draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes-00.txt   draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes-01.txt 
LAMPS WG Q. Dang LAMPS WG Q. Dang
Internet-Draft NIST Internet-Draft NIST
Intended status: Standards Track P. Kampanakis Intended status: Standards Track P. Kampanakis
Expires: August 19, 2018 Cisco Systems Expires: December 31, 2018 Cisco Systems
February 15, 2018 June 29, 2018
Use of the SHAKE One-way Hash Functions in the Cryptographic Message Use of the SHAKE One-way Hash Functions in the Cryptographic Message
Syntax (CMS) Syntax (CMS)
draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes-00 draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes-01
Abstract Abstract
This document describes the conventions for using the SHAKE family of This document describes the conventions for using the SHAKE family of
hash functions with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). hash functions with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS).
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
skipping to change at page 1, line 33 skipping to change at page 1, line 33
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This Internet-Draft will expire on August 19, 2018. This Internet-Draft will expire on December 31, 2018.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Message Digest Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. One-way Extensible-Output-Function SHAKEs . . . . . . . . 3 4. Use in CMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Mask Generation SHAKEs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4.1. Message Digests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Signature Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4.2. Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. RSASSA-PSS with SHAKEs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4.2.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2. ECDSA with SHAKEs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4.2.2. ECDSA Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Message Authentication Codes with SHAKEs . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.3. Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.3.1. RSASSA-PSS Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.3.2. ECDSA Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.4. Message Authentication Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1. Change Log 1. Change Log
[ EDNOTE: Remove this section before publication. ] [ EDNOTE: Remove this section before publication. ]
o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-01:
* Significant reorganization of the sections to simplify the
introduction, the new OIDs and their use in CMS.
* Added new OIDs for RSASSA-PSS that hardcodes hash, salt and
MFG, according the WG consensus.
* Updated Public Key section to use the new RSASSA-PSS OIDs and
clarify the algorithm identifier usage.
* Removed the no longer used SHAKE OIDs from section 3.1.
o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-00: o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-00:
* Various updates to title and section names. * Various updates to title and section names.
* Content changes filling in text and references. * Content changes filling in text and references.
o draft-dang-lamps-cms-shakes-hash-00: o draft-dang-lamps-cms-shakes-hash-00:
* Initial version * Initial version
2. Introduction 2. Introduction
The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] is used to digitally The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] is used to digitally
sign, digest, authenticate, or encrypt arbitrary message contents. sign, digest, authenticate, or encrypt arbitrary message contents.
This specification describes the use of the SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 This specification describes the use of the SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
specified in [SHA3] as new hash functions in CMS. In addition, this specified in [SHA3] as new hash functions in CMS. In addition, it
specification describes the use of these one-way hash functions with describes the use of these functions with the RSASSA-PSS signature
the RSASSA-PSS signature algorithm [RFC8017] and the Elliptic Curve algorithm [RFC8017] and the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [X9.62] with the CMS signed-data Algorithm (ECDSA) [X9.62] with the CMS signed-data content type.
content type.
3. Message Digest Algorithms
3.1. One-way Extensible-Output-Function SHAKEs
The SHA-3 family of one-way hash functions is specified in [SHA3]. The SHA-3 family of one-way hash functions is specified in [SHA3].
In the SHA-3 family, two extendable-output functions, called SHAKE128 In the SHA-3 family, two extendable-output functions, called SHAKE128
and SHAKE256 are defined. Four hash functions, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, and SHAKE256 are defined. Four hash functions, SHA3-224, SHA3-256,
SHA3-384, and SHA3-512 are also defined but are out of scope for this SHA3-384, and SHA3-512 are also defined but are out of scope for this
document. document. A SHAKE is a variable length hash function. The output
lengths, in bits, of the SHAKE hash functions are defined by the d
parameter. The corresponding collision and preimage resistance
security levels for SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are respectively
min(d/2,128) and min(d,128) and min(d/2,256) and min(d,256) bits.
In CMS, Digest algorithm identifiers are located in the SignedData A SHAKE can be used in CMS as a message digest, message
digestAlgorithms field, the SignerInfo digestAlgorithm field, the authentication code or a mask generation function (in RSASSA-PSS).
DigestedData digestAlgorithm field, and the AuthenticatedData In this document we define six new OIDs using SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
digestAlgorithm field. in CMS.
