emLen is the maximum emLen - hLen - 1 bytes. emLen is the maximum message length
message length ceil((n-1)/8), where n is the RSA modulus in bits. ceil((n-1)/8), where n is the RSA modulus in bits. hLen is 32 and 64
hLen is 32 and 64-bytes for id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 and id-RSASSA-PSS- bytes for id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 and id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256,
SHAKE256, respectively. Thus when SHAKE is used as the MGF, the respectively. Thus, when SHAKE is used as the MGF, the SHAKE output
SHAKE output length maskLen is (8*emLen - 264) or (8*emLen - 520) length maskLen is (8*emLen - 264) or (8*emLen - 520) bits,
bits, respectively. For example, when RSA modulus n is 2048, the respectively. For example, when RSA modulus n is 2048, the output
output length of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 as the MGF will be 1784 or length of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 as the MGF will be 1784 or 1528 bits
1528-bits when id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 is when id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 is used,
used, respectively. respectively.
The RSASSA-PSS saltLength MUST be 32 bytes for id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 The RSASSA-PSS saltLength MUST be 32 bytes for id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128
or 64 bytes for id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256. Finally, the trailerField or 64 bytes for id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256. Finally, the trailerField
MUST be 1, which represents the trailer field with hexadecimal value MUST be 1, which represents the trailer field with hexadecimal value
0xBC [RFC8017]. 0xBC [RFC8017].
4.2.2. ECDSA Signatures 3.2.2. ECDSA Signatures
The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is defined in The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is defined in
[X9.62]. When the id-ecdsa-with-shake128 or id-ecdsa-with-shake256 [X9.62]. When the id-ecdsa-with-shake128 or id-ecdsa-with-shake256
(specified in Section 3) algorithm identifier appears, the respective (specified in Section 2) algorithm identifier appears, the respective
SHAKE function is used as the hash. The encoding MUST omit the SHAKE function is used as the hash. The encoding MUST omit the
parameters field. That is, the AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a parameters field. That is, the AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a
SEQUENCE of one component, the OID id-ecdsa-with-shake128 or id- SEQUENCE of one component, the OID id-ecdsa-with-shake128 or id-
ecdsa-with-shake256. ecdsa-with-shake256.
For simplicity and compliance with the ECDSA standard specification, For simplicity and compliance with the ECDSA standard specification
the output length of the hash function must be explicitly determined. [X9.62], the output length of the hash function must be explicitly
The output length for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 used in ECDSA MUST be 32 determined. The output length for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 used in ECDSA
or 64 bytes, respectively. MUST be 32 or 64 bytes, respectively.
Conforming CA implementations that generate ECDSA with SHAKE Conforming Certification Authority (CA) implementations that generate
signatures in certificates or CRLs SHOULD generate such signatures ECDSA with SHAKE signatures in certificates or Certificate Revocation
with a deterministically generated, non-random k in accordance with Lists (CRLs) SHOULD generate such signatures with a deterministically
all the requirements specified in [RFC6979]. They MAY also generate generated, nonrandom k in accordance with all the requirements
such signatures in accordance with all other recommendations in specified in [RFC6979]. They MAY also generate such signatures in
[X9.62] or [SEC1] if they have a stated policy that requires accordance with all other recommendations in [X9.62] or [SEC1] if
conformance to those standards. Those standards have not specified they have a stated policy that requires conformance to those
SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 as hash algorithm options. However, SHAKE128 standards. Those standards have not specified SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
and SHAKE256 with output length being 32 and 64 octets, respectively as hash algorithm options. However, SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 with
can be used instead of 256 and 512-bit output hash algorithms such as output length being 32 and 64 octets, respectively, can be used
SHA256 and SHA512. instead of 256 and 512-bit output hash algorithms, such as SHA256 and
SHA512.
