draft-ietf-lamps-cms-hash-sig-04.txt   draft-ietf-lamps-cms-hash-sig-05.txt 
INTERNET-DRAFT R. Housley INTERNET-DRAFT R. Housley
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Vigil Security Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Vigil Security
Intended Status: Proposed Standard Intended Status: Proposed Standard
Expires: 12 August 2019 12 February 2019 Expires: 22 August 2019 22 February 2019
Use of the HSS/LMS Hash-based Signature Algorithm Use of the HSS/LMS Hash-based Signature Algorithm
in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
<draft-ietf-lamps-cms-hash-sig-04> <draft-ietf-lamps-cms-hash-sig-05>
Abstract Abstract
This document specifies the conventions for using the the HSS/LMS This document specifies the conventions for using the the HSS/LMS
hash-based signature algorithm with the Cryptographic Message Syntax hash-based signature algorithm with the Cryptographic Message Syntax
(CMS). In addition, the algorithm identifier and public key syntax (CMS). In addition, the algorithm identifier and public key syntax
are provided. The HSS/LMS algorithm is one form of hash-based are provided. The HSS/LMS algorithm is one form of hash-based
digital signature; it is described in [HASHSIG]. digital signature; it is described in [HASHSIG].
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/1id-abstracts.html http://www.ietf.org/1id-abstracts.html
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html
Copyright and License Notice Copyright and License Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
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based signature algorithm with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) based signature algorithm with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
[CMS] signed-data content type. The Leighton-Micali Signature (LMS) [CMS] signed-data content type. The Leighton-Micali Signature (LMS)
system provides a one-time digital signature that is a variant of system provides a one-time digital signature that is a variant of
Merkle Tree Signatures (MTS). The Hierarchical Signature System Merkle Tree Signatures (MTS). The Hierarchical Signature System
(HSS) is built on top of the LMS system to efficiently scale for a (HSS) is built on top of the LMS system to efficiently scale for a
larger numbers of signatures. The HSS/LMS algorithm is one form of larger numbers of signatures. The HSS/LMS algorithm is one form of
hash-based digital signature, and it is described in [HASHSIG]. The hash-based digital signature, and it is described in [HASHSIG]. The
HSS/LMS signature algorithm can only be used for a fixed number of HSS/LMS signature algorithm can only be used for a fixed number of
signing operations. The number of signing operations depends upon signing operations. The number of signing operations depends upon
the size of the tree. The HSS/LMS signature algorithm uses small the size of the tree. The HSS/LMS signature algorithm uses small
private and public keys, and it has low computational cost; however, public keys, and it has low computational cost; however, the
the signatures are quite large. signatures are quite large. The HSS/LMS private key can be very
small when the signer is willing to perform additional computation at
signing time; alternatively, the private key can consume additional
memory and provide a faster signing time.
Well, yes, there is quite a range of possible time/memory trade-offs
available when storing the private key; if you need to, the private
key can be expressed in quite a small amount of space (albeit at the
expense of making the signature generation operation expensive).
1.1. ASN.1 1.1. ASN.1
CMS values are generated using ASN.1 [ASN1-B], using the Basic CMS values are generated using ASN.1 [ASN1-B], using the Basic
Encoding Rules (BER) and the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) Encoding Rules (BER) and the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)
[ASN1-E]. [ASN1-E].
1.2. Terminology 1.2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
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A post-quantum cryptosystem is a system that is secure against A post-quantum cryptosystem is a system that is secure against
quantum computers that have more than a trivial number of quantum quantum computers that have more than a trivial number of quantum
bits. It is open to conjecture when it will be feasible to build bits. It is open to conjecture when it will be feasible to build
such a machine. RSA, DSA, and ECDSA are not post-quantum secure. such a machine. RSA, DSA, and ECDSA are not post-quantum secure.
The LM-OTS one-time signature, LMS, and HSS do not depend on discrete The LM-OTS one-time signature, LMS, and HSS do not depend on discrete
logarithm or factoring, as a result these algorithms are considered logarithm or factoring, as a result these algorithms are considered
to be post-quantum secure. to be post-quantum secure.
