--- 1/draft-ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-dm-10.txt 2020-09-06 05:13:17.821696732 -0700 +++ 2/draft-ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-dm-11.txt 2020-09-06 05:13:17.913699055 -0700 @@ -1,24 +1,24 @@ I2NSF Working Group J. Jeong, Ed. Internet-Draft C. Chung Intended status: Standards Track Sungkyunkwan University -Expires: March 1, 2021 T. Ahn +Expires: March 10, 2021 T. Ahn Korea Telecom R. Kumar Juniper Networks S. Hares Huawei - August 28, 2020 + September 6, 2020 I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface YANG Data Model - draft-ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-dm-10 + draft-ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-dm-11 Abstract This document describes an information model and a YANG data model for the Consumer-Facing Interface between an Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) User and Security Controller in an I2NSF system in a Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) environment. The information model defines various types of managed objects and the relationship among them needed to build the interface. The information model is based on the "Event-Condition-Action" (ECA) @@ -36,76 +36,75 @@ Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." - This Internet-Draft will expire on March 1, 2021. + This Internet-Draft will expire on March 10, 2021. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 - 2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 - 3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 - 4. Information Model for Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 - 4.1. Event Sub-model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 - 4.2. Condition Sub-model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 - 4.3. Action Sub-model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 - 5. Information Model for Policy Endpoint Groups . . . . . . . . 10 - 5.1. User Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 - 5.2. Device Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 - 5.3. Location Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 - 6. Information Model for Threat Prevention . . . . . . . . . . . 14 - 6.1. Threat Feed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 - 6.2. Payload Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 - 7. Network Configuration Access Control Model (NACM) for I2NSF + 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 + 3. Information Model for Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 + 3.1. Event Sub-model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 + 3.2. Condition Sub-model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 + 3.3. Action Sub-model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 + 4. Information Model for Policy Endpoint Groups . . . . . . . . 10 + 4.1. User Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 + 4.2. Device Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 + 4.3. Location Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 + 5. Information Model for Threat Prevention . . . . . . . . . . . 14 + 5.1. Threat Feed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 + 5.2. Payload Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 + 6. Network Configuration Access Control Model (NACM) for I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 - 8. YANG Data Model of Consumer-Facing Interface . . . . . . . . 18 - 8.1. YANG Module of Consumer-Facing Interface . . . . . . . . 18 - 9. XML Configuration Examples of High-Level Security Policy - Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 - 9.1. Database Registration: Information of Positions and - Devices (Endpoint Group) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 - 9.2. Scenario 1: Block SNS Access during Business Hours . . . 43 - 9.3. Scenario 2: Block Malicious VoIP/VoLTE Packets Coming to - a Company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 - 9.4. Scenario 3: Mitigate HTTP and HTTPS Flood Attacks on a - Company Web Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 - 10. XML Configuration Example of a User Group's Access Control - for I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 - 11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 - 12. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 - 13. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 - 14. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 - 15. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 - 15.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 - 15.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 - Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 + 7. YANG Data Model of Consumer-Facing Interface . . . . . . . . 18 + 7.1. YANG Module of Consumer-Facing Interface . . . . . . . . 