LAMPS Working Group                                         H. Brockhaus
Internet-Draft                                                   Siemens
Updates: 4210, 6712 (if approved)                         August 7,                      September 8, 2020
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: February 8, March 12, 2021

                              CMP Updates
                    draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-03
                    draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-04

Abstract

   This document contains a set of updates to the base syntax and
   transport of Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) version 2.  This
   document updates RFC 4210 and RFC 6712.

   Specifically, the CMP services updated in this document comprise the
   enabling of using EnvelopedData instead of EncryptedValue, the
   definition of extended key usages to identify certificates of CMP
   endpoints on certification and registration authorities, and adds an
   HTTP URI discovery mechanism and extend the URI structure.

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on February 8, March 12, 2021.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Convention and Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Updates to RFC 4210 - Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) .   3
     2.1.  New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 4210 . . . . . . . .   3
     2.2.  New Section 4.5 - Extended Key Usage  . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.3.  Replace Section 5.1.3.4 - Multiple Protection . . . . . .   6
     2.4.  Replace Section 5.2.2. - Encrypted Values . . . . . . . .   7
     2.5.  Update Section 5.3.4. - Certification Response  . . . . .   9
     2.6.  Replace Section 5.3.19.9. - Revocation Passphrase . . . .   9
     2.7.  Update Section 5.3.19. - PKI General Message Content  . .  10
     2.8.  Update Section 5.3.22 - Polling Request and Response  . .  10
     2.8.  11
     2.9.  Update Section 9 - IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     2.9.  12
     2.10. Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase  . .  11
     2.10.  13
     2.11. Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral
           Clarifications  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     2.11.  13
     2.12. Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification
           (Basic Authenticated Scheme)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12  14
   3.  Updates to RFC 6712 - HTTP Transfer for the Certificate
       Management Protocol (CMP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13  14
     3.1.  New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 6712 . . . . . . . .  13  14
     3.2.  New Section 3.6. - HTTP Request-URI . . . . . . . . . . .  13  15
     3.3.  Update Section 6. - IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . .  16
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14  16
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15  17
   6.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15  17
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15  17
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15  17
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16  18
   Appendix A.  ASN.1 Modules  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17  19
     A.1.  1988 ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17  19
     A.2.  2002 ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28  31
   Appendix B.  History of changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39  43
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  41  45

1.  Introduction

   While using CMP [RFC4210] in industrial and IoT environments and
   developing the Lightweight CMP Profile
   [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] some limitations were
   identified in the original CMP specification.  This document updates
   RFC 4210 [RFC4210] and RFC 6712 [RFC6712] to overcome these
   limitations.

   In general, this document aims to improve the crypto agility of CMP
   to be flexible to react on future advances in cryptography.

   This document also introduces new extended key usages to identify CMP
   endpoints on registration and certification authorities.

1.1.  Convention and Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

   In this document, these words will appear with that interpretation
   only when in ALL CAPS.  Lower case uses of these words are not to be
   interpreted as carrying significance described in RFC 2119.

   Technical terminology is used in conformance with RFC 4210 [RFC4210],
   RFC 4211 [RFC4211], and RFC 5280 [RFC5280].  The following key words
   are used:

   CA:  Certification authority, which issues certificates.

   RA:  Registration authority, an optional system component to which a
        CA delegates certificate management functions such as
        authorization checks.

   KGA: Key generation authority, which generates key pairs on behalf of
        an EE.  The KGA could be co-located with an RA or a CA.

   EE:  End entity, a user, device, or service that holds a PKI
        certificate.  An identifier for the EE is given as its subject
        of the certificate.

2.  Updates to RFC 4210 - Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)

2.1.  New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 4210

   The following subsection describes feature updates to RFC 4210
   [RFC4210].  They are always related to the base specification.  Hence
   references to the original sections in RFC 4210 [RFC4210] are used
   whenever possible.

   Insert this section at the end of the current Section 1.

   1.1 Changes since RFC 4210
   The following updates are made in [thisRFC]:

   o  Add new extended key usages for different CMP server types, e.g.
      registration authority and certification authority, to express the
      authorization of the entity identified in the certificate
      containing the respective extended key usage extension to act as
      the indicated PKI management entity.

   o  Extend the description of multiple protection to cover additional
      use cases, e.g., batch processing of messages.

   o  Offering EnvelopedData as the preferred choice next to
      EncryptedValue to extend crypto agility in CMP.  Note that
      according to RFC 4211 [RFC4211] section 2.1.9 the use of the
      EncryptedValue structure has been deprecated in favor of the
      EnvelopedData structure.  RFC 4211 [RFC4211] offers the
      EncryptedKey structure, a choice of EncryptedValue and
      EnvelopedData for migration to EnvelopedData.  For reasons of
      completeness and consistency the exchange of EncryptedValue is
      performed for all usages in RFC 4210 [RFC4210].  This includes the
      protection of centrally generated private keys, encryption of
      certificates, and revocation passphrases.

   o  Extend the usage of polling also to p10cr messages.

   < TBD: The specification of algorithm profiles seed to be moved to a
   separate document. >

2.2.  New Section 4.5 - Extended Key Usage

   The following subsection describes new extended key usages for
   different CMP server types specified in RFC 4210 [RFC4210].

   Insert this section at the end of the current Section 4.

   4.5 Extended Key Usage

   The Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension indicates the purposes for
   which the certified public key may be used.  It therefore restricts
   the use of a certificate to specific applications.

   A CA may want to delegate parts of their duties to other PKI
   management entities.  The mechanism to prove this delegation
   explained in this section offers zero-touch means to check the
   authorization of such delegation.  Such delegation could also be
   expressed by other means, e.g., explicit configuration.

   To offer automatic validation means for the delegation of a role by a
   CA, the certificates used by PKI management entities for CMP message
   protection or signed data for central key generation MUST be issued
   by the delegating CA and MUST contain the respective EKUs.  This
   proves the authorization of this entity by the delegating CA to act
   as the PKI management entity as described below.

   The ASN.1 to define these EKUs is:

   id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
      { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
        security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) }

   id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 27 }
   id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 }
   id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 32 }

   Note: RFC 6402 section 2.10 [RFC6402] specifies OIDs for a CMC CA and
   a CMC RA.  As the functionality of a CA and RA is not specific to
   whether use CMC or CMP as certificate management protocol, the same
   OIDs SHALL be used for a CMP CA and a CMP RA.

   < TBD: The Description of the OIDs for id-kp-cmcCA and id-kp-cmcRA
   needs to be extended to avoid confusion as they currently only refer
   to CMC. >

   The description of the PKI management entity for each of the EKUs is
   as follows:

   CMP CA:  CMP Certification Authorities are CMP endpoints on CA
            equipment as described in section 3.1.1.2.  The key used in
            the context of CMP management operations, especially CMP
            message protection, need not be the same key that signs the
            certificates.  It is necessary, however, to ensure that the
            entity acting as CMP CA is authorized to do so.  Therefore,
            the CMP CA MUST do one of the following,

            *  use the CA private key on the CMP endpoint, or

            *  explicitly designate this authority to another entity.

            For automatic validation of such delegation it MUST be
            indicated by the id-kp-cmcCA extended key usage.  This
            extended key usage MUST be placed into the certificate used
            on the CA equipment and the CA that delegates this role MUST
            issue the CMP CA certificate.

            Note: Using a separate key pair for protecting CMP
            management operations at the CA decreases the number of
            operations of the private key used to sign certificates.

   CMP RA:  CMP Registration Authorities are CMP endpoints on RA
            equipment as described in Section 3.1.1.3.  A CMP RA is
            identified by the id-kp-cmcRA extended key usage.  This
            extended key usage is placed into RA certificates.  The CA
            that delegated this role is identified by the CA that issued
            the CMP RA certificate.

   CMP KGA: CMP Key Generation Authorities are identified by the id-kp-
            cmKGA extended key usage.  Though the CMP KGA knows the
            private key it generated on behalf of the end entity.  This
            is a very sensitive service and needs specific
            authorization.  This authorization is either with the CA
            certificate itself, or indicated by placing the id-kp-cmKGA
            extended key usage into the CMP RA or CMP CA certificate
            used to authenticate the origin of the private key, and to
            express the authorization to offer this service.

   Note: In device PKIs, especially those issuing IDevID certificates,
   CA may have very long validity (including the GeneralizedTime value
   99991231235959Z to indicate a not well-defined expiration date as
   specified in IEEE 802.1AR Section 8.5 [IEEE802.1AR] and RFC 5280
   Section 4.1.2.5 [RFC5280]).  Such validity periods SHOULD NOT be used
   for protection of CMP messages.  Certificates for delegated CMP
   message protection (CMP CA, CMP RA, CMP KGA) MUST NOT use indefinite
   expiration date.

2.3.  Replace Section 5.1.3.4 - Multiple Protection

   Section 5.1.3.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the nested message.
   This document opens the usage of nested messages also for batch
   transport of PKI messages between different PKI management entities.

   Replace the text of the section with the following text.