Hash-based signatures [HASHSIG] are currently defined to use Hash-based signatures [HASHSIG] are currently defined to use
exclusively SHA-256. An IANA registry is defined so that other hash exclusively SHA-256 [SHS]. An IANA registry is defined so that other
functions could be used in the future. LM-OTS signature generation hash functions could be used in the future. LM-OTS signature
prepends a random string as well as other metadata before computing generation prepends a random string as well as other metadata before
the hash value. The inclusion of the random value reduces the computing the hash value. The inclusion of the random value reduces
chances of an attacker being able to find collisions, even if the the chances of an attacker being able to find collisions, even if the
attacker has a large-scale quantum computer. attacker has a large-scale quantum computer.
Today, RSA is often used to digitally sign software updates. This Today, RSA is often used to digitally sign software updates. This
means that the distribution of software updates could be compromised means that the distribution of software updates could be compromised
if a significant advance is made in factoring or a quantum computer if a significant advance is made in factoring or a quantum computer
is invented. The use of HSS/LMS hash-based signatures to protect is invented. The use of HSS/LMS hash-based signatures to protect
software update distribution, perhaps using the format described in software update distribution, perhaps using the format described in
[FWPROT], will allow the deployment of software that implements new [FWPROT], will allow the deployment of software that implements new
cryptosystems. cryptosystems.
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Micali Signature (LMS) system. LMS systems have two parameters. The Micali Signature (LMS) system. LMS systems have two parameters. The
first parameter is the height of the tree, h, which is the number of first parameter is the height of the tree, h, which is the number of
levels in the tree minus one. The [HASHSIG] specification supports levels in the tree minus one. The [HASHSIG] specification supports
five values for this parameter: h=5; h=10; h=15; h=20; and h=25. five values for this parameter: h=5; h=10; h=15; h=20; and h=25.
Note that there are 2^h leaves in the tree. The second parameter is Note that there are 2^h leaves in the tree. The second parameter is
the number of bytes output by the hash function, m, which is the the number of bytes output by the hash function, m, which is the
amount of data associated with each node in the tree. The [HASHSIG] amount of data associated with each node in the tree. The [HASHSIG]
specification supports only the SHA-256 hash function [SHS], with specification supports only the SHA-256 hash function [SHS], with
m=32. m=32.
Currently, the [HASHSIG] specification supports five tree sizes: The [HASHSIG] specification supports five tree sizes:
LMS_SHA256_M32_H5; LMS_SHA256_M32_H5;
LMS_SHA256_M32_H10; LMS_SHA256_M32_H10;
LMS_SHA256_M32_H15; LMS_SHA256_M32_H15;
LMS_SHA256_M32_H20; and LMS_SHA256_M32_H20; and
LMS_SHA256_M32_H25. LMS_SHA256_M32_H25.
The [HASHSIG] specification establishes an IANA registry to permit The [HASHSIG] specification establishes an IANA registry to permit
the registration of additional tree sizes in the future. the registration of additional tree sizes in the future.
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p - The number of n-byte string elements that make up the LM-OTS p - The number of n-byte string elements that make up the LM-OTS
signature. signature.
ls - The number of left-shift bits used in the checksum function, ls - The number of left-shift bits used in the checksum function,
which is defined in Section 4.4 of [HASHSIG]. which is defined in Section 4.4 of [HASHSIG].
The values of p and ls are dependent on the choices of the parameters The values of p and ls are dependent on the choices of the parameters
n and w, as described in Appendix B of [HASHSIG]. n and w, as described in Appendix B of [HASHSIG].
Currently, the [HASHSIG] specification supports four LM-OTS variants: The [HASHSIG] specification supports four LM-OTS variants:
LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W1; LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W1;
LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W2; LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W2;
LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W4; and LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W4; and
LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8. LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8.
The [HASHSIG] specification establishes an IANA registry to permit The [HASHSIG] specification establishes an IANA registry to permit
the registration of additional variants in the future. the registration of additional variants in the future.
Signing involves the generation of C, an n-byte random value. Signing involves the generation of C, an n-byte random value.