18 + 8. XML Configuration Examples of High-Level Security Policy + Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 + 8.1. Database Registration: Information of Positions and + Devices (Endpoint Group) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 + 8.2. Scenario 1: Block SNS Access during Business Hours . . . 44 + 8.3. Scenario 2: Block Malicious VoIP/VoLTE Packets Coming to + a Company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 + 8.4. Scenario 3: Mitigate HTTP and HTTPS Flood Attacks on a + Company Web Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 + 9. XML Configuration Example of a User Group's Access Control + for I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 + 10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 + 11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 + 12. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 + 13. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 + 14. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 + 14.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 + 14.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 + Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 1. Introduction In a framework of Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) [RFC8329], each vendor can register their NSFs using a Developer's Management System (DMS). Assuming that vendors also provide the front-end web applications registered with an I2NSF User, the Consumer-Facing Interface is required because the web applications developed by each vendor need to have a standard interface specifying the data types used when the I2NSF User and Security Controller @@ -180,37 +179,30 @@ Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) system leads to a rapid advance in the network industry. As practical applications, Network Security Functions (NSFs), such as firewall, Intrusion Detection System (IDS)/Intrusion Prevention System (IPS), and attack mitigation, can also be provided as Virtual Network Functions (VNF) in the NFV system. By the efficient virtualization technology, these VNFs might be automatically provisioned and dynamically migrated based on real-time security requirements. This document presents a YANG data model to implement security functions based on NFV. -2. Requirements Language - - The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", - "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this - document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119][RFC3444] - [RFC8174]. - -3. Terminology +2. Terminology This document uses the terminology described in [RFC8329]. This document follows the guidelines of [RFC8407], uses the common YANG types defined in [I-D.ietf-netmod-rfc6991-bis], and adopts the Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA). The meaning of the symbols in tree diagrams is defined in [RFC8340]. -4. Information Model for Policy +3. Information Model for Policy A Policy object represents a mechanism to express a Security Policy by Security Administrator (i.e., I2NSF User) using Consumer-Facing Interface toward Security Controller; the policy would be enforced on an NSF. Figure 2 shows the YANG tree of the Policy object. The Policy object SHALL have the following information: Name: This field identifies the name of this object. Rule: This field contains a list of rules. These rules are @@ -271,21 +263,21 @@ +--rw (condition)? +--rw action +--rw ipsec-method Figure 3: Rule YANG Data Tree Note that in the case of policy conflicts, the resolution of the conflicted policies conforms to the guidelines of "Information Model of NSFs Capabilities" [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability]. -4.1. Event Sub-model +3.1. Event Sub-model The Event Object contains information related to scheduling a Rule. The Rule could be activated based on a set time or security event. Figure 4 shows the YANG tree of the Event object. Event object SHALL have following information: Security-event: This field identifies for which security event the policy is enforced. The examples of security events are: "DDOS", "spyware", "trojan", and "ransomware". @@ -312,21 +304,21 @@ | +--rw period | | +--rw start-time? time | | +--rw stop-time? time | | +--rw day* identityref | | +--rw date* int32 | | +--rw month* string +--rw frequency? enumeration Figure 4: Event Sub-model YANG Data Tree -4.2. Condition Sub-model +3.2. Condition Sub-model This object represents Conditions that Security Administrator wants to apply the checking on the traffic in order to determine whether the set of actions in the Rule can be executed or not. The Condition Sub-model consists of three different types of containers each representing different cases, such as general firewall and DDoS- mitigation cases, and a case when the condition is based on the payload strings of packets. Each