I2NSF Working Group S. Hares, Ed. Internet-Draft Huawei Intended status: Standards Track J. Jeong, Ed. Expires:September 9, 202115 February 2022 J. Kim Sungkyunkwan University R. Moskowitz HTT Consulting Q. Lin HuaweiMarch 8,14 August 2021 I2NSF Capability YANG Data Modeldraft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-16draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-17 Abstract This document defines an information model and the corresponding YANG data model for the capabilities of various Network Security Functions (NSFs) in the Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) framework to centrally manage the capabilities of the various NSFs. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire onSeptember 9, 2021.15 February 2022. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info)(https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.CapabilityInformation ModelDesign . . .of I2NSF NSF Capability . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1. Design Principles and ECA Policy ModelOverview . . . . . 5 3.2. Matched Policy Rule . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . 8 3.3.5 3.2. Conflict, Resolution Strategy and Default Action . . . . 8 4. Overview of YANG Data Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .910 5. YANG Tree Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.1. Network Security Function (NSF) Capabilities . . . . . . 12 6. YANG Data Model of I2NSF NSF Capability . . . . . . . . . . . 15 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5948 8. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5949 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6049 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6051 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6051 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6555 Appendix A. Configuration Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6757 A.1. Example 1: Registration for the Capabilities of a General Firewall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6757 A.2. Example 2: Registration for the Capabilities of aTime- basedTime-based Firewall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 7059 A.3. Example 3: Registration for the Capabilities of a Web Filter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7261 A.4. Example 4: Registration for the Capabilities of aVoIP/VoLTEVoIP/ VoLTE Filter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .72. . 61 A.5. Example 5: Registration for the Capabilities of a HTTP and HTTPS Flood Mitigator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .73. . 62 Appendix B. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7463 Appendix C. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7564 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7765 1. Introduction As the industry becomes more sophisticated and network devices (e.g., Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices, autonomous vehicles, and smartphones using Voice over IP (VoIP) and Voice over LTE (VoLTE)) require advanced security protection in variousscenario,scenarios, security service providers have a lot of problems described in[RFC8192].[RFC8192] to provide such network devices with efficient and reliable security services in network infrastructure. To resolve these problems, this document specifies the information and data models of the capabilities of Network Security Functions (NSFs) in a framework of the Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) [RFC8329]. NSFs produced by multiple security vendors provide various security capabilities to customers. Multiple NSFs can be combined together to provide security services over the given network traffic, regardless of whether the NSFs are implemented as physical or virtual functions. Security Capabilities describe the functions that Network Security Functions (NSFs)are available tocan provide for security policyenforcement purposes.enforcement. Security Capabilities are independent of the actual securitycontrol mechanismspolicy that will implementthem.the functionality of the NSF. Every NSF SHOULD be described with the set of capabilities it offers. Security Capabilities enable security functionality to be described in a vendor-neutral manner.That is, it is not needed to refer to a specific product or technology when designing the network; rather, the functions characterized by their capabilities are considered.Security Capabilities are a market enabler, providing a way to define customized security protection by unambiguously describing the security features offered by a given NSF. Note that this YANG data modeloutlines anstructurizes the NSFmonitoringMonitoring Interface YANG data model [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model] andathe NSF-Facing Interface YANGdata model for Software-Defined Networking (SDN)-based IPsec flow protection [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection].Data Model [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-nsf-facing-interface-dm]. This document provides an information model and the corresponding YANG data model [RFC6020][RFC7950] that defines the capabilities of NSFs to centrally manage the capabilities of thosesecurity devices.NSFs. Thesecurity devicesNSFs can register their own capabilities into a Network Operator Management (Mgmt) System (i.e., Security Controller) with this YANG data model through the registration interface [RFC8329]. With the database of the capabilities of thosesecurity devicesNSFs that are maintained centrally, thosesecurity devicesNSFs can be more easily managed [RFC8329]. This YANG data model uses an "Event-Condition-Action" (ECA) policy model that is used as the basis for the design of I2NSF Policy as described in [RFC8329] and Section 3.1. The "ietf-i2nsf-capability" YANG module defined in this document provides the following features:o Definition for time capabilities of network security functions. o* Definition for event capabilities ofgeneric network security functions. o Definition for condition capabilities of genericnetwork security functions.o* Definition for condition capabilities ofadvancednetwork security functions.o* Definition for action capabilities ofgenericnetwork security functions.o* Definition for resolution strategy capabilities ofgenericnetwork security functions.o* Definition for default action capabilities ofgenericnetwork security functions. 2. Terminology The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. This document uses the terminology described in [RFC8329]. This document follows the guidelines of [RFC8407], uses the common YANG types defined in [RFC6991], and adopts the Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA). The meaning of the symbols in tree diagrams is defined in [RFC8340]. 3.CapabilityInformation ModelDesign Aof I2NSF NSF Capability This section provides the I2NSF Capability Information Model(CapIM)(CapIM). A CapIM is a formalization of the functionality that an NSF advertises. This enables the precise specification of what an NSF can do in terms of security policy enforcement, so thatcomputer-basedcomputer- based tasks can unambiguously refer to, use, configure, and manage NSFs. Capabilities MUST be defined in a vendor- andtechnology-independenttechnology- independent manner (e.g., regardless of the differences among vendors and individual products). Humans can refer to categories of security controls and understand each other. For instance, network security experts agree on what is meant by the terms "NAT", "filtering", and "VPN concentrator". As a further example, network security experts unequivocally refer to "packet filters" as stateless devices that allow or deny packet forwarding based on various conditions (e.g., source and destination IP addresses, source and destination ports, and IP protocol type fields) [Alshaer]. However, more information is required in case of other devices, like stateful firewalls or application layer filters. These devices filter packets or communications, but there are differences in the packets and communications that they can categorize and the states they maintain. Humans deal with these differences by asking more questions to determine the specific category and functionality of the device. Machines can follow a similar approach, which is commonly referred to as question-answering [Hirschman] [Galitsky]. In this context, the CapIM and the derived data model can provide important and rich information sources. Analogous considerations can be applied for channel protection protocols, where we all understand that they will protect packets by means of symmetric algorithms whose keys could have been negotiated with asymmetric cryptography, but they may work at different layers and support different algorithms and protocols. To ensure protection, these protocols apply integrity, optionally confidentiality, anti-reply protections, and authentication. The CapIM is intended to clarify these ambiguities by providing a formal description of NSF functionality. The set of functions that are advertised MAY be restricted according to the privileges of the user or application that is viewing those functions. I2NSF Capabilities enable unambiguous specification of the security capabilities available in a (virtualized) networking environment, and their automatic processing by means of computer-based techniques. This CapIM includes enabling a security controller in an I2NSF framework [RFC8329] to properly identify and manage NSFs, and allow NSFs to properly declare their functionality through a Developer's Management System (DMS)[RFC8329] ,[RFC8329], so that they can be used in the correct way. 3.1. Design Principles and ECA Policy ModelOverview -poThis document defines an information model for representing NSF capabilities. Some basic design principles for security capabilities and the systems that manage them are:o* Independence: Each security capability SHOULD be an independent function, with minimum overlap or dependency on other capabilities. This enables each security capability to be utilized and assembled together freely. More importantly, changes to one capability SHOULD NOT affect other capabilities. This follows the Single Responsibility Principle [Martin] [OODSRP].o* Abstraction: Each capability MUST be defined in a vendor- independent manner.o* Advertisement:A dedicated, well-known interfaceRegistration Interface [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-registration-interface-dm] MUST be used to advertise and register the capabilities of each NSF. This same interface MUST be used by other I2NSF Components to determine what Capabilities are currently available to them.o* Execution:Dedicated, well-known interfacesNSF-Facing Interface [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-nsf-facing-interface-dm] and NSF Monitoring Interface [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model] MUST be used to configureand monitorthe use of acapability, resepectively.capability into an NSF and monitor the NSF, respectively. These provide a standardized ability to describe its functionality, and report its processing results,resepectively.respectively. These facilitate multi-vendor interoperability.o* Automation: The system MUST have the ability to auto-discover, auto-negotiate, and auto-update its security capabilities (i.e., without human intervention). These features are especially useful for the management of a large number of NSFs. They are essential for adding smart services (e.g., refinement, analysis, capability reasoning, and optimization) to the security scheme employed. These features are supported by many design patterns, including the Observer Pattern [OODOP], the Mediator Pattern [OODMP], and a set of Message Exchange Patterns [Hohpe].o Scalability: The management system SHOULD have the capability to scale up/down or scale in/out. Thus, itRegistration Interface [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-registration-interface-dm] canmeet various performance requirements derived from changeable network traffic or service requests.register the capabilities of NSFs with the security controller from the