draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes-02.txt   draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes-03.txt 
LAMPS WG Q. Dang LAMPS WG Q. Dang
Internet-Draft NIST Internet-Draft NIST
Intended status: Standards Track P. Kampanakis Intended status: Standards Track P. Kampanakis
Expires: April 25, 2019 Cisco Systems Expires: May 29, 2019 Cisco Systems
October 22, 2018 November 25, 2018
Use of the SHAKE One-way Hash Functions in the Cryptographic Message Use of the SHAKE One-way Hash Functions in the Cryptographic Message
Syntax (CMS) Syntax (CMS)
draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes-02 draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes-03
Abstract Abstract
This document describes the conventions for using the SHAKE family of This document describes the conventions for using the SHAKE family of
hash functions with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). hash functions with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) as one-way
hash functions with the RSA Probabilistic signature and ECDSA
signature algorithms, as message digests and message authentication
codes. The conventions for the associated signer public keys in CMS
are also described.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 25, 2019. This Internet-Draft will expire on May 29, 2019.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Use in CMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. Use in CMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. Message Digests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4.1. Message Digests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2. Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4.2. Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.2.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2.2. Deterministic ECDSA Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.2.2. Deterministic ECDSA Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.3. Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.3. Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.3.1. RSASSA-PSS Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.3.1. RSASSA-PSS Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.3.2. ECDSA Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.3.2. ECDSA Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.4. Message Authentication Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.4. Message Authentication Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1. Change Log 1. Change Log
[ EDNOTE: Remove this section before publication. ] [ EDNOTE: Remove this section before publication. ]
o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-03:
* Removed paragraph suggesting KMAC to be used in generating k in
Deterministric ECDSA. That should be RFC6979-bis.
* Removed paragraph from Security Considerations that talks about
randomness of k because we are using deterministric ECDSA.
* Completed ASN.1 module and fixed KMAC ASN.1 based on Jim's
feedback.
* Text fixes.
o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-02: o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-02:
* Updates based on suggestions and clarifications by Jim. * Updates based on suggestions and clarifications by Jim.
* Started ASN.1 module. * Started ASN.1 module.
o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-01: o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-01:
* Significant reorganization of the sections to simplify the * Significant reorganization of the sections to simplify the
introduction, the new OIDs and their use in CMS. introduction, the new OIDs and their use in CMS.
skipping to change at page 3, line 23 skipping to change at page 3, line 40
2. Introduction 2. Introduction
The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] is used to digitally The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] is used to digitally
sign, digest, authenticate, or encrypt arbitrary message contents. sign, digest, authenticate, or encrypt arbitrary message contents.
This specification describes the use of the SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 This specification describes the use of the SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
specified in [SHA3] as new hash functions in CMS. In addition, it specified in [SHA3] as new hash functions in CMS. In addition, it
describes the use of these functions with the RSASSA-PSS signature describes the use of these functions with the RSASSA-PSS signature
algorithm [RFC8017] and the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature algorithm [RFC8017] and the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA) [X9.62] with the CMS signed-data content type. Algorithm (ECDSA) [X9.62] with the CMS signed-data content type.
The SHA-3 family of one-way hash functions is specified in [SHA3]. In the SHA-3 family, two extendable-output functions (SHAKEs),
In the SHA-3 family, two extendable-output functions (SHAKEs):
SHAKE128 and SHAKE256, are defined. Four other hash function SHAKE128 and SHAKE256, are defined. Four other hash function
instances, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and SHA3-512 are also instances, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and SHA3-512 are also
defined but are out of scope for this document. A SHAKE is a defined but are out of scope for this document. A SHAKE is a
variable length hash function. The output length, in bits, of a variable length hash function. The output length, in bits, of a
SHAKE is defined by the d parameter. The corresponding collision and SHAKE is defined by the d parameter. The corresponding collision and
second preimage resistance strengths for SHAKE128 are min(d/2,128) second preimage resistance strengths for SHAKE128 are min(d/2,128)
and min(d,128) bits respectively. And, the corresponding collision and min(d,128) bits respectively. And, the corresponding collision
and second preimage resistance strengths for SHAKE256 are and second preimage resistance strengths for SHAKE256 are
min(d/2,256) and min(d,256) bits respectively. min(d/2,256) and min(d,256) bits respectively.