containers have source and destination-target to represent the source and destination for each case. Figure 5 shows the YANG tree of the Condition object. The @@ -389,41 +381,41 @@ | +--rw destination? | | -> /i2nsf-cfi-policy/threat-preventions/payload-content/name +--:threat-feed-condition +--rw source* | -> /i2nsf-cfi-policy/threat-preventions/threat-feed-list/name +--rw destination? | -> /i2nsf-cfi-policy/threat-preventions/threat-feed-list/name Figure 5: Condition Sub-model YANG Data Tree -4.3. Action Sub-model +3.3. Action Sub-model This object represents actions that Security Admin wants to perform based on certain traffic class. Figure 6 shows the YANG tree of the Action object. The Action object SHALL have following information: Primary-action: This field identifies the action when a rule is matched by an NSF. The action could be one of "PASS", "DROP", "ALERT", "RATE-LIMIT", and "MIRROR". Secondary-action: This field identifies the action when a rule is matched by an NSF. The action could be one of "log", "syslog", "session-log". +--rw action +--rw primary-action identityref +--rw secondary-action? identityref Figure 6: Action Sub-model YANG Data Tree -5. Information Model for Policy Endpoint Groups +4. Information Model for Policy Endpoint Groups The Policy Endpoint Group is a very important part of building User- Construct based policies. A Security Administrator would create and use these objects to represent a logical entity in their business environment, where a Security Policy is to be applied. There are multiple managed objects that constitute a Policy's Endpoint Group, as shown in Figure 7. Figure 8 shows the YANG tree of the Endpoint- Groups object. This section lists these objects and relationship among them. @@ -450,21 +442,21 @@ +--rw endpoint-groups | +--rw user-group* [name] | ... | +--rw device-group* [name] | ... | +--rw location-group* [name] | ... Figure 8: Endpoint Group YANG Data Tree -5.1. User Group +4.1. User Group This object represents a User-Group. Figure 9 shows the YANG tree of the User-Group object. The User-Group object SHALL have the following information: Name: This field identifies the name of this object. IPv4: This represents the IPv4 address of a user in the user group. @@ -488,21 +480,21 @@ | +--rw range-ipv4-address | +--rw start-ipv4-address inet:ipv4-address | +--rw end-ipv4-address inet:ipv4-address +--:(range-match-ipv6) +--rw range-ipv6-address* +--rw start-ipv6-address inet:ipv6-address +--rw end-ipv6-address inet:ipv6-address Figure 9: User Group YANG Data Tree -5.2. Device Group +4.2. Device Group This object represents a Device-Group. Figure 10 shows the YANG tree of the Device-group object. The Device-Group object SHALL have the following information: Name: This field identifies the name of this object. IPv4: This represents the IPv4 address of a device in the device group. @@ -531,21 +523,21 @@ | | | +--rw start-ipv4-address inet:ipv4-address | | | +--rw end-ipv4-address inet:ipv4-address | +--:(range-match-ipv6) | | +--rw range-ipv6-address* | | | +--rw start-ipv6-address inet:ipv6-address | | | +--rw end-ipv6-address inet:ipv6-address +--rw protocol identityref Figure 10: Device Group YANG Data Tree -5.3. Location Group +4.3. Location Group This object represents a location group based on either tag or other information. Figure 11 shows the YANG tree of the Location-Group object. The Location-Group object SHALL have the following information: Name: This field identifies the name of this object. Geo-ip-ipv4: This field represents the IPv4 Geo-ip address of a location [RFC8805]. @@ -557,21 +549,21 @@ location group member is located. +--rw location-group* [name] +--rw name string +--rw geo-ip-ipv4 inet:ipv4-address +--rw geo-ip-ipv6 inet:ipv6-address +--rw continent? identityref Figure 11: Location Group YANG Data Tree -6. Information Model for Threat Prevention +5. Information Model for Threat Prevention The threat prevention plays an important part in the overall security posture by reducing the attack surfaces. This information could come from various threat feeds (i.e., sources for obtaining the threat information). There are multiple managed objects that constitute this category. This section lists these objects and relationship among them. Figure 13 shows the YANG tree of a Threat-Prevention object. +-------------------+ @@ -588,21 +580,21 @@ Figure 12: Threat Prevention Diagram +--rw threat-prevention +--rw threat-feed-list* [name] ... +--rw payload-content* [name] ... Figure 13: Threat Prevention YANG Data Tree -6.1. Threat Feed +5.1. Threat Feed This object represents a threat feed which provides the signatures of malicious activities. Figure 14 shows the YANG tree of a Threat- feed-list. The Threat-Feed object SHALL have the following information: Name: This field identifies the name