4.3. Public Keys 3.3. Public Keys
In CMS, the signer's public key algorithm identifiers are located in In CMS, the signer's public key algorithm identifiers are located in
the OriginatorPublicKey's algorithm attribute. The conventions and the OriginatorPublicKey's algorithm attribute. The conventions and
encoding for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA public keys algorithm identifiers encoding for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA public keys algorithm identifiers
are as specified in Section 2.3 of [RFC3279], Section 3.1 of are as specified in Section 2.3 of [RFC3279], Section 3.1 of
[RFC4055] and Section 2.1 of [RFC5480]. [RFC4055], and Section 2.1 of [RFC5480].
Traditionally, the rsaEncryption object identifier is used to Traditionally, the rsaEncryption object identifier is used to
identify RSA public keys. The rsaEncryption object identifier identify RSA public keys. The rsaEncryption object identifier
continues to identify the public key when the RSA private key owner continues to identify the public key when the RSA private key owner
does not wish to limit the use of the public key exclusively to does not wish to limit the use of the public key exclusively to
RSASSA-PSS with SHAKEs. When the RSA private key owner wishes to RSASSA-PSS with SHAKEs. When the RSA private key owner wishes to
limit the use of the public key exclusively to RSASSA-PSS, the limit the use of the public key exclusively to RSASSA-PSS, the
AlgorithmIdentifier for RSASSA-PSS defined in Section 3 SHOULD be AlgorithmIdentifier for RSASSA-PSS defined in Section 2 SHOULD be
used as the algorithm attribute in the OriginatorPublicKey sequence. used as the algorithm attribute in the OriginatorPublicKey sequence.
Conforming client implementations that process RSASSA-PSS with SHAKE Conforming client implementations that process RSASSA-PSS with SHAKE
public keys in CMS message MUST recognize the corresponding OIDs in public keys in CMS message MUST recognize the corresponding OIDs in
Section 3. Section 2.
Conforming implementations MUST specify and process the algorithms Conforming implementations MUST specify and process the algorithms
explicitly by using the OIDs specified in Section 3 when encoding explicitly by using the OIDs specified in Section 2 when encoding
ECDSA with SHAKE public keys in CMS messages. ECDSA with SHAKE public keys in CMS messages.
The identifier parameters, as explained in Section 3, MUST be absent. The identifier parameters, as explained in Section 2, MUST be absent.
4.4. Message Authentication Codes 3.4. Message Authentication Codes
KMAC message authentication code (KMAC) is specified in [SP800-185]. Keccak message authentication code (KMAC) is specified in
In CMS, KMAC algorithm identifiers are located in the [SP800-185]. In CMS, KMAC algorithm identifiers are located in the
AuthenticatedData macAlgorithm field. The KMAC values are located in AuthenticatedData macAlgorithm field. The KMAC values are located in
the AuthenticatedData mac field. the AuthenticatedData mac field.
When the id-KmacWithSHAKE128 or id-KmacWithSHAKE256 OID is used as When the id-KmacWithSHAKE128 or id-KmacWithSHAKE256 OID is used as
the MAC algorithm identifier, the parameters field is optional the MAC algorithm identifier, the parameters field is optional
(absent or present). If absent, the SHAKE256 output length used in (absent or present). If absent, the SHAKE256 output length used in
KMAC is 32 or 64 bytes, respectively, and the customization string is KMAC is 32 or 64 bytes, respectively, and the customization string is
an empty string by default. an empty string by default.
Conforming implementations that process KMACs with the SHAKEs when Conforming implementations that process KMACs with the SHAKEs when
processing CMS data MUST recognize these identifiers. processing CMS data MUST recognize these identifiers.
When calculating the KMAC output, the variable N is 0xD2B282C2, S is When calculating the KMAC output, the variable N is 0xD2B282C2, S is
an empty string, and L, the integer representing the requested output an empty string, and L (the integer representing the requested output
length in bits, is 256 or 512 for KmacWithSHAKE128 or length in bits) is 256 or 512 for KmacWithSHAKE128 or
KmacWithSHAKE256, respectively, in this specification. KmacWithSHAKE256, respectively, in this specification.