request of Developer's Management System providing NSFs and the corresponding security capabilities. Also, this interface can send a query to Developer's Management System in order to find an NSF to satisfy the requested security capability from the security controller that receives a security policy. * Scalability: The management system SHOULD have the capability to scale up/down or scale in/out. Thus, it can meet various performance requirements derived from changeable network traffic or service requests. In addition, security capabilities that are affected by scalability changes SHOULD support reporting statistics to the security controller to assist its decision on whether it needs to invoke scaling or not. NSF Monitoring Interface [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model] can observe the performance of NSFs to let the security controller decide scalability changes of the NSFs. Based on the above principles, this document defines a capability model that enables an NSF to register (and hence advertise) its set of capabilities that other I2NSF Components can use. These capabilitiesMAYMUST have their access control restricted by a policy; this is out of scope for this document. The set of capabilities provided by a given set of NSFs unambiguously defines the security services offered by the set of NSFs used. The security controller can compare the requirements of users and applications with the set of capabilities that are currently available in order to choose which capabilities of which NSFs are needed to meet those requirements. Note that this choice is independent of vendor, and instead relies specifically on the capabilities (i.e., the description) of the functions provided. Furthermore,when an unknown threat (e.g., zero-day exploitsNSFs are subject to the updates of security capabilities andunknown malware) is reported by an NSF,software to cope with newly found security attacks or threats, hence new capabilities may be created, and/or existing capabilities may be updated (e.g., by updating its signature and algorithm).This results in enhancing the existing NSFs (and/or creating new NSFs) to address the new threats.New capabilities may be sent to and stored in a centralized repository, or stored separately in a vendor's local repository. In either case,a standard interface facilitatesRegistration Interface can facilitate this updateprocess.process to Developer's Management System to let the security controller update its repository for NSFs and their security capabilities. The "Event-Condition-Action" (ECA) policy model in [RFC8329] is used as the basis for the design of the capability model;definitions of all I2NSF policy-related terms are also defined in [RFC8329].The following three terms define the structure and behavior of an I2NSF imperative policy rule:o* Event: An Event is defined as any important occurrence in time of a change in the system being managed, and/or in the environment of the system being managed. When used in the context of I2NSF Policy Rules, it is used to determine whether the condition clause of an I2NSF Policy Rule can be evaluated or not. Examples of an I2NSF Event include time and user actions (e.g., logon, logoff, and actions that violate an ACL).o* Condition: A condition is defined as a set of attributes, features, and/or values that are to be compared with a set of known attributes, features, and/or values in order to determine whether or not the set of actions in that (imperative) I2NSF Policy Rule can be executed or not. Examples of I2NSF conditions include matching attributes of a packet or flow, and comparing the internal state of an NSF with a desired state.o* Action: An action is used to control and monitor aspects offlow- basedNSFs to handle packets or flows when the event and condition clauses are satisfied. NSFs provide security functions by executing various Actions. Examples of I2NSF actions include providing intrusion detection and/or protection, web and flow filtering, and deep packet inspection for packets and flows. An I2NSF Policy Rule is made up of three Boolean clauses: an Event clause, a Condition clause, and an Action clause. This structure is also called an ECA (Event-Condition-Action) Policy Rule. A Boolean clause is a logical statement that evaluates to either TRUE or FALSE. It may be made up of one or more terms; if more than one term is present, then each term in the Boolean clause is combined using logical connectives (i.e., AND, OR, and NOT). An I2NSF ECA Policy Rule has the following semantics: IF <event-clause> is TRUE IF <condition-clause> is TRUE THEN execute <action-clause> [constrained by metadata] END-IF END-IF Technically, the "Policy Rule" is really a container that aggregates the above three clauses, as well as metadata, which describe the characteristics and behaviors of a capability (or an NSF). Aggregating metadata enables a business logic to be used to prescribe a behavior. For example, suppose a particular ECA Policy Rule contains three actions (A1, A2, and A3, in that order). Action A2 has a priority of 10; actions A1 and A3 have no priority specified. Then, metadata may be used to restrict the set of actions that can be executed when the event and condition clauses of this ECA Policy Rule are evaluated to be TRUE; two examples are: (1) only the first action (A1) is executed, and then the policy rule returns to its caller, or (2) all actions are executed, starting with the highest priority. The above ECA policy model is very general and easily extensible. 3.2.MatchedConflict, Resolution Strategy and Default Action Formally, two I2NSF PolicyRule The conceptRules conflict with each other if: * the Event Clauses ofa "matched" policy rule is defined as one in which its event and condition clauses botheach evaluate totrue. To precisely describe what an NSF can do in termsTRUE; * the Condition Clauses ofsecurity, that a policy rule needseach evaluate todescribeTRUE; * theevents that it can catch,Action Clauses affect theconditions it can evaluate,same object in different ways. For example, if we have two Policy Rules called R1 andthe actions that it can enforce. Therefore, the properties to characterize the capabilities of an NSF are as follows: o Ac is the set of Actions currently available from the NSF; o Ec is the set of Events that an NSF can catch. Note that for NSF (e.g., a packet filter) that are not able to react to events, this set will be empty; o Cc is the set of Conditions currently available from the NSF; o EVc defines the set of Condition Clause Evaluation Rules that can be used by the NSF to decide when the Condition Clause is true when the results of the individual Conditions under evaluation are given. 3.3. Conflict, Resolution Strategy and Default Action Formally, two I2NSF Policy Rules conflict with each other if: o the Event Clauses of each evaluate to TRUE; o the Condition Clauses of each evaluate to TRUE; o the Action Clauses affect the same object in different ways. For example, if we have two Policy RulesR2 in the same Policy: R1: During 8am-6pm, if traffic is external, then run throughFWfirewall R2: During 7am-8pm,conduct anti-malware investigationrun anti-virus There is no conflict between the two policy rules R1 and R2, since the actions are different. However, consider these tworules:rules called R3 and R4: R3: During8am-6pm,9am-6pm, allow Johngets GoldServiceto access social networking service websites R4: During10am-4pm, FTP from9am-6pm, disallow all usersgets BronzeServiceto access social networking service websites The two policy rules R3 and R4 are now in conflict, between the hours of10am9am and4pm,6pm, because the actions of R3 and R4 are different and apply to the same user (i.e., John). Conflicts theoretically compromise the correct functioning ofdevices (as happened for routers several year ago).devices. However, NSFs have been designed to cope with these issues. Since conflicts are originated by simultaneously matching rules, an additional process decides the action to be applied, e.g., among theonesactions which the matching rule would have enforced. This process is described by means of a resolution strategy for conflicts. The finding and handling of conflicted matching rules is performed by resolution strategies in the security controller. The implementation of such resolution strategies is out of scope for I2NSF. On the other hand, it may happen that, if an event is caught, none of the policy rules matches theevent.condition. Note that a packet or flow is handled only when it matches both the event and condition of a policy rule according to the ECA policy model. As a simple case, no condition in the rules may match a packet arriving at the border firewall. In this case, the packet is usually dropped, that is, the firewall has a default behavior of packet dropping in order to manage the cases that are not covered by specific rules. Therefore, this document introducesanother security capability that serves to characterize valid policiestwo further capabilities for an NSFthat solveto handle security policy conflicts with resolution strategies and enforce a defaultactionsaction if no rulesmatch: o RSc is the set ofmatch. * ResolutionStrategies thatStrategies: They can be used to specify how to resolve conflicts that occur between the actions of the same or different policy rules that are matched and contained in this particular NSF;o Dc defines the notion of a* Defaultaction. This actionAction: It provides the default behavior to be executed when there are no other alternatives. This action can be either an explicit action or a set of actions. 4. Overview of YANG Data Model This section provides an overview of how the YANG data model can be used in the I2NSF framework described in [RFC8329]. Figure 1 shows the capabilities (e.g., firewall and web filter) of NSFs in the I2NSF Framework. As shown in this figure,an NSFa Developer's Management System (DMS) can register NSFs andthetheir capabilitiesthat the NSFs can support.with a Security Controller. To register NSFs in this way, the DMS utilizesthisthe standardized capability YANG data model in this document through the I2NSF Registration Interface [RFC8329]. That is, this Registration Interface uses the YANG module described in this document to describe the capabilities of an NSF that is registered with the Security Controller.With the database ofAs described in [RFC8192], with thecapabilitiesusage of Registration Interface and theNSFs that are maintained centrally,YANG module in this document, the NSFs manufactured by multiple vendors can bemore easily managed, which can resolve many ofmanaged together by theproblems describedSecurity Controller in[RFC8192].a centralized way and be updated dynamically by each vendor as the NSF has software or hardware updates. In Figure 1, a new NSF at a Developer's Management System has capabilities of Firewall (FW) and Web Filter (WF), which are denoted as (Cap = {FW, WF}), to support Event-Condition-Action (ECA) policy rules where 'E', 'C', and 'A' mean "Event", "Condition", and "Action", respectively. The condition involves IPv4 or IPv6 datagrams, and the action includes "Allow" and "Deny" for those datagrams. Note that the NSF-Facing Interface [RFC8329] is usedforby the Security Controller to configure the security policy rules ofgeneric NSFs (e.g., firewall) and advancedNSFs (e.g.,anti-virusfirewall andDistributed- Denial-of-ServiceDistributed-Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack mitigator) with the capabilities of the NSFs registered with the Security Controller. +------------------------------------------------------+ | I2NSF User (e.g., Overlay Network Mgmt, Enterprise | | Network Mgmt, another network domain's mgmt, etc.) | +--------------------+---------------------------------+ I2NSF ^ Consumer-Facing Interface | | v I2NSF +-----------------+------------+ Registration +-------------+ | Network Operator Mgmt System | Interface | Developer's | | (i.e., Security Controller)|<-------------->||<------------->| Mgmt System | +-----------------+------------+ +-------------+ ^ New NSF | Cap = {FW, WF} I2NSF | E = {} NSF-Facing Interface | C = {IPv4, IPv6} | A = {Allow, Deny} v +---------------+----+------------+-----------------+ | | | | +---+---+ +---+---+ +---+---+ +---+---+ | NSF-1 | ... | NSF-m | | NSF-1 | ... | NSF-n | +-------+ +-------+ +-------+ +-------+ NSF-1 NSF-m NSF-1 NSF-n Cap = {FW, WF} Cap = {FW, WF} Cap = {FW, WF} Cap = {FW, WF} E = {} E = {user} E = {dev} E = {time} C = {IPv4} C = {IPv6} C = {IPv4, IPv6} C = {IPv4} A = {Allow, Deny} A = {Allow, Deny} A = {Allow, Deny} A = {Allow, Deny} Developer's Mgmt System A Developer's Mgmt System B Figure 1: Capabilities of NSFs in I2NSF Framework A use case of an NSF with the capabilities of firewall and web filter is described as follows.o* If a network administrator wants to apply security policy rules to block malicious users with firewall and web filter, it is a tremendous burden for a network administrator to apply all of the needed rules to NSFs one by one. This problem can be resolved by managing the capabilities of NSFs as described in this document.o* If a network administrator wants to block IPv4 or IPv6 packets from malicious users, the network administrator sends a security policy rule to block the users to the Network Operator Management System (i.e., Security Controller) using the I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface.o* When the Network Operator Management System receives the security policy rule, it automatically sends that security policy rule to appropriate NSFs (i.e., NSF-m in Developer's Management System A and NSF-1 in Developer's Management System B) which can support the capabilities (i.e., IPv6). This lets an I2NSF User not consider which specific NSF(s) will work for the security policy rule.o* If NSFs encounter the suspicious IPv4 or IPv6 packets of malicious users, they can filter the packets out according to the configured security policy rule. Therefore, the security policy rule against the malicious users' packets can be automatically applied to appropriate NSFs without human intervention. 5. YANG Tree Diagram This section shows a YANG tree diagram of capabilities of network security functions, as defined in the Section 3. 5.1. Network Security Function (NSF) Capabilities This section explains a YANG tree diagram of NSF capabilities and its features. Figure 2 shows a YANG tree diagram of NSF capabilities. The NSF capabilities in the tree include time capabilities, event capabilities, condition capabilities, action capabilities, resolution strategy capabilities, and default action capabilities. Those capabilities can be tailored or extended according to a vendor's specific requirements. Refer to the NSF capabilities information model for detailed discussion in Section 3. module: ietf-i2nsf-capability +--rw nsf* [nsf-name] +--rw nsf-name string +--rwtime-capabilities* enumerationdirectional-capabilities* identityref +--rw event-capabilities | +--rw system-event-capability* identityref | +--rw system-alarm-capability* identityref | +--rw time-capabilities* identityref +--rw condition-capabilities | +--rw generic-nsf-capabilities | | +--rw ipv4-capability* identityref | | +--rwicmp-capability*ipv6-capability* identityref | | +--rwipv6-capability*icmpv4-capability* identityref | | +--rw icmpv6-capability* identityref | | +--rw tcp-capability* identityref | | +--rw udp-capability* identityref | | +--rw sctp-capability* identityref | | +--rw dccp-capability* identityref | +--rw advanced-nsf-capabilities | | +--rwanti-virus-capability*anti-ddos-capability* identityref | | +--rwanti-ddos-capability*ips-capability* identityref | | +--rwips-capability*url-capability* identityref | | +--rwurl-capability*voip-volte-filtering-capability* identityref | +--rw context-capabilities | +--rw application-filter-capabilities* identityref | +--rw target-capabilities* identityref | +--rwvoip-volte-capability*user-condition-capabilities* identityref | +--rwcontext-capabilities*geography-capabilities* identityref +--rw action-capabilities | +--rw ingress-action-capability* identityref | +--rw egress-action-capability* identityref | +--rw log-action-capability* identityref +--rw resolution-strategy-capabilities* identityref +--rw default-action-capabilities* identityref+--rw ipsec-method* identityrefFigure 2: YANG Tree Diagram of Capabilities of Network Security Functions The data model in this document provides identities for the capabilities of NSFs. Every identity in the data model represents the capability of an NSF. Each identity is explained in the description of the identity. Event capabilities are used to specify the capabilities that describe an event that would trigger the evaluation of the condition clause of the I2NSF Policy Rule. The defined event capabilities are system event, system alarm, and time. Time capabilities are used to specify the capabilities which describe when to execute the I2NSF policy rule. The time capabilities are defined in terms of absolute time and periodic time. The absolute time means the exact time to start or end. The periodic time means repeated time like day, week, month, ormonth. Event capabilities are used to specify the capabilities that describe an event that would trigger the evaluation of the condition clause of the I2NSF Policy Rule. The defined event capabilities are system event and system alarm.year. Condition capabilities are used to specify capabilities of a set of attributes, features, and/or values that are to be compared with a set of known attributes, features, and/or values in order to determine whether a set of actions needs to be executed or not so that an imperative I2NSF policy rule can be executed. In this document, two kinds of condition capabilities are used to classify different capabilities of NSFs such as generic-nsf-capabilitiesfor generic NSFsandadvanced-nsf-capabilities for advanced NSFs.advanced-nsf-capabilities. First, the generic-nsf-capabilities definethe common capabilities ofNSFssuch asthat operate on packet header for layer 2 (i.e., Ethernet capability), layer 3 (i.e., IPv4 capability, IPv6 capability, ICMPv4 capability, and ICMPv6 capability.), and layer 4 (i.e., TCP capability, UDP capability, SCTP capability,DCCP capability, ICMP capability,andICMPv6 capability.DCCP capability). Second, the advanced-nsf-capabilities defineadvanced capabilities ofNSFs that operate on features different from the generic-nsf-capabilities, e.g., the payload, cross flow state, application layer, traffic statistics, network behavior, etc. This document defines the advanced-nsf into two categories such as content-security-control and attack- mitigation-control. * Content security control is an NSF that evaluates the payload of a packet, such asanti-virus capability, anti- DDoS capability,Intrusion Prevention System(IPS)(IPS), URL-Filtering, Antivirus, and VoIP/VoLTE Filter. * Attack mitigation control is an NSF that mitigates an attack such as anti-DDoS (DDoS-mitigator). The advanced-nsf can be extended with other types of NSFs. This document only provides five advanced-nsf capabilities, i.e., IPS capability,HTTPURL-Filtering capability, Antivirus capability, VoIP/ VoLTE Filter capability, andVoIP/VoLTEAnti-DDoS capability. Note that VoIP and VoLTE are merged into a single capability in this document because VoIP and VoLTE use the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [RFC3261] for a call setup. See Section 3.1 for more information about the condition in the ECA policy model. The context capabilities provide extra information for the condition. The given context conditions are application filter, target, user condition, and geography location. The application filter capability is capability in matching the packet based on the application protocol, such as HTTP, HTTPS, FTP, etc. The target capability is capability in matching the type of the target devices, such as PC, IoT, Network Infrastructure devices, etc. The user condition is capability in matching the users of the network by mapping each user ID to an IP address. Users can be combined into one group. The geography location capability is capability in matching the geographical location of a source or destination of a packet. Action capabilities are used to specify the capabilities that describe the control and monitoring aspects of flow-based NSFs when the event and condition clauses are satisfied. The action capabilities are defined as ingress-action capability, egress-action capability, and log-action capability. See Section 3.1 for more information about the action in the ECA policy model. Also, see Section 7.2 (NSF-Facing Flow Security Policy Structure) in [RFC8329] for more information about the ingress and egress actions. In addition, see Section 9.1 (Flow-Based NSF Capability Characterization) in [RFC8329] and Section 7.5 (NSF Logs) in [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model] for more information about logging at NSFs. Resolution strategy capabilities are used to specify the capabilities that describe conflicts that occur between the actions of the same or different policy rules that are matched and contained in this particular NSF. The resolution strategy capabilities are defined as First Matching Rule (FMR), Last Matching Rule (LMR), Prioritized Matching Rule (PMR), Prioritized Matching Rule with Errors (PMRE), and Prioritized Matching Rule with No Errors (PMRN). See Section3.33.2 for more information about the resolution strategy. Default action capabilities are used to specify the capabilities that describe how to execute I2NSF policy rules when no rule matches a packet. The default action capabilities are defined as pass, drop,alert,rate-limit, and mirror. See Section3.33.2 for more information about the default action.IPsec method capabilities are used to specify capabilities of how to support an Internet Key Exchange (IKE) [RFC7296] for the security communication. The default action capabilities are defined as IKE or IKE-less. See [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection] for more information about the SDN-based IPsec flow protection in I2NSF.6. YANG Data Model of I2NSF NSF Capability This section introduces a YANG module for NSFs' capabilities, as defined in the Section 3.This YANG module imports from [RFC6991].It makes references too* [RFC0768]o* [RFC0791]o* [RFC0792]o* [RFC0793]o* [RFC2474]o* [RFC3168]o* [RFC3261]o* [RFC3501] * [RFC4340]o* [RFC4443]o* [RFC4960]o* [RFC5595]o* [RFC6335]o* [RFC6437]o* [RFC6691]o* [RFC6864]o* [RFC7230]o* [RFC7231]o* [RFC7296]o* [RFC7323]o* [RFC8200]o* [RFC8329]o* [RFC8519]o* [RFC8805]o* [IANA-Protocol-Numbers]o* [I-D.ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis]o* [I-D.ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn]o* [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-udp-options]o* [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model]o [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection]<CODE BEGINS> file"ietf-i2nsf-capability@2021-03-08.yang""ietf-i2nsf-capability@2021-08-14.yang" module ietf-i2nsf-capability { yang-version 1.1; namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-capability"; prefix nsfcap; organization "IETF I2NSF (Interface to Network Security Functions) Working Group"; contact "WG Web: <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/i2nsf> WG List: <mailto:i2nsf@ietf.org> Editor: Jaehoon Paul Jeong <mailto:pauljeong@skku.edu> Editor: Jinyong Tim Kim <mailto:timkim@skku.edu> Editor: Patrick Lingga <mailto:patricklink@skku.edu> Editor: Susan Hares <mailto:shares@ndzh.com>"; description "This module is a YANG module for I2NSF Network Security Functions (NSFs)'s Capabilities. Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as authors of the code. All rights reserved. Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info). This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX (https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcXXXX); see the RFC itself for full legal notices."; // RFC Ed.: replace XXXX with an actual RFC number and remove // this note. revision"2021-03-08"{"2021-08-14"{ description "Initial revision."; reference "RFC XXXX: I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model"; // RFC Ed.: replace XXXX with an actual RFC number and remove // this note. } /* * Identities */ identity event { description "Base identity for I2NSF events."; reference"draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-04:"draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-09: I2NSF NSF Monitoring YANG Data Model - Event";// RFC Ed.: replace the above draft with an actual RFC in the // YANG module and remove this note.