Digest values are located in the DigestedData digest field and the 3. Identifiers
Message Digest authenticated attribute. In addition, digest values
are input to signature algorithms.
SHAKE is a variable length hash function. The output lengths, in The object identifiers for SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 hash functions are
bits, of the SHAKE hash functions is defined by the parameter d. The defined in [shake-nist-oids] and we include them here for
corresponding collision and preimage resistance security levels for convenience.
SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are respectively min(d/2,128) and min(d,128)
and min(d/2,256) and min(d,256). The Object Identifiers (OIDs) for
these two hash functions are defined in [shake-nist-oids] and are
included here for convenience:
id-shake128-len OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) id-shake128-len OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 2 17 }
nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 17 }
id-shake128-len OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) id-shake256-len OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 2 18 }
nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 18 }
ShakeOutputLen ::= INTEGER -- Output length in octets In this specification, when using the id-shake128-len or id-
shake256-len algorithm identifiers, the parameters MUST be absent.
That is, the identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, the
OID.
When using the id-shake128-len id-shake256-len algorithm identifiers, The new identifiers for RSASSA-PSS signatures using SHAKEs are below.
the parameters MUST be present, and they MUST employ the
ShakeOutputLen syntax that contains an encoded positive integer value
at least 32 or 64 respectively.
3.2. Mask Generation SHAKEs id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD }
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD }
The RSASSA-PSS signature algorithm uses a mask generation function. [ EDNOTE: "TBD" will be specified by NIST later. ]
A mask generation function takes an octet string of variable length
and a desired output length as input, and outputs an octet string of
the desired length. The mask generation function used in RSASSA-PSS
is defined in [RFC8017], but we include it here as well for
convenience:
id-mgf1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 8 } The new algorithm identifiers of ECDSA signatures using SHAKEs are
below.
The parameters field associated with id-mgf1 MUST have a id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
hashAlgorithm value that identifies the hash used with MGF1. To use us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 3 TBD }
SHAKE as this hash, this parameter MUST be id-shake128-len or id-
shake256-len as specified in Section 3.1 above.
4. Signature Algorithms id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 3 TBD }
This section specifies the conventions employed by CMS [ EDNOTE: "TBD" will be specified by NIST. ]
implementations that support 2 SHAKE one-way hash functions with the
RSASSA-PSS signature algorithm [RFC8017] and the Elliptic Curve
Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [X9.62] with the CMS signed-data
content type.
In CMS, signature algorithm identifiers are located in the SignerInfo The same RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA with SHAKEs algorithm identifiers are
signatureAlgorithm field of SignedData and countersignature used for identifying public keys and signatures.
attributes. Signature values are located in the SignerInfo signature
field of SignedData and countersignature attributes.
4.1. RSASSA-PSS with SHAKEs The parameters for the four RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA identifiers MUST be
absent. That is, each identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one
component, the OID.
The RSASSA-PSS signature algorithm identifier and its parameters are The new object identifiers for KMACs using SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are
specifed in [RFC4055]: below.
id-RSASSA-PSS OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 10 } id-KmacWithSHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 2 TBD }
RSASSA-PSS-params ::= SEQUENCE { id-KmacWithSHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
hashAlgorithm HashAlgorithm, us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 2 TBD }
maskGenAlgorithm MaskGenAlgorithm,
saltLength INTEGER,
trailerField INTEGER }
This document adds two new hash algorithm choices and two new choices EDNOTE: "TBD" will be specified by NIST.
for mask generation functions. These are the SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
algorithm identifiers specified in Section 3.1.
When SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 is used as the hashAlgorithm, it MUST also The parameters for id-KmacWithSHAKE128 and id-KmacWithSHAKE256 MUST
be used as the maskGenAlgorithm. be absent. That is, each identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one
component, the OID.
When used as the hashAlgorithm, the SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 output- 4. Use in CMS
length must be either 32 or 64 bytes respectively. In these cases,
the parameters MUST be present, and they MUST employ the
ShakeOutputLen syntax that contains an encoded positive integer value
of 32 or 64 for id-shake128-len or id-shake256-len algorithm
identifier respectively.