5. IANA Considerations 4. IANA Considerations
One object identifier for the ASN.1 module in Appendix A was One object identifier for the ASN.1 module in Appendix A was updated
requested for the SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifiers in the "Structure of Management Information (SMI) Security for S/MIME
(1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0) registry: Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)" registry:
+---------+----------------------+--------------------+ +---------+----------------------+------------+
| Decimal | Description | References | | Decimal | Description | References |
+---------+----------------------+--------------------+ +=========+======================+============+
| 70 | CMSAlgsForSHAKE-2019 | [EDNOTE: THIS RFC] | | 70 | CMSAlgsForSHAKE-2019 | RFC 8702 |
+---------+----------------------+--------------------+ +---------+----------------------+------------+
6. Security Considerations Table 1
5. Security Considerations
This document updates [RFC3370]. The security considerations section This document updates [RFC3370]. The security considerations section
of that document applies to this specification as well. of that document applies to this specification as well.
NIST has defined appropriate use of the hash functions in terms of NIST has defined appropriate use of the hash functions in terms of
the algorithm strengths and expected time frames for secure use in the algorithm strengths and expected time frames for secure use in
Special Publications (SPs) [SP800-78-4] and [SP800-107]. These Special Publications (SPs) [SP800-78-4] and [SP800-107]. These
documents can be used as guides to choose appropriate key sizes for documents can be used as guides to choose appropriate key sizes for
various security scenarios. various security scenarios.
SHAKE128 with output length of 32 bytes offers 128-bits of collision SHAKE128 with an output length of 32 bytes offers 128 bits of
and preimage resistance. Thus, SHAKE128 OIDs in this specification collision and preimage resistance. Thus, SHAKE128 OIDs in this
are RECOMMENDED with 2048 (112-bit security) or 3072-bit (128-bit specification are RECOMMENDED with a 2048- (112-bit security) or
security) RSA modulus or curves with group order of 256-bits (128-bit 3072-bit (128-bit security) RSA modulus or curves with a group order
security). SHAKE256 with 64 bytes output length offers 256-bits of of 256 bits (128-bit security). SHAKE256 with a 64-byte output
collision and preimage resistance. Thus, the SHAKE256 OIDs in this length offers 256 bits of collision and preimage resistance. Thus,
specification are RECOMMENDED with 4096-bit RSA modulus or higher or the SHAKE256 OIDs in this specification are RECOMMENDED with 4096-bit
curves with group order of at least 512 bits such as NIST Curve P-521 RSA modulus or higher or curves with group order of at least 512
(256-bit security). Note that we recommended 4096-bit RSA because we bits, such as NIST curve P-521 (256-bit security). Note that we
would need 15360-bit modulus for 256-bits of security which is recommended a 4096-bit RSA because we would need a 15360-bit modulus
impractical for today's technology. for 256 bits of security, which is impractical for today's
technology.
When more than two parties share the same message-authentication key, When more than two parties share the same message-authentication key,
data origin authentication is not provided. Any party that knows the data origin authentication is not provided. Any party that knows the
message-authentication key can compute a valid MAC, therefore the message-authentication key can compute a valid MAC; therefore, the
content could originate from any one of the parties. content could originate from any one of the parties.
7. Acknowledgements 6. References
This document is based on Russ Housley's draft
[I-D.housley-lamps-cms-sha3-hash]. It replaces SHA3 hash functions
by SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 as the LAMPS WG agreed.
The authors would like to thank Russ Housley for his guidance and
very valuable contributions with the ASN.1 module. Valuable feedback
was also provided by Eric Rescorla.