} identitysystem-event-capabilitysystem-event { base event; description "Identity for system event"; reference"draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-04:"draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-09: I2NSF NSF Monitoring YANG Data Model - System event"; } identitysystem-alarm-capabilitysystem-alarm { base event; description "Identity for system alarm"; reference"draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-04:"draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-09: I2NSF NSF Monitoring YANG Data Model - System alarm"; } identity time { base event; description "Identity for time capabilities"; } identity access-violation { basesystem-event-capability;system-event; description "Identity for access violation event"; reference"draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-04:"draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-09: I2NSF NSF Monitoring YANG Data Model - System event for access violation"; } identity configuration-change { basesystem-event-capability;system-event; description "Identity for configuration change event"; reference"draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-04:"draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-09: I2NSF NSF Monitoring YANG Data Model - System event for configuration change"; } identity memory-alarm { basesystem-alarm-capability;system-alarm; description "Identity for memory alarm. Alarm when memory usage exceeds a threshold."; reference"draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-04:"draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-09: I2NSF NSF Monitoring YANG Data Model - System alarm for memory"; } identity cpu-alarm { basesystem-alarm-capability;system-alarm; description "Identity for CPU alarm. Alarm when CPU usage exceeds a threshold."; reference"draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-04:"draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-09: I2NSF NSF Monitoring YANG Data Model - System alarm for CPU"; } identity disk-alarm { basesystem-alarm-capability;system-alarm; description "Identity for disk alarm. Alarm when disk usage exceeds a threshold."; reference"draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-04:"draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-09: I2NSF NSF Monitoring YANG Data Model - System alarm for disk"; } identity hardware-alarm { basesystem-alarm-capability;system-alarm; description "Identity for hardware alarm. Alarm when a hardware failure or hardware degradation occurs."; reference"draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-04:"draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-09: I2NSF NSF Monitoring YANG Data Model - System alarm for hardware"; } identity interface-alarm { basesystem-alarm-capability;system-alarm; description "Identity for interface alarm. Alarm when interface usage exceeds a threshold."; reference"draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-04:"draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-09: I2NSF NSF Monitoring YANG Data Model - System alarm for interface"; } identityconditionabsolute-time { base time; description"Base identity for I2NSF conditions";"absolute time capabilities. If a network security function has the absolute time capability, the network security function supports rule execution according to absolute time."; } identitycontext-capabilityperiodic-time { basecondition;time; description"Base"periodic time capabilities. If a network security function has the periodic time capability, the network security function supports rule execution according to periodic time."; } identity target-device { description "Identity forcontexttarget conditioncapabilities for an NSF.capability. Thecontext contains background information of various entitiescapability for matching the target device type."; } identity computer { base target-device; description "Identity for computer such asan access control list, application layer filter, target, user, group,personal computer (PC) andgeography.";server"; } identityaccess-control-listmobile-phone { basecontext-capability;target-device; description "Identity forAccess Control List (ACL) condition capability"; reference "RFC 8519: YANG Data Modelmobile-phone such as smartphone and cellphone"; } identity voip-volte-phone { base target-device; description "Identity forNetwork Access Control Lists (ACLs) - A user-ordered set of rules used to configure the forwarding behavior in an NSF.";voip-volte-phone"; } identityapplication-layer-filtertablet { basecontext-capability;target-device; description "Identity forapplication-layer-filter condition capability. application-layer-filter capability can examine the contents of a packet (e.g., a URL contained in an HTTP message)."; reference "RFC7230: Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing RFC7231: Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semanticstablet"; } identity network-infrastructure-device { base target-device; description "Identity for network infrastructure devices such as switch, router, andContent";access point"; } identitytargetiot { basecontext-capability;target-device; description "Identity fortarget condition capability"; reference "RFC 8519: YANG Data ModelIoT (Internet of Things)"; } identity ot { base target-device; description "Identity forNetwork Access Control Lists (ACLs) - An access controlOperational Technology"; } identity vehicle { base target-device; description "Identity fora target (e.g.,vehicle that connects to and shares data through the Internet"; } identity user-condition { description "Base identity for user condition capability. This is the capability of mapping user(s) into their corresponding IPaddress) in an NSF.";address"; } identity user { basecontext-capability;user-condition; description "Identity for user condition capability. A user (e.g., employee) can be mapped to an IP address of a computing device (e.g., computer, laptop, and virtual machine) which the user is using.";reference "RFC 8519: YANG Data Model for Network Access Control Lists (ACLs) - An access control for a user (e.g., the corresponding IP address) in an NSF.";} identity group { basecontext-capability;user-condition; description "Identity for group condition capability. A group (e.g., employees) can be mapped to multiple IP addresses of computing devices (e.g., computers, laptops, and virtual machines) which the group is using."; } identity geography-location { description "Identity for geography condition capability"; reference "RFC8519: YANG Data Model8805: A Format forNetwork Access Control Lists (ACLs)Self-Published IP Geolocation Feeds - An access control for agroup (e.g.,geographical location (i.e., geolocation) that has the corresponding IPaddresses) in an NSF.";prefix."; } identity source-location { base geography-location; description "Identity for source geography location condition capability"; reference "RFC 8805: A Format for Self-Published IP Geolocation Feeds - An access control for a geographical location (i.e., geolocation) that has the corresponding IP prefix."; } identity destination-location { basecontext-capability;geography-location; description "Identity for destination geography location condition capability"; reference "RFC 8805: A Format for Self-Published IP Geolocation Feeds - An access control for a geographical location (i.e., geolocation) that has the corresponding IP prefix."; } identitydirectional-capabilitydirectional { description "Base identity for directional traffic flow capability"; reference "RFC 5101: Specification of the IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX) Protocol for the Exchange of IP Traffic Flow Information - Terminology Unidirectional and Bidirectional Flow"; } identity unidirectional { basedirectional-capability;directional; description "Identity for unirectional traffic flow."; reference "RFC 5101: Specification of the IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX) Protocol for the Exchange of IP Traffic Flow Information - Terminology Unidirectional Flow"; } identity bidirectional { basedirectional-capability;directional; description "Identity for bidirectional traffic flow."; reference "RFC 5101: Specification of the IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX) Protocol for the Exchange of IP Traffic Flow Information - Terminology Bidirectional Flow"; } identityipv4-capabilityprotocol { description "Base identity for Internet Protocols"; } identity ethernet { basecondition;protocol; description "Base identity forIPv4data link layer protocol."; } identity source-mac-address { base ethernet; description "Identity for the capability of matching Media Access Control (MAC) source address(es) conditioncapability";capability."; reference"RFC 791: Internet Protocol";"IEEE 802.3: IEEE Standard for Ethernet"; } identity destination-mac-address { base ethernet; description "Identity for the capability of matching Media Access Control (MAC) destination address(es) condition capability."; reference "IEEE 802.3: IEEE Standard for Ethernet"; } identityexact-ipv4-header-lengthether-type { baseipv4-capability;ethernet; description "Identity forexact-matchthe capability of matching the EtherType of a packet."; reference "IEEE 802.3: IEEE Standard for Ethernet"; } identity ip { base protocol; description "Base identity for internet/network layer protocol, e.g., IPv4, IPv6, and ICMP."; } identity ipv4 { base ip; description "Base identity for IPv4header-lengthcondition capability"; reference "RFC 791: InternetProtocol - Header Length";Protocol"; } identityrange-ipv4-header-lengthipv6 { baseipv4-capability;ip; description"Identity"Base identity forrange-match IPv4 header-lengthIPv6 conditioncapability";capabilities"; reference "RFC791:8200: InternetProtocol - Header Length";Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification"; } identityipv4-tos-dscpdscp { baseipv4-capability;ipv4; base ipv6; description "Identity for the capability of matching IPv4Type-Of-Service (TOS)annd IPv6 Differentiated Services Codepoint (DSCP)condition capability";condition"; reference "RFC 791: Internet Protocol - Type of Service RFC 2474: Definition of the Differentiated Services Field (DS Field) in the IPv4 and IPv6Headers"; } identity exact-ipv4-total-length { base ipv4-capability; description "Identity for exact-match IPv4 total length condition capability"; reference "RFC 791:Headers RFC 8200: InternetProtocolProtocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification -Total Length";Traffic Class"; } identityrange-ipv4-total-lengthlength { baseipv4-capability;ipv4; base ipv6; description "Identity forrange-matchthe capability of matching IPv4total length condition capability";Total Length header field or IPv6 Payload Length header field. IPv4 Total Length is the length of datagram, measured in octets, including internet header and data. IPv6 Payload Length is the length of the IPv6 payload, i.e., the rest of the packet following the IPv6 header, measured in octets."; reference "RFC 791: Internet Protocol - Total Length RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification - Payload Length"; } identityipv4-idttl { baseipv4-capability;ipv4; base ipv6; description "Identity for the capability of matching IPv4identification condition capability. IPv4 ID field is used for fragmentation and reassembly.";Time-To-Live (TTL) or IPv6 Hop Limit."; reference "RFC 791: Internet Protocol -IdentificationTime To Live (TTL) RFC6864: Updated8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specificationof the IPv4 ID Field-Fragmentation and Reassembly";Hop Limit"; } identityipv4-fragment-flagsnext-header { baseipv4-capability;ipv4; base ipv6; description "Identity for the capability of matching IPv4fragment flags condition capability";Protocol Field or equivalent