   In cases where an end entity sends a protected PKI message to an RA,
   the RA MAY forward that message to a CA, adding its own protection
   (which MAY be a MAC or a signature, depending on the information and
   certificates shared between the RA and the CA).  There are different
   use cases for such multi protected messages.

   o  The RA confirms the validation and authorization of a message and
      forwards the original message unchanged.

   o  The RA collects several messages and forwards them in a batch.
      This can for instance be used to bridge an off-line connection
      between two PKI management entities.  In communication to the CA
      request messages and in communication from the CA response or
      announcement messages will be collected in such batch.

   o  The RA modifies the message(s) in some way (e.g., add or modify
      particular field values or add new extensions) before forwarding
      them, then it MAY create its own desired PKIBody.  In case the
      changes made by the RA to PKIMessage breaks the POP, the RA MUST
      either set the POP RAVerified or include the original PKIMessage
      from the EE in the generalInfo field of PKIHeader of the nested
      message (to force the CA to check POP on the original message).
      The infoType to be used in this situation is {id-it 15} (see
      Section 5.3.19 for the value of id-it) and the infoValue is
      PKIMessages (contents MUST be in the same order as the requests in
      PKIBody).  For simplicity reasons, if batching is used in
      combination with inclusion of the original PKIMessage in the
      generalInfo field, all messages in the batch MUST be of the same
      type (e.g., ir).

   These use cases are accomplished by nesting the messages sent by the
   PKI entity within a new PKI message.  The structure used is as
   follows.

   NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages

   (The use of PKIMessages, a SEQUENCE OF PKIMessage, lets the RA batch
   the requests of several EEs in a single new message.)

2.4.  Replace Section 5.2.2. - Encrypted Values

   Section 5.2.2 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the usage of
   EncryptedValue to transport encrypted data.  This document extends
   the encryption of data to preferably use EnvelopedData.

   Replace the text of the section with the following text.

   Where encrypted data (restricted, in this specification, to be either
   private keys, certificates, or passwords) are sent in PKI messages,
   the EncryptedKey data structure is used.

   EncryptedKey ::= CHOICE {
      encryptedValue        EncryptedValue, -- deprecated
      envelopedData     [0] EnvelopedData }

   See CRMF [RFC4211] for EncryptedKey and EncryptedValue syntax and for
   EnvelopedData syntax see CMS [RFC5652].  Using the EncryptedKey data
   structure, the choice to either use EncryptedValue (for backward
   compatibility only) or EnvelopedData is offered.  The use of the
   EncryptedValue structure has been deprecated in favor of the
   EnvelopedData structure.  Therefore, it is recommended to use
   EnvelopedData.

   Note: As we reuse the EncryptedKey structure defined in CRMF
   [RFC4211], the update is backward compatible.  Using the new syntax
   with the untagged default choice EncryptedValue is bitwise compatible
   with the old syntax.

   The EncryptedKey data structure is used in CMP to either transport a
   private key, certificate or revocation passphrase in encrypted form.

   EnvelopedData is used as follows:

   o  Contains only one recepientInfo structure because the content is
      encrypted only for one recipient.

   o  Contains a private key in the AsymmetricKeyPackage structure as
      defined in RFC 5958 [RFC5958] wrapped in a SignedData structure as
      specified in CMS section 5 [RFC5652] signed by the Key Generation
      Authority.

   o  Contains a certificate or revocation passphrase directly in the
      encryptedContent field.

   Note: To ensure explicit control of the encoding of the private key
   according to the specific algorithm the new key pair in an asymmetric
   key package structure as specified in [RFC5958].

   The content of the EnvelopedData structure, as specified in CMS
   section 6 [RFC5652], MUST be encrypted using a newly generated
   symmetric content-encryption key.  This content-encryption key MUST
   be securely provided to the recipient using one of three key
   management techniques.

   The choice of the key management technique to be used by the sender
   depends on the credential available for the recipient:

   o  Recipient's certificate that contains a key usage extension
      asserting keyAgreement: The content-encryption key will be
      protected using the key agreement key management technique, as
      specified in CMS section 6.2.2 [RFC5652].

   o  Recipient's certificate that contains a key usage extension
      asserting keyEncipherment: The content-encryption key will be
      protected using the key transport key management technique, as
      specified in CMS section 6.2.1 [RFC5652].

   o  Jointly shared secret: The content-encryption key will be
      protected using the password-based key management technique, as
      specified in CMS section 6.2.4 [RFC5652].

2.5.  Update Section 5.3.4. - Certification Response

   Section 5.3.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the Certification
   Response.  This document updates the syntax by using the parent
   structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue as described in
   Section 2.1 above.

   Replace the ASN.1 syntax of CertifiedKeyPair and CertOrEncCert with
   the following text.

   CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE {
       certOrEncCert       CertOrEncCert,
       privateKey      [0] EncryptedKey        OPTIONAL,
       -- see [CRMF] for comment on encoding
       publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo  OPTIONAL
   }

   CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE {
       certificate     [0] Certificate,
       encryptedCert   [1] EncryptedKey
   }

   Add the following paragraphs to the end of the section.

   The use of EncryptedKey is described in section 5.2.2.

2.6.  Replace Section 5.3.19.9. - Revocation Passphrase

   Section 5.3.19.9 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the provisioning of
   a revocation passphrase for authenticating a later revocation
   request.  This document updates the handling by using the parent
   structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue to transport this
   information as described in Section 2.1 above.

   Replace the text of the section with the following text.

   This MAY be used by the EE to send a passphrase to a CA/RA for the
   purpose of authenticating a later revocation request (in the case
   that the appropriate signing private key is no longer available to
   authenticate the request).  See Appendix B for further details on the
   use of this mechanism.

   GenMsg:    {id-it 12}, EncryptedKey
   GenRep:    {id-it 12}, < absent >

   The use of EncryptedKey is described in section 5.2.2.

2.7.  Update Section 5.3.22 5.3.19. - Polling Request and Response PKI General Message Content

   The following subsections describes IDs for new examples
   InfoTypeAndValue to be used in general messages content specified in
   RFC 4210 [RFC4210].

   Section 5.3.22 5.3.19 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes when and how polling various PKI general
   messages are used. and the respective OIDs.  This document adds three
   additional subsection to introduce the polling mechanism also new IDs id-it-caCerts, id-it-
   rootCaKeyUpdate, and id-it-certReqTemplate to
   outstanding p10cr transactions.

   Replace all paragraphs the support messages as
   defined in front of Lightweight CMP Profile
   [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] Section 4.4.

   Add these new subsections at the state machine diagram end of this section with the
   following text.

   2.3.19.14 CA Certificates

   This pair of messages is intended to handle scenarios in which MAY be used by the client needs to poll get the server in order to determine latest CA intermediate and
   issuing CA certificates.

   GenMsg:    {id-it 17}, < absent >
   GenRep:    {id-it 17}, CaCertsValue | < absent >

   5.3.19.15.  Root CA Certificates Update

   This MAY be used by the status client to get an update of an outstanding ir, cr, p10cr, or kur transaction (i.e., when existing root
   CA Certificate.

   GenMsg:    {id-it 18}, < absent >
   GenRep:    {id-it 18}, RootCaKeyUpdateValue | < absent >

   Note: In contrast to CAKeyUpdAnnContent, this type offers omitting
   newWithOld and oldWithNew in the
   "waiting" PKIStatus has been received).

   PollReqContent ::= GenRep message, depending on the
   needs of the EE.

   5.3.19.16.  Certificate Request Template

   This MAY be used by the client to get a template with parameters for
   a future certificate request operation.

   GenMsg:    {id-it 19}, < absent >
   GenRep:    {id-it 19}, CertReqTemplateValue | < absent >

2.8.  Update Section 5.3.22 - Polling Request and Response

   Section 5.3.22 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes when and how polling
   messages are used.  This document adds the polling mechanism also to
   outstanding p10cr transactions.

   Replace all paragraphs in front of the state machine diagram with the
   following text.

   This pair of messages is intended to handle scenarios in which the
   client needs to poll the server in order to determine the status of
   an outstanding ir, cr, p10cr, or kur transaction (i.e., when the
   "waiting" PKIStatus has been received).

   PollReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
       certReqId    INTEGER }

   PollRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
       certReqId    INTEGER,
       checkAfter   INTEGER,  -- time in seconds
       reason       PKIFreeText OPTIONAL }

   The following clauses describe when polling messages are used, and
   how they are used.  It is assumed that multiple certConf messages can
   be sent during transactions.  There will be one sent in response to
   each ip, cp, or kup that contains a CertStatus for an issued
   certificate.

   1  In response to an ip, cp, or kup message, an EE will send a
      certConf for all issued certificates and, following the ack, a
      pollReq for all pending certificates.

   2  In response to a pollReq, a CA/RA will return an ip, cp, or kup if
      one or more of the pending certificates is ready; otherwise, it
      will return a pollRep.

   3  If the EE receives a pollRep, it will wait for at least as long as
      the checkAfter value before sending another pollReq.

   4  If an ip, cp, or kup is received in response to a pollReq, then it
      will be treated in the same way as the initial response.

   Note: A p10cr message contains exactly one CertificationRequestInfo
   data structure as specified in PKCS#10 [RFC2986] but no certificate
   request number.  Therefore, the certReqId MUST be set to 0 in all
   following messages of this transaction.