8. References
8.1. Normative References 6.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3370] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC3370] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
Algorithms", RFC 3370, DOI 10.17487/RFC3370, August 2002, Algorithms", RFC 3370, DOI 10.17487/RFC3370, August 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3370>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3370>.
skipping to change at page 12, line 34 skipping to change at line 413
[RFC8017] Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch, [RFC8017] Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch,
"PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2", "PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2",
RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016, RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[SHA3] National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. [SHA3] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
Department of Commerce, "SHA-3 Standard - Permutation- "SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-
Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions", FIPS PUB 202, Output Functions", FIPS PUB 202,
August 2015. DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.202, August 2015,
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
NIST.FIPS.202.pdf>.
[SP800-185] [SP800-185]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "SHA-3 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
Derived Functions: cSHAKE, KMAC, TupleHash and "SHA-3 Derived Functions: cSHAKE, KMAC, TupleHash and
ParallelHash. NIST SP 800-185", December 2016, ParallelHash", NIST Special Publication 800-185,
DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-185, December 2016,
<http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/ <http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
NIST.SP.800-185.pdf>. NIST.SP.800-185.pdf>.
8.2. Informative References 6.2. Informative References
[I-D.housley-lamps-cms-sha3-hash]
Housley, R., "Use of the SHA3 One-way Hash Functions in
the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", draft-housley-
lamps-cms-sha3-hash-00 (work in progress), March 2017.
[I-D.ietf-lamps-pkix-shake] [CMS-SHA3] Housley, R., "Use of the SHA3 One-way Hash Functions in
Kampanakis, P. and Q. Dang, "Internet X.509 Public Key the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", Work in Progress,
Infrastructure: Additional Algorithm Identifiers for Internet-Draft, draft-housley-lamps-cms-sha3-hash-00, 27
RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA using SHAKEs", draft-ietf-lamps-pkix- March 2017, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-housley-
shake-15 (work in progress), July 2019. lamps-cms-sha3-hash-00>.
[RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and [RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April (CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April
2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279>. 2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279>.
[RFC5753] Turner, S. and D. Brown, "Use of Elliptic Curve [RFC5753] Turner, S. and D. Brown, "Use of Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms in Cryptographic Message Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms in Cryptographic Message
Syntax (CMS)", RFC 5753, DOI 10.17487/RFC5753, January Syntax (CMS)", RFC 5753, DOI 10.17487/RFC5753, January
skipping to change at page 13, line 38 skipping to change at line 463
for the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and the Public for the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and the Public
Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 6268, Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 6268,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6268, July 2011, DOI 10.17487/RFC6268, July 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6268>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6268>.
[RFC6979] Pornin, T., "Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature [RFC6979] Pornin, T., "Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature
Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA)", RFC 6979, DOI 10.17487/RFC6979, August Algorithm (ECDSA)", RFC 6979, DOI 10.17487/RFC6979, August
2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6979>. 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6979>.
[RFC8692] Kampanakis, P. and Q. Dang, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure: Additional Algorithm Identifiers for
RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA Using SHAKEs", RFC 8692,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8692, December 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8692>.
[SEC1] Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, "SEC 1: [SEC1] Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, "SEC 1:
Elliptic Curve Cryptography", May 2009, Elliptic Curve Cryptography", May 2009,
<http://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf>. <http://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf>.
[shake-nist-oids] [shake-nist-oids]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Computer National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
Security Objects Register", October 2017, "Computer Security Objects Register", October 2019,
<https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Computer-Security-Objects- <https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Computer-Security-Objects-
Register/Algorithm-Registration>. Register/Algorithm-Registration>.
[SP800-107] [SP800-107]
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
"SP800-107: Recommendation for Applications Using Approved "Recommendation for Applications Using Approved Hash
Hash Algorithms", May 2014, Algorithms", Draft NIST Special Publication 800-107
<https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/publications/sp/800-107/ Revised, August 2012,
rev-1/final/documents/draft_revised_sp800-107.pdf>. <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/
nistspecialpublication800-107r1.pdf>.
[SP800-78-4] [SP800-78-4]
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
"SP800-78-4: Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for "Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for Personal
Personal Identity Verification", May 2014, Identity Verification", NIST Special Publication 800-78-4,
<https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/publications/sp/800- DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-78-4, May 2015,
78/4/final/documents/sp800_78-4_revised_draft.pdf>. <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
NIST.SP.800-78-4.pdf>.