The LM-OTS signature value can be summarized as the identifier of the The LM-OTS signature value can be summarized as the identifier of the
LM-OTS variant, the random value, and a sequence of hash values that LM-OTS variant, the random value, and a sequence of hash values that
correspond to the elements of the public key as described in Section correspond to the elements of the public key as described in Section
4.5 of [HASHSIG]: 4.5 of [HASHSIG]:
u32str(otstype) || C || y[0] || ... || y[p-1] u32str(otstype) || C || y[0] || ... || y[p-1]
3. Algorithm Identifiers and Parameters 3. Algorithm Identifiers and Parameters
The algorithm identifier for an HSS/LMS hash-based signature when The algorithm identifier for an HSS/LMS hash-based signatures is:
SHA-256 [SHS] is used to hash the content is the
id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig-with-sha256 object identifier:
id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig-with-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) alg(3) TBD }
The algorithm identifier for an HSS/LMS hash-based signature when
SHA-384 [SHS] is used to hash the content is the
id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig-with-sha384 object identifier:
id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig-with-sha384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) alg(3) TBD }
The algorithm identifier for an HSS/LMS hash-based signature when
SHA-512 [SHS] is used to hash the content is the
id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig-with-sha512 object identifier:
id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig-with-sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) alg(3) TBD } smime(16) alg(3) 17 }
When any of these object identifiers is used for a signature, the When this object identifier is used for a HSS/LMS signature, the
AlgorithmIdentifier parameters field MUST be absent (that is, the AlgorithmIdentifier parameters field MUST be absent (that is, the
parameters are not present; the parameters are not set to NULL). parameters are not present; the parameters are not set to NULL).
The signature values is a large OCTET STRING. The signature format The signature value is a large OCTET STRING. The signature format is
is designed for easy parsing. Each format includes a counter and designed for easy parsing. Each format includes a counter and type
type codes that indirectly providing all of the information that is codes that indirectly providing all of the information that is needed
needed to parse the value during signature validation. to parse the value during signature validation.
The signature value identifies the hash function used in the HSS/LMS
tree. In [HASHSIG] only the SHA-256 hash function [SHS] is
supported, but it also establishes an IANA registry to permit the
registration of additional hash functions in the future.
4. HSS/LMS Public Key Identifier 4. HSS/LMS Public Key Identifier
The AlgorithmIdentifier for an HSS/LMS public key uses the id-alg- The AlgorithmIdentifier for an HSS/LMS public key uses the id-alg-
hss-lms-hashsig object identifier, and the parameters field MUST be hss-lms-hashsig object identifier, and the parameters field MUST be
absent. absent.
The SubjectPublicKeyInfo field of an X.509 certificate [RFC5280] is When this AlgorithmIdentifier appears in the SubjectPublicKeyInfo
one place where this algorithm identifier appears. In this field of an X.509 certificate [RFC5280], the certificate key usage
situation, the certificate key usage extension MAY contain extension MAY contain digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyCertSign,
digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyCertSign, and cRLSign; however, and cRLSign; however, it MUST NOT contain other values.
it MUST NOT contain other values.
pk-HSS-LMS-HashSig PUBLIC-KEY ::= { pk-HSS-LMS-HashSig PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig IDENTIFIER id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig
KEY HSS-LMS-HashSig-PublicKey KEY HSS-LMS-HashSig-PublicKey
PARAMS ARE absent PARAMS ARE absent
CERT-KEY-USAGE CERT-KEY-USAGE
{ digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyCertSign, cRLSign } } { digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyCertSign, cRLSign } }
HSS-LMS-HashSig-PublicKey ::= OCTET STRING HSS-LMS-HashSig-PublicKey ::= OCTET STRING
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The public key value is an OCTET STRING. Like the signature format, The public key value is an OCTET STRING. Like the signature format,
it is designed for easy parsing. The value is the number of levels it is designed for easy parsing. The value is the number of levels
in the public key, L, followed by the LMS public key. in the public key, L, followed by the LMS public key.
The HSS/LMS public key value can be summarized as: The HSS/LMS public key value can be summarized as:
u32str(L) || lms_public_key u32str(L) || lms_public_key
Note that the public key for the top-most LMS tree is the public key Note that the public key for the top-most LMS tree is the public key
of the HSS system, and when L=1 it is a stand-alone tree. of the HSS system. When L=1, the HSS system is a single tree.