2.8.

2.9.  Update Section 9 - IANA Considerations

   Section 9 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] contains the IANA Considerations of
   that document.  As this document defines a new and updates two
   existing Extended Key Usages, the IANA Considerations need to be
   updated accordingly.

   Add the following paragraphs between the first and second paragraph
   of the section.

   Within the SMI-numbers registry "SMI Security for PKIX Extended Key
   Purpose Identifiers (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3)" (see
   https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-
   numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3) as defined in RFC 7299 [RFC7299] three
   changes have been performed.

   Two existing entries have been updated to also point to this
   document:

   Decimal Description References
   ------- ----------- ------------------
   27      id-kp-cmcCA [RFC6402][thisRFC]
   28      id-kp-cmcRA [RFC6402][thisRFC]

   One new entry has been added:

   Decimal Description References
   ------- ----------- ----------
   32      id-kp-cmKGA [thisRFC]

2.9.

   Within the SMI-numbers registry "SMI Security for PKIX CMP
   Information Types (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.4)" (see
   https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-
   numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.4) as defined in RFC 7299 [RFC7299] three
   changes have been performed.

   Three new entry have been added:

   Decimal Description           References
   ------- --------------------- ----------
   17      id-it-caCerts         [thisRFC]
   18      id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate [thisRFC]
   19      id-it-certReqTemplate [thisRFC]

2.10.  Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase

   Appendix B of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the usage of the
   revocation passphrase.  As this document updates RFC 4210 [RFC4210]
   to utilize the parent structure EncryptedKey instead of
   EncryptedValue as described in Section 2.1 above, the description is
   updated accordingly.

   Replace the first bullet point of this section with the following
   text.

   o  The OID and value specified in Section 5.3.19.9 of RFC 4210
      [RFC4210] MAY be sent in a GenMsg message at any time, or MAY be
      sent in the generalInfo field of the PKIHeader of any PKIMessage
      at any time.  (In particular, the EncryptedKey as described in
      section 5.2.2 may be sent in the header of the certConf message
      that confirms acceptance of certificates requested in an
      initialization request or certificate request message.)  This
      conveys a revocation passphrase chosen by the entity (i.e., for
      use of EnvelopedData this is in the decrypted bytes of
      encryptedContent field and for use of EncryptedValue this is in
      the decrypted bytes of the encValue field) to the relevant CA/RA;
      furthermore, the transfer is accomplished with appropriate
      confidentiality characteristics.

   Replace the third bullet point of this section with the following
   text.

   o  When using EnvelopedData the localKeyId attribute as specified in
      RFC 2985 [RFC2985] and when using EncryptedValue the valueHint
      field MAY contain a key identifier (chosen by the entity, along
      with the passphrase itself) to assist in later retrieval of the
      correct passphrase (e.g., when the revocation request is
      constructed by the entity and received by the CA/RA).

2.10.

2.11.  Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral Clarifications

   Appendix C of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides clarifications to the
   request message behavior.  As this document updates RFC 4210
   [RFC4210] to utilize the parent structure EncryptedKey instead of
   EncryptedValue as described in Section 2.1 above, the description is
   updated accordingly.

   Replace the note coming after the ASN.1 syntax of POPOPrivKey of this
   section with the following text.

   -- **********
   -- *  the type of "thisMessage" is given as BIT STRING in RFC 4211
   -- *  [RFC4211]; it should be "EncryptedKey" (in accordance with
   -- *  Section 5.2.2 of this specification). Therefore, this document
   -- *  makes the behavioral clarification of specifying that the
   -- *  contents of "thisMessage" MUST be encoded either as
   -- *  "EnvelopedData" or "EncryptedValue" (only for backward
   -- *  compatibility) and then wrapped in a BIT STRING.  This allows
   -- *  the necessary conveyance and protection of the private key
   -- *  while maintaining bits-on-the-wire compatibility with RFC 4211
   -- *  [RFC4211].
   -- **********

2.11.

2.12.  Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification (Basic
       Authenticated Scheme)

   Appendix D.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides the initial registration/
   certification scheme.  This scheme shall continue to use
   EncryptedValue for backward compatibility reasons.

   Replace the comment after the privateKey field of
   crc[1].certifiedKeyPair in the syntax of the Initialization Response
   message with the following text.

   -- see Appendix C, Request Message Behavioral Clarifications
   -- for backward compatibility reasons, use EncryptedValue

3.  Updates to RFC 6712 - HTTP Transfer for the Certificate Management
    Protocol (CMP)

3.1.  New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 6712

   The following subsection describes feature updates to RFC 6712
   [RFC6712].  They are always related to the base specification.  Hence
   references to the original sections in RFC 6712 [RFC6712] are used
   whenever possible.

   Insert this section at the end of the current Section 1.

   1.1 Changes since RFC 6712

   The following updates are made in draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates:

   o  Add an HTTP URI discovery mechanism and extend the URI structure.

3.2.  New Section 3.6. - HTTP Request-URI

   Section 3.6 of RFC 6712 [RFC6712] specifies the used HTTP URIs.  This
   document adds a discovery mechanism and extends the URIs.

   Replace the text of the section with the following text.

   Each CMP server on a PKI management entity supporting HTTP or HTTPS
   transport MUST support the use of the path-prefix of '/.well-known/'
   as defined in RFC 5785 [RFC5785] 8515 [RFC8515] and the registered name of 'cmp' to
   ease interworking in a multi-vendor environment.

   The CMP client MUST needs to be configured with sufficient information to
   form the CMP server URI.  This MUST be is at least the authority portion of
   the URI, e.g., 'www.example.com:80', or the full operational path of
   the PKI management entity.  Additional arbitrary label, e.g.,
   'profileLabel' and 'operationLabel', MAY may be configured as a separate
   component or as part of the full operational path to provide further
   information.  The 'profileLabel' MAY may support addressing multiple CAs
   or certificate profiles and the 'operationLabel' may support
   addressing PKI management operation specific endpoints.  A valid full
   operational path can look like this:

   1  http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp

   2  http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/operationLabel

   3  http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/profileLabel

   4  http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/profileLabel/operationLabel

   The discovery of supported endpoints as defined above will provide
   the information to the EE, CMP client how to contact the PKI management
   entity and, if available, how to request enrolment for a specific
   certificate profile or revoke a certificate at a specific CA.

   Querying the PKI management entity, the EE CMP client will get a list of
   potential endpoints supported by the PKI management entity.

   Performing a GET on "/.well-known/cmp" to the default port MUST
   return a set of links to endpoints available from the CMP server.  In
   addition to the link also the expected format of the data object is
   provided as content type (ct).

   < TBD: It needs to be discussed if the discovery should be performed
   using GET on "/.well-known/cmp" or GET on "/.well-known" only. >
   The following provides an illustrative example for a PKI management
   entity supporting different various PKI management operations for different various
   certificate profiles and CAs.

   Detailed message description:

   REQ: GET /.well-known/cmp

   RES: Content
     </cmp/certprofile1/operation1>;ct=pkixcmp
     </cmp/certprofile2/operation1>;ct=pkixcmp
     </cmp/certprofile3/operation1>;ct=pkixcmp
     </cmp/certprofile1/operation2>;ct=pkixcmp
     </cmp/certprofile2/operation2>;ct=pkixcmp
     </cmp/certprofile3/operation2>;ct=pkixcmp
     </cmp/ca1/operation3>;ct=pkixcmp
     </cmp/ca2/operation3>;ct=pkixcmp

3.3.  Update Section 6. - IANA Considerations

   Section 6 of RFC 6712 [RFC6712] contains the IANA Considerations of
   that document.  As this document defines a new well-known URI, the
   IANA Considerations need to be updated accordingly.

   Add the following text between the first and second paragraph of the
   section.

   Within the well-known URI registry (see
   https://www.iana.org/assignments/well-known-uris/well-known-
   uris.xhtml#well-known-uris-1) as defined in RFC 8515 [RFC8515] the
   following change has been performed.

   One new name entry has been added:

   URI suffix  Change controller
   ----------- -----------------
   cmp         IETF

4.  IANA Considerations

   This document contains an update to the IANA Considerations section Consideration sections
   to be added to [RFC4210]. [RFC4210] and [RFC6712].

   < TBD: The existing description and information of id-kp-cmcRA and
   id-kp-cmcCA need to be updated to reflect their extended usage.  >

5.  Security Considerations

   No changes are made to the existing security considerations of
   RFC 4210 [RFC4210] and RFC 6712 [RFC6712].

6.  Acknowledgements

   Special thank goes to Jim Schaad for his guidance and the inspiration
   on structuring and writing this document I got from [RFC6402] that
   updates CMC.  Special thank also goes also to Russ Housley and Tomas
   Gustavsson for reviewing and providing valuable suggestions on the
   approvement of this document.

   I also like to thank all reviewers of this document for their
   valuable feedback.

7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC2985]  Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object
              Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2985, November 2000,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2985>.

   [RFC2986]  Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
              Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2986>.