to IPv6 Next Header."; reference"RFC"IANA Website: Assigned Internet Protocol Numbers - Protocol Number for IPv4 RFC 791: Internet Protocol -Fragmentation Flags";Protocol RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification - Next Header"; } identityexact-ipv4-fragment-offsetsource-address { baseipv4-capability;ipv4; base ipv6; description "Identity forexact-matchthe capability of matching IPv4fragment offsetor IPv6 source address(es) conditioncapability";capability."; reference "RFC 791: Internet Protocol -Fragmentation Offset";Address RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification - Source Address"; } identityrange-ipv4-fragment-offsetdestination-address { baseipv4-capability;ipv4; base ipv6; description "Identity forrange-matchthe capability of matching IPv4fragment offsetor IPv6 destination address(es) conditioncapability";capability."; reference "RFC 791: Internet Protocol -Fragmentation Offset";Address RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification - Destination Address"; } identityexact-ipv4-ttlflow-direction { baseipv4-capability;ipv4; base ipv6; description "Identity forexact-match IPv4 Time-To-Live (TTL)flow direction of matching IPv4/IPv6 source or destination address(es) conditioncapability";capability where a flow's direction is either unidirectional or bidirectional"; reference "RFC 791: Internet Protocol- Time To Live (TTL)";RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification"; } identityrange-ipv4-ttlheader-length { baseipv4-capability;ipv4; description "Identity forrange-matchmatching IPv4Time-To-Live (TTL)header-length condition capability"; reference "RFC 791: Internet Protocol -Time To Live (TTL)";Header Length"; } identityipv4-protocolidentification { baseipv4-capability;ipv4; description "Identity for IPv4protocolidentification conditioncapability";capability. IPv4 ID field is used for fragmentation and reassembly."; reference"IANA Website: Assigned"RFC 791: Internet ProtocolNumbers-Protocol Number for IPv4Identification RFC791: Internet Protocol - Protocol"; } identity prefix-ipv4-address-flow-direction { base ipv4-capability; description "Identity for flow direction6864: Updated Specification ofprefix-matchthe IPv4source or destination address(es) condition capability where flow direction is either unidirectional or bidirectional"; reference "RFC 4340: Datagram Congestion Control Protocol";ID Field - Fragmentation and Reassembly"; } identityprefix-ipv4-addressfragment-flags { baseipv4-capability;ipv4; description "Identity forprefix-matchIPv4source or destination addressfragment flags conditioncapability. The addresses are specified by a pair of prefix and prefix length.";capability"; reference "RFC 791: Internet Protocol -Address";Fragmentation Flags"; } identityprefix-ipv4-src-addressfragment-offset { baseipv4-capability;ipv4; description "Identity forprefix-matchmatching IPv4source addressfragment offset conditioncapability. The addresses are specified by a pair of prefix and prefix length.";capability"; reference "RFC 791: Internet Protocol -Address";Fragmentation Offset"; } identityprefix-ipv4-dst-addressipv4-options { baseipv4-capability;ipv4; description "Identity forprefix-matchIPv4destination addressoptions conditioncapability. The addresses are specified by a pair of prefix and prefix length.";capability"; reference "RFC 791: Internet Protocol -Address";Options"; } identityrange-ipv4-address-flow-directionflow-label { baseipv4-capability;ipv6; description "Identity for matching IPv6 flowdirection of range-match IPv4 source or destination address(es)label conditioncapability where flow direction is either unidirectional or bidirectional";capability"; reference "RFC4340: Datagram Congestion Control Protocol";8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification - Flow Label RFC 6437: IPv6 Flow Label Specification"; } identityrange-ipv4-addressheader-order { baseipv4-capability;ipv6; description "Identity forrange-match IPv4 source or destination addressIPv6 extension header order conditioncapability. The addresses are specified by a pair of a start address and an end address.";capability"; reference "RFC791:8200: InternetProtocolProtocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification -Address";Extension Header Order"; } identityrange-ipv4-src-addresshop-by-hop { baseipv4-capability;ipv6; description "Identity forrange-match IPv4 source address condition capability. The addresses are specified by a pair ofIPv6 hop bya start address and an end address.";hop options header condition capability"; reference "RFC791:8200: InternetProtocolProtocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification -Address";Options"; } identityrange-ipv4-dst-addressrouting-header { baseipv4-capability;ipv6; description "Identity forrange-match IPv4 destination addressIPv6 routing header conditioncapability. The addresses are specified by a pair of by a start address and an end address.";capability"; reference "RFC791:8200: InternetProtocolProtocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification -Address";Routing Header"; } identityipv4-ip-optsfragment-header { baseipv4-capability;ipv6; description "Identity forIPv4 optionIPv6 fragment header condition capability"; reference "RFC791: Internet Protocol - Options"; } identity ipv4-geo-ip { base ipv4-capability; description "Identity for IPv4 geography condition capability"; reference "RFC 8805: Self-published IP Geolocation Data - An access control for a geographical location i.e., geolocation (e.g., the corresponding IP address)."; } identity ipv6-capability { base condition; description "Base identity for IPv6 condition capabilities"; reference "RFC 8200:8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6)Specification";Specification - Fragment Header"; } identityipv6-traffic-class-dscpdestination-options { baseipv6-capability;ipv6; description "Identity for IPv6traffic classes Differentiated Services Codepoint (DSCP)destination options condition capability"; reference "RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification -Traffic Class RFC 2474: Definition of the Differentiated Services Field (DS Field) in the IPv4 and IPv6 Headers.";Destination Options"; } identityexact-ipv6-flow-labelicmp { baseipv6-capability;protocol; description"Identity"Base identity forexact-match IPv6 flow labelICMPv4 and ICMPv6 condition capability"; reference "RFC8200:792: InternetProtocol,Control Message Protocol RFC 4443: Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification -Flow Label RFC 6437: IPv6 Flow Label Specification";ICMPv6"; } identityrange-ipv6-flow-labelicmpv4 { baseipv6-capability;icmp; description"Identity"Base identity forrange-match IPv6 flow labelICMPv4 condition capability"; reference "RFC8200:792: InternetProtocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification - Flow Label RFC 6437: IPv6 Flow Label Specification";Control Message Protocol"; } identityexact-ipv6-payload-lengthicmpv6 { baseipv6-capability;icmp; description"Identity"Base identity forexact-match IPv6 payload lengthICMPv6 condition capability"; reference "RFC8200:4443: InternetProtocol,Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification -Payload Length";ICMPv6"; } identityrange-ipv6-payload-lengthtype { baseipv6-capability;icmpv4; base icmpv6; description "Identity forrange-match IPv6 payload lengthICMPv4 and ICMPv6 type condition capability"; reference "RFC8200:792: InternetProtocol,Control Message Protocol RFC 4443: Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification -Payload Length";ICMPv6"; } identityipv6-next-headercode { baseipv6-capability;icmpv4; base icmpv6; description "Identity forIPv6 next headerICMPv4 and ICMPv6 code condition capability"; reference"IANA Website: Assigned"RFC 792: Internet Control Message ProtocolNumbers -RFC 4443: Internet Control Message ProtocolNumber(ICMPv6) forIPv6 RFC 8200:the InternetProtocol,Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification -Next Header";ICMPv6"; } identityexact-ipv6-hop-limittransport-protocol { baseipv6-capability;protocol; description"Identity"Base identity forexact-match IPv6 hop limitLayer 4 protocol conditioncapability"; reference "RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification - Hop Limit";capabilities, e.g., TCP, UDP, SCTP, DCCP, and ICMP"; } identityrange-ipv6-hop-limittcp { baseipv6-capability;transport-protocol; description"Identity"Base identity forrange-match IPv6 hop limitTCP conditioncapability";capabilities"; reference "RFC8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification - Hop Limit";793: Transmission Control Protocol draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis: Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) Specification"; } identityprefix-ipv6-address-flow-directionudp { baseipv6-capability;transport-protocol; description"Identity"Base identity forflow direction of prefix-match IPv6 source or destination address(es)UDP conditioncapability where flow direction is either unidirectional or bidirectional";capabilities"; reference "RFC8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification - Address";768: User Datagram Protocol"; } identityprefix-ipv6-addresssctp { baseipv6-capability;transport-protocol; description "Identity forprefix-match IPv6 addressSCTP conditioncapability. The addresses are specified by a pair of prefix and prefix length.";capabilities"; reference "RFC8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification - Address";4960: Stream Control Transmission Protocol"; } identityprefix-ipv6-src-addressdccp { baseipv6-capability;transport-protocol; description "Identity forprefix-match IPv6 source addressDCCP conditioncapability. The addresses are specified by a pair of prefix and prefix length.";capabilities"; reference "RFC8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification - Address";4340: Datagram Congestion Control Protocol"; } identityprefix-ipv6-dst-addresssource-port-number { baseipv6-capability;tcp; base udp; base sctp; base dccp; description "Identity forprefix-match IPv6 destination address condition capability. The addresses are specified by a pair of prefixmatching TCP, UDP, SCTP, andprefix length.";DCCP source port number condition capability"; reference "RFC8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification793: Transmission Control Protocol -Address";Port Number draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis: Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) Specification RFC 768: User Datagram Protocol RFC 4960: Stream Control Transmission Protocol RFC 4340: Datagram Congestion Control Protocol"; } identityrange-ipv6-address-flow-directiondestination-port-number { baseipv6-capability;tcp; base udp; base sctp; base dccp; description "Identity forflow direction of prefix-match IPv6 source ormatching TCP, UDP, SCTP, and DCCP destinationaddress(es)port number conditioncapability where flow direction is either unidirectional or bidirectional";capability"; reference "RFC8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification793: Transmission Control Protocol -Address";Port Number draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis: Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) Specification"; } identityrange-ipv6-addressflags { baseipv6-capability;tcp; description "Identity forrange-match IPv6 source or destination addressTCP control bits (flags) conditioncapability.capability"; reference "RFC 793: Transmission Control Protocol - Flags RFC 3168: Theaddresses are specified by a pairAddition ofa start address and an end address."; reference "RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) SpecificationExplicit Congestion Notification (ECN) to IP -Address";TCP Header Flags draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis: Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) Specification draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn: More Accurate ECN Feedback in TCP"; } identityrange-ipv6-src-addresstcp-options { baseipv6-capability;tcp; description "Identity forrange-match IPv6 source addressTCP options conditioncapability. The addresses are specified