A SHAKE can be used in CMS as the message digest function (to hash A SHAKE can be used in CMS as the message digest function (to hash
the message to be signed) in RSASSA-PSS and deterministic ECDSA, the message to be signed) in RSASSA-PSS and deterministic ECDSA,
message authentication code and as the mask generating function in message authentication code and as the mask generating function in
RSASSA-PSS. In Section 3 of this document we define six new OIDs RSASSA-PSS. This specification describes the identifiers for SHAKEs
using SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 in CMS. to be used in CMS and their meaning.
2.1. Terminology 2.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
3. Identifiers 3. Identifiers
The object identifiers for SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 hash functions are This section defines six new OIDs for using SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 in
CMS.
EDNOTE: If PKIX draft is standardized first maybe we should not say
the identifiers are new for the RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA.
Two object identifiers for SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 hash functions are
defined in [shake-nist-oids] and we include them here for defined in [shake-nist-oids] and we include them here for
convenience. convenience.
id-shake128-len OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) id-shake128-len OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) 2 17 } nistAlgorithm(4) 2 17 }
id-shake256-len OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) id-shake256-len OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) 2 18 } nistAlgorithm(4) 2 18 }
In this specification, when using the id-shake128-len or id- In this specification, when using the id-shake128-len or id-
shake256-len algorithm identifiers, the parameters MUST be absent. shake256-len algorithm identifiers, the parameters MUST be absent.
That is, the identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, the That is, the identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, the
OID. OID.
The new identifiers for RSASSA-PSS signatures using SHAKEs are below. We define two new identifiers for RSASSA-PSS signatures using SHAKEs.
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD } id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD }
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD } id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD }
[ EDNOTE: "TBD" will be specified by NIST later. ] [ EDNOTE: "TBD" will be specified by NIST later. ]
The new algorithm identifiers of ECDSA signatures using SHAKEs are The same RSASSA-PSS algorithm identifiers can be used for identifying
below. public keys and signatures.
We define two new algorithm identifiers of ECDSA signatures using
SHAKEs.
id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) 3 TBD } nistAlgorithm(4) 3 TBD }
id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) 3 TBD } nistAlgorithm(4) 3 TBD }
[ EDNOTE: "TBD" will be specified by NIST. ] [ EDNOTE: "TBD" will be specified by NIST. ]
The same RSASSA-PSS and deterministric ECDSA with SHAKEs algorithm
identifiers are used for identifying public keys and signatures.
The parameters for the four RSASSA-PSS and deterministic ECDSA The parameters for the four RSASSA-PSS and deterministic ECDSA
identifiers MUST be absent. That is, each identifier SHALL be a identifiers MUST be absent. That is, each identifier SHALL be a
SEQUENCE of one component, the OID. SEQUENCE of one component, the OID.
The new object identifiers for KMACs using SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are Two new object identifiers for KMACs using SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are
below. define elow.
id-KmacWithSHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) id-KmacWithSHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) 2 TBD } nistAlgorithm(4) 2 19 }
id-KmacWithSHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) id-KmacWithSHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) 2 TBD } nistAlgorithm(4) 2 20 }
EDNOTE: "TBD" will be specified by NIST.
The parameters for id-KmacWithSHAKE128 and id-KmacWithSHAKE256 MUST The parameters for id-KmacWithSHAKE128 and id-KmacWithSHAKE256 MUST
be absent. That is, each identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one be absent. That is, each identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one
component, the OID. component, the OID.