When id-shake128-len or id-shake256-len algorithm identifier is used 4.1. Message Digests
as the id-mfg1 maskGenAlgorithm parameter, the ShakeOutputLen
parameter must be (n - 264)/8 or (n - 520)/8 respectively for
SHAKE128 and SHAKE256, where n is the RSA modulus in bits. For
example, when RSA modulus n is 2048, ShakeOutputLen must be 223 or
191 when id-shake128-len or id-shake256-len is used respectively.
The parameter saltLength MUST be 32 or 64 bytes respectively for the The id-shake128-len and id-shake256-len OIDs (Section 3) can be used
SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 OIDs. as the digest algorithm identifiers located in the SignedData,
SignerInfo, DigestedData, and the AuthenticatedData digestAlgorithm
fields in CMS [RFC5652]. The encoding MUST omit the parameters field
and the output size, d, for the SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 message digest
MUST be 256 or 512 bits respectively.
The conventions for RSA public keys are as specified in [RFC3279] and The digest values are located in the DigestedData field and the
[RFC4055]. [RFC3279] defines the following OID for RSA with NULL Message Digest authenticated attribute included in the
parameters. signedAttributes of the SignedData signerInfo. In addition, digest
values are input to signature algorithms.
rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 1} 4.2. Signatures
Additionally, [RFC4055] adds the RSASSA-PSS OID and parameters shown In CMS, signature algorithm identifiers are located in the SignerInfo
above as a public key identifier. The parameters may be either signatureAlgorithm field of SignedData content type and
absent or present when RSASSA-PSS OID is used as subject public key countersignature attribute. Signature values are located in the
information. If id-RSASSA-PSS is used in the public key identifier SignerInfo signature field of SignedData and countersignature.
with parameters, Section 3.3 of [RFC4055] describes that the
signature algorithm parameters MUST match the parameters in the key
structure algorithm identifier except the saltLength field. The
saltLength field in the signature parameters MUST be greater or equal
to that in the key parameters field. If the id-RSASSA-PSS parameters
are NULL no further parameter validation is necessary.
4.2. ECDSA with SHAKEs Conforming implementations that process RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA with
SHAKE signatures when processing CMS data MUST recognize the
corresponding OIDs specified in Section 3.
The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is defined in 4.2.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures
[X9.62]. When ECDSA is used in conjunction with one of the SHAKE
one-way hash functions, the object identifiers are:
id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) The RSASSA-PSS algorithm is defined in [RFC8017]. When id-RSASSA-
us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 3 x} PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 specified in Section 3 is
used, the encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the
AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, id-RSASSA-
PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256.
id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) The hash algorithm to hash a message being signed and the hash
us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 3 y} algorithm in the maskGenAlgorithm used in RSASSA-PSS MUST be the
same, SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 respectively. The output-length of the
SHAKE which hashes the message SHALL be 32 or 64 bytes respectively.
EDNOTE: x and y will be specified by NIST. The maskGenAlgorithm is the MGF1 specified in Section B.2.1 of
[RFC8017]. A mask generation function in RSASSA-PSS takes an octet
string of variable length and a desired output length as input, and
outputs an octet string of the desired length. The output length for
SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 being used as the hash function in MGF1 is (n -
264)/8 or (n - 520)/8 bytes respectively, where n is the RSA modulus
in bits. For example, when RSA modulus n is 2048, the output length
for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 in the maskGenAlgorithm will be 223 or 191
when id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 is used
respectively.
When using the id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 or id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE256 The RSASSA-PSS saltLength MUST be 32 or 64 bytes respectively.
algorithm identifier, the parameters field MUST be absent; not NULL Finally, the trailerField MUST be 1, which represents the trailer
but absent. field with hexadecimal value 0xBC [RFC8017].
4.2.2. ECDSA Signatures
The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is defined in
[X9.62]. When the id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 or id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE256
(specified in Section 3) algorithm identifier appears, the respective
SHAKE function is used as the hash. The encoding MUST omit the
parameters field. That is, the AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a
SEQUENCE of one component, the OID id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 or id-
ecdsa-with-SHAKE256.
For simplicity and compliance with the ECDSA standard specification, For simplicity and compliance with the ECDSA standard specification,
the output size of the hash function must be explicitly determined. the output size of the hash function must be explicitly determined.
The ShakeOutputLen parameter of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 MUST be 32 or 64 The output size, d, for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 used in ECDSA MUST be
bytes respectively when it is used in ECDSA 256 or 512 bits respectively. The ECDSA message hash function is
SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 respectively.