   [RFC4210]  Adams, C., Farrell, S., Kause, T., and T. Mononen,
              "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
              Management Protocol (CMP)", RFC 4210,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4210, September 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4210>.

   [RFC4211]  Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
              Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4211, September 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4211>.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

   [RFC5652]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
              RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.

   [RFC5785]  Nottingham, M. and E. Hammer-Lahav, "Defining Well-Known
              Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)", RFC 5785,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5785, April 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5785>.

   [RFC5912]  Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the
              Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912>.

   [RFC5958]  Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", RFC 5958,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5958, August 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5958>.

   [RFC6402]  Schaad, J., "Certificate Management over CMS (CMC)
              Updates", RFC 6402, DOI 10.17487/RFC6402, November 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6402>.

   [RFC6712]  Kause, T. and M. Peylo, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure -- HTTP Transfer for the Certificate
              Management Protocol (CMP)", RFC 6712,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6712, September 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6712>.

   [RFC7299]  Housley, R., "Object Identifier Registry for the PKIX
              Working Group", RFC 7299, DOI 10.17487/RFC7299, July 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7299>.

   [RFC8515]  Jethanandani, M. and M. Reina Ortega, "URN Namespace for
              ETSI Documents", RFC 8515, DOI 10.17487/RFC8515, February
              2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8515>.

7.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile]
              Brockhaus, H., Fries, S., and D. Oheimb, "Lightweight CMP
              Profile", draft-ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile-02
              (work in progress), July 2020.

   [IEEE802.1AR]
              IEEE, "802.1AR Secure Device Identifier", June 2018,
              <http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/standard/802.1AR-
              2009.html>.

Appendix A.  ASN.1 Modules

A.1.  1988 ASN.1 Module

   This section contains the updated ASN.1 module for [RFC4210].  This
   module replaces the module in Appendix F of that document.  Although
   a 2002 ASN.1 module is provided, this remains the normative module as
   per the policy of the PKIX working group.

   PKIXCMP {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
         dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
         id-mod(0) id-mod-cmp2000(16)}

   DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=

   BEGIN

   -- EXPORTS ALL --

   IMPORTS

       Certificate, CertificateList, Extensions, AlgorithmIdentifier,
       UTF8String, id-kp -- if required; otherwise, comment out
              FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
              dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
              id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit-88(1)}

       GeneralName, KeyIdentifier
              FROM PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
              dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
              id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit-88(2)}

       CertTemplate, PKIPublicationInfo, EncryptedKey, EncryptedValue,
       CertId, CertReqMessages
              FROM PKIXCRMF-2005 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
              dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
              id-mod(0) id-mod-crmf2005(36)}
       -- The import of EncryptedKey is added due to the updates made
       -- in this document CMP Updates [thisRFC]

       -- see also the behavioral clarifications to CRMF codified in
       -- Appendix C of this specification
       CertificationRequest
              FROM PKCS-10 {iso(1) member-body(2)
                            us(840) rsadsi(113549)
                            pkcs(1) pkcs-10(10) modules(1) pkcs-10(1)}
       -- (specified in RFC 2986 with 1993 ASN.1 syntax and IMPLICIT
       -- tags).  Alternatively, implementers may directly include
       -- the [PKCS10] syntax in this module

       localKeyId
              FROM PKCS-9 {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
                           pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) modules(0) pkcs-9(1)}
       -- The import of localKeyId is added due to the updates made in
       -- this document CMP Updates [thisRFC]

       EnvelopedData, SignedData
              FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004 { iso(1)
              member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
              smime(16) modules(0) cms-2004(24) }
       -- The import of EnvelopedData and SignedData is added due to
       -- the updates made in this document CMP Updates [thisRFC]

       ;

   -- the rest of the module contains locally-defined OIDs and
   -- constructs

   CMPCertificate ::= CHOICE {
       x509v3PKCert        Certificate
   }
   -- This syntax, while bits-on-the-wire compatible with the
   -- standard X.509 definition of "Certificate", allows the
   -- possibility of future certificate types (such as X.509
   -- attribute certificates, WAP WTLS certificates, or other kinds
   -- of certificates) within this certificate management protocol,
   -- should a need ever arise to support such generality.  Those
   -- implementations that do not foresee a need to ever support
   -- other certificate types MAY, if they wish, comment out the
   -- above structure and "un-comment" the following one prior to
   -- compiling this ASN.1 module.  (Note that interoperability
   -- with implementations that don't do this will be unaffected by
   -- this change.)

   -- CMPCertificate ::= Certificate

   PKIMessage ::= SEQUENCE {
       header           PKIHeader,
       body             PKIBody,
       protection   [0] PKIProtection OPTIONAL,
       extraCerts   [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate
                        OPTIONAL
   }

   PKIMessages ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIMessage
   PKIHeader ::= SEQUENCE {
       pvno                INTEGER     { cmp1999(1), cmp2000(2) },
       sender              GeneralName,
       -- identifies the sender
       recipient           GeneralName,
       -- identifies the intended recipient
       messageTime     [0] GeneralizedTime         OPTIONAL,
       -- time of production of this message (used when sender
       -- believes that the transport will be "suitable"; i.e.,
       -- that the time will still be meaningful upon receipt)
       protectionAlg   [1] AlgorithmIdentifier     OPTIONAL,
       -- algorithm used for calculation of protection bits
       senderKID       [2] KeyIdentifier           OPTIONAL,
       recipKID        [3] KeyIdentifier           OPTIONAL,
       -- to identify specific keys used for protection
       transactionID   [4] OCTET STRING            OPTIONAL,
       -- identifies the transaction; i.e., this will be the same in
       -- corresponding request, response, certConf, and PKIConf
       -- messages
       senderNonce     [5] OCTET STRING            OPTIONAL,
       recipNonce      [6] OCTET STRING            OPTIONAL,
       -- nonces used to provide replay protection, senderNonce
       -- is inserted by the creator of this message; recipNonce
       -- is a nonce previously inserted in a related message by
       -- the intended recipient of this message
       freeText        [7] PKIFreeText             OPTIONAL,
       -- this may be used to indicate context-specific instructions
       -- (this field is intended for human consumption)
       generalInfo     [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                              InfoTypeAndValue     OPTIONAL
       -- this may be used to convey context-specific information
       -- (this field not primarily intended for human consumption)
   }

   PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String
       -- text encoded as UTF-8 String [RFC3629] (note: each
       -- UTF8String MAY include an [RFC3066] language tag
       -- to indicate the language of the contained text
       -- see [RFC2482] for details)

   PKIBody ::= CHOICE {       -- message-specific body elements
       ir       [0]  CertReqMessages,        --Initialization Request
       ip       [1]  CertRepMessage,         --Initialization Response
       cr       [2]  CertReqMessages,        --Certification Request
       cp       [3]  CertRepMessage,         --Certification Response
       p10cr    [4]  CertificationRequest,   --imported from [PKCS10]
       popdecc  [5]  POPODecKeyChallContent, --pop Challenge
       popdecr  [6]  POPODecKeyRespContent,  --pop Response
       kur      [7]  CertReqMessages,        --Key Update Request
       kup      [8]  CertRepMessage,         --Key Update Response
       krr      [9]  CertReqMessages,        --Key Recovery Request
       krp      [10] KeyRecRepContent,       --Key Recovery Response
       rr       [11] RevReqContent,          --Revocation Request
       rp       [12] RevRepContent,          --Revocation Response
       ccr      [13] CertReqMessages,        --Cross-Cert. Request
       ccp      [14] CertRepMessage,         --Cross-Cert. Response
       ckuann   [15] CAKeyUpdAnnContent,     --CA Key Update Ann.
       cann     [16] CertAnnContent,         --Certificate Ann.
       rann     [17] RevAnnContent,          --Revocation Ann.
       crlann   [18] CRLAnnContent,          --CRL Announcement
       pkiconf  [19] PKIConfirmContent,      --Confirmation
       nested   [20] NestedMessageContent,   --Nested Message
       genm     [21] GenMsgContent,          --General Message
       genp     [22] GenRepContent,          --General Response
       error    [23] ErrorMsgContent,        --Error Message
       certConf [24] CertConfirmContent,     --Certificate confirm
       pollReq  [25] PollReqContent,         --Polling request
       pollRep  [26] PollRepContent          --Polling response
   }

   PKIProtection ::= BIT STRING

   ProtectedPart ::= SEQUENCE {
       header    PKIHeader,
       body      PKIBody
   }

   id-PasswordBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {1 2 840 113533 7 66 13}
   PBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
       salt                OCTET STRING,
       -- note:  implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes
       -- of this string to values appropriate for their environment
       -- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks
       owf                 AlgorithmIdentifier,
       -- AlgId for a One-Way Function (SHA-1 recommended)
       iterationCount      INTEGER,
       -- number of times the OWF is applied
       -- note:  implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes
       -- of this integer to values appropriate for their environment
       -- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks
       mac                 AlgorithmIdentifier
       -- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11],
   }   -- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202])

   id-DHBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {1 2 840 113533 7 66 30}
   DHBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
       owf                 AlgorithmIdentifier,
       -- AlgId for a One-Way Function (SHA-1 recommended)
       mac                 AlgorithmIdentifier
       -- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11],
   }   -- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202])

   NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages

   PKIStatus ::= INTEGER {
       accepted                (0),
       -- you got exactly what you asked for
       grantedWithMods        (1),
       -- you got something like what you asked for; the
       -- requester is responsible for ascertaining the differences
       rejection              (2),
       -- you don't get it, more information elsewhere in the message
       waiting                (3),
       -- the request body part has not yet been processed; expect to
       -- hear more later (note: proper handling of this status
       -- response MAY use the polling req/rep PKIMessages specified
       -- in Section 5.3.22; alternatively, polling in the underlying
       -- transport layer MAY have some utility in this regard)
       revocationWarning      (4),
       -- this message contains a warning that a revocation is
       -- imminent
       revocationNotification (5),
       -- notification that a revocation has occurred
       keyUpdateWarning       (6)
       -- update already done for the oldCertId specified in
       -- CertReqMsg
   }

   PKIFailureInfo ::= BIT STRING {
   -- since we can fail in more than one way!
   -- More codes may be added in the future if/when required.
       badAlg              (0),
       -- unrecognized or unsupported Algorithm Identifier
       badMessageCheck     (1),
       -- integrity check failed (e.g., signature did not verify)
       badRequest          (2),
       -- transaction not permitted or supported
       badTime             (3),
       -- messageTime was not sufficiently close to the system time,
       -- as defined by local policy
       badCertId           (4),
       -- no certificate could be found matching the provided criteria
       badDataFormat       (5),
       -- the data submitted has the wrong format
       wrongAuthority      (6),
       -- the authority indicated in the request is different from the
       -- one creating the response token
       incorrectData       (7),
       -- the requester's data is incorrect (for notary services)
       missingTimeStamp    (8),
       -- when the timestamp is missing but should be there
       -- (by policy)
       badPOP              (9),
       -- the proof-of-possession failed
       certRevoked         (10),
          -- the certificate has already been revoked
       certConfirmed       (11),
          -- the certificate has already been confirmed
       wrongIntegrity      (12),
          -- invalid integrity, password based instead of signature or
          -- vice versa
       badRecipientNonce   (13),
          -- invalid recipient nonce, either missing or wrong value
       timeNotAvailable    (14),
          -- the TSA's time source is not available
       unacceptedPolicy    (15),
          -- the requested TSA policy is not supported by the TSA.
       unacceptedExtension (16),
          -- the requested extension is not supported by the TSA.
       addInfoNotAvailable (17),
          -- the additional information requested could not be
          -- understood or is not available
       badSenderNonce      (18),
          -- invalid sender nonce, either missing or wrong size
       badCertTemplate     (19),
          -- invalid cert. template or missing mandatory information
       signerNotTrusted    (20),
          -- signer of the message unknown or not trusted
       transactionIdInUse  (21),
          -- the transaction identifier is already in use
       unsupportedVersion  (22),
          -- the version of the message is not supported
       notAuthorized       (23),
          -- the sender was not authorized to make the preceding
          -- request or perform the preceding action
       systemUnavail       (24),
       -- the request cannot be handled due to system unavailability
       systemFailure       (25),
       -- the request cannot be handled due to system failure
       duplicateCertReq    (26)
       -- certificate cannot be issued because a duplicate
       -- certificate already exists
   }

   PKIStatusInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
       status        PKIStatus,
       statusString  PKIFreeText     OPTIONAL,
       failInfo      PKIFailureInfo  OPTIONAL
   }

   OOBCert ::= CMPCertificate

   OOBCertHash ::= SEQUENCE {
       hashAlg     [0] AlgorithmIdentifier     OPTIONAL,
       certId      [1] CertId                  OPTIONAL,
       hashVal         BIT STRING
       -- hashVal is calculated over the DER encoding of the
       -- self-signed certificate with the identifier certID.
   }

   POPODecKeyChallContent ::= SEQUENCE OF Challenge
   -- One Challenge per encryption key certification request (in the
   -- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages).

   Challenge ::= SEQUENCE {
       owf                 AlgorithmIdentifier  OPTIONAL,
       -- MUST be present in the first Challenge; MAY be omitted in
       -- any subsequent Challenge in POPODecKeyChallContent (if
       -- omitted, then the owf used in the immediately preceding
       -- Challenge is to be used).
       witness             OCTET STRING,
       -- the result of applying the one-way function (owf) to a
       -- randomly-generated INTEGER, A.  [Note that a different
       -- INTEGER MUST be used for each Challenge.]
       challenge           OCTET STRING
       -- the encryption (under the public key for which the cert.
       -- request is being made) of Rand, where Rand is specified as
       --   Rand ::= SEQUENCE {
       --      int      INTEGER,
       --       - the randomly-generated INTEGER A (above)
       --      sender   GeneralName
       --       - the sender's name (as included in PKIHeader)
       --   }
   }

   POPODecKeyRespContent ::= SEQUENCE OF INTEGER
   -- One INTEGER per encryption key certification request (in the
   -- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages).  The
   -- retrieved INTEGER A (above) is returned to the sender of the
   -- corresponding Challenge.

   CertRepMessage ::= SEQUENCE {
       caPubs       [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate
                        OPTIONAL,
       response         SEQUENCE OF CertResponse
   }

   CertResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
       certReqId           INTEGER,
       -- to match this response with corresponding request (a value
       -- of -1 is to be used if certReqId is not specified in the
       -- corresponding request)
       status              PKIStatusInfo,
       certifiedKeyPair    CertifiedKeyPair    OPTIONAL,
       rspInfo             OCTET STRING        OPTIONAL
       -- analogous to the id-regInfo-utf8Pairs string defined
       -- for regInfo in CertReqMsg [CRMF]
   }

   CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE {
       certOrEncCert       CertOrEncCert,
       privateKey      [0] EncryptedKey        OPTIONAL,
       -- see [CRMF] for comment on encoding
       -- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE of
       -- EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes made in
       -- this document CMP Updates [thisRFC]
       -- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the
       -- syntax without this change
       publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo  OPTIONAL
   }

   CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE {
       certificate     [0] CMPCertificate,
       encryptedCert   [1] EncryptedKey
       -- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE of
       -- EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes made in
       -- this document CMP Updates [thisRFC]
       -- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the
       -- syntax without this change
   }

   KeyRecRepContent ::= SEQUENCE {
       status                  PKIStatusInfo,
       newSigCert          [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
       caCerts             [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                                           CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
       keyPairHist         [2] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                                           CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL
   }

   RevReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF RevDetails

   RevDetails ::= SEQUENCE {
       certDetails         CertTemplate,
       -- allows requester to specify as much as they can about
       -- the cert. for which revocation is requested
       -- (e.g., for cases in which serialNumber is not available)
       crlEntryDetails     Extensions       OPTIONAL
       -- requested crlEntryExtensions
   }

   RevRepContent ::= SEQUENCE {
       status       SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIStatusInfo,
       -- in same order as was sent in RevReqContent
       revCerts [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertId
                                           OPTIONAL,
       -- IDs for which revocation was requested
       -- (same order as status)
       crls     [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertificateList
                                           OPTIONAL
       -- the resulting CRLs (there may be more than one)
   }

   CAKeyUpdAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE {
       oldWithNew   CMPCertificate, -- old pub signed with new priv
       newWithOld   CMPCertificate, -- new pub signed with old priv
       newWithNew   CMPCertificate  -- new pub signed with new priv
   }

   CertAnnContent ::= CMPCertificate

   RevAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE {
       status              PKIStatus,
       certId              CertId,
       willBeRevokedAt     GeneralizedTime,
       badSinceDate        GeneralizedTime,
       crlDetails          Extensions  OPTIONAL
       -- extra CRL details (e.g., crl number, reason, location, etc.)
   }

   CRLAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertificateList

   CertConfirmContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertStatus

   CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
      certHash    OCTET STRING,
      -- the hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorithm
      -- as is used to create and verify the certificate signature
      certReqId   INTEGER,
      -- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep
      statusInfo  PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL
   }

   PKIConfirmContent ::= NULL

   -- Added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]

   RootCaKeyUpdateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
      newWithNew       CMPCertificate
      -- new root CA certificate
      newWithOld   [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
      -- X.509 certificate containing the new public root CA key
      -- signed with the old private root CA key
      oldWithNew   [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL
      -- old root CA key certificate
      }

   -- Added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]

   CertReqTemplateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
      certTemplate           CertTemplate,
      -- prefilled certTemplate structure elements
      rsaKeyLen              INTEGER OPTIONAL
      -- Any reasonable RSA key length, if subjectPublicKeyInfo
      -- of the certTemplate has the OID rsaEncryption.
      }

   InfoTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
       infoType               OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
       infoValue              ANY DEFINED BY infoType  OPTIONAL
   }
   -- Example InfoTypeAndValue contents include, but are not limited
   -- to, the following (un-comment in this ASN.1 module and use as
   -- appropriate for a given environment):
   --
   --   id-it-caProtEncCert    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 1}
   --      CAProtEncCertValue      ::= CMPCertificate
   --   id-it-signKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 2}
   --      SignKeyPairTypesValue   ::= SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier
   --   id-it-encKeyPairTypes  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 3}
   --      EncKeyPairTypesValue    ::= SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier
   --   id-it-preferredSymmAlg OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 4}
   --      PreferredSymmAlgValue   ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
   --   id-it-caKeyUpdateInfo  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 5}
   --      CAKeyUpdateInfoValue    ::= CAKeyUpdAnnContent
   --   id-it-currentCRL       OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 6}
   --      CurrentCRLValue         ::= CertificateList
   --   id-it-unsupportedOIDs  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 7}
   --      UnsupportedOIDsValue    ::= SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER
   --   id-it-keyPairParamReq  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 10}
   --      KeyPairParamReqValue    ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
   --   id-it-keyPairParamRep  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 11}
   --      KeyPairParamRepValue    ::= AlgorithmIdentifer
   --   id-it-revPassphrase    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 12}
   --      RevPassphraseValue      ::= EncryptedKey
   --      -- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE
   --      -- of EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes
   --      -- made in this document CMP Updates [thisRFC]
   --      -- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the
   --      -- syntax without this change
   --   id-it-implicitConfirm  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 13}
   --      ImplicitConfirmValue    ::= NULL
   --   id-it-confirmWaitTime  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 14}
   --      ConfirmWaitTimeValue    ::= GeneralizedTime
   --   id-it-origPKIMessage   id-it-origPKIMessage   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 15}
   --      OrigPKIMessageValue     ::= PKIMessages
   --   id-it-suppLangTags     OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 16}
   --      SuppLangTagsValue       ::= SEQUENCE OF UTF8String
   --   id-it-caCerts OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-it 17}
   --      CaCertsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF CMPCertificate
   --      -- id-it-caCerts added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
   --   id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 15} { id-it 18}
   --      OrigPKIMessageValue      RootCaKeyUpdateValue ::= PKIMessages RootCaKeyUpdateContent
   --   id-it-suppLangTags      -- id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
   --   id-it-certReqTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 16} { id-it 19}
   --      SuppLangTagsValue      CertReqTemplateValue ::= SEQUENCE OF UTF8String CertReqTemplateContent
   --      -- id-it-certReqTemplate added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
   --
   -- where
   --
   --   id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
   --      iso(1) identified-organization(3)
   --      dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)}
   -- and
   --   id-it   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 4}
   --
   --
   -- This construct MAY also be used to define new PKIX Certificate
   -- Management Protocol request and response messages, or general-
   -- purpose (e.g., announcement) messages for future needs or for
   -- specific environments.

   GenMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue

   -- May be sent by EE, RA, or CA (depending on message content).
   -- The OPTIONAL infoValue parameter of InfoTypeAndValue will
   -- typically be omitted for some of the examples given above.
   -- The receiver is free to ignore any contained OBJ. IDs that it
   -- does not recognize. If sent from EE to CA, the empty set
   -- indicates that the CA may send
   -- any/all information that it wishes.

   GenRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue
   -- Receiver MAY ignore any contained OIDs that it does not
   -- recognize.

   ErrorMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE {
       pKIStatusInfo          PKIStatusInfo,
       errorCode              INTEGER           OPTIONAL,
       -- implementation-specific error codes
       errorDetails           PKIFreeText       OPTIONAL
       -- implementation-specific error details
   }

   PollReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
       certReqId              INTEGER
   }

   PollRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
       certReqId              INTEGER,
       checkAfter             INTEGER,  -- time in seconds
       reason                 PKIFreeText OPTIONAL
   }

   --
   -- Extended Key Usage extension for PKI entities used in CMP
   -- operations, added due to the changes made in this document
   -- CMP Updates [thisRFC]
   -- The EKUs for the CA and RA are reused from CMC as defined in
   -- [RFC6402]
   --

   -- id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 27 }
   -- id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 }
   id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 32 }

   END -- of CMP module

A.2.  2002 ASN.1 Module

   This section contains the updated 2002 ASN.1 module for [RFC5912].
   This module replaces the module in Section 9 of that document.  The
   module contains those changes that were done to update to 2002 ASN.1
   standard done in [RFC5912] as well as changes made for this document.

   < TBD: Dose this document then also updates [RFC5912]? >

   < In case the working group sees a need to provide this ASN.1 module
   in 2015 syntax, please let me know.  >

   PKIXCMP-2009
       { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
       security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
       id-mod-cmp2000-02(50) } DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
   BEGIN
   IMPORTS

   AttributeSet{}, Extensions{}, EXTENSION, ATTRIBUTE
   FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009
       {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
       mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57)}

   AlgorithmIdentifier{}, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, ALGORITHM,
       DIGEST-ALGORITHM, MAC-ALGORITHM
   FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009
       {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
       mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
       id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58)}

   Certificate, CertificateList, id-kp
   FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009
       {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
       mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51)}

   GeneralName, KeyIdentifier
   FROM PKIX1Implicit-2009
       {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
       mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59)}

   CertTemplate, PKIPublicationInfo, EncryptedKey, EncryptedValue,
       CertId,CertReqMessages
   FROM PKIXCRMF-2009
       { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
       security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
       id-mod-crmf2005-02(55) }
   -- see also the behavioral clarifications to CRMF codified in
   -- Appendix C of this specification

   CertificationRequest
   FROM PKCS-10
       {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
       mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkcs10-2009(69)}
   -- (specified in RFC 2986 with 1993 ASN.1 syntax and IMPLICIT
   -- tags).  Alternatively, implementers may directly include
   -- the [PKCS10] syntax in this module

   localKeyId
   FROM PKCS-9
       {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
       modules(0) pkcs-9(1)}
       -- The import of localKeyId is added due to the updates made in
       -- this document CMP Updates [thisRFC]

   EnvelopedData, SignedData
   FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2009
       {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
       smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2004-02(41)}
       -- The import of EnvelopedData and SignedData is added due to
       -- the updates made in this document CMP Updates [thisRFC]
   ;

   -- the rest of the module contains locally defined OIDs and
   -- constructs

   CMPCertificate ::= CHOICE { x509v3PKCert Certificate, ... }
   -- This syntax, while bits-on-the-wire compatible with the
   -- standard X.509 definition of "Certificate", allows the
   -- possibility of future certificate types (such as X.509
   -- attribute certificates, WAP WTLS certificates, or other kinds
   -- of certificates) within this certificate management protocol,
   -- should a need ever arise to support such generality.  Those
   -- implementations that do not foresee a need to ever support
   -- other certificate types MAY, if they wish, comment out the
   -- above structure and "uncomment" the following one prior to
   -- compiling this ASN.1 module.  (Note that interoperability
   -- with implementations that don't do this will be unaffected by
   -- this change.)

   -- CMPCertificate ::= Certificate

   PKIMessage ::= SEQUENCE {
       header           PKIHeader,
       body             PKIBody,
       protection   [0] PKIProtection OPTIONAL,
       extraCerts   [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate
                     OPTIONAL }

   PKIMessages ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIMessage

   PKIHeader ::= SEQUENCE {
       pvno                INTEGER     { cmp1999(1), cmp2000(2) },
       sender              GeneralName,
       -- identifies the sender
       recipient           GeneralName,
       -- identifies the intended recipient
       messageTime     [0] GeneralizedTime         OPTIONAL,
       -- time of production of this message (used when sender
       -- believes that the transport will be "suitable"; i.e.,
       -- that the time will still be meaningful upon receipt)
       protectionAlg   [1] AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}}
                               OPTIONAL,
       -- algorithm used for calculation of protection bits
       senderKID       [2] KeyIdentifier           OPTIONAL,
       recipKID        [3] KeyIdentifier           OPTIONAL,
       -- to identify specific keys used for protection
       transactionID   [4] OCTET STRING            OPTIONAL,
       -- identifies the transaction; i.e., this will be the same in
       -- corresponding request, response, certConf, and PKIConf
       -- messages
       senderNonce     [5] OCTET STRING            OPTIONAL,
       recipNonce      [6] OCTET STRING            OPTIONAL,
       -- nonces used to provide replay protection, senderNonce
       -- is inserted by the creator of this message; recipNonce
       -- is a nonce previously inserted in a related message by
       -- the intended recipient of this message
       freeText        [7] PKIFreeText             OPTIONAL,
       -- this may be used to indicate context-specific instructions
       -- (this field is intended for human consumption)
       generalInfo     [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                           InfoTypeAndValue     OPTIONAL
       -- this may be used to convey context-specific information
       -- (this field not primarily intended for human consumption)
   }

   PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String
       -- text encoded as UTF-8 String [RFC3629] (note: each
       -- UTF8String MAY include an [RFC3066] language tag
       -- to indicate the language of the contained text;
       -- see [RFC2482] for details)