Section 4.1, Section 4.2.1, Section 4.2.2 and Section 4.4 specify the Section 4.1, Section 4.2.1, Section 4.2.2 and Section 4.4 specify the
required output length for each use of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 in required output length for each use of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 in
message digests, RSASSA-PSS, determinstic ECDSA and KMAC. message digests, RSASSA-PSS, determinstic ECDSA and KMAC.
4. Use in CMS 4. Use in CMS
skipping to change at page 5, line 37 skipping to change at page 6, line 4
The id-shake128-len and id-shake256-len OIDs (Section 3) can be used The id-shake128-len and id-shake256-len OIDs (Section 3) can be used
as the digest algorithm identifiers located in the SignedData, as the digest algorithm identifiers located in the SignedData,
SignerInfo, DigestedData, and the AuthenticatedData digestAlgorithm SignerInfo, DigestedData, and the AuthenticatedData digestAlgorithm
fields in CMS [RFC5652]. The encoding MUST omit the parameters field fields in CMS [RFC5652]. The encoding MUST omit the parameters field
and the output size, d, for the SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 message digest and the output size, d, for the SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 message digest
MUST be 256 or 512 bits respectively. MUST be 256 or 512 bits respectively.
The digest values are located in the DigestedData field and the The digest values are located in the DigestedData field and the
Message Digest authenticated attribute included in the Message Digest authenticated attribute included in the
signedAttributes of the SignedData signerInfo. In addition, digest signedAttributes of the SignedData signerInfo. In addition, digest
values are input to signature algorithms. values are input to signature algorithms. The digest algorithm MUST
be the same as the message hash algorithms used in signatures.
4.2. Signatures 4.2. Signatures
In CMS, signature algorithm identifiers are located in the SignerInfo In CMS, signature algorithm identifiers are located in the SignerInfo
signatureAlgorithm field of SignedData content type and signatureAlgorithm field of SignedData content type and
countersignature attribute. Signature values are located in the countersignature attribute. Signature values are located in the
SignerInfo signature field of SignedData and countersignature. SignerInfo signature field of SignedData and countersignature.
Conforming implementations that process RSASSA-PSS and deterministic Conforming implementations that process RSASSA-PSS and deterministic
ECDSA with SHAKE signatures when processing CMS data MUST recognize ECDSA with SHAKE signatures when processing CMS data MUST recognize
the corresponding OIDs specified in Section 3. the corresponding OIDs specified in Section 3.
4.2.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures 4.2.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures
The RSASSA-PSS algorithm is defined in [RFC8017]. When id-RSASSA- The RSASSA-PSS algorithm is defined in [RFC8017]. When id-RSASSA-
PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 specified in Section 3 is PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 specified in Section 3 is
used, the encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the used, the encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the
AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, id-RSASSA- AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, id-RSASSA-
PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256. PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256.
The hash algorithm to hash a message being signed and the hash The hash algorithm to hash a message being signed and the hash and
algorithm as the mask generation function "MGF(H, emLen - hLen - 1)" the hash algorithm as the mask generation function used in RSASSA-PSS
[RFC8017] used in RSASSA-PSS MUST be the same, SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 MUST be the same, SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 respectively. The output-
respectively. The output-length of the SHAKE which hashes the length of the hash algorithm which hashes the message SHALL be 32 or
message SHALL be 32 or 64 bytes respectively. 64 bytes respectively.