of this object. Server-ipv4: This represents the IPv4 server address of the feed provider, which may be either an external or local server. @@ -634,21 +626,21 @@ +--rw threat-feed-list* [name] +--rw name identityref +--rw server-ipv4? inet:ipv4-address +--rw server-ipv6? inet:ipv6-address +--rw description? string +--rw threat-file-types* identityref +--rw signatures* identityref Figure 14: Threat Feed YANG Data Tree -6.2. Payload Content +5.2. Payload Content This object represents a custom list created for the purpose of defining an exception to threat feeds. Figure 15 shows the YANG tree of a Payload-content list. The Payload-Content object SHALL have the following information: Name: This field identifies the name of this object. For example, the name "backdoor" indicates the payload content is related to a backdoor attack. @@ -658,21 +650,21 @@ Content: This contains the payload contents, which are involed in a security attack, such as strings. +--rw payload-content* [name] +--rw name string +--rw description string +--rw content* string Figure 15: Payload Content in YANG Data Tree -7. Network Configuration Access Control Model (NACM) for I2NSF +6. Network Configuration Access Control Model (NACM) for I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface Network Configuration Access Control Model (NACM) provides a user group with an access control with the following features [RFC8341]: o Independent control of action, data, and notification access is provided. o A simple and familiar set of datastore permissions is used. @@ -691,21 +683,21 @@ Consumer-Facing Interface. Figure 16 shows part of the NACM module to enable the access control of a user group for the I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface. To use the NACM, a user needs to configure either a NETCONF server [RFC6241] or a RESTCONF server [RFC8040] to enable the NACM module. Then, the user can simply use an account of root or admin user for the access control for the module of the I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface (i.e., ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy). An XML example to configure the access control a user group for the I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface can be - seen in Section 10. + seen in Section 9. list rule { key "name"; ordered-by user; leaf name { type string { length "1..max"; } description "Arbitrary name assigned to the rule."; @@ -737,21 +729,21 @@ description "The access control action associated with the rule. If a rule is determined to match a particular request, then this object is used to determine whether to permit or deny the request."; } Figure 16: A Part of the NACM YANG Data Model -8. YANG Data Model of Consumer-Facing Interface +7. YANG Data Model of Consumer-Facing Interface The main objective of this data model is to provide both an information model and the corresponding YANG data model of I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface. This interface can be used to deliver control and management messages between an I2NSF User and Security Controller for the I2NSF User's high-level security policies. The semantics of the data model must be aligned with the information model of the Consumer-Facing Interface. The transformation of the information model is performed so that this YANG data model can @@ -759,36 +751,35 @@ messages. This data model is designed to support the I2NSF framework that can be extended according to the security needs. In other words, the model design is independent of the content and meaning of specific policies as well as the implementation approach. With the YANG data model of I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface, this document suggests use cases for security policy rules such as time- based firewall, VoIP/VoLTE security service, and DDoS-attack - mitigation in Section 9. + mitigation in Section 8. -8.1. YANG Module of Consumer-Facing Interface +7.1. YANG Module of Consumer-Facing Interface This section describes a YANG module of Consumer-Facing Interface. - This YANG module imports from [RFC6991] and uses the typedef of time - in [I-D.ietf-netmod-rfc6991-bis]. It makes references to [RFC0854][R - FC0913][RFC0959][RFC1081][RFC1631][RFC2616][RFC2818][RFC4250][RFC5321 - ]. + This YANG module imports from [I-D.ietf-netmod-rfc6991-bis]. It + makes references to [RFC0854][RFC0913][RFC0959][RFC1081][RFC1631][RFC + 2616][RFC2818][RFC4250][RFC5321]. - file "ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy@2020-08-28.yang" + file "ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy@2020-09-06.yang" module ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy { yang-version 1.1; namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy"; - prefix cfi-policy; + prefix nsfcfi; import ietf-inet-types{ prefix