[X9.62] American National Standard for Financial Services (ANSI), [X9.62] American National Standard for Financial Services (ANSI),
"X9.62-2005 Public Key Cryptography for the Financial "Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services
Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Industry: the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
Standard (ECDSA)", November 2005. (ECDSA)", ANSI X9.62, November 2005.
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module Appendix A. ASN.1 Module
This appendix includes the ASN.1 modules for SHAKEs in CMS. This This appendix includes the ASN.1 modules for SHAKEs in CMS. This
module includes some ASN.1 from other standards for reference. module includes some ASN.1 from other standards for reference.
CMSAlgsForSHAKE-2019 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) CMSAlgsForSHAKE-2019 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0)
id-mod-cms-shakes-2019(70) } id-mod-cms-shakes-2019(70) }
skipping to change at page 15, line 10 skipping to change at line 535
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkix1-algorithms2008-02(56) } id-mod-pkix1-algorithms2008-02(56) }
sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE128, sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE256, sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE128, sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE256,
sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE128, sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE256 sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE128, sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE256
FROM PKIXAlgsForSHAKE-2019 { FROM PKIXAlgsForSHAKE-2019 {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkix1-shakes-2019(94) } ; id-mod-pkix1-shakes-2019(94) } ;
-- Message Digest Algorithms (mda-) -- Message digest Algorithms (mda-)
-- used in SignedData, SignerInfo, DigestedData, -- used in SignedData, SignerInfo, DigestedData,
-- and the AuthenticatedData digestAlgorithm -- and the AuthenticatedData digestAlgorithm
-- fields in CMS -- fields in CMS
-- --
-- This expands MessageAuthAlgs from [RFC5652] and -- This expands MessageAuthAlgs from [RFC5652] and
-- MessageDigestAlgs in [RFC5753] -- MessageDigestAlgs in [RFC5753]
-- --
-- MessageDigestAlgs DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= { -- MessageDigestAlgs DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
-- mda-shake128 | -- mda-shake128 |
-- mda-shake256, -- mda-shake256,
skipping to change at page 15, line 48 skipping to change at line 573
} }
id-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) id-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
hashAlgs(2) 12 } hashAlgs(2) 12 }
-- --
-- Public key algorithm identifiers located in the -- Public key algorithm identifiers located in the
-- OriginatorPublicKey's algorithm attribute in CMS. -- OriginatorPublicKey's algorithm attribute in CMS.
-- And Signature identifiers used in SignerInfo -- And Signature identifiers used in SignerInfo
-- signatureAlgorithm field of SignedData content -- signatureAlgorithm field of signed-data content
-- type and countersignature attribute in CMS. -- type and countersignature attribute in CMS.
-- --
-- From RFC5280, for reference. -- From RFC 5280, for reference:
-- rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 1 } -- rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 1 }
-- When the rsaEncryption algorithm identifier is used -- When the rsaEncryption algorithm identifier is used
-- for a public key, the AlgorithmIdentifier parameters -- for a public key, the AlgorithmIdentifier parameters
-- field MUST contain NULL. -- field MUST contain NULL.
-- --
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) 30 } security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) 30 }
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) 31 } security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) 31 }
-- When the id-RSASSA-PSS-* algorithm identifiers are used -- When the id-RSASSA-PSS-* algorithm identifiers are used
-- for a public key or signature in CMS, the AlgorithmIdentifier -- for a public key or signature in CMS, the AlgorithmIdentifier
-- parameters field MUST be absent. The message digest algorithm -- parameters field MUST be absent. The message digest algorithm
-- used in RSASSA-PSS MUST be SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 with a 32 or -- used in RSASSA-PSS MUST be SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 with a 32- or
-- 64 byte outout length, respectively. The mask generation -- 64-byte output length, respectively. The mask generation
-- function MUST be SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 with an output length -- function MUST be SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 with an output length
-- of (8*ceil((n-1)/8) - 264) or (8*ceil((n-1)/8) - 520) bits, -- of (8*ceil((n-1)/8) - 264) or (8*ceil((n-1)/8) - 520) bits,
-- respectively, where n is the RSA modulus in bits. -- respectively, where n is the RSA modulus in bits.