5. Signed-data Conventions 5. Signed-data Conventions
As specified in [CMS], the digital signature is produced from the As specified in [CMS], the digital signature is produced from the
message digest and the signer's private key. If signed attributes message digest and the signer's private key. The signature is
are absent, then the message digest is the hash of the content. If computed over different value depending on whether signed attributes
signed attributes are present, then the hash of the content is placed are absent or present. When signed attributes are absent, the
in the message-digest attribute, the set of signed attributes is DER HSS/LMS signature is computed over the content. When signed
encoded, and the message digest is the hash of the encoded attributes are present, a hash is computed over the content using the
attributes. In summary: same hash function that is used in the HSS/LMS tree, and then a
message-digest attribute is constructed with the resulting hash
value, and then DER encode the set of signed attributes, which MUST
include a content-type attribute and a message-digest attribute, and
then the HSS/LMS signature is computed over the output of the DER-
encode operation. In summary:
IF (signed attributes are absent) IF (signed attributes are absent)
THEN md = Hash(content) THEN HSS_LMS_Sign(content)
ELSE message-digest attribute = Hash(content); ELSE message-digest attribute = Hash(content);
md = Hash(DER(SignedAttributes)) HSS_LMS_Sign(DER(SignedAttributes))
Sign(md)
When using [HASHSIG], the fields in the SignerInfo are used as When using [HASHSIG], the fields in the SignerInfo are used as
follows: follows:
digestAlgorithms SHOULD contain the one-way hash function used to digestAlgorithm MUST contain the one-way hash function used to in
compute the message digest on the eContent value. In the HSS/LMS tree. In [HASHSIG], SHA-256 is the only supported
[HASHSIG], SHA-256 is used throughout the hash tree, and the hash function, but other hash functions might be registered in
hash computation includes a random string. This random data the future. For convenience, the AlgorithmIdentifier for
makes it harder for an attacker to find collisions. The signer SHA-256 from [PKIXASN1] is repeated here:
SHOULD use SHA-256 or a stronger hash function to compute the
message digest on the content. For this purpose, Algorithm
identifiers for SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 are provided in
this document.
Further, the same one-way hash function SHOULD be used to mda-sha256 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
compute the message digest on both the eContent and the IDENTIFIER id-sha256
signedAttributes value if signedAttributes are present. PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE preferredAbsent }
signatureAlgorithm MUST contain id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig-with- id-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
sha256, id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig-with-sha384, or id-alg-hss-lms- country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
hashsig-with-sha512. The algorithm parameters field MUST be nistAlgorithms(4) hashalgs(2) 1 }
absent.
signatureAlgorithm MUST contain id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig, and the
algorithm parameters field MUST be absent.
signature contains the single HSS signature value resulting from signature contains the single HSS signature value resulting from
the signing operation as specified in [HASHSIG]. the signing operation as specified in [HASHSIG].
6. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
Implementations MUST protect the private keys. Compromise of the Implementations MUST protect the private keys. Compromise of the
private keys may result in the ability to forge signatures. Along private keys may result in the ability to forge signatures. Along
with the private key, the implementation MUST keep track of which with the private key, the implementation MUST keep track of which
leaf nodes in the tree have been used. Loss of integrity of this leaf nodes in the tree have been used. Loss of integrity of this
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In the SMI Security for S/MIME Algorithms (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.3) In the SMI Security for S/MIME Algorithms (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.3)
registry, change the description for value 17 to registry, change the description for value 17 to
"id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig" and change the reference to point to this "id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig" and change the reference to point to this
document. document.
Also, add the following note to the registry: Also, add the following note to the registry:
Value 17, "id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig", is also referred to as Value 17, "id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig", is also referred to as
"id-alg-mts-hashsig". "id-alg-mts-hashsig".
In the SMI Security for S/MIME Algorithms (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.3)
registry, assign a new value for id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig-with-sha256
with a reference to this document.
In the SMI Security for S/MIME Algorithms (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.3)
registry, assign a new value for id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig-with-sha384
with a reference to this document.
In the SMI Security for S/MIME Algorithms (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.3)
registry, assign a new value for id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig-with-sha512
with a reference to this document.
8. Acknowledgements 8. Acknowledgements
Many thanks to Scott Fluhrer, Jonathan Hammell, Panos Kampanakis, Jim Many thanks to Scott Fluhrer, Jonathan Hammell, Panos Kampanakis, Jim
Schaad, Sean Turner, and Daniel Van Geest for their careful review Schaad, Sean Turner, and Daniel Van Geest for their careful review
and comments. and comments.