In RSASSA-PSS, a mask generation function takes an octet string of
variable length and a desired output length as input, and outputs an
octet string of the desired length. In RSASSA-PSS with SHAKES, the
SHAKEs MUST be used natively as the MGF, instead of the MGF1
algorithm that uses the hash function in multiple iterations as
specified in Section B.2.1 of [RFC8017]. In other words, the MGF is
defined as
SHAKE128(mgfSeed, maskLen)
and
SHA256(mgfSeed, maskLen)
respectively for id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 and id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256. The mask generation function takes an octet string of variable length
The mgfSeed is the seed from which mask is generated, an octet and a desired output length as input, and outputs an octet string of
string. The maskLen for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 being used as the MGF the desired length. In RSASSA-PSS with SHAKES, the SHAKEs MUST be
is (n - 264)/8 or (n - 520)/8 bytes respectively, where n is the RSA used natively as the MGF function, instead of the MGF1 algorithm that
modulus in bits. For example, when RSA modulus n is 2048, the output uses the hash function in multiple iterations as specified in
length of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 as the MGF will be 223 or 191 bytes Section B.2.1 of [RFC8017]. In other words, the MGF is defined as
when id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 is used the SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 output of the mgfSeed for id-RSASSA-PSS-
respectively. SHAKE128 and id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 respectively. The mgfSeed is the
seed from which mask is generated, an octet string [RFC8017]. The
output length is (n - 264)/8 or (n - 520)/8 bytes respectively, where
n is the RSA modulus in bits. For example, when RSA modulus n is
2048, the output length of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 as the MGF will be
223 or 191-bits when id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256
is used respectively.
The RSASSA-PSS saltLength MUST be 32 or 64 bytes respectively. The RSASSA-PSS saltLength MUST be 32 or 64 bytes respectively.
Finally, the trailerField MUST be 1, which represents the trailer Finally, the trailerField MUST be 1, which represents the trailer
field with hexadecimal value 0xBC [RFC8017]. field with hexadecimal value 0xBC [RFC8017].
4.2.2. Deterministic ECDSA Signatures 4.2.2. Deterministic ECDSA Signatures
The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is defined in The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is defined in
[X9.62]. When the id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 or id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE256 [X9.62]. When the id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 or id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE256
(specified in Section 3) algorithm identifier appears, the respective (specified in Section 3) algorithm identifier appears, the respective
SHAKE function is used as the hash. The encoding MUST omit the SHAKE function is used as the hash. The encoding MUST omit the
parameters field. That is, the AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a parameters field. That is, the AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a
SEQUENCE of one component, the OID id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 or id- SEQUENCE of one component, the OID id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 or id-
ecdsa-with-SHAKE256. ecdsa-with-SHAKE256.
For simplicity and compliance with the ECDSA standard specification, For simplicity and compliance with the ECDSA standard specification,
the output size of the hash function must be explicitly determined. the output size of the hash function must be explicitly determined.
The output size, d, for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 used in ECDSA MUST be The output size, d, for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 used in ECDSA MUST be
256 or 512 bits respectively. The ECDSA message hash function is 256 or 512 bits respectively.
SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 respectively.
Conforming implementations that generate ECDSA with SHAKE signatures Conforming implementations that generate ECDSA with SHAKE signatures
in CMS MUST generate such signatures with a deterministicly in CMS MUST generate such signatures with a deterministicly
generated, non-random k in accordance with all the requirements generated, non-random k in accordance with all the requirements
specified in [RFC6979]. They MAY also generate such signatures in specified in [RFC6979]. They MAY also generate such signatures in
accordance with all other recommendations in [X9.62] or [SEC1] if accordance with all other recommendations in [X9.62] or [SEC1] if
they have a stated policy that requires conformance to these they have a stated policy that requires conformance to these
standards. standards.
In Section 3.2 "Generation of k" of [RFC6979], HMAC is used to derive
the deterministic k. Conforming implementations that generate
deterministic ECDSA with SHAKE signatures in X.509 MUST use KMAC with
SHAKE128 or KMAC with SHAKE256 as specfied in [SP800-185] when
SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 is used as the message hashing algorithm,
respectively. In this situation, KMAC with SHAKE128 and KMAC with
SHAKE256 have 256-bit and 512-bit outputs respectively, and the
optional customization bit string S is an empty string.
4.3. Public Keys 4.3. Public Keys
In CMS, the signer's public key algorithm identifiers are located in In CMS, the signer's public key algorithm identifiers are located in
the OriginatorPublicKey's algorithm attribute. the OriginatorPublicKey's algorithm attribute.