-- The RSASSA-PSS saltLength MUST be 32 or 64 bytes, respectively. -- The RSASSA-PSS saltLength MUST be 32 or 64 bytes, respectively.
-- The trailerField MUST be 1, which represents the trailer -- The trailerField MUST be 1, which represents the trailer
-- field with hexadecimal value 0xBC. Regardless of -- field with hexadecimal value 0xBC. Regardless of
-- id-RSASSA-PSS-* or rsaEncryption being used as the -- id-RSASSA-PSS-* or rsaEncryption being used as the
-- AlgorithmIdentifier of the OriginatorPublicKey, the RSA -- AlgorithmIdentifier of the OriginatorPublicKey, the RSA
-- public key MUST be encoded using the RSAPublicKey type. -- public key MUST be encoded using the RSAPublicKey type.
-- From RFC4055, for reference. -- From RFC 4055, for reference:
-- RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { -- RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE {
-- modulus INTEGER, -- -- n -- modulus INTEGER, -- -- n
-- publicExponent INTEGER } -- -- e -- publicExponent INTEGER } -- -- e
id-ecdsa-with-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) id-ecdsa-with-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) 32 } security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) 32 }
id-ecdsa-with-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) id-ecdsa-with-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) 33 } security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) 33 }
-- When the id-ecdsa-with-shake* algorithm identifiers are -- When the id-ecdsa-with-shake* algorithm identifiers are
-- used in CMS, the AlgorithmIdentifier parameters field -- used in CMS, the AlgorithmIdentifier parameters field
-- MUST be absent and the signature algorithm should be -- MUST be absent and the signature algorithm should be
-- deterministic ECDSA [RFC6979]. The message digest MUST -- deterministic ECDSA [RFC6979]. The message digest MUST
-- be SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 with a 32 or 64 byte outout -- be SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 with a 32- or 64-byte output
-- length, respectively. In both cases, the ECDSA public key, -- length, respectively. In both cases, the ECDSA public key,
-- MUST be encoded using the id-ecPublicKey type. -- MUST be encoded using the id-ecPublicKey type.
-- From RFC5480, for reference. -- From RFC 5480, for reference:
-- id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { -- id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
-- iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) keyType(2) 1 } -- iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) keyType(2) 1 }
-- The id-ecPublicKey parameters must be absent or present -- The id-ecPublicKey parameters must be absent or present
-- and are defined as -- and are defined as:
-- ECParameters ::= CHOICE { -- ECParameters ::= CHOICE {
-- namedCurve OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- namedCurve OBJECT IDENTIFIER
-- -- -- implicitCurve NULL -- -- -- implicitCurve NULL
-- -- -- specifiedCurve SpecifiedECDomain -- -- -- specifiedCurve SpecifiedECDomain
-- } -- }
-- This expands SignatureAlgorithms from [RFC5912] -- This expands SignatureAlgs from [RFC5912]
-- --
-- SignatureAlgs SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { -- SignatureAlgs SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
-- sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE128 | -- sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE128 |
-- sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE256 | -- sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE256 |
-- sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE128 | -- sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE128 |
-- sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE256, -- sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE256,
-- ... -- ...
-- } -- }
-- This expands MessageAuthAlgs from [RFC5652] and [RFC6268] -- This expands MessageAuthAlgs from [RFC5652] and [RFC6268]
skipping to change at page 18, line 5 skipping to change at line 675
maca-KMACwithSHAKE128.&smimeCaps | maca-KMACwithSHAKE128.&smimeCaps |
maca-KMACwithSHAKE256.&smimeCaps, maca-KMACwithSHAKE256.&smimeCaps,
... ...