by a pair of a start address and an end address.";capability."; reference "RFC8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification793: Transmission Control Protocol -Address";Options draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis: Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) Specification RFC 6691: TCP Options and Maximum Segment Size RFC 7323: TCP Extensions for High Performance"; } identityrange-ipv6-dst-addresstotal-length { baseipv6-capability;udp; description "Identity forrange-match IPv6 destination addressmatching UDP total-length condition capability. Theaddresses are specified by a pair of a start address and an end address.";UDP total length can be smaller than the IP transport length for UDP transport layer options."; reference "RFC8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification768: User Datagram Protocol -Address";Total Length draft-ietf-tsvwg-udp-options: Transport Options for UDP"; } identityipv6-header-orderverification-tag { baseipv6-capability;sctp; description "Identity forIPv6 extension header orderrange-match SCTP verification tag condition capability"; reference "RFC8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification4960: Stream Control Transmission Protocol -Extension Header Order";Verification Tag"; } identityipv6-optionschunk-type { baseipv6-capability;sctp; description "Identity forIPv6 optionsSCTP chunk type condition capability"; reference "RFC8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification4960: Stream Control Transmission Protocol -Options";Chunk Type"; } identityipv6-hop-by-hopservice-code { baseipv6-capability;dccp; description "Identity forIPv6 hop by hop options headerDCCP Service Code conditioncapability";capabilitiy"; reference "RFC8200:4340: Datagram Congestion Control Protocol RFC 5595: The Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP) Service Codes RFC 6335: InternetProtocol, Version 6 (IPv6) SpecificationAssigned Numbers Authority (IANA) Procedures for the Management of the Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Number Registry -Options";Service Code"; } identityipv6-routing-headerapplication-protocol { baseipv6-capability;protocol; description"Identity"Base identity forIPv6 routing header condition capability";Application protocol"; } identity http { base application-protocol; description "The identity for HTTP protocol."; reference "RFC8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification -2616: Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) RFC7230: Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and RoutingHeader";RFC7231: Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content"; } identityipv6-fragment-headerhttps { baseipv6-capability;application-protocol; description"Identity"The identity forIPv6 fragment header condition capability";HTTPS protocol."; reference "RFC8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification - Fragment Header";2818: HTTP over TLS (HTTPS) RFC7230: Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing RFC7231: Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content"; } identityipv6-destination-optionsftp { baseipv6-capability;application-protocol; description"Identity"The identity forIPv6 destination options condition capability";ftp protocol."; reference "RFC8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification - Destination Options";959: File Transfer Protocol (FTP)"; } identityipv6-geo-ipssh { baseipv6-capability;application-protocol; description"Identity"The identity forIPv4 geography condition capability";ssh protocol."; reference "RFC8805: Self-published IP Geolocation Data - An access control for a geographical location i.e., geolocation (e.g., the corresponding IP address).";4250: The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol"; } identitytcp-capabilitytelnet { basecondition;application-protocol; description"Base"The identity forTCP condition capabilities";telnet."; reference "RFC793: Transmission Control Protocol draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis: Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) Specification";854: Telnet Protocol"; } identityexact-tcp-port-num-flow-directionsmtp { basetcp-capability;application-protocol; description"Identity"The identity forflow direction of exact-match TCP source or destination port number condition capability where flow direction is either unidirectional or bidirectional";smtp."; reference "RFC793: Transmission Control Protocol - Port Number draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis: Transmission Control5321: Simple Mail Transfer Protocol(TCP) Specification";(SMTP)"; } identityexact-tcp-port-numsftp { basetcp-capability;application-protocol; description"Identity"The identity forexact-match TCP source or destination port number condition capability";sftp."; reference "RFC793: Transmission Control Protocol - Port Number draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis: Transmission Control913: Simple File Transfer Protocol(TCP) Specification";(SFTP)"; } identityexact-tcp-src-port-numpop3 { basetcp-capability;application-protocol; description"Identity"The identity forexact-match TCP source port number condition capability";pop3."; reference "RFC793: Transmission Control1081: Post Office Protocol -Port Number draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis: Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) Specification";Version 3 (POP3)"; } identityexact-tcp-dst-port-numimap { basetcp-capability;application-protocol; description"Identity"The identity forexact-match TCP destination port number condition capability";Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP)."; reference "RFC793: Transmission Control Protocol3501: INTERNET MESSAGE ACCESS PROTOCOL -Port Number draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis: Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) Specification";VERSION 4rev1"; } identityrange-tcp-port-num-flow-directionaction {base tcp-capability;description"Identity"Base identity forflow direction of range-match TCP source or destination port number condition capability where flow direction is either unidirectional or bidirectional"; reference "RFC 793: Transmission Control Protocol - Port Number draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis: Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) Specification"; } identity range-tcp-port-num { base tcp-capability; description "Identity for range-match TCP source or destination port number condition capability. The port numbers are specified by a pair of a start port number and an end port number."; reference "RFC 793: Transmission Control Protocol - Port Number draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis: Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) Specification"; } identity range-tcp-src-port-num { base tcp-capability; description "Identity for range-match TCP source port number condition capability. The port numbers are specified by a pair of a start port number and an end port number."; reference "RFC 793: Transmission Control Protocol - Port Number draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis: Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) Specification"; } identity range-tcp-dst-port-num { base tcp-capability; description "Identity for range-match TCP destination port number condition capability. The port numbers are specified by a pair of a start port number and an end port number."; reference "RFC 793: Transmission Control Protocol - Port Number draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis: Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) Specification"; } identity tcp-flags { base tcp-capability; description "Identity for TCP control bits (flags) condition capability"; reference "RFC 793: Transmission Control Protocol - Flags RFC 3168: The Addition of Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) to IP - TCP Header Flags draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis: Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) Specification draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn: More Accurate ECN Feedback in TCP"; } identity tcp-options { base tcp-capability; description "Identity for TCP options condition capability"; reference "RFC 793: Transmission Control Protocol - Options draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis: Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) Specification RFC 6691: TCP Options and Maximum Segment Size RFC 7323: TCP Extensions for High Performance"; } identity udp-capability { base condition; description "Base identity for UDP condition capabilities"; reference "RFC 768: User Datagram Protocol"; } identity exact-udp-port-num-flow-direction { base udp-capability; description "Identity for flow direction of exact-match UDP source or destination port number condition capability where flow direction is either unidirectional or bidirectional"; reference "RFC 768: User Datagram Protocol - Port Number"; } identity exact-udp-port-num { base udp-capability; description "Identity for exact-match UDP source or destination port number condition capability"; reference "RFC 768: User Datagram Protocol - Port Number"; } identity exact-udp-src-port-num { base udp-capability; description "Identity for exact-match UDP source port number condition capability"; reference "RFC 768: User Datagram Protocol - Port Number"; } identity exact-udp-dst-port-num { base udp-capability; description "Identity for exact-match UDP destination port number condition capability"; reference "RFC 768: User Datagram Protocol - Port Number"; } identity range-udp-port-num-flow-direction { base udp-capability; description "Identity for flow direction of range-match UDP source or destination port number condition capability where flow direction is either unidirectional or bidirectional"; reference "RFC 768: User Datagram Protocol - Port Number"; } identity range-udp-port-num { base udp-capability; description "Identity for range-match UDP source or destination port number condition capability. The port numbers are specified by a pair of a start port number and an end port number."; reference "RFC 768: User Datagram Protocol - Port Number"; } identity range-udp-src-port-num { base udp-capability; description "Identity for range-match UDP source port number condition capability. The port numbers are specified by a pair of a start port number and an end port number."; reference "RFC 768: User Datagram Protocol - Port Number"; } identity range-udp-dst-port-num { base udp-capability; description "Identity for range-match TCP destination port number condition capability. The port numbers are specified by a pair of a start port number and an end port number."; reference "RFC 768: User Datagram Protocol - Port Number"; } identity exact-udp-total-length { base udp-capability; description "Identity for exact-match UDP total-length condition capability. The UDP total length can be smaller than the IP transport length for UDP transport layer options."; reference "RFC 768: User Datagram Protocol - Total Length draft-ietf-tsvwg-udp-options: Transport Options for UDP"; } identity range-udp-total-length { base udp-capability; description "Identity for range-match UDP total-length condition capability. The UDP total length can be smaller than the IP transport length for UDP transport layer options."; reference "RFC 768: User Datagram Protocol - Total Length draft-ietf-tsvwg-udp-options: Transport Options for UDP"; } identity sctp-capability { description "Identity for SCTP condition capabilities"; reference "RFC 4960: Stream Control Transmission Protocol"; } identity exact-sctp-port-num-flow-direction { base sctp-capability; description "Identity for flow direction of range-match SCTP source or destination port number condition capability where flow direction is either unidirectional or bidirectional"; reference "RFC 4960: Stream Control Transmission Protocol - Port Number"; } identity exact-sctp-port-num { base sctp-capability; description "Identity for exact-match SCTP source or destination port number condition capability"; reference "RFC 4960: Stream