The conventions for ECDSA public keys is specified in [RFC5480] as 4.3. Public Keys
In CMS, the signer's public key algorithm identifiers are located in
the OriginatorPublicKey's algorithm attribute.
The conventions for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA public keys algorithm
identifiers are as specified in [RFC3279], [RFC4055] and [RFC5480] ,
but we include them below for convenience.
4.3.1. RSASSA-PSS Public Keys
[RFC3279] defines the following OID for RSA AlgorithmIdentifier in
the SubjectPublicKeyInfo with NULL parameters.
rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 1}
Additionally, when the RSA private key owner wishes to limit the use
of the public key exclusively to RSASSA-PSS, the AlgorithmIdentifier
for RSASSA-PSS defined in Section 3 can be used as the algorithm
attribute in the OriginatorPublicKey sequence. The identifier
parameters, as explained in Section 3, MUST be absent. The RSASSA-
PSS algorithm functions and output lengths are the same as defined in
Section 4.2.1.
Regardless of what public key algorithm identifier is used, the RSA
public key, which is composed of a modulus and a public exponent,
MUST be encoded using the RSAPublicKey type [RFC4055]. The output of
this encoding is carried in the CMS publicKey bit string.
RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE {
modulus INTEGER, -- n
publicExponent INTEGER -- e
}
4.3.2. ECDSA Public Keys
When id-ecdsa-with-shake128 or id-ecdsa-with-shake256 are used as the
algorithm identitifier in the public key, the parameters, as
explained in Section 3, MUST be absent. The hash function and its
output-length are the same as in Section 4.2.2.
Additionally, the mandatory EC SubjectPublicKey is defined in
Section 2.1.1 and its syntax in Section 2.2 of [RFC5480]. We also
include them here for convenience:
id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) keyType(2) 1 } iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) keyType(2) 1 }
ECParameters ::= CHOICE { ECParameters ::= CHOICE {
namedCurve OBJECT IDENTIFIER namedCurve OBJECT IDENTIFIER
-- implicitCurve NULL -- implicitCurve NULL
-- specifiedCurve SpecifiedECDomain } -- specifiedCurve SpecifiedECDomain
}
The ECParameters associated with the ECDSA public key in the signers The ECParameters associated with the ECDSA public key in the signers
certificate SHALL apply to the verification of the signature. certificate SHALL apply to the verification of the signature.
5. Message Authentication Codes with SHAKEs 4.4. Message Authentication Codes
This section specifies the conventions employed by CMS
implementations that support the KMAC specified in [SP800-185] as
authentication code (MAC).
KMAC message authentication code (KMAC) is specified in [SP800-185].
In CMS, KMAC algorithm identifiers are located in the In CMS, KMAC algorithm identifiers are located in the
AuthenticatedData macAlgorithm field. MAC values are located in the AuthenticatedData macAlgorithm field. The KMAC values are located in
AuthenticatedData mac field. the AuthenticatedData mac field.
The object identifiers for KMACs with SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are:
id-KmacWithSHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 2 z }
id-KmacWithSHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 2 w }
EDNOTE: z and w will be specified by NIST.
When the id-KmacWithSHAKE128 or id-KmacWithSHAKE256 algorithm When the id-KmacWithSHAKE128 or id-KmacWithSHAKE256 algorithm
identifier is used, the parameters field MUST be absent; not NULL but identifier is used as the KMAC algorithm identifier, the parameters
absent. field MUST be absent.
Conforming implementations that process KMACs with the SHAKEs when
processing CMS data MUST recognize these identifiers.
When calculating the KMAC output, the variable N is 0xD2B282C2, S is When calculating the KMAC output, the variable N is 0xD2B282C2, S is
an empty string, and L, the integer representing the requested output an empty string, and L, the integer representing the requested output
length in bits, is 256 or 512 for KmacWithSHAKE128 or length in bits, is 256 or 512 for KmacWithSHAKE128 or
KmacWithSHAKE256 respectively in this specification. KmacWithSHAKE256 respectively in this specification.
6. Acknowledgement 5. IANA Considerations
This document is based on Russ Housley's draft
[I-D.housley-lamps-cms-sha3-hash] It replaces SHA3 hash functions by
SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 as the LAMPS WG agreed.