} }
-- --
-- KMAC with SHAKE128 -- KMAC with SHAKE128
maca-KMACwithSHAKE128 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= { maca-KMACwithSHAKE128 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-KMACWithSHAKE128 IDENTIFIER id-KMACWithSHAKE128
PARAMS TYPE KMACwithSHAKE128-params ARE optional PARAMS TYPE KMACwithSHAKE128-params ARE optional
-- If KMACwithSHAKE128-params parameters are absent -- If KMACwithSHAKE128-params parameters are absent,
-- the SHAKE128 output length used in KMAC is 256 bits -- the SHAKE128 output length used in KMAC is 256 bits
-- and the customization string is an empty string. -- and the customization string is an empty string.
IS-KEYED-MAC TRUE IS-KEYED-MAC TRUE
SMIME-CAPS {IDENTIFIED BY id-KMACWithSHAKE128} SMIME-CAPS {IDENTIFIED BY id-KMACWithSHAKE128}
} }
id-KMACWithSHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) id-KMACWithSHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) country(16) us(840) organization(1)
gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
hashAlgs(2) 19 } hashAlgs(2) 19 }
KMACwithSHAKE128-params ::= SEQUENCE { KMACwithSHAKE128-params ::= SEQUENCE {
kMACOutputLength INTEGER DEFAULT 256, -- Output length in bits kMACOutputLength INTEGER DEFAULT 256, -- Output length in bits
customizationString OCTET STRING DEFAULT ''H customizationString OCTET STRING DEFAULT ''H
} }
-- KMAC with SHAKE256 -- KMAC with SHAKE256
maca-KMACwithSHAKE256 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= { maca-KMACwithSHAKE256 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-KMACWithSHAKE256 IDENTIFIER id-KMACWithSHAKE256
PARAMS TYPE KMACwithSHAKE256-params ARE optional PARAMS TYPE KMACwithSHAKE256-params ARE optional
-- If KMACwithSHAKE256-params parameters are absent -- If KMACwithSHAKE256-params parameters are absent,
-- the SHAKE256 output length used in KMAC is 512 bits -- the SHAKE256 output length used in KMAC is 512 bits
-- and the customization string is an empty string. -- and the customization string is an empty string.
IS-KEYED-MAC TRUE IS-KEYED-MAC TRUE
SMIME-CAPS {IDENTIFIED BY id-KMACWithSHAKE256} SMIME-CAPS {IDENTIFIED BY id-KMACWithSHAKE256}
} }
id-KMACWithSHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) id-KMACWithSHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) country(16) us(840) organization(1)
gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
hashAlgs(2) 20 } hashAlgs(2) 20 }
KMACwithSHAKE256-params ::= SEQUENCE { KMACwithSHAKE256-params ::= SEQUENCE {
kMACOutputLength INTEGER DEFAULT 512, -- Output length in bits kMACOutputLength INTEGER DEFAULT 512, -- Output length in bits
customizationString OCTET STRING DEFAULT ''H customizationString OCTET STRING DEFAULT ''H
} }
END END
Acknowledgements
This document is based on Russ Housley's document [CMS-SHA3]. It
replaces SHA3 hash functions by SHAKE128 and SHAKE256, as the LAMPS
WG agreed.
The authors would like to thank Russ Housley for his guidance and
very valuable contributions with the ASN.1 module. Valuable feedback
was also provided by Eric Rescorla.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Panos Kampanakis Panos Kampanakis
Cisco Systems Cisco Systems
Email: pkampana@cisco.com Email: pkampana@cisco.com
Quynh Dang Quynh Dang
NIST NIST
100 Bureau Drive 100 Bureau Drive
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Gaithersburg, MD 20899
United States of America
Email: quynh.Dang@nist.gov Email: quynh.Dang@nist.gov
 End of changes. 86 change blocks. 
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