Control Transmission Protocol - Port Number"; } identity exact-sctp-src-port-num { base sctp-capability; description "Identity for exact-match SCTP source port number condition capability"; reference "RFC 4960: Stream Control Transmission Protocol - Port Number"; } identity exact-sctp-dst-port-num { base sctp-capability; description "Identity for exact-match SCTP destination port number condition capability"; reference "RFC 4960: Stream Control Transmission Protocol - Port Number"; } identity range-sctp-port-num-flow-direction { base sctp-capability; description "Identity for flow direction of range-match SCTP source or destination port number condition capability where flow direction is either unidirectional or bidirectional"; reference "RFC 4960: Stream Control Transmission Protocol - Port Number"; } identity range-sctp-port-num { base sctp-capability; description "Identity for range-match SCTP source or destination port number condition capability. The port numbers are specified by a pair of a start port number and an end port number."; reference "RFC 4960: Stream Control Transmission Protocol - Port Number"; } identity range-sctp-src-port-num { base sctp-capability; description "Identity for range-match SCTP source port number condition capability. The port numbers are specified by a pair of a start port number and an end port number."; reference "RFC 4960: Stream Control Transmission Protocol - Port Number"; } identity range-sctp-dst-port-num { base sctp-capability; description "Identity for range-match SCTP destination port number condition capability. The port numbers are specified by a pair of a start port number and an end port number."; reference "RFC 4960: Stream Control Transmission Protocol - Port Number"; } identity sctp-verification-tag { base sctp-capability; description "Identity for range-match SCTP verification tag condition capability"; reference "RFC 4960: Stream Control Transmission Protocol - Verification Tag"; } identity sctp-chunk-type { base sctp-capability; description "Identity for SCTP chunk type condition capability"; reference "RFC 4960: Stream Control Transmission Protocol - Chunk Type"; } identity dccp-capability { description "Identity for DCCP condition capabilities"; reference "RFC 4340: Datagram Congestion Control Protocol"; } identity exact-dccp-port-num-flow-direction { base dccp-capability; description "Identity for flow direction of exact-match DCCP source or destination port number condition capability where flow direction is either unidirectional or bidirectional"; reference "RFC 4340: Datagram Congestion Control Protocol"; } identity exact-dccp-port-num { base dccp-capability; description "Identity for exact-match DCCP source or destination port number condition capability"; reference "RFC 4340: Datagram Congestion Control Protocol"; } identity exact-dccp-src-port-num { base dccp-capability; description "Identity for exact-match DCCP source port number condition capability"; reference "RFC 4340: Datagram Congestion Control Protocol"; } identity exact-dccp-dst-port-num { base dccp-capability; description "Identity for exact-match DCCP destination port number condition capability"; reference "RFC 4340: Datagram Congestion Control Protocol"; } identity range-dccp-port-num-flow-direction { base dccp-capability; description "Identity for flow direction of range-match DCCP source or destination port number condition capability where flow direction is either unidirectional or bidirectional"; reference "RFC 4340: Datagram Congestion Control Protocol"; } identity range-dccp-port-num { base dccp-capability; description "Identity for range-match DCCP source or destination port number condition capability. The port numbers are specified by a pair of a start port number and an end port number."; reference "RFC 4340: Datagram Congestion Control Protocol"; } identity range-dccp-src-port-num { base dccp-capability; description "Identity for range-match DCCP source port number condition capability. The port numbers are specified by a pair of a start port number and an end port number."; reference "RFC 4340: Datagram Congestion Control Protocol"; } identity range-dccp-dst-port-num { base dccp-capability; description "Identity for range-match DCCP source port number condition capability. The port numbers are specified by a pair of a start port number and an end port number."; reference "RFC 4340: Datagram Congestion Control Protocol"; } identity dccp-service-code { base dccp-capability; description "Identity for DCCP Service Code condition capabilitiy"; reference "RFC 4340: Datagram Congestion Control Protocol RFC 5595: The Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP) Service Codes RFC 6335: Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) Procedures for the Management of the Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Number Registry - Service Code"; } identity icmp-capability { base condition; description "Base identity for ICMP condition capability"; reference "RFC 792: Internet Control Message Protocol"; } identity icmp-type { base icmp-capability; description "Identity for ICMP type condition capability"; reference "RFC 792: Internet Control Message Protocol"; } identity icmp-code { base icmp-capability; description "Identity for ICMP code condition capability"; reference "RFC 792: Internet Control Message Protocol"; } identity icmpv6-capability { base condition; description "Base identity for ICMPv6 condition capability"; reference "RFC 4443: Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification - ICMPv6"; } identity icmpv6-type { base icmpv6-capability; description "Identity for ICMPv6 type condition capability"; reference "RFC 4443: Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification - ICMPv6"; } identity icmpv6-code { base icmpv6-capability; description "Identity for ICMPv6 code condition capability"; reference "RFC 4443: Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification - ICMPv6"; } identity url-capability { base condition; description "Base identity for URL condition capability"; } identity pre-defined { base url-capability; description "Identity for pre-defined URL Database condition capability. where URL database is a public database for URL filtering."; } identity user-defined { base url-capability; description "Identity for user-defined URL Database condition capability. that allows a users manual addition of URLs for URL filtering."; } identity log-action-capability { description "Base identity for log-action capability"; } identity rule-log { base log-action-capability; description "Identity for rule log log-action capability. Log the received packet based on the rule"; } identity session-log { base log-action-capability; description "Identity for session log log-action capability. Log the received packet based on the session."; } identity ingress-action-capability { description "Base identity for ingress-action capability"; reference "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions - Ingress action"; } identity egress-action-capability { description "Base identity for egress-action capability"; reference "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions - Egress action"; } identity default-action-capability { description "Base identity for default-action capability"; } identity pass { base ingress-action-capability; base egress-action-capability; base default-action-capability; description "Identity for pass action capability"; reference "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions - Ingress, egress, and pass actions."; } identity drop { base ingress-action-capability; base egress-action-capability; base default-action-capability; description "Identity for drop action capability"; reference "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions - Ingress, egress, and drop actions."; } identity alert { base ingress-action-capability; base egress-action-capability; base default-action-capability; description "Identity for alert action capability"; reference "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions - Ingress, egress, and alert actions. draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-04: I2NSF NSF Monitoring YANG Data Model - Alarm (i.e., alert)."; } identity mirror { base ingress-action-capability; base egress-action-capability; base default-action-capability; description "Identity for mirror action capability"; reference "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions - Ingress, egress, and mirror actions."; } identity invoke-signaling { base egress-action-capability; description "Identity for invoke signalingaction capability";reference "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions - Invoke-signaling action"; } identity forwarding { base egress-action-capability; description "Identity for forwarding action capability"; reference "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions - Forwarding action"; } identity redirection { base egress-action-capability; description "Identity for redirection action capability"; reference "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions - Redirection action"; } identity resolution-strategy-capability { description "Base identity for resolution strategy capability"; } identity fmr { base resolution-strategy-capability; description "Identity for First Matching Rule (FMR) resolution strategy capability"; } identity lmr { base resolution-strategy-capability; description "Identity for Last Matching Rule (LMR) resolution strategy capability"; } identity pmr { base resolution-strategy-capability; description "Identity for Prioritized Matching Rule (PMR) resolution strategy capability"; } identity pmre { base resolution-strategy-capability; description "Identity for Prioritized Matching Rule with Errors (PMRE) resolution strategy capability";} identitypmrnlog-action { baseresolution-strategy-capability; description "Identity for Prioritized Matching Rule with No Errors (PMRN) resolution strategy capability"; } identity advanced-nsf-capability {action; description "Base identity foradvanced Network Security Function (NSF) capability. This can be used for advanced NSFs such as Anti-Virus, Anti-DDoS Attack, IPS, and VoIP/VoLTE Security Service."; reference "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions - Advanced NSFlog-action capability"; } identityanti-virus-capabilityingress-action {base advanced-nsf-capability; description "Identity for advanced NSF Anti-Virus capability. This can be used for an extension pointbase action; description "Base identity forAnti-Virus as an advanced NSF.";ingress-action capability"; reference "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions -Advanced NSF Anti-Virus capability";Section 7.2"; } identityanti-ddos-capabilityegress-action { baseadvanced-nsf-capability;action; description"Identity for advanced NSF Anti-DDoS Attack capability. This can be used for an extension point"Base identity forAnti-DDoS Attack as an advanced NSF.";egress-action capability"; reference "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions -Advanced NSF Anti-DDoS AttackSection 7.2"; } identity default-action { base action; description "Base identity for default-action capability"; } identityips-capabilityrule-log { baseadvanced-nsf-capability;log-action; description "Identity foradvanced NSF IPS capabilities. This can be used for an extension pointrule log-action capability. Log the received packet based on the rule"; } identity session-log { base log-action; description "Identity forIPS as an advanced NSF."; reference "RFC 8329: Frameworksession log-action capability. Log the received packet based on the session."; } identity pass { base ingress-action; base egress-action; base default-action; description "Identity forInterfacepass action capability. The pass action allows packet or flow toNetwork Security Functions - Advancedgo through the NSFIPS capability";entering or exiting the internal network."; } identityvoip-volte-capabilitydrop { baseadvanced-nsf-capability;ingress-action; base egress-action; base default-action; description "Identity foradvanced NSF VoIP/VoLTE Security Servicedrop action capability.This can be used for an