Conforming implementations MUST specify the algorithms explicitly by Conforming implementations MUST specify the algorithms explicitly by
using the OIDs specified in Section 3 when encoding RSASSA-PSS and using the OIDs specified in Section 3 when encoding RSASSA-PSS and
ECDSA with SHAKE public keys in CMS messages. The conventions for ECDSA with SHAKE public keys in CMS messages. The conventions for
RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA public keys algorithm identifiers are as RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA public keys algorithm identifiers are as
specified in [RFC3279], [RFC4055] and [RFC5480] , but we include them specified in [RFC3279], [RFC4055] and [RFC5480] , but we include them
skipping to change at page 8, line 21 skipping to change at page 8, line 19
MUST be encoded using the RSAPublicKey type [RFC4055]. The output of MUST be encoded using the RSAPublicKey type [RFC4055]. The output of
this encoding is carried in the CMS publicKey bit string. this encoding is carried in the CMS publicKey bit string.
RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE {
modulus INTEGER, -- n modulus INTEGER, -- n
publicExponent INTEGER -- e publicExponent INTEGER -- e
} }
4.3.2. ECDSA Public Keys 4.3.2. ECDSA Public Keys
When id-ecdsa-with-shake128 or id-ecdsa-with-shake256 are used as the For ECDSA, the mandatory EC SubjectPublicKey is defined in
algorithm identitifier in the public key, the parameters, as
explained in Section 3, MUST be absent. The hash function and its
output-length are the same as in Section 4.2.2.
Additionally, the mandatory EC SubjectPublicKey is defined in
Section 2.1.1 and its syntax in Section 2.2 of [RFC5480]. We also Section 2.1.1 and its syntax in Section 2.2 of [RFC5480]. We also
include them here for convenience: include them here for convenience:
id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) keyType(2) 1 } iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) keyType(2) 1 }
ECParameters ::= CHOICE { ECParameters ::= CHOICE {
namedCurve OBJECT IDENTIFIER namedCurve OBJECT IDENTIFIER
-- implicitCurve NULL -- implicitCurve NULL
-- specifiedCurve SpecifiedECDomain -- specifiedCurve SpecifiedECDomain
skipping to change at page 8, line 50 skipping to change at page 8, line 43
certificate SHALL apply to the verification of the signature. certificate SHALL apply to the verification of the signature.
4.4. Message Authentication Codes 4.4. Message Authentication Codes
KMAC message authentication code (KMAC) is specified in [SP800-185]. KMAC message authentication code (KMAC) is specified in [SP800-185].
In CMS, KMAC algorithm identifiers are located in the In CMS, KMAC algorithm identifiers are located in the
AuthenticatedData macAlgorithm field. The KMAC values are located in AuthenticatedData macAlgorithm field. The KMAC values are located in
the AuthenticatedData mac field. the AuthenticatedData mac field.
When the id-KmacWithSHAKE128 or id-KmacWithSHAKE256 algorithm When the id-KmacWithSHAKE128 or id-KmacWithSHAKE256 algorithm
identifier is used as the KMAC algorithm identifier, the parameters identifier is used as the MAC algorithm identifier, the parameters
field MUST be absent. field is optional (absent or present). If absent, the SHAKE256
output length used in KMAC is 256 or 512 bits respectively and the
customization string is an empty string by default.
Conforming implementations that process KMACs with the SHAKEs when Conforming implementations that process KMACs with the SHAKEs when
processing CMS data MUST recognize these identifiers. processing CMS data MUST recognize these identifiers.
When calculating the KMAC output, the variable N is 0xD2B282C2, S is When calculating the KMAC output, the variable N is 0xD2B282C2, S is
an empty string, and L, the integer representing the requested output an empty string, and L, the integer representing the requested output
length in bits, is 256 or 512 for KmacWithSHAKE128 or length in bits, is 256 or 512 for KmacWithSHAKE128 or
KmacWithSHAKE256 respectively in this specification. KmacWithSHAKE256 respectively in this specification.