inet; } import ietf-yang-types{ prefix yang; } import ietf-netconf-acm { @@ -818,36 +810,40 @@ Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info). This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see the RFC itself for full legal notices."; - revision "2020-08-28"{ + // RFC Ed.: replace XXXX with an actual RFC number and remove + // this note. + + revision "2020-09-06"{ description "Initial revision."; reference "RFC XXXX: I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface YANG Data Model"; + + // RFC Ed.: replace XXXX with an actual RFC number and remove + // this note. } identity malware-file-type { description "Base identity for malware file types."; } - identity executable-file { base malware-file-type; description "Identity for executable file types."; - } identity doc-file { base malware-file-type; description "Identity for Microsoft document file types."; } identity html-app-file { base malware-file-type; @@ -1200,22 +1201,24 @@ */ typedef time { type string { pattern '(0[0-9]|1[0-9]|2[0-3]):[0-5][0-9]:[0-5][0-9](\.\d+)?' + '(Z|[\+\-]((1[0-3]|0[0-9]):([0-5][0-9])|14:00))?'; } description "The time type represents an instance of time of zero-duration that recurs every day."; reference - "draft-ietf-netmod-rfc6991-bis-04: Common YANG Data Types - - typedef time is used."; + "RFC 6991-bis: Common YANG Data Types - typedef time is used."; + + // RFC Ed.: When RFC 6991-bis becomes an RFC, remove 'typedef time' + // this note. } /* * Groupings */ grouping ipv4-list { description "Grouping for an IPv4 address list."; leaf-list ipv4 { @@ -1540,37 +1543,52 @@ end-date-time."; } container period{ when "../../frequency!='only-once'"; description "This represents the repetition time. In the case where the frequency is weekly, the days can be set."; leaf start-time { type time; + + // RFC Ed.: When RFC 6991-bis becomes an RFC, time must + // be replaced with yang:time. + // this note. + description "This is a period's start time for an event."; reference "RFC 6991-bis: Common YANG Data Types - The time type represents an instance of time of zero-duration that - recurs every day. When RFC 6991-bis becomes an RFC, - time must be replaced with yang:time."; + recurs every day."; + + // RFC Ed.: Replace 6991-bis with an actual RFC number + // and remove this note. + } leaf end-time { type time; + + // RFC Ed.: When RFC 6991-bis becomes an RFC, time must + // be replaced with yang:time. + // this note. + description "This is a period's end time for an event."; reference "RFC 6991-bis: Common YANG Data Types - The time type represents an instance of time of zero-duration that - recurs every day. When RFC 6991-bis becomes an RFC, - time must be replaced with yang:time."; + recurs every day."; + + // RFC Ed.: Replace 6991-bis with an actual RFC number + // and remove this note. } leaf-list day { when "../../../frequency='weekly'"; type identityref{ base day; } min-elements 1; description "This represents the repeated day of every week (e.g., @@ -1867,37 +1886,38 @@ description "This represents the name of a packet's payload-content. It should give an idea of why a specific payload content is marked as a threat. For example, the name 'backdoor' indicates the payload content is related to a backdoor attack."; } description "This represents a payload-string group."; uses payload-string; + } } } } Figure 17: YANG for Consumer-Facing Interface -9. XML Configuration Examples of High-Level Security Policy Rules +8. XML Configuration Examples of High-Level Security Policy Rules This section shows XML configuration examples of high-level security policy rules that are delivered from the I2NSF User to the Security Controller over the Consumer-Facing Interface. The considered use cases are: Database registration, time-based firewall for web filtering, VoIP/VoLTE security service, and DDoS-attack mitigation. -9.1. Database Registration: Information of Positions and Devices +8.1. Database Registration: Information of Positions and Devices (Endpoint Group) If new endpoints are introduced to the network, it is necessary to first register their data to the database. For example, if new members are newly introduced in either of three different groups (i.e., user-group, device-group, and payload-group), each of them should be registered with information such as ip-addresses or protocols used by devices. Figure 18 shows an example XML representation of the registered @@ -1913,22 +1933,22 @@ 192.0.2.11 192.0.2.90 webservers 198.51.100.11 198.51.100.20 - cfi-policy:http - cfi-policy:https + nsfcfi:http + nsfcfi:https Figure 18: Registering User-group and Device-group Information with IPv4 Addresses Also, Figure 19 shows an example XML representation of the registered information for the user-group and device-group with IPv6 addresses [RFC3849]. @@ -1942,69 +1962,69 @@ 