extension pointThe drop action denies packet to go through the NSF entering or exiting the internal network."; } identity mirror { base ingress-action; base egress-action; base default-action; description "Identity forVoIP/VoLTE Security Service as an advancedmirror action capability. The mirror action copies packet and send it to the monitoring entity while still allow the packet or flow to go through the NSF.";reference "RFC 3261: SIP: Session Initiation Protocol";} identitydetectrate-limit { baseanti-virus-capability;ingress-action; base egress-action; base default-action; description "Identity foradvanced NSF Anti-Virus Detectionrate limiting action capability.ThisThe rate limit action limits the number of packets or flows that canbe used for an extension point for Anti-Virus Detection as an advanced NSF."; reference "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions - Advancedgo through the NSFAnti-Virus Detectionby dropping packets or flows (randomly or systematically)."; } identity invoke-signaling { base egress-action; description "Identity for invoke signaling action capability"; } identityallow-listtunnel-encapsulation { baseanti-virus-capability;egress-action; description "Identity foradvanced NSF Anti-Virus Allow List capability. This can be used for an extension point for Anti-Virus Allow List as an advanced NSF."; reference "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions - Advanced NSF Anti-Virus Allow Listtunnel encapsulation action capability"; } identitysyn-flood-actionforwarding { baseanti-ddos-capability;egress-action; description "Identity foradvanced NSF Anti-DDoS SYN Flood Action capability. This can be used for an extension point for Anti-DDoS SYN Flood Action as an advanced NSF."; reference "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions - Advanced NSF Anti-DDoS SYN Flood Actionforwarding action capability"; } identityudp-flood-actiontransformation { baseanti-ddos-capability;egress-action; description "Identity foradvanced NSF Anti-DDoS UDP Flood Action capability. This can be used for an extension point for Anti-DDoS UDP Flood Action as an advanced NSF."; reference "RFC 8329: Frameworktransformation action capability"; } identity resolution-strategy { description "Base identity forInterface to Network Security Functions - Advanced NSF Anti-DDoS UDP Flood Actionresolution strategy capability"; } identityhttp-flood-actionfmr { baseanti-ddos-capability;resolution-strategy; description "Identity foradvanced NSF Anti-DDoS HTTP Flood Action capability. This can be used for an extension point for Anti-DDoS HTTP Flood Action as an advanced NSF."; reference "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions - Advanced NSF Anti-DDoS HTTP Flood ActionFirst Matching Rule (FMR) resolution strategy capability"; } identityhttps-flood-actionlmr { baseanti-ddos-capability;resolution-strategy; description "Identity foradvanced NSF Anti-DDoS HTTPS Flood Action capability. This can be used for an extension point for Anti-DDoS HTTPS Flood Action as an advanced NSF."; reference "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions - Advanced NSF Anti-DDoS HTTPS Flood ActionLast Matching Rule (LMR) resolution strategy capability"; } identitydns-request-flood-actionpmr { baseanti-ddos-capability;resolution-strategy; description "Identity foradvanced NSF Anti-DDoS DNS Request Flood Action capability. This can be used for an extension point for Anti-DDoS DNS Request Flood Action as an advanced NSF."; reference "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions - Advanced NSF Anti-DDoS DNS Request Flood ActionPrioritized Matching Rule (PMR) resolution strategy capability"; } identitydns-reply-flood-actionpmre { baseanti-ddos-capability;resolution-strategy; description "Identity foradvanced NSF Anti-DDoS DNS Reply Flood Action capability. This can be usedPrioritized Matching Rule with Errors (PMRE) resolution strategy capability"; } identity pmrn { base resolution-strategy; description "Identity foran extension pointPrioritized Matching Rule with No Errors (PMRN) resolution strategy capability"; } identity advanced-nsf { description "Base identity forAnti-DDoS DNS Reply Flood Action as anadvancedNSF."; reference "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface toNetwork SecurityFunctions - Advanced NSF Anti-DDoS DNS Reply Flood Action capability";Function (NSF) capability."; } identityicmp-flood-actioncontent-security-control { baseanti-ddos-capability;advanced-nsf; description"Identity for advanced NSF Anti-DDoS ICMP Flood Action capability. This can be used"Base identity for content security control. Content security control is anextension point for Anti-DDoS ICMP Flood ActionNSF that evaluates a packet's payload such asan advanced NSF."; reference "RFC 8329: FrameworkIntrusion Prevention System (IPS), URL-Filtering, Antivirus, and VoIP/VoLTE Filter."; } identity attack-mitigation-control { base advanced-nsf; description "Base identity forInterface to Network Security Functions - Advancedattack mitigation control. Attack mitigation control is an NSFAnti-DDoS ICMP Flood Action capability";that mitigates an attack such as anti-DDoS or DDoS-mitigator."; } identityicmpv6-flood-actionips { baseanti-ddos-capability;content-security-control; description"Identity"Base identity foradvanced NSF Anti-DDoS ICMPv6 Flood Action capability. This can be usedIPS (Intrusion Prevention System) capability that prevents malicious activity within a network"; } identity url-filtering { base content-security-control; description "Base identity foran extension pointurl filtering capability that limits access by comparing the web traffic's URL with the URLs forAnti-DDoS ICMPv6 Flood Action as an advanced NSF."; reference "RFC 8329: Frameworkweb filtering in a database"; } identity anti-virus { base content-security-control; description "Base identity forInterfaceanti-virus capability toNetwork Security Functions - Advanced NSF Anti-DDoS ICMPv6 Flood Action capability";protect the network by detecting and removing viruses."; } identitysip-flood-actionvoip-volte-filtering { baseanti-ddos-capability;content-security-control; description"Identity"Base identity for advanced NSFAnti-DDoS SIP Flood Action capability. This can be used for an extension point for Anti-DDoS SIP Flood Action as an advanced NSF.";VoIP/VoLTE Security Service capability to filter the VoIP/VoLTE packets or flows."; reference "RFC8329: Framework3261: SIP: Session Initiation Protocol"; } identity anti-ddos { base attack-mitigation-control; description "Base identity forInterface to Network Security Functions - Advancedadvanced NSF Anti-DDoSSIP Flood Action capability";Attack or DDoS Mitigator capability."; } identitydetect-modepacket-rate { baseanti-ddos-capability;anti-ddos; description "Identity for advanced NSF Anti-DDoSDetection Mode capability. This can be used for an extension point for Anti-DDoS Detection Modedetecting Packet Rate Capability where a packet rate is defined asan advanced NSF."; reference "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions - Advancedthe arrival rate of Packets toward a victim destination node. The NSFAnti-DDoS Detection Mode capability";with this capability can detect the incoming packet rate and create an alert if the rate exceeds the threshold."; } identitybaseline-learningflow-rate { baseanti-ddos-capability;anti-ddos; description "Identity for advanced NSF Anti-DDoSBaseline Learning capability. This can be used for an extension point for Anti-DDoS Baseline Learningdetecting Flow Rate Capability where a flow rate is defined asan advanced NSF."; reference "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions - Advancedthe arrival rate of flows towards a victim destination node. The NSFAnti-DDoS Baseline Learning capability";with this capability can detect the incoming flow rate and create an alert if the rate exceeds the threshold."; } identitysignature-setbyte-rate { baseips-capability;anti-ddos; description "Identity for advanced NSFIPS Signature Set capability. ThisAnti-DDoS detecting Byte Rate Capability where a byte rate is defined as the arrival rate of Bytes toward a victim destination node. The NSF with this capability canbe used fordetect the incoming byte rate and create anextension pointalert if the rate exceeds the threshold."; } identity signature-set { base ips; description "Identity for the capability of IPS to set the signature. SignatureSet asis a set of rules to detect anadvanced NSF.";intrusive activity."; reference "RFC8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions4766: Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Requirements -Advanced NSF IPS Signature Set capability";Section 2.2.13"; } identityips-exception-signatureexception-signature { baseips-capability;ips; description "Identity foradvanced NSF IPS Exception Signature capability. This can be used for an extension point forthe capability of IPSException Signature as an advanced NSF.";to exclude signatures from detecting the intrusion."; reference "RFC8329: Framework4766: Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Requirements - Section 2.2.13"; } identity detect { base anti-virus; description "Identity forInterfaceadvanced NSF Antivirus capability to detect viruses using a security profile. The security profile is used toNetwork Security Functions - Advancedscan threats, such as virus, malware, and spyware. The NSFIPS Exception Signature Set capability";should be able to update the security profile."; } identityvoip-volte-call-idexception-files { basevoip-volte-capability;anti-virus; description "Identity for advanced NSFVoIP/VoLTE Call Identifier (ID) capability. This can be used for an extension point for VoIP/VoLTE Call ID as an advanced NSF."; reference "RFC 3261: SIP: Session Initiation Protocol";Antivirus capability to exclude a certain file type or name from detection."; } identityuser-agentpre-defined { basevoip-volte-capability;url-filtering; description "Identity foradvanced NSF VoIP/VoLTE User Agentpre-defined URL Database condition capability.This can be used for an extension pointwhere URL database is a public database forVoIP/VoLTE User Agent as an advanced NSF."; reference "RFC 3261: SIP: Session Initiation Protocol";URL filtering."; } identityipsec-capabilityuser-defined { base url-filtering; description"Base identity"Identity foran IPsec capability"; reference "draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection-12: Software-Defined Networking (SDN)-based IPsec Flow Protection - IPsec methods such as IKE and IKE-less";user-defined URL Database condition capability. that allows a users manual addition of URLs for URL filtering."; } identityikecall-id { baseipsec-capability;voip-volte-filtering; description "Identity foran IPsec Internet Key Exchange (IKE) capability"; reference "draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection-12: Software-Defined Networking (SDN)-based IPsec Flow Protection - IPsec method with IKE. RFC 7296: Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) - IKE as a component of IPsec used for performing mutual authentication and establishing and maintaining Security Associations (SAs).";advanced NSF VoIP/VoLTE Call Identifier (ID) capability."; } identityikelessuser-agent { baseipsec-capability;voip-volte-filtering; description "Identity foran IPsec without Internet Key Exchange (IKE) capability"; reference "draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection-12: Software-Defined Networking (SDN)-based IPsec Flow Protection - IPsec method without IKE";advanced NSF VoIP/VoLTE User Agent capability."; } /* * Grouping */ grouping nsf-capabilities { description "Network Security Function (NSF) Capabilities"; reference "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions - I2NSF Flow Security Policy Structure."; leaf-list directional-capabilities { type identityref { basedirectional-capability;directional; } description "The capability of an NSF for handling directional traffic flow (i.e., unidirectional or bidirectional traffic flow)."; }leaf-list time-capabilities { type enumeration { enum absolute-time { description "absolute time capabilities. If a network