5. IANA Considerations 5. IANA Considerations
[ EDNOTE: Update here only if there are OID allocations by IANA. ] [ EDNOTE: Update here only if there are OID allocations by IANA. ]
This document has no IANA actions. This document has no IANA actions.
6. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are one-way extensible-output functions. Their
output length depends on a required length of the consuming
application.
The SHAKEs are deterministic functions. Like any other deterministic The SHAKEs are deterministic functions. Like any other deterministic
functions, executing each function with the same input multiple times function, executing each function with the same input multiple times
will produce the same output. Therefore, users should not expect will produce the same output. Therefore, users should not expect
unrelated outputs (with the same or different output lengths) from unrelated outputs (with the same or different output lengths) from
excuting a SHAKE function with the same input multiple times. The excuting a SHAKE function with the same input multiple times. The
shorter one of any 2 outputs produced from a SHAKE with the same shorter one of any 2 outputs produced from a SHAKE with the same
input is a prefix of the longer one. It is a similar situation as input is a prefix of the longer one. It is a similar situation as
truncating a 512-bit output of SHA-512 by taking its 256 left-most truncating a 512-bit output of SHA-512 by taking its 256 left-most
bits. These 256 left-most bits are a prefix of the 512-bit output. bits. These 256 left-most bits are a prefix of the 512-bit output.
Implementations must protect the signer's private key. Compromise of Implementations must protect the signer's private key. Compromise of
the signer's private key permits masquerade. the signer's private key permits masquerade.
When more than two parties share the same message-authentication key, When more than two parties share the same message-authentication key,
data origin authentication is not provided. Any party that knows the data origin authentication is not provided. Any party that knows the
message-authentication key can compute a valid MAC, therefore the message-authentication key can compute a valid MAC, therefore the
content could originate from any one of the parties. content could originate from any one of the parties.
Implementations must randomly generate message-authentication keys
and one-time values, such as the k value when generating a ECDSA
signature. In addition, the generation of public/private key pairs
relies on random numbers. The use of inadequate pseudo-random number
generators (PRNGs) to generate such cryptographic values can result
in little or no security. The generation of quality random numbers
is difficult. [RFC4086] offers important guidance in this area, and
[SP800-90A] series provide acceptable PRNGs.
Implementers should be aware that cryptographic algorithms may become Implementers should be aware that cryptographic algorithms may become
weaker with time. As new cryptanalysis techniques are developed and weaker with time. As new cryptanalysis techniques are developed and
computing power increases, the work factor or time required to break computing power increases, the work factor or time required to break
a particular cryptographic algorithm may decrease. Therefore, a particular cryptographic algorithm may decrease. Therefore,
cryptographic algorithm implementations should be modular allowing cryptographic algorithm implementations should be modular allowing
new algorithms to be readily inserted. That is, implementers should new algorithms to be readily inserted. That is, implementers should
be prepared to regularly update the set of algorithms in their be prepared to regularly update the set of algorithms in their
implementations. implementations.
7. Acknowledgements 7. Acknowledgements
skipping to change at page 11, line 30 skipping to change at page 11, line 11
Housley, R., "Use of the SHA3 One-way Hash Functions in Housley, R., "Use of the SHA3 One-way Hash Functions in
the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", draft-housley- the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", draft-housley-
lamps-cms-sha3-hash-00 (work in progress), March 2017. lamps-cms-sha3-hash-00 (work in progress), March 2017.
[RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and [RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April (CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April
2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279>. 2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279>.
[RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.
[RFC6979] Pornin, T., "Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature [RFC6979] Pornin, T., "Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature
Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA)", RFC 6979, DOI 10.17487/RFC6979, August Algorithm (ECDSA)", RFC 6979, DOI 10.17487/RFC6979, August
2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6979>. 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6979>.
[SEC1] Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, "SEC 1: [SEC1] Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, "SEC 1:
Elliptic Curve Cryptography", May 2009, Elliptic Curve Cryptography", May 2009,
<http://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf>. <http://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf>.