2001:DB8:0:1::11 2001:DB8:0:1::90 webservers 2001:DB8:0:2::11 2001:DB8:0:2::20 - cfi-policy:http - cfi-policy:https + nsfcfi:http + nsfcfi:https Figure 19: Registering User-group and Device-group Information with IPv6 Addresses -9.2. Scenario 1: Block SNS Access during Business Hours +8.2. Scenario 1: Block SNS Access during Business Hours The first example scenario is to "block SNS access during office hours" using a time-based firewall policy. In this scenario, all users registered as "employees" in the user-group list are unable to access Social Networking Services (SNS) during the office hours (weekdays). The XML instance is described below: security_policy_for_blocking_sns123 block_access_to_sns_during_office_hours 2020-03-11T09:00:00.00Z 2020-12-31T18:00:00.00Z 09:00:00Z 18:00:00Z - cfi-policy:monday - cfi-policy:tuesday - cfi-policy:wednesday - cfi-policy:thursday - cfi-policy:friday + nsfcfi:monday + nsfcfi:tuesday + nsfcfi:wednesday + nsfcfi:thursday + nsfcfi:friday weekly employees sns-websites - cfi-policy:drop + nsfcfi:drop Figure 20: An XML Example for Time-based Firewall Time-based-condition Firewall 1. The policy name is "security_policy_for_blocking_sns". @@ -2016,21 +2036,21 @@ 4. The destination target is "sns-websites". "sns-websites" is the key which represents the list containing the information, such as URL, about sns-websites. 5. The action required is to "drop" any attempt to connect to websites related to Social networking. 6. The IPsec method type used for nsf traffic steering is set to "ipsec-ike". -9.3. Scenario 2: Block Malicious VoIP/VoLTE Packets Coming to a Company +8.3. Scenario 2: Block Malicious VoIP/VoLTE Packets Coming to a Company The second example scenario is to "block malicious VoIP/VoLTE packets coming to a company" using a VoIP policy. In this scenario, the calls comming from from VOIP and/or VOLTE sources with VOLTE IDs that are classified as malicious are dropped. The IP addresses of the employees and malicious VOIP IDs should be blocked are stored in the database or datastore of the enterprise. Here and the rest of the cases assume that the security administrators or someone responsible for the existing and newly generated policies, are not aware of which and/or how many NSFs are needed to meet the security requirements. @@ -2050,24 +2070,24 @@ Block_malicious_voip_and_volte_packets malicious-id employees - cfi-policy:drop + nsfcfi:drop - cfi-policy:ipsec-ikeless + nsfcfi:ipsec-ikeless Figure 21: An XML Example for VoIP Security Service Custom-condition Firewall 1. The policy name is @@ -2083,21 +2103,21 @@ 4. The destination target is "employees". "employees" is the key which represents the list containing information about employees, such as IP addresses. 5. The action required is "drop" when any incoming packets are from "malicious-id". 6. The IPsec method used for nsf traffic steering is set to "ipsec- ikeless". -9.4. Scenario 3: Mitigate HTTP and HTTPS Flood Attacks on a Company Web +8.4. Scenario 3: Mitigate HTTP and HTTPS Flood Attacks on a Company Web Server The third example scenario is to "Mitigate HTTP and HTTPS flood attacks on a company web server" using a DDoS-attack mitigation policy. Here, the time information is not set because the service provided by the network should be maintained at all times. If the packets sent by any sources are more than the set threshold, then the admin can set the percentage of the packets to be dropped to safely maintain the service. In this scenario, the source is set as "any" to block any sources which send abnormal amount of packets. The @@ -2114,24 +2134,24 @@ 100_packets_per_second webservers 100 - cfi-policy:drop + nsfcfi:drop - cfi-policy:ipsec-ikeless + nsfcfi:ipsec-ikeless Figure 22: An XML Example for DDoS-attack Mitigation DDoS-condition Firewall 1. The policy name is "security_policy_for_ddos_attacks". @@ -2147,22 +2167,22 @@ server devices. 5. The Source is all sources which send abnormal amount of packets. 6. The action required is to "drop" packet reception is more than 100 packets per second. 7. The IPsec method used for nsf traffic steering is set to "ipsec- ike". -10. XML Configuration Example of a User Group's Access Control for - I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface +9. XML Configuration Example of a User Group's Access Control for I2NSF + Consumer-Facing Interface This is an example for creating privileges for a group of users (i.e., a user group) to access and use the I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface to create security policies via the interface. For the access control of the Consumer-Facing Interface, the NACM module can be used. Figure 23 shows an XML example the access control of a user group (named Example-Group) for I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface A group called