7. IANA Considerations
This document uses several registries that were originally created in This document uses several new registries [ EDNOTE: Update here. ]
[shake-nist-oids]. No further registries are required. [ EDNOTE:
Update here. ]
8. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are one-way extensible-output functions. Their SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are one-way extensible-output functions. Their
output length depends on a required length of the consuming output length depends on a required length of the consuming
application. application.
The SHAKEs are deterministic functions. Like any other deterministic The SHAKEs are deterministic functions. Like any other deterministic
functions, executing each function with the same input multiple times functions, executing each function with the same input multiple times
will produce the same output. Therefore, users should not expect will produce the same output. Therefore, users should not expect
unrelated outputs (with the same or different output lengths) from unrelated outputs (with the same or different output lengths) from
excuting a SHAKE function with the same input multiple times. excuting a SHAKE function with the same input multiple times.
skipping to change at page 7, line 48 skipping to change at page 8, line 40
and one-time values, such as the k value when generating a ECDSA and one-time values, such as the k value when generating a ECDSA
signature. In addition, the generation of public/private key pairs signature. In addition, the generation of public/private key pairs
relies on random numbers. The use of inadequate pseudo-random number relies on random numbers. The use of inadequate pseudo-random number
generators (PRNGs) to generate such cryptographic values can result generators (PRNGs) to generate such cryptographic values can result
in little or no security. The generation of quality random numbers in little or no security. The generation of quality random numbers
is difficult. [RFC4086] offers important guidance in this area, and is difficult. [RFC4086] offers important guidance in this area, and
[SP800-90A] series provide acceptable PRNGs. [SP800-90A] series provide acceptable PRNGs.
Implementers should be aware that cryptographic algorithms may become Implementers should be aware that cryptographic algorithms may become
weaker with time. As new cryptanalysis techniques are developed and weaker with time. As new cryptanalysis techniques are developed and
computing performance improves, the work factor to break a particular computing power increases, the work factor or time required to break
cryptographic algorithm will reduce. Therefore, cryptographic a particular cryptographic algorithm may decrease. Therefore,
algorithm implementations should be modular allowing new algorithms cryptographic algorithm implementations should be modular allowing
to be readily inserted. That is, implementers should be prepared to new algorithms to be readily inserted. That is, implementers should
regularly update the set of algorithms in their implementations. be prepared to regularly update the set of algorithms in their
implementations.
9. References 7. Acknowledgements
9.1. Normative References This document is based on Russ Housley's draft
[I-D.housley-lamps-cms-sha3-hash] It replaces SHA3 hash functions by
SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 as the LAMPS WG agreed.
[RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and 8. References
Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List 8.1. Normative References
(CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April
2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279>.
[RFC4055] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional [RFC4055] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional
Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in
the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055, and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4055, June 2005, DOI 10.17487/RFC4055, June 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4055>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4055>.
[RFC5480] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk, [RFC5480] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk,
"Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key "Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
skipping to change at page 8, line 48 skipping to change at page 9, line 42
Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions", FIPS PUB 202, Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions", FIPS PUB 202,
August 2015. August 2015.
[SP800-185] [SP800-185]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "SHA-3 National Institute of Standards and Technology, "SHA-3
Derived Functions: cSHAKE, KMAC, TupleHash and Derived Functions: cSHAKE, KMAC, TupleHash and
ParallelHash. NIST SP 800-185", December 2016, ParallelHash. NIST SP 800-185", December 2016,
<http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/ <http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
NIST.SP.800-185.pdf>. NIST.SP.800-185.pdf>.
9.2. Informative References 8.2. Informative References
[I-D.housley-lamps-cms-sha3-hash] [I-D.housley-lamps-cms-sha3-hash]
Housley, R., "Use of the SHA3 One-way Hash Functions in Housley, R., "Use of the SHA3 One-way Hash Functions in
the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", draft-housley- the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", draft-housley-
lamps-cms-sha3-hash-00 (work in progress), March 2017. lamps-cms-sha3-hash-00 (work in progress), March 2017.
[RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April
2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279>.
[RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, [RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005, DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.
[shake-nist-oids] [shake-nist-oids]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Computer National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Computer
Security Objects Register", October 2017, Security Objects Register", October 2017,
<https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Computer-Security-Objects- <https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Computer-Security-Objects-
Register/Algorithm-Registration>. Register/Algorithm-Registration>.
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