[shake-nist-oids] [shake-nist-oids]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Computer National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Computer
Security Objects Register", October 2017, Security Objects Register", October 2017,
<https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Computer-Security-Objects- <https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Computer-Security-Objects-
Register/Algorithm-Registration>. Register/Algorithm-Registration>.
[SP800-90A]
National Institute of Standards and Technology,
"Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using
Deterministic Random Bit Generators. NIST SP 800-90A",
June 2015,
<http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf>.
[X9.62] American National Standard for Financial Services (ANSI), [X9.62] American National Standard for Financial Services (ANSI),
"X9.62-2005 Public Key Cryptography for the Financial "X9.62-2005 Public Key Cryptography for the Financial
Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Standard (ECDSA)", November 2005. Standard (ECDSA)", November 2005.
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module Appendix A. ASN.1 Module
[EDNOTE: Update. TBD. ] This appendix includes the ASN.1 modules for SHAKEs in CMS. This
module includes some ASN.1 from other standards for reference.
PKIXAlgsForSHAKE-2018 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) CMSAlgsForSHAKE-2018 { { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0)
id-mod-cms-shakes-2018(TBD) } id-mod-cms-shakes(TBD) }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL; -- EXPORTS ALL;
IMPORTS IMPORTS
-- FROM [RFC6268] DIGEST-ALGORITHM, MAC-ALGORITHM, SMIME-CAPS
FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) }
RSAPublicKey, rsaEncryption, id-ecPublicKey
FROM PKIXAlgs-2009 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkix1-algorithms2008-02(56) }
--
-- Message Digest Algorithms (mda-)
-- used in SignedData, SignerInfo, DigestedData,
-- and the AuthenticatedData digestAlgorithm
-- fields in CMS
--
digestAlgorithms DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
...
-- This expands MessageAuthAlgs from [RFC5652]
-- and MessageDigestAlgs in [RFC5753]
mda-shake128 |
mda-shake256,
...
}
-- --
-- One-Way Hash Functions -- One-Way Hash Functions
-- SHAKE128 -- SHAKE128
mda-shake128 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= { mda-shake128 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-shake128 -- with output length 32 bytes. IDENTIFIER id-shake128 -- with output length 32 bytes.
} }
id-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) id-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
hashAlgs(2) 11 } hashAlgs(2) 11 }
-- SHAKE-256 -- SHAKE-256
mda-shake256 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= { mda-shake256 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-shake256 -- with output length 64 bytes. IDENTIFIER id-shake256 -- with output length 64 bytes.
} }
id-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) id-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
hashAlgs(2) 12 } hashAlgs(2) 12 }
--
-- Public key algorithm identifiers located in the
-- OriginatorPublicKey's algorithm attribute in CMS.
-- And Signature identifiers used in SignerInfo
-- signatureAlgorithm field of SignedData content
-- type and countersignature attribute in CMS.
--
-- From RFC5280, for reference.
-- rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 1 }
-- When the rsaEncryption algorithm identifier is used
-- for a public key, the AlgorithmIdentifier parameters
-- field MUST contain NULL.
--
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD }
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD }
-- When the id-RSASSA-PSS-* algorithm identifiers are used
-- for a public key or a signature in CMS, the AlgorithmIdentifier
-- parameters field MUST be absent. The message digest algorithm
-- used in RSASSA-PSS MUST be SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 with a 32 or
-- 64 byte outout length respectively. The mask generating
-- function MUST be SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 with an output length
-- of (n - 264)/8 or (n - 520)/8 bytes respectively, where n
-- is the RSA modulus in bits. The RSASSA-PSS saltLength MUST
-- be 32 or 64 bytes respectively. In both cases, the RSA
-- public key, MUST be encoded using the RSAPublicKey type.
-- From RFC4055, for reference.
-- RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE {
-- modulus INTEGER, -- n
-- publicExponent INTEGER } -- e
id-ecdsa-with-shake128 ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
sigAlgs(3) TBD }
id-ecdsa-with-shake256 ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
sigAlgs(3) TBD }
-- When the id-ecdsa-with-shake* algorithm identifiers are
-- used in CMS, the AlgorithmIdentifier parameters field
-- MUST be absent and the signature algorithm should
-- Deterministric ECDSA [RFC6979]. The message digest MUST
-- be SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 with a 32 or 64 byte outout
-- length respectively. In both cases, the ECDSA public key,
-- MUST be encoded using the id-ecPublicKey type.
-- From RFC5480, for reference.
-- id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
-- iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) keyType(2) 1 }
-- The id-ecPublicKey parameters must be absent or present
-- and are defined as
-- ECParameters ::= CHOICE {
-- namedCurve OBJECT IDENTIFIER
-- -- implicitCurve NULL
-- -- specifiedCurve SpecifiedECDomain
-- }
--
-- Message Authentication (maca-) Algorithms
-- used in AuthenticatedData macAlgorithm in CMS
--
MessageAuthAlgs MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
...
-- This expands MessageAuthAlgs from [RFC5652] and [RFC6268]
maca-KMACwithSHAKE128 |
maca-KMACwithSHAKE256
}
SMimeCaps SMIME-CAPS ::= {
...
-- The expands SMimeCaps from [RFC5911]
maca-KMACwithSHAKE128 |
maca-KMACwithSHAKE256
}
-- --
-- KMAC Functions
-- KMAC with SHAKE128 -- KMAC with SHAKE128
KMACwithSHAKE128 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= { maca-KMACwithSHAKE128 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-KMACWithSHAKE128 IDENTIFIER id-KMACWithSHAKE128
PARAMS TYPE KMACwithSHAKE128-params ARE required PARAMS TYPE KMACwithSHAKE128-params ARE optional
-- If KMACwithSHAKE128-params parameters are absent
-- the SHAKE128 output length used in KMAC is 256 bits
-- and the customization string is an empty string.
SMIME-CAPS {IDENTIFIED BY id-KMACWithSHAKE128}
} }
id-KMACWithSHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) id-KMACWithSHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) country(16) us(840) organization(1)
gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
hashAlgs(2) 19 } hashAlgs(2) 19 }
KMACwithSHAKE128-params ::= SEQUENCE { KMACwithSHAKE128-params ::= SEQUENCE {
KMACOutputLength INTEGER DEFAULT 256, -- Output length in bits KMACOutputLength INTEGER DEFAULT 256, -- Output length in bits
customizationString OCTET STRING DEFAULT '' customizationString OCTET STRING DEFAULT ''H
} }
-- KMAC with SHAKE256 -- KMAC with SHAKE256
KMACwithSHAKE256 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= { maca-KMACwithSHAKE256 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-KMACWithSHAKE256 IDENTIFIER id-KMACWithSHAKE256
PARAMS TYPE KMACwithSHAKE256-params ARE required PARAMS TYPE KMACwithSHAKE256-params ARE optional
-- If KMACwithSHAKE256-params parameters are absent
-- the SHAKE256 output length used in KMAC is 512 bits
-- and the customization string is an empty string.
SMIME-CAPS {IDENTIFIED BY id-KMACWithSHAKE256}
} }
id-KMACWithSHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) id-KMACWithSHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) country(16) us(840) organization(1)
gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
hashAlgs(2) 20 } hashAlgs(2) 20 }
KMACwithSHAKE256-params ::= SEQUENCE { KMACwithSHAKE256-params ::= SEQUENCE {
KMACOutputLength INTEGER DEFAULT 512, -- Output length in bits KMACOutputLength INTEGER DEFAULT 512, -- Output length in bits
customizationString OCTET STRING DEFAULT '' customizationString OCTET STRING DEFAULT ''H
} }
END END
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Quynh Dang Quynh Dang
NIST NIST
100 Bureau Drive 100 Bureau Drive
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Gaithersburg, MD 20899
 End of changes. 42 change blocks. 
116 lines changed or deleted 197 lines changed or added

This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.47. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/