   PKIBody ::= CHOICE {       -- message-specific body elements
       ir       [0]  CertReqMessages,        --Initialization Request
       ip       [1]  CertRepMessage,         --Initialization Response
       cr       [2]  CertReqMessages,        --Certification Request
       cp       [3]  CertRepMessage,         --Certification Response
       p10cr    [4]  CertificationRequest,   --imported from [PKCS10]
       popdecc  [5]  POPODecKeyChallContent, --pop Challenge
       popdecr  [6]  POPODecKeyRespContent,  --pop Response
       kur      [7]  CertReqMessages,        --Key Update Request
       kup      [8]  CertRepMessage,         --Key Update Response
       krr      [9]  CertReqMessages,        --Key Recovery Request
       krp      [10] KeyRecRepContent,       --Key Recovery Response
       rr       [11] RevReqContent,          --Revocation Request
       rp       [12] RevRepContent,          --Revocation Response
       ccr      [13] CertReqMessages,        --Cross-Cert. Request
       ccp      [14] CertRepMessage,         --Cross-Cert. Response
       ckuann   [15] CAKeyUpdAnnContent,     --CA Key Update Ann.
       cann     [16] CertAnnContent,         --Certificate Ann.
       rann     [17] RevAnnContent,          --Revocation Ann.
       crlann   [18] CRLAnnContent,          --CRL Announcement
       pkiconf  [19] PKIConfirmContent,      --Confirmation
       nested   [20] NestedMessageContent,   --Nested Message
       genm     [21] GenMsgContent,          --General Message
       genp     [22] GenRepContent,          --General Response
       error    [23] ErrorMsgContent,        --Error Message
       certConf [24] CertConfirmContent,     --Certificate confirm
       pollReq  [25] PollReqContent,         --Polling request
       pollRep  [26] PollRepContent          --Polling response
   }

   PKIProtection ::= BIT STRING

   ProtectedPart ::= SEQUENCE {
       header    PKIHeader,
       body      PKIBody }

   id-PasswordBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
       usa(840) nt(113533) nsn(7) algorithms(66) 13 }
   PBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
       salt                OCTET STRING,
       -- note:  implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes
       -- of this string to values appropriate for their environment
       -- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks
       owf                 AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}},
       -- AlgId for a One-Way Function (SHA-1 recommended)
       iterationCount      INTEGER,
       -- number of times the OWF is applied
       -- note:  implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes
       -- of this integer to values appropriate for their environment
       -- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks
       mac                 AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {...}}
       -- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11],
       -- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202])
   }

   id-DHBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
       usa(840) nt(113533) nsn(7) algorithms(66) 30 }
   DHBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
       owf                 AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}},
       -- AlgId for a One-Way Function (SHA-1 recommended)
       mac                 AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {...}}
       -- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11],
       -- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202])
   }

   PKIStatus ::= INTEGER {
       accepted               (0),
       -- you got exactly what you asked for
       grantedWithMods        (1),
       -- you got something like what you asked for; the
       -- requester is responsible for ascertaining the differences
       rejection              (2),
       -- you don't get it, more information elsewhere in the message
       waiting                (3),
       -- the request body part has not yet been processed; expect to
       -- hear more later (note: proper handling of this status
       -- response MAY use the polling req/rep PKIMessages specified
       -- in Section 5.3.22; alternatively, polling in the underlying
       -- transport layer MAY have some utility in this regard)
       revocationWarning      (4),
       -- this message contains a warning that a revocation is
       -- imminent
       revocationNotification (5),
       -- notification that a revocation has occurred
       keyUpdateWarning       (6)
       -- update already done for the oldCertId specified in
       -- CertReqMsg
   }

   PKIFailureInfo ::= BIT STRING {
   -- since we can fail in more than one way!
   -- More codes may be added in the future if/when required.
       badAlg              (0),
       -- unrecognized or unsupported Algorithm Identifier
       badMessageCheck     (1),
       -- integrity check failed (e.g., signature did not verify)
       badRequest          (2),
       -- transaction not permitted or supported
       badTime             (3),
       -- messageTime was not sufficiently close to the system time,
       -- as defined by local policy
       badCertId           (4),
       -- no certificate could be found matching the provided criteria
       badDataFormat       (5),
       -- the data submitted has the wrong format
       wrongAuthority      (6),
       -- the authority indicated in the request is different from the
       -- one creating the response token
       incorrectData       (7),
       -- the requester's data is incorrect (for notary services)
       missingTimeStamp    (8),
       -- when the timestamp is missing but should be there
       -- (by policy)
       badPOP              (9),
       -- the proof-of-possession failed
       certRevoked         (10),
       -- the certificate has already been revoked
       certConfirmed       (11),
       -- the certificate has already been confirmed
       wrongIntegrity      (12),
       -- invalid integrity, password based instead of signature or
       -- vice versa
       badRecipientNonce   (13),
       -- invalid recipient nonce, either missing or wrong value
       timeNotAvailable    (14),
       -- the TSA's time source is not available
       unacceptedPolicy    (15),
       -- the requested TSA policy is not supported by the TSA
       unacceptedExtension (16),
       -- the requested extension is not supported by the TSA
       addInfoNotAvailable (17),
       -- the additional information requested could not be
       -- understood or is not available
       badSenderNonce      (18),
       -- invalid sender nonce, either missing or wrong size
       badCertTemplate     (19),
       -- invalid cert. template or missing mandatory information
       signerNotTrusted    (20),
       -- signer of the message unknown or not trusted
       transactionIdInUse  (21),
       -- the transaction identifier is already in use
       unsupportedVersion  (22),
       -- the version of the message is not supported
       notAuthorized       (23),
       -- the sender was not authorized to make the preceding
       -- request or perform the preceding action
       systemUnavail       (24),
       -- the request cannot be handled due to system unavailability
       systemFailure       (25),
       -- the request cannot be handled due to system failure
       duplicateCertReq    (26)
       -- certificate cannot be issued because a duplicate
       -- certificate already exists
   }

   PKIStatusInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
       status        PKIStatus,
       statusString  PKIFreeText     OPTIONAL,
       failInfo      PKIFailureInfo  OPTIONAL }

   OOBCert ::= CMPCertificate

   OOBCertHash ::= SEQUENCE {
       hashAlg     [0] AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}}
                           OPTIONAL,
       certId      [1] CertId                  OPTIONAL,
       hashVal         BIT STRING
       -- hashVal is calculated over the DER encoding of the
       -- self-signed certificate with the identifier certID.
   }

   POPODecKeyChallContent ::= SEQUENCE OF Challenge
   -- One Challenge per encryption key certification request (in the
   -- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages).

   Challenge ::= SEQUENCE {
       owf                 AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}}
                               OPTIONAL,
       -- MUST be present in the first Challenge; MAY be omitted in
       -- any subsequent Challenge in POPODecKeyChallContent (if
       -- omitted, then the owf used in the immediately preceding
       -- Challenge is to be used).
       witness             OCTET STRING,
       -- the result of applying the one-way function (owf) to a
       -- randomly-generated INTEGER, A.  [Note that a different
       -- INTEGER MUST be used for each Challenge.]
       challenge           OCTET STRING
       -- the encryption (under the public key for which the cert.
       -- request is being made) of Rand, where Rand is specified as
       --   Rand ::= SEQUENCE {
       --      int      INTEGER,
       --       - the randomly-generated INTEGER A (above)
       --      sender   GeneralName
       --       - the sender's name (as included in PKIHeader)
       --   }
   }

   POPODecKeyRespContent ::= SEQUENCE OF INTEGER
   -- One INTEGER per encryption key certification request (in the
   -- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages).  The
   -- retrieved INTEGER A (above) is returned to the sender of the
   -- corresponding Challenge.

   CertRepMessage ::= SEQUENCE {
       caPubs       [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate
                     OPTIONAL,
       response         SEQUENCE OF CertResponse }

   CertResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
       certReqId           INTEGER,
       -- to match this response with the corresponding request (a value
       -- of -1 is to be used if certReqId is not specified in the
       -- corresponding request)
       status              PKIStatusInfo,
       certifiedKeyPair    CertifiedKeyPair    OPTIONAL,
       rspInfo             OCTET STRING        OPTIONAL
       -- analogous to the id-regInfo-utf8Pairs string defined
       -- for regInfo in CertReqMsg [RFC4211]
   }

   CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE {
       certOrEncCert       CertOrEncCert,
       privateKey      [0] EncryptedKey      OPTIONAL,
       -- see [RFC4211] for comment on encoding
       -- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE of
       -- EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes made in
       -- this document CMP Updates [thisRFC]
       -- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the
       -- syntax without this change
       publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo  OPTIONAL }

   CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE {
       certificate     [0] CMPCertificate,
       encryptedCert   [1] EncryptedKey
       -- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE of
       -- EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes made in
       -- this document CMP Updates [thisRFC]
       -- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the
       -- syntax without this change
   }

   KeyRecRepContent ::= SEQUENCE {
       status                  PKIStatusInfo,
       newSigCert          [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
       caCerts             [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                                        CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
       keyPairHist         [2] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                                        CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL }

   RevReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF RevDetails

   RevDetails ::= SEQUENCE {
       certDetails         CertTemplate,
       -- allows requester to specify as much as they can about
       -- the cert. for which revocation is requested
       -- (e.g., for cases in which serialNumber is not available)
       crlEntryDetails     Extensions{{...}}    OPTIONAL
       -- requested crlEntryExtensions
   }