9. References 9. References
9.1. Normative References 9.1. Normative References
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DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN
EXPORTS ALL; EXPORTS ALL;
IMPORTS IMPORTS
PUBLIC-KEY, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, SMIME-CAPS PUBLIC-KEY, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, SMIME-CAPS
FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009 -- RFC 5911 [CMSASN1] FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009 -- RFC 5911 [CMSASN1]
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) } id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) }
mda-sha256, mda-sha384, mda-sha512 mda-sha256
FROM PKIX1-PSS-OAEP-Algorithms-2009 -- RFC 5912 [PKIXASN1] FROM PKIX1-PSS-OAEP-Algorithms-2009 -- RFC 5912 [PKIXASN1]
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkix1-rsa-pkalgs-02(54) } ; id-mod-pkix1-rsa-pkalgs-02(54) } ;
-- --
-- Object Identifiers -- Object Identifiers
-- --
id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) alg(3) 17 } smime(16) alg(3) 17 }
id-alg-mts-hashsig OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig id-alg-mts-hashsig OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig
id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig-with-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) alg(3) TBD }
id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig-with-sha384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) alg(3) TBD }
id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig-with-sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) alg(3) TBD }
-- --
-- Signature Algorithm and Public Key -- Signature Algorithm and Public Key
-- --
sa-HSS-LMS-HashSig-with-SHA256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { sa-HSS-LMS-HashSig SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig-with-sha256 IDENTIFIER id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig
PARAMS ARE absent PARAMS ARE absent
HASHES { mda-sha256 } HASHES { mda-sha256 }
PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-HSS-LMS-HashSig } PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-HSS-LMS-HashSig }
SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig-with-sha256 } } SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig } }
sa-HSS-LMS-HashSig-with-SHA384 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig-with-sha384
PARAMS ARE absent
HASHES { mda-sha384 }
PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-HSS-LMS-HashSig }
SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig-with-sha384 } }
sa-HSS-LMS-HashSig-with-SHA512 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig-with-sha512
PARAMS ARE absent
HASHES { mda-sha512 }
PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-HSS-LMS-HashSig }
SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig-with-sha512 } }
pk-HSS-LMS-HashSig PUBLIC-KEY ::= { pk-HSS-LMS-HashSig PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig IDENTIFIER id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig
KEY HSS-LMS-HashSig-PublicKey KEY HSS-LMS-HashSig-PublicKey
PARAMS ARE absent PARAMS ARE absent
CERT-KEY-USAGE CERT-KEY-USAGE
{ digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyCertSign, cRLSign } } { digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyCertSign, cRLSign } }
HSS-LMS-HashSig-PublicKey ::= OCTET STRING HSS-LMS-HashSig-PublicKey ::= OCTET STRING
-- --
-- Expand the signature algorithm set used by CMS [CMSASN1U] -- Expand the signature algorithm set used by CMS [CMSASN1U]
-- --
SignatureAlgorithmSet SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= SignatureAlgorithmSet SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::=
{ sa-HSS-LMS-HashSig-with-SHA256 | { sa-HSS-LMS-HashSig, ... }
sa-HSS-LMS-HashSig-with-SHA384 |
sa-HSS-LMS-HashSig-with-SHA512, ... }
-- --
-- Expand the S/MIME capabilities set used by CMS [CMSASN1] -- Expand the S/MIME capabilities set used by CMS [CMSASN1]
-- --
SMimeCaps SMIME-CAPS ::= SMimeCaps SMIME-CAPS ::=
{ sa-HSS-LMS-HashSig-with-SHA256.&smimeCaps | { sa-HSS-LMS-HashSig.&smimeCaps, ... }
sa-HSS-LMS-HashSig-with-SHA384.&smimeCaps |
sa-HSS-LMS-HashSig-with-SHA512.&smimeCaps, ... }
END END
Author's Address Author's Address
Russ Housley Russ Housley
Vigil Security, LLC Vigil Security, LLC
516 Dranesville Road 516 Dranesville Road
Herndon, VA 20170 Herndon, VA 20170
USA USA
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