Example-Group can be created and configured with NACM for the Consumer-Facing Interface. For Example-Group, a rule list can created with the name of Example-Group-Rules. Example-Group- @@ -2219,59 +2239,62 @@ 5. As the first rule name, Example-Group-Rule1 is specified. This rule is used to give read privilege to Example-Group's members for the module of the I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface. 6. As the second rule name, Example-Group-Rule2 is specified. This rule is used to deny create, update, and delete privileges against Example-Group's members for the module of the I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface. -11. IANA Considerations +10. IANA Considerations This document requests IANA to register the following URI in the "IETF XML Registry" [RFC3688]: URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy Registrant Contact: The IESG. XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace. This document requests IANA to register the following YANG module in - the "YANG Module Names" registry [RFC7950][RFC8525]. + the "YANG Module Names" registry [RFC7950][RFC8525]: name: ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy - prefix: cfi-policy + prefix: nsfcfi reference: RFC XXXX -12. Security Considerations + // RFC Ed.: replace XXXX with an actual RFC number and remove + // this note. + +11. Security Considerations The data model for the I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface is based on the I2NSF framework [RFC8329], so the same security considerations with the I2NSF framework should be included in this document. The data model needs a secure communication channel to protect the Consumer-Facing Interface between the I2NSF User and Security Controller. Also, the data model's management access control is based on Network Configuration Access Control Model(NACM) mechanisms [RFC8341]. -13. Acknowledgments +12. Acknowledgments This work was supported by Institute of Information & Communications Technology Planning & Evaluation (IITP) grant funded by the Korea MSIT (Ministry of Science and ICT) (R-20160222-002755, Cloud based Security Intelligence Technology Development for the Customized Security Service Provisioning). This work was supported in part by the IITP (2020-0-00395, Standard Development of Blockchain based Network Management Automation Technology). -14. Contributors +13. Contributors This document is made by the group effort of I2NSF working group. Many people actively contributed to this document, such as Mahdi F. Dachmehchi and Daeyoung Hyun. The authors sincerely appreciate their contributions. The following are co-authors of this document: Patrick Lingga Department of Electronic, Electrical and Computer Engineering @@ -2350,23 +2373,23 @@ EMail: senad.palislamovic@nokia.com Liang Xia Huawei 101 Software Avenue Nanjing, Jiangsu 210012 China EMail: Frank.Xialiang@huawei.com -15. References +14. References -15.1. Normative References +14.1. Normative References [I-D.ietf-netmod-rfc6991-bis] Schoenwaelder, J., "Common YANG Data Types", draft-ietf- netmod-rfc6991-bis-04 (work in progress), July 2020. [RFC0854] Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "Telnet Protocol Specification", STD 8, RFC 854, DOI 10.17487/RFC0854, May 1983, . [RFC0913] Lottor, M., "Simple File Transfer Protocol", RFC 913, @@ -2431,24 +2454,20 @@ [RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020, DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010, . [RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011, . - [RFC6991] Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., "Common YANG Data Types", - RFC 6991, DOI 10.17487/RFC6991, July 2013, - . - [RFC7950] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language", RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016, . [RFC8040] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, January 2017, . [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, @@ -2482,21 +2501,21 @@ [RFC8525] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., Watsen, K., and R. Wilton, "YANG Library", RFC 8525, DOI 10.17487/RFC8525, March 2019, . [RFC8805] Kline, E., Duleba, K., Szamonek, Z., Moser, S., and W. Kumari, "A Format for Self-Published IP Geolocation Feeds", RFC 8805, DOI 10.17487/RFC8805, August 2020, . -15.2. Informative References +14.2. Informative References [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability] Xia, L., Strassner, J., Basile, C., and D. Lopez, "Information Model of NSFs Capabilities", draft-ietf- i2nsf-capability-05 (work in progress), April 2019. [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection] Lopez, R., Lopez-Millan, G., and F. Pereniguez-Garcia, "Software-Defined Networking (SDN)-based IPsec Flow Protection", draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection-08