--- 1/draft-ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-dm-03.txt 2019-04-04 04:14:55.879328553 -0700 +++ 2/draft-ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-dm-04.txt 2019-04-04 04:14:55.979329988 -0700 @@ -1,56 +1,56 @@ I2NSF Working Group J. Jeong Internet-Draft E. Kim Intended status: Standards Track Sungkyunkwan University -Expires: September 12, 2019 T. Ahn +Expires: October 6, 2019 T. Ahn Korea Telecom R. Kumar Juniper Networks S. Hares Huawei - March 11, 2019 + April 4, 2019 I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface YANG Data Model - draft-ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-dm-03 + draft-ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-dm-04 Abstract This document describes an information model and a YANG data model for the Consumer-Facing Interface between an Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) User and Security Controller in an I2NSF system in a Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) environment. The information model defines various managed objects and relationship among these objects needed to build the interface. The information model is organized based on the "Event-condition-Event" (ECA) policy model defined by a capability information model for Interface to - Network Security Functions (I2NSF)[draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability], and - the data model is defined for enabling different users of a given - I2NSF system to define, manage, and monitor security policies for - specific flows within an administrative domain. + Network Security Functions (I2NSF)[i2nsf-capability-im], and the data + model is defined for enabling different users of a given I2NSF system + to define, manage, and monitor security policies for specific flows + within an administrative domain. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." - This Internet-Draft will expire on September 12, 2019. + This Internet-Draft will expire on October 6, 2019. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents @@ -59,98 +59,102 @@ include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. Information Model for Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 - 4.1. Event Sub-Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 - 4.2. Condition Sub-Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 - 4.3. Action Sub-Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 - 5. Information Model for Multi-Tenancy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 - 5.1. Policy-Domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 - 5.2. Policy-Tenant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 - 5.3. Policy-Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 - 5.4. Policy-User . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 + 4.1. Event Sub-model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 + 4.2. Condition Sub-model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 + 4.3. Action Sub-model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 + 5. Information Model for Multi-Tenancy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 + 5.1. Policy Domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 + 5.2. Policy Tenant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 + 5.3. Policy Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 + 5.4. Policy User . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 5.5. Policy Management Authentication Method . . . . . . . . . 13 6. Information Model for Policy Endpoint Groups . . . . . . . . 14 6.1. User Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 - 6.2. Device-Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 - 6.3. Location-Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 + 6.2. Device Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 + 6.3. Location Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 7. Information Model for Threat Prevention . . . . . . . . . . . 17 - 7.1. Threat-Feed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 - 7.2. Payload-content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 - 8. Role-Based Acess Control (RBAC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 + 7.1. Threat Feed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 + 7.2. Payload Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 + 8. Role-based Acess Control (RBAC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 9. YANG Data Model for Security Policies for Consumer-Facing Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 - 10. Example XML Output for Various Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . 37 - 10.1. DB registration: Information of positions and devices - (Endpoint group) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 - 10.2. Scenario 1: Block SNS access during business hours . . . 38 - 10.3. Scenario 2: Block malicious VoIP/VoLTE packets coming to - the company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 - 10.4. Scenario 3: Mitigate HTTP and HTTPS flood attacks on a - company web Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 + 10. Example XML Output for Various Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . 38 + 10.1. DB Registration: Information of Positions and Devices + (Endpoint Group) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 + 10.2. Scenario 1: Block SNS Access during Business Hours . . . 39 + 10.3. Scenario 2: Block Malicious VoIP/VoLTE Packets Coming to + a Company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 + 10.4. Scenario 3: Mitigate HTTP and HTTPS Flood Attacks on a + Company Web Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 - 11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 - 12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 - 13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 - 13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 - 13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 + 11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 + 12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 + 13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 + 13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 + 13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Appendix A. Changes from draft-ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing- - interface-dm-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 - Appendix B. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 + interface-dm-03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 + Appendix B. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 Appendix C. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 - Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 + Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 1. Introduction - In I2NSF framework, each vendor can register their NSFs using the - Vendor Management System (VMS). Assuming that vendors also provide - the front-end web applications registered with the I2NSF provider, + In an I2NSF framework, each vendor can register their NSFs using a + Developer's Management System (DMS). Assuming that vendors also + provide the front-end web applications registered with an I2NSF User, the Consumer-Facing Interface is required because the web applications developed by each vendor need to have a standard - interface specifying the data types used when I2NSF user and security - controller communicate using this interface. Therefore, this - document specifies the required information, their data types, and - encoding schemes so that any data (security policy) transferred - through the Consumer-Facing Interface can easily be translated by the - security controller into low-level security policies. The translated - policies are delivered to Network Security Functions (NSFs) according - to their respective security capabilities for securiy enforcement. + interface specifying the data types used when the I2NSF User and + Security Controller communicate using this interface. Therefore, + this document specifies the required information, their data types, + and encoding schemes so that high-level security policies (or + configuration information for security policies) can be transferred + to the Security Controller through the Consumer-Facing Interface. + These policies can easily be translated by the Security Controller + into low-level security policies. The Security Controller delivers + the translated policies to Network Security Functions (NSFs) + according to their respective security capabilities for the required + securiy enforcement. The Consumer-Facing Interface would be built using a set of objects, with each object capturing a unique set of information from Security - Admin (i.e., I2NSF User [RFC8329]) needed to express a Security - Policy. An object may have relationship with various other objects - to express a complete set of requirement. An information model - captures the managed objects and relationship among these objects. - The information model proposed in this document is structured in - accordance with the "Event-Condition-Event" (ECA) policy model. + Administrator (i.e., I2NSF User [RFC8329]) needed to express a + Security Policy. An object may have relationship with various other + objects to express a complete set of requirement. An information + model captures the managed objects and relationship among these + objects. The information model proposed in this document is + structured in accordance with the "Event-Condition-Event" (ECA) + policy model. - An NSF Capability model is proposed in [draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability] - as the basic model for both the NSF-Facing interface and Consumer- - Facing Interface security policy model of this document. + An NSF Capability model is proposed in [i2nsf-capability-im] as the + basic model for both the NSF-Facing interface and Consumer-Facing + Interface security policy model of this document. [RFC3444] explains differences between an information and data model. This document use the guidelines in [RFC3444] to define both the information and data model for Consumer-Facing Interface. Figure 1 shows a high-level abstraction of Consumer-Facing Interface. A data model, which represents an implementation of the information model in - a specific data representation language, is also defined in the later - sections of this document (see section 10). + a specific data representation language, is also defined in this + document. +-----------------+ +-----------------+ - | Consumer-facing | | Consumer-facing | + | Consumer-Facing | | Consumer-Facing | | Interface +--->+ Interface | |Information Model| | Data Model | +--------+--------+ +-----------------+ ^ | +-------------+-------------+------------+ | | | | +----+----+ +-----+----+ +-----+----+ +----+----+ | Multi | | Policy | | Endpoint | | Threat | | Tenancy | | | | groups | | feed | @@ -171,72 +175,73 @@ Figure 1: Diagram for High-level Abstraction of Consumer-Facing Interface Data models are defined at a lower level of abstraction and provide many details. They provide details about the implementation of a protocol's specification, e.g., rules that explain how to map managed objects onto lower-level protocol constructs. Since conceptual models can be implemented in different ways, multiple data models can be derived by a single information model. - The efficient and flexible provisioning of network functions by NFV - leads to a rapid advance in the network industry. As practical - applications, network security functions (NSFs), such as firewall, - intrusion detection system (IDS)/intrusion protection system (IPS), - and attack mitigation, can also be provided as virtual network - functions (VNF) in the NFV system. By the efficient virtual - technology, these VNFs might be automatically provisioned and - dynamically migrated based on real-time security requirements. This - document presents a YANG data model to implement security functions - based on NFV. + The efficient and flexible provisioning of network functions by a + Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) system leads to a rapid + advance in the network industry. As practical applications, Network + Security Functions (NSFs), such as firewall, Intrusion Detection + System (IDS)/Intrusion Prevention System (IPS), and attack + mitigation, can also be provided as Virtual Network Functions (VNF) + in the NFV system. By the efficient virtual technology, these VNFs + might be automatically provisioned and dynamically migrated based on + real-time security requirements. This document presents a YANG data + model to implement security functions based on NFV. 2. Requirements Language The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC3444] RFC8174 [RFC8174]. 3. Terminology This document uses the terminology described in - [i2nsf-terminology][client-facing-inf-im][client-facing-inf-req]. + [i2nsf-terminology][client-facing-inf-req]. This document follows the guidelines of [RFC6087], uses the common YANG types defined in [RFC6991], and adopts the Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA). The meaning of the symbols in tree diagrams is defined in [RFC8340]. 