   RevRepContent ::= SEQUENCE {
       status       SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIStatusInfo,
       -- in same order as was sent in RevReqContent
       revCerts [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertId OPTIONAL,
       -- IDs for which revocation was requested
       -- (same order as status)
       crls     [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertificateList OPTIONAL
       -- the resulting CRLs (there may be more than one)
   }

   CAKeyUpdAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE {
       oldWithNew   CMPCertificate, -- old pub signed with new priv
       newWithOld   CMPCertificate, -- new pub signed with old priv
       newWithNew   CMPCertificate  -- new pub signed with new priv
   }

   CertAnnContent ::= CMPCertificate

   RevAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE {
       status              PKIStatus,
       certId              CertId,
       willBeRevokedAt     GeneralizedTime,
       badSinceDate        GeneralizedTime,
       crlDetails          Extensions{{...}}  OPTIONAL
       -- extra CRL details (e.g., crl number, reason, location, etc.)
   }

   CRLAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertificateList
   PKIConfirmContent ::= NULL
   NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages

   -- Added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]

   RootCaKeyUpdateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
      newWithNew       CMPCertificate
      -- new root CA certificate
      newWithOld   [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
      -- X.509 certificate containing the new public root CA key
      -- signed with the old private root CA key
      oldWithNew   [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL
      -- old root CA key certificate
      }

   -- Added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]

   CertReqTemplateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
      certTemplate           CertTemplate,
      -- prefilled certTemplate structure elements
      rsaKeyLen              INTEGER OPTIONAL
      -- Any reasonable RSA key length, if subjectPublicKeyInfo
      -- of the certTemplate has the OID rsaEncryption.
      }

   INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER

   InfoTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
       infoType    INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE.
                       &id({SupportedInfoSet}),
       infoValue   INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE.
                       &Type({SupportedInfoSet}{@infoType}) }

   SupportedInfoSet INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE ::= { ... }

   -- Example InfoTypeAndValue contents include, but are not limited
   -- to, the following (uncomment in this ASN.1 module and use as
   -- appropriate for a given environment):
   --
   --   id-it-caProtEncCert    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 1}
   --      CAProtEncCertValue      ::= CMPCertificate
   --   id-it-signKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 2}
   --      SignKeyPairTypesValue   ::= SEQUENCE OF
   --                                      AlgorithmIdentifier{{...}}
   --   id-it-encKeyPairTypes  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 3}
   --      EncKeyPairTypesValue    ::= SEQUENCE OF
   --                                      AlgorithmIdentifier{{...}}
   --   id-it-preferredSymmAlg OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 4}
   --      PreferredSymmAlgValue   ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{{...}}
   --   id-it-caKeyUpdateInfo  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 5}
   --      CAKeyUpdateInfoValue    ::= CAKeyUpdAnnContent
   --   id-it-currentCRL       OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 6}
   --      CurrentCRLValue         ::= CertificateList
   --   id-it-unsupportedOIDs  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 7}
   --      UnsupportedOIDsValue    ::= SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER
   --   id-it-keyPairParamReq  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 10}
   --      KeyPairParamReqValue    ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
   --   id-it-keyPairParamRep  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 11}
   --      KeyPairParamRepValue    ::= AlgorithmIdentifer
   --   id-it-revPassphrase    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 12}
   --      RevPassphraseValue      ::= EncryptedKey
   --      -- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE
   --      -- of EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes
   --      -- made in this document CMP Updates [thisRFC]
   --      -- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to
   --      -- the syntax without this change
   --   id-it-implicitConfirm  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 13}
   --      ImplicitConfirmValue    ::= NULL
   --   id-it-confirmWaitTime  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 14}
   --      ConfirmWaitTimeValue    ::= GeneralizedTime
   --   id-it-origPKIMessage   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 15}
   --      OrigPKIMessageValue     ::= PKIMessages
   --   id-it-suppLangTags     OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 16}
   --      SuppLangTagsValue       ::= SEQUENCE OF UTF8String
   --   id-it-caCerts OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-it 17}
   --      CaCertsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF CMPCertificate
   --      -- id-it-caCerts added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
   --   id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-it 18}
   --      RootCaKeyUpdateValue ::= RootCaKeyUpdateContent
   --      -- id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
   --   id-it-certReqTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-it 19}
   --      CertReqTemplateValue ::= CertReqTemplateContent
   --      -- id-it-certReqTemplate added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
   --
   -- where
   --
   --   id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
   --      iso(1) identified-organization(3)
   --      dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)}
   -- and
   --   id-it   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 4}
   --
   --
   -- This construct MAY also be used to define new PKIX Certificate
   -- Management Protocol request and response messages, or general-
   -- purpose (e.g., announcement) messages for future needs or for
   -- specific environments.

   GenMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue

   -- May be sent by EE, RA, or CA (depending on message content).
   -- The OPTIONAL infoValue parameter of InfoTypeAndValue will
   -- typically be omitted for some of the examples given above.
   -- The receiver is free to ignore any contained OBJECT IDs that it
   -- does not recognize.  If sent from EE to CA, the empty set
   -- indicates that the CA may send
   -- any/all information that it wishes.

   GenRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue
   -- Receiver MAY ignore any contained OIDs that it does not
   -- recognize.

   ErrorMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE {
       pKIStatusInfo          PKIStatusInfo,
       errorCode              INTEGER           OPTIONAL,
       -- implementation-specific error codes
       errorDetails           PKIFreeText       OPTIONAL
       -- implementation-specific error details
   }

   CertConfirmContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertStatus

   CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
       certHash    OCTET STRING,
       -- the hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorithm
       -- as is used to create and verify the certificate signature
       certReqId   INTEGER,
       -- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep
       statusInfo  PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL }

   PollReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
       certReqId              INTEGER }

   PollRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
       certReqId              INTEGER,
       checkAfter             INTEGER,  -- time in seconds
       reason                 PKIFreeText OPTIONAL }

   --
   -- Extended Key Usage extension for PKI entities used in CMP
   -- operations, added due to the changes made in this document
   -- CMP Updates [thisRFC]
   -- The EKUs for the CA and RA are reused from CMC as defined in
   -- [RFC6402]
   --
   -- id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 27 }
   -- id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 }
   id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 32 }

   END

Appendix B.  History of changes

   Note: This appendix will be deleted in the final version of the
   document.

   From version 03 -> 04:

   o  Added Section 2.7 to introduce three new id-it IDs for uses in
      general messages as discussed (see thread "draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-
      updates add section to introduce id-it-caCerts, id-it-
      rootCaKeyUpdate, and id-it-certReqTemplate")

   o  Added the new id-it IDs and the /.well-known/cmp to the IANA
      Considerations of [RFC4210] in Section 2.9

   o  Updated the IANA Considerations of [RFC4210] in Section 2.10

   o  Some changes in wording on Section 3 due to review comments from
      Martin Peylo

   From version 02 -> 03:

   o  Added a ToDo on aligning with the CMP Algorithms draft that will
      be set up as decided in IETF 108

   o  Updated section on Encrypted Values in Section 2.4 to add the
      AsymmetricKey Package structure to transport a newly generated
      private key as decided in IETF 108

   o  Updated the IANA Considerations of [RFC4210] in Section 2.9 2.10

   o  Added the pre-registered OID in Section 2.9 2.10 and the ASN.1 module

   o  Added Section 3Section 3 to document the changes to RFC 6712 [RFC6712]
      regarding URI discovery and using the path-prefix of
      '/.well-known/' '/.well-
      known/' as discussed in IETF 108

   o  Updated the IANA Considerations section

   o  Added a complete updated ASN.1 module in 1988 syntax to update
      Appendix F of [RFC4210] and a complete updated ASN.1 module in
      2002 syntax to update Section 9 of [RFC5912]

   o  Minor changes in wording

   From version 01 -> 02:

   o  Updated section on EKU OIDs in Section 2.2 as decided in IETF 107

   o  Changed from symmetric key-encryption to password-based key
      management technique in Section 2.4 as discussed with Russ and Jim
      on the mailing list

   o  Defined the attribute containing the key identifier for the
      revocation passphrase in Section 2.9 2.10

   o  Moved the change history to the Appendix

   From version 00 -> 01:

   o  Minor changes in wording

   From draft-brockhaus-lamps-cmp-updates-03 -> draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-
   updates-00:

   o  Changes required to reflect WG adoption

   From version 02 -> 03:

   o  Added some clarification in Section 2.1

   From version 01 -> 02:

   o  Added clarification to section on multiple protection

   o  Added clarification on new EKUs after some exchange with Tomas
      Gustavsson

   o  Reused OIDs from RFC 6402 [RFC6402] as suggested by Sean Turner at
      IETF 106

   o  Added clarification on the field containing the key identifier for
      a revocation passphrase

   o  Minor changes in wording

   From version 00 -> 01:

   o  Added a section describing the new extended key usages
   o  Completed the section on changes to the specification of encrypted
      values

   o  Added a section on clarification to Appendix D.4

   o  Minor generalization in RFC 4210 [RFC4210] Sections 5.1.3.4 and
      5.3.22

   o  Minor changes in wording

Author's Address

   Hendrik Brockhaus
   Siemens AG

   Email: hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com