4. Information Model for Policy A Policy object represents a mechanism to express a Security Policy - by Security Admin (i.e., I2NSF User) using Consumer-Facing Interface - toward Security Controller; the policy would be enforced on an NSF. - Figure 2 shows the XML instance of the Policy object. The Policy - object SHALL have following information: + by Security Administrator (i.e., I2NSF User) using Consumer-Facing + Interface toward Security Controller; the policy would be enforced on + an NSF. Figure 2 shows the XML instance of the Policy object. The + Policy object SHALL have following information: Name: This field identifies the name of this object. Date: Date when this object was created or last modified. Rules: This field contains a list of rules. If the rule does not have a user-defined precedence, then any conflict must be manually resolved. +--rw policy +--rw policy-name? string +--rw rule* [rule-name] - +--rw event - +--rw condition - +--rw action + | +--rw event + | +--rw condition + | +--rw action + ... - Figure 2: Policy YANG Data tree + Figure 2: Policy YANG Data Tree A policy is a container of Rules. In order to express a Rule, a Rule must have complete information such as where and when a policy needs to be applied. This is done by defining a set of managed objects and relationship among them. A Policy Rule may be related segmentation, threat mitigation or telemetry data collection from an NSF in the network, which will be specified as the sub-model of the policy model in the subsequent sections. Figure 3 shows the XML instance of the Rule object. The rule object SHALL have the following information: @@ -251,34 +256,39 @@ Condition: This field contains all the checking conditions to apply to the objective traffic. See details in Section 4.2. Action: This field identifies the action taken when a rule is matched. There is always an implicit action to drop traffic if no rule is matched for a traffic type. See details in Section 4.3. + IPsec: This field contains the information about IPsec type. + There are two types such as IPsec-IKE and IPsec-IKEless + [i2nsf-ipsec]. + Owner: This field contains the onwer of the rule. For example, the person who created it, and eligible for modifying it. +--rw rule* [rule-name] +--rw rule-name string +--rw date? yang:date-and-time +--rw event* [name] +--rw condition +--rw action + +--rw ipsec +--rw owner? string - Figure 3: YANG Data tree for Rule + Figure 3: YANG Data Tree for Rule -4.1. Event Sub-Model +4.1. Event Sub-model The Event Object contains information related to scheduling a Rule. The Rule could be activated based on a time calendar or security event including threat level changes. Figure 4 shows the XML instance of the Event object. Event object SHALL have following information: Name: This field identifies the name of this object. Date: This field indicates the date when this object was created @@ -297,34 +307,34 @@ +--rw date? yang:date-and-time +--rw event-type enumeration +--rw time-information +--rw time | +--rw begin-time begin-time-type | +--rw end-time end-time-type +--rw recursive +--rw recur boolean +--rw recursive-type? enumeration - Figure 4: Event sub-model YANG data tree + Figure 4: Event Sub-model YANG Data Tree -4.2. Condition Sub-Model +4.2. Condition Sub-model - This object represents Conditions that Security Admin wants to apply - the checking on the traffic in order to determine whether the set of - actions in the Rule can be executed or not. The condition sub-model - consists of 3 different types of three containers each representing - different cases, such as general firewall and ddos-mitigation cases, - and a case when the condition is based on the payload strings of - packets. Each containers have source-target and destination-target - to represent the source and destination for each case. Figure 5 - shows the XML instance of the Condition object.The Condition submodel - SHALL have following information: + This object represents Conditions that Security Administrator wants + to apply the checking on the traffic in order to determine whether + the set of actions in the Rule can be executed or not. The Condition + Sub-model consists of 3 different types of three containers each + representing different cases, such as general firewall and DDoS- + mitigation cases, and a case when the condition is based on the + payload strings of packets. Each containers have source-target and + destination-target to represent the source and destination for each + case. Figure 5 shows the XML instance of the Condition object. The + Condition Sub-model SHALL have following information: Firewall-condition: This field represents the general firewall case, where a security admin can set up firewall conditions using the information present in this field. The source and destination is represented as source-target and destination-target, each referring to the IP-address-based groups defined in the endpoint-group. DDoS-condition: This field represents the condition for DDoS mitigation, where a security admin can set up DDoS @@ -382,56 +392,56 @@ | +--rw src-target* -> /policy | /threat-prevention | /threat-feed-list | /name +--rw destination-target +--rw dest-target? -> /policy /threat-prevention /threat-feed-list /name - Figure 5: Condition sub-model YANG data tree + Figure 5: Condition Sub-model YANG Data Tree -4.3. Action Sub-Model +4.3. Action Sub-model This object represents actions that Security Admin wants to perform based on certain traffic class. Figure 6 shows the XML instance of the Action object. The Action object SHALL have following information: Name: This field identifies the name of this object. Date: This field indicates the date when this object was created or last modified. Action: This field identifies the action when a rule is matched by an NSF. The action could be one of "PASS", "DROP", "ALERT", "MIRROR", and "LOG". +--rw action +--rw name string +--rw date yang:date-and-time +--rw action string - Figure 6: Action sub-model YANG data tree + Figure 6: Action Sub-model YANG Data Tree 5. Information Model for Multi-Tenancy Multi-tenancy is an important aspect of any application that enables multiple administrative domains in order to manage application resources. An Enterprise organization may have multiple tenants or departments such as Human Resources (HR), Finance, and Legal, with each tenant having a need to manage their own Security Policies. In a Service Provider, a tenant could represent a Customer that wants to manage its own Security Policies. There are multiple managed objects that constitute multi-tenancy aspects as shown in Figure 7. This - section lists these objects and any relationship among these objects. + section lists these objects and the relationship among these objects. Below diagram shows an example of multi-tenancy in an Enterprise domain. +-------------------+ (Multi-Tenancy) | Domain | |(e.g., Enterprise) | +---------+---------+ ^ | +--------------------+--------------------+ @@ -445,32 +455,32 @@ | Sub-domain 1..n | | Sub-domain 1..n | | Sub-domain 1..n | +--------+--------+ +--------+--------+ +--------+--------+ ^ ^ ^ | | | +--------+--------+ +--------+--------+ +--------+--------+ | Tenant 1..n | | Tenant 1..n | | Tenant 1..n | +-----------------+ +-----------------+ +-----------------+ Figure 7: Multi-tenancy Diagram -5.1. Policy-Domain +5.1. Policy Domain This object defines a boundary for the purpose of policy management within a Security Controller. This may vary based on how the Security Controller is deployed and hosted. For example, if an Enterprise hosts a Security Controller in their network; the domain in this case could just be the one that represents that Enterprise. But if a Cloud Service Provider hosts managed services, then a domain could represent a single customer of that Provider. Figure 8 shows - the XML instance of the Policy-domain object. Multi-tenancy model + the XML instance of the Policy-Domain object. Multi-tenancy model should be able to work in all such environments. The Policy-Domain - object SHALL have following information: + object SHALL have the following information: Name: Name of the organization or customer representing this domain. Address: Address of the organization or customer. Contact: Contact information of the organization or customer. Date: Date when this account was created or last modified. @@ -484,56 +494,56 @@ +--rw address? string +--rw contact? string +--rw policy-tenant* [name] +--rw authentication-method? -> /policy /multi-tenancy /policy-mgnt-auth-method /name ... ... - Figure 8: Policy domain YANG data tree + Figure 8: Policy Domain YANG Data Tree -5.2. Policy-Tenant +5.2. Policy Tenant This object defines an entity within an organization. The entity could be a department or business unit within an Enterprise organization that would like to manage its own Policies due to regulatory compliance or business reasons. Figure 9 shows the XML - instance of the Policy-tenant object. The Policy-Tenant object SHALL - have following information: + instance of the Policy-Tenant object. The Policy-Tenant object SHALL + have the following information: Name: Name of the Department or Division within an organization. Date: Date when this account was created or last modified. Domain: This field identifies the domain to which this tenant belongs. This should be a reference to a Policy-Domain object. +--rw policy-tenant* [name] +--rw name string +--rw date? yang:date-and-time +--rw domain? -> /policy /multi-tenancy /policy-domain /name - Figure 9: Policy tenant YANG data tree + Figure 9: Policy Tenant YANG Data Tree -5.3. Policy-Role +5.3. Policy Role This object defines a set of permissions assigned to a user in an organization that wants to manage its own Security Policies. It provides a convenient way to assign policy users to a job function or a set of permissions within the organization. Figure 10 shows the - XML instance of the Policy-role object. The Policy-Role object SHALL + XML instance of the Policy-Role object. The Policy-Role object SHALL have the following information: Name: This field identifies the name of the role. Date: Date when this role was created or last modified. Access-Profile: This field identifies the access profile for the role. The profile grants or denies the permissions to access Endpoint Groups for the purpose of policy management or may restrict certain operations related to policy @@ -541,30 +551,30 @@ read-and-write, to choose from for each access-profile. +--rw policy-role | +--rw name? string | +--rw date? yang:date-and-time | +--rw access-profile* [name] | +--rw name string | +--rw date? yang:date-and-time | +--rw permission-type? identityref - Figure 10: Policy role YANG data tree + Figure 10: Policy Role YANG Data Tree -5.4. Policy-User +5.4. Policy User This object represents a unique identity of a user within an organization. The identity authenticates with Security Controller using credentials such as a password or token in order to perform policy management. A user may be an individual, system, or application requiring access to Security Controller. Figure 11 shows - the XML instance of the Policy-user object. The Policy-User object + the XML instance of the Policy-User object. The Policy-User object SHALL have the following information: Name: Name of a user. Date: Date when this user was created or last modified. Password: User password for basic authentication. Email: E-mail address of the user. @@ -579,21 +589,21 @@ | +--rw date? yang:date-and-time | +--rw password? string | +--rw email? string | +--rw scope-type? identityref | +--rw role? -> /policy /multi-tenancy /policy-role /access-profile /name - Figure 11: Policy user YANG data tree + Figure 11: Policy User YANG Data Tree 5.5. Policy Management Authentication Method This object represents authentication schemes supported by Security Controller. Figure 12 shows the XML instance of the Policy Management Authentication Method onject. This Policy-Management- Authentication-Method object SHALL have the following information: Name: This field identifies name of this object. @@ -606,51 +616,56 @@ Mutual-Authentication: This field indicates whether mutual authentication is mandatory or not. Token-Server: This field stores the information about server that validates the token submitted as credentials. Certificate-Server: This field stores the information about server that validates certificates submitted as credentials. + IPsec: This field contains the information about IPsec type. + There are two types; 1) IPsec-IKE and IPsec-IKEless. + Single Sign-on-Server: This field stores the information about server that validates user credentials. +--rw policy-mgnt-auth-method* [name] +--rw name string +--rw date? yang:date-and-time +--rw mutual-authentication? boolean +--rw password | +--rw password? password-type +--rw token | +--rw token? string | +--rw token-server? inet:ipv4-address +--rw certificate | +--rw certificate? certificate-type | +--rw certificate-server? inet:ipv4-address + +--rw ipsec* [ipsec-method] + | +--rw ipsec-method identityref +--rw single-sign-on +--rw credential? certificate-type +--rw certificate-server? inet:ipv4-address - Figure 12: Policy management authentication method YANG data tree + Figure 12: Policy Management Authentication Method YANG Data Tree 6. Information Model for Policy Endpoint Groups The Policy Endpoint Group is a very important part of building User- - construct based policies. Security Admin would create and use these - objects to represent a logical entity in their business environment, - where a Security Policy is to be applied. There are multiple managed - objects that constitute a Policy Endpoint Group as shown in - Figure 13. Figure 14 shows the XML instance of the endpoint-group - object. shows the XML instance of the User-group object.. This - section lists these objects and relationship among them. + Construct based policies. A Security Administrator would create and + use these objects to represent a logical entity in their business + environment, where a Security Policy is to be applied. There are + multiple managed objects that constitute a Policy's Endpoint Group as + shown in Figure 13. Figure 14 shows the XML instance of the + Endpoint-Group object. This section lists these objects and + relationship among them. +-------------------+ | Endpoint Group | +---------+---------+ ^ | +--------------+----------------+ 1..n | 1..n | 1..n | +-----+----+ +------+-----+ +-------+------+ |User-group| |Device-group| |Location-group| @@ -659,26 +674,26 @@ Figure 13: Endpoint Group Diagram +--rw endpoint-group +--rw user-group* [name] | ... +--rw device-group* [name] | ... +--rw location-group* [name] ... - Figure 14: Endpoint Group YANG data tree + Figure 14: Endpoint Group YANG Data Tree 6.1. User Group - This object represents a User-group. Figure 15 shows the XML - instance of the User-group object.The User-Group object SHALL have + This object represents a User-Group. Figure 15 shows the XML + instance of the User-Group object. The User-Group object SHALL have the following information: Name: This field identifies the name of this object. Date: Date when this object was created or last modified. IP-Address: This field identifies the IP address of a user. Range-IP-Address: This field is a range of IP addresses of users. @@ -686,25 +701,25 @@ +--rw name string +--rw date? yang:date-and-time +--rw (match-type)? +--:(exact-match) | +--rw ip-address* inet:ipv4-address +--:(range-match) +--rw range-ip-address* [start-ip-address end-ip-address] +--rw start-ip-address inet:ipv4-address +--rw end-ip-address inet:ip-address - Figure 15: User group YANG data tree + Figure 15: User Group YANG Data Tree -6.2. Device-Group +6.2. Device Group - This object represents a Device-group. Figure 16 shows the XML + This object represents a Device-Group. Figure 16 shows the XML instance of the Device-group object.The Device-Group object SHALL have the following information: Name: This field identifies the name of this object. Date: Date when this object was created or last modified. IP-Address: This field identifies the IP address of a device. Range-IP-Address: This field is a range of IP addresses of @@ -714,75 +729,75 @@ +--rw name string +--rw date? yang:date-and-time +--rw (match-type)? +--:(exact-match) | +--rw ip-address* inet:ipv4-address +--:(range-match) +--rw range-ip-address* [start-ip-address end-ip-address] +--rw start-ip-address inet:ipv4-address +--rw end-ip-address inet:ip-address - Figure 16: Device group YANG data tree + Figure 16: Device Group YANG Data Tree -6.3. Location-Group +6.3. Location Group This object represents a location group based on either tag or other - information. Figure 17 shows the XML instance of the Location-group - object. The Location-group object SHALL have the following + information. Figure 17 shows the XML instance of the Location-Group + object. The Location-Group object SHALL have the following information: Name: This field identifies the name of this object. Date: Date when this object was created or last modified. continent: to identify which continent the location group member is based at. +--rw location-group* [name] +--rw name string +--rw date? yang:date-and-time +--rw continent? identityref - Figure 17: Location group YANG data tree + Figure 17: Location Group YANG Data Tree 7. Information Model for Threat Prevention The threat prevention plays an important part in the overall security posture by reducing the attack surfaces. This information could come from various threat feeds (i.e., sources for obtaining the threat information), such as EmergingThreats.com or AlienVault.com. There are multiple managed objects that constitute this category. This section lists these objects and relationship among them. Figure 19 - shows the XML instance of a Threat-prevention object. + shows the XML instance of a Threat-Prevention object. +-------------------+ | Threat Prevention | +---------+---------+ ^ | +---------+---------+ 1..n | 1..n | +------+------+ +--------+--------+ | Threat-feed | | payload-content | +-------------+ +-----------------+ Figure 18: Threat Prevention Diagram +--rw threat-prevention | +--rw threat-feed-list* [name] | ... | +--rw payload-content* [name] | ... - Figure 19: Threat Prevention YANG data tree + Figure 19: Threat Prevention YANG Data Tree -7.1. Threat-Feed +7.1. Threat Feed This object represents a threat feed which provides signatures of malicious activities. Figure 20 shows the XML instance of a Threat- feed-list. The Threat-Feed object SHALL have the following information: Name: This field identifies the name of this object. Date: Date when this object was created or last modified. @@ -804,65 +819,65 @@ | | +--:(exact-match) | | | +--rw ip-address* inet:ipv4-address | | +--:(range-match) | | +--rw range-ip-address* [start-ip-address end-ip-address] | | +--rw start-ip-address inet:ipv4-address | | +--rw end-ip-address inet:ip-address | +--rw threat-feed-description? string +--rw threat-file-types* identityref +--rw signatures* string - Figure 20: Threat feed YANG data tree + Figure 20: Threat Feed YANG Data Tree -7.2. Payload-content +7.2. Payload Content This object represents a custom list created for the purpose of defining exception to threat feeds. Figure 21 shows the XML instance - of a Payload-content list. The Payload-content object SHALL have the + of a Payload-content list. The Payload-Content object SHALL have the following information: Name: This field identifies the name of this object. Date: Date when this object was created or last modified. List-Content: This field contains contents such as IP addresses or URL names. +--rw payload-content* [name] | +--rw name string | +--rw date? yang:date-and-time | +--rw content* string - Figure 21: Payload-content in YANG data tree + Figure 21: Payload Content in YANG Data Tree -8. Role-Based Acess Control (RBAC) +8. Role-based Acess Control (RBAC) Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) provides a powerful and centralized control within a network. It is a policy neutral access control mechanism defined around roles and privileges. The components of RBAC, such as role-permissions, user-role and role-role relationships, make it simple to perform user assignments. +--------------+ | | | User 1 + (has many) | |\ +--------------+ \ +---------------+ +-------------+ . \ | | (has many) | | . --->+ List of roles +----------->+ Permissions | +--------------+ / | | | | | | / +---------------+ +-------------+ | User n +/ | | (has many) +--------------+ - Figure 22: RBAC Diagram + Figure 22: Role-based Acess Control Diagram As shown in Figure 22, a role represents a collection of permissions (e.g., accessing a file server or other particular resources). A role may be assigned to one or multiple users. Both roles and permissions can be organized in a hirarchy. A role may consists of other roles and permissions. Following are the steps required to build RBAC: 1. Defining roles and permissions. @@ -870,42 +885,42 @@ 2. Establishing relations among roles and permissions. 3. Defining users. 4. Associating rules with roles and permissions. 5. assigning roles to users. 9. YANG Data Model for Security Policies for Consumer-Facing Interface - The main objective of this data model is to fully transform the - information model [client-facing-inf-im] into a YANG data model that - can be used for delivering control and management messages via the - Consumer-Facing Interface between an I2NSF User and Security + The main objective of this data model is to provide both an + information model and the corresponding YANG data model of I2NSF + Consumer-Facing Interface. This interface can be used to deliver + control and management messages between an I2NSF User and Security Controller for the I2NSF User's high-level security policies. The semantics of the data model must be aligned with the information model of the Consumer-Facing Interface. The transformation of the information model was performed so that this YANG data model can facilitate the efficient delivery of the control or management messages. This data model is designed to support the I2NSF framework that can be extended according to the security needs. In other words, the model design is independent of the content and meaning of specific policies as well as the implementation approach. This document suggests a VoIP/VoLTE security service as a use case for policy rule generation. This section describes a YANG data model for Consumer-Facing Interface, based on the information model of Consumer-Facing - Interface to security controller [client-facing-inf-im]. + Interface to Security Controller. file "ietf-cfi-policy.yang" module ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy { yang-version 1.1; namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy"; prefix cfi-policy; import ietf-yang-types{ @@ -943,24 +958,24 @@ authors of the code. All rights reserved. Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info). This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see the RFC itself for full legal notices."; - revision "2019-03-11"{ + revision "2019-04-04"{ description "latest revision"; reference - "draft-ietf-consumer-facing-interface-dm-02"; + "draft-ietf-consumer-facing-interface-dm-03"; } identity permission-type { description "Base identity for the permission types."; } identity read-only { base permission-type; description "Identity for read-only permission."; @@ -1043,20 +1058,37 @@ identity trojan { base malware-file-type; description "Identity for Trojan infection event types."; } identity ransomeware { base malware-file-type; description "Identity for ransomeware infection event types."; } + identity ipsec-type { + description + "Base identity for the IPsec types."; + } + + identity ike { + base ipsec-type; + description + "Identity for ipsec-ike"; + } + + identity ikeless { + base ipsec-type; + description + "Identity for ipsec-ikeless"; + } + identity continent { description "Base Identity for continent types."; } identity africa { base continent; description "Identity for africa."; } @@ -1108,28 +1140,30 @@ among *nix systems. CER certificate extension, which is an alternate form of .crt (Microsoft Convention) You can use MS to convert .crt to .cer (.both DER encoded .cer, or base64[PEM] encoded .cer). The KEY extension is used both for public and private PKCS#8 keys. The keys may be encoded as binary DER or as ASCII PEM."; } grouping meta { description - "The purpose of this grouping is to avoid repetition of same fields, such as 'name' and 'date'."; + "The purpose of this grouping is to avoid repetition + of same fields, such as 'name' and 'date'."; leaf name { type string; description "This is the name for an entity."; } leaf date { type yang:date-and-time; - description "This is the date when the entity is created or modified."; + description "This is the date when the entity is + created or modified."; } } grouping ip-address { description "There are two types to configure a security policy for IPv4 address, such as exact match and range match."; choice match-type { description "User can choose between 'exact match' and 'range match'."; @@ -1217,40 +1250,36 @@ } description "There can be a multiple number of security rules in a policy object. This object is a policy instance to have complete information such as where and when a policy need to be applied."; list rule { leaf rule-name { type string; - mandatory true; description "This represents the name for rules."; } key "rule-name"; description "There can be a single or multiple number of rules."; leaf date { type yang:date-and-time; description "Date this object was created or last modified"; } - list event { - uses meta; - key "name"; + container event { description "This represents the event map group name."; - leaf security-event { type identityref { base security-event-type; } description "This contains the description of security events."; } leaf enforce-type { type enumeration{ enum admin-enforced { @@ -1434,35 +1463,46 @@ condition destination."; } } } } container action { description "This is the action container."; leaf primary-action { type string; - mandatory true; description "This field identifies the action when a rule is matched by NSF. The action could be one of 'PERMIT', 'DENY', 'RATE-LIMIT', 'TRAFFIC-CLASS', 'AUTHENTICATE-SESSION', 'IPS, 'APP-FIREWALL', etc."; } leaf secondary-action { type string; description "This field identifies additional actions if a rule is matched. This could be one of 'LOG', 'SYSLOG', 'SESSION-LOG', etc."; } } + container ipsec { + description + "This container represents the IPsec-IKE/IKEless cases."; + leaf ipsec-method { + type leafref { + path "/policy/multi-tenancy/policy-mgnt-auth-method/ipsec/ipsec-method"; + } + description + "This represents the IPsec-method, which + is defined by policy-mgny-auth-method."; + } + } leaf owner { type string; description "This field defines the owner of this policy. Only the owner is authorized to modify the contents of the policy."; } } container multi-tenancy { @@ -1497,21 +1537,21 @@ path "/policy/multi-tenancy/policy-domain/name"; } description "This field identifies the domain to which this tenant belongs. This should be reference to a 'Policy-Domain' object."; } } leaf authentication-method { type leafref { - path "/policy/multi-tenancy/policy-mgnt-auth-method/name"; + path "/policy/multi-tenancy/policy-mgnt-auth-method/ipsec/ipsec-method"; } description "Authentication method to be used for this domain. It should be a reference to a 'policy-mgmt-auth-method' object."; } description "This represents the list of policy domains."; } container policy-role { @@ -1563,92 +1603,111 @@ } leaf role { type leafref { path "/policy/multi-tenancy/policy-role/access-profile/name"; } description "This represents the reference to the access-profiles."; } } - list policy-mgnt-auth-method { - uses meta; - key "name"; + container policy-mgnt-auth-method { + description + "This represents the list of authentication methods."; + leaf auth-method { + type string; + description + "This represents the authentication method name."; + } leaf mutual-authentication { type boolean; description "To identify whether the authentication is mutual."; } - container password { + list password-based { + key "password"; leaf password { type string; description "This should be defined using the regular expression."; } description - "This represents the password method."; + "This represents the password-based method."; } - container token { + list token-based { + key "token"; leaf token { type string; description "This should be defined according to the token scheme."; } - description - "This represents the token method."; leaf token-server { type inet:ipv4-address; description - "The token-server information if the - authentication method is token-based"; - } + "This represents the token-server + information if the authentication method + is token-based."; } - container certificate { description - "This represents the certificate method."; + "This represents the token-based method."; + } + list certificate-based { + key "certificate"; leaf certificate { type certificate-type; description "This represents the certificate-type."; } leaf certificate-server { type inet:ipv4-address; description "The certificate-server information if the authentication method is certificate-based"; } + description + "This describes the certificate-based authentication list."; + } + list ipsec { + key "ipsec-method"; + leaf ipsec-method { + type identityref { + base ipsec-type; } - container single-sign-on { description - "This represents the authentication method - for single-sing-on."; + "This represents the IPsec-IKE or IPsec-IKEless cases."; + } + description + "This represents the list of IPsec-method."; + } + list single-sign-on { + key "credential"; leaf credential { type certificate-type; description "This represents the authentication using user credentials."; - } leaf certificate-server { type inet:ipv4-address; description "The certificate-server information if the authentication method is certificate-based"; } - } description - "This represents the policy managegement method."; + "This represents the authentication method + for single-sing-on."; + } } } container endpoint-group { description "A logical entity in their business environment, where a security policy is to be applied."; list user-group { uses user-group; key "name"; @@ -1708,31 +1767,31 @@ uses payload-string; key "name"; description "This represents the payload-string group."; } } } } - Figure 23: YANG for policy-general + Figure 23: YANG for Consumer-Facing Interface 10. Example XML Output for Various Scenarios This section describes the XML instances for different policies examples that are delivered through Consumer-Facing Interface. The considered use cases are: VoIP/VoLTE security service, DDoS-attack mitigation, time-based firewall as a web-filter. -10.1. DB registration: Information of positions and devices (Endpoint - group) +10.1. DB Registration: Information of Positions and Devices (Endpoint + Group) In order to create a rule of a security policy, it is essential to first register data (those which are used to form such rule) to the database. For example, The endpoint group consists of three different groups: user-group, device-group, and payload-group. Each of these groups have separate group members with information other than meta ("name" or "date"), such as ip-addresses or protocols used by devices. Figure 24 shows an example XML representation of the registered information for the user-group and device-group. @@ -1749,23 +1808,23 @@ webservers 221.159.112.91 221.159.112.97 http https - Figure 24: Registering user-group and device-group information + Figure 24: Registering User-group and Device-group Information -10.2. Scenario 1: Block SNS access during business hours +10.2. Scenario 1: Block SNS Access during Business Hours The first example scenario is to "block SNS access during business hours" using a time-based firewall policy. In this scenario, all users registered as "employee" in the user-group list are unable to access Social Networking Services (SNS) during the office hours. The XML instance is described below: security_policy_for_blocking_sns @@ -1785,45 +1844,50 @@ sns-websites drop + + ikeless + Figure 25: An XML Example for Time-based Firewall Time-based-condition Firewall 1. The policy name is "security_policy_for_blocking_sns". 2. The rule name is "block_access_to_sns_during_office_hours". 3. The Source-target is "employees". 4. The destination target is "sns-websites". "sns-websites" is the key which represents the list containing the information, such as URL, about sns-websites. 5. The action required is to "drop" any attempt to connect to websites related to Social networking. -10.3. Scenario 2: Block malicious VoIP/VoLTE packets coming to the - company + 6. The IPsec-method is set to "ikeless". + +10.3. Scenario 2: Block Malicious VoIP/VoLTE Packets Coming to a + Company The second example scenario is to "block malicious VoIP/VoLTE packets - coming to the company" using a VoIP policy. In this scenario, the + coming to a company" using a VoIP policy. In this scenario, the calls comming from from VOIP and/or VOLTE sources with VOLTE IDs that are classified as malicious are dropped. The IP addresses of the employees and malicious VOIP IDs should be blocked are stored in the database or datastore of the enterprise. Here and the rest of the cases assume that the security administrators or someone responsible for the existing and newly generated policies, are not aware of which and/or how many NSFs are needed to meet the security requirements. Figure 26 represents the XML document generated from YANG discussed in previous sections. Once a high-level seucurity policy is created by a security admin, it is delivered by the Consumer-Facing @@ -1843,20 +1907,23 @@ employees drop + + ikeless + Figure 26: An XML Example for VoIP Security Service Custom-condition Firewall 1. The policy name is "security_policy_for_blocking_malicious_voip_packets". @@ -1868,25 +1935,27 @@ admin can read every stored malicious VOIP IDs that are named as "malicious-id". 4. The destination target is "employees". "employees" is the key which represents the list containing information about employees, such as IP addresses. 5. The action required is "drop" when any incoming packets are from "malicious-id". -10.4. Scenario 3: Mitigate HTTP and HTTPS flood attacks on a company - web Server + 6. The IPsec-method is set to "ikeless". + +10.4. Scenario 3: Mitigate HTTP and HTTPS Flood Attacks on a Company + Web Server The third example scenario is to "Mitigate HTTP and HTTPS flood - attacks on a company web Server" using a DDoS-attack mitigation + attacks on a company web server" using a DDoS-attack mitigation policy. Here, the time information is not set because the service provided by the network should be maintained at all times. If the packets sent by any sources are more than the set threshold, then the admin can set the percentage of the packets to be dropped to safely maintain the service. In this scenario, the source is set as "any" to block any sources which send abnormal amount of packets. The destination is set as "web_server01". Once the rule is set and delivered and enforced to the nsfs by the securiy controller, the NSFs will monitor the incoming packet amounts and the destination to act according to the rule set. The XML instance is described below: @@ -1902,20 +1971,23 @@ webservers 100 drop + + ikeless + Figure 27: An XML Example for DDoS-attack Mitigation DDoS-condition Firewall 1. The policy name is "security_policy_for_ddos_attacks". 2. The rule name is "100_packets_per_second". @@ -1928,28 +2000,30 @@ second. In this case the rate limit is "100" packets per second. This amount depends on the packet receiving capacity of the server devices. 5. The Source-target is all sources which send abnormal amount of packets. 6. The action required is to "drop" packet reception is more than 100 packets per second. + 7. The IPsec-method is set to "ikeless". + 11. Security Considerations - The data model for the I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface is derived - from the I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface Information Model - [client-facing-inf-im], so the same security considerations with the - information model should be included in this document. The data - model needs to support a mechanism to protect Consumer-Facing - Interface to Security Controller. + The data model for the I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface is based on + the I2NSF framework [RFC8329], so the same security considerations + with the I2NSF framework should be included in this document. The + data model needs a secure communication channel to protect the + Consumer-Facing Interface between the I2NSF User and Security + Controller. 12. IANA Considerations This document requests IANA to register the following URI in the "IETF XML Registry" [RFC3688]: URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy Registrant Contact: The I2NSF. XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace. @@ -1958,57 +2032,33 @@ name: ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy prefix: cfi-policy reference: RFC 7950 13. References 13.1. Normative References - [RFC3444] Pras, A., "On the Difference between Information Models - and Data Models", RFC 3444, January 2003. - -13.2. Informative References - - [client-facing-inf-im] - Kumar, R., Lohiya, A., Qi, D., Bitar, N., Palislamovic, - S., and L. Xia, "Information model for Client-Facing - Interface to Security Controller", draft-kumar-i2nsf- - client-facing-interface-im-07 (work in progress), July - 2018. - - [client-facing-inf-req] - Kumar, R., Lohiya, A., Qi, D., Bitar, N., Palislamovic, - S., and L. Xia, "Requirements for Client-Facing Interface - to Security Controller", draft-ietf-i2nsf-client-facing- - interface-req-05 (work in progress), May 2018. - - [draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability] - Xia, L., Strassner, J., Huawei, Basile, C., PoliTo, Lopez, - D., and TID, "Information Model of NSFs Capabilities", - draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-04 (work in progress), October - 2018. - - [i2nsf-terminology] - Hares, S., Strassner, J., Lopez, D., Birkholz, H., and L. - Xia, "Information model for Client-Facing Interface to - Security Controller", draft-ietf-i2nsf-terminology-07 - (work in progress), January 2019. + [RFC3444] Pras, A. and J. Schoenwaelder, "On the Difference between + Information Models and Data Models", RFC 3444, + DOI 10.17487/RFC3444, January 2003, + . [RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688, DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004, . - [RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for the - Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020, - October 2010. + [RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for + the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020, + DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010, + . [RFC6087] Bierman, A., "Guidelines for Authors and Reviewers of YANG Data Model Documents", RFC 6087, DOI 10.17487/RFC6087, January 2011, . [RFC6991] Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., "Common YANG Data Types", RFC 6991, DOI 10.17487/RFC6991, July 2013, . [RFC7950] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language", @@ -2027,60 +2077,54 @@ [RFC8329] Lopez, D., Lopez, E., Dunbar, L., Strassner, J., and R. Kumar, "Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions", RFC 8329, DOI 10.17487/RFC8329, February 2018, . [RFC8340] Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, Ed., "YANG Tree Diagrams", BCP 215, RFC 8340, DOI 10.17487/RFC8340, March 2018, . -Appendix A. Changes from draft-ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface- - dm-02 - - The following changes have been made from draft-ietf-i2nsf-consumer- - facing-interface-dm-02: - - o In this version of the WG draft, we merged the - [client-facing-inf-im] and draft-ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing- - interface-dm-02 drafts. In sections 4 to 9, we describe the - information model for the security policies delivered through the - Consumer-Facing Interface. In sections 10 to 12, we provide and - discuss the YANG data model and example XML outputs of security - policies for various use cases. +13.2. Informative References - o In Section 10, the following changes have been made: For "time- - information" container in event sub-module list, the enforcement - type is defined into three different types (admin-enforced, time- - enforced, and event-enforced). Also, begin-time and end-time type - has been defined seperately. The security policies can now be set - recursively (daily, weekly, and monthly). + [client-facing-inf-req] + Kumar, R., Lohiya, A., Qi, D., Bitar, N., Palislamovic, + S., and L. Xia, "Requirements for Client-Facing Interface + to Security Controller", draft-ietf-i2nsf-client-facing- + interface-req-05 (work in progress), May 2018. - o "policy-role" now has the access-profile container, and previlege - can be set separately per profile. + [i2nsf-capability-im] + Xia, L., Strassner, J., Basile, C., and D. Lopez, + "Information Model of NSFs Capabilities", draft-ietf- + i2nsf-capability-04 (work in progress), October 2018. - o "policy-user" information, such as email and password is newly - defined by regular expressions. + [i2nsf-ipsec] + Marin-Lopez, R., Lopez-Millan, G., and F. Pereniguez- + Garcia, "Software-Defined Networking (SDN)-based IPsec + Flow Protection", draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow- + protection-04 (work in progress), March 2019. - o "authentication-method" in "policy-mgnt-auth-method" has been - modified. More specifically, the authentication-method type has - been changed from string to choice so that one can choose between - password, token, and certificate. If not selected, password is - used as a default. + [i2nsf-terminology] + Hares, S., Strassner, J., Lopez, D., Xia, L., and H. + Birkholz, "Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) + Terminology", draft-ietf-i2nsf-terminology-07 (work in + progress), January 2019. - o "Certificate-type" has been re-defined to include common - certificate extensions, such as ".CRT", "CER", and "KEY". +Appendix A. Changes from draft-ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface- + dm-03 - o Used groupings to represent the groups in the Endpoint groups. + The following changes have been made from draft-ietf-i2nsf-consumer- + facing-interface-dm-03: - o Added examples for registering information (i.e., endpoint-groups, - threat-prevention, and multi-tenancy.) + o This version added an I2NSF IPsec field for configuration and + state data for IPsec management (i.e., IPsec method such as IKE + and IKEless [i2nsf-ipsec]) in the I2NSF framework. Appendix B. Acknowledgments This work was supported by Institute for Information & communications Technology Promotion(IITP) grant funded by the Korea government(MSIP) (No.R-20160222-002755, Cloud based Security Intelligence Technology Development for the Customized Security Service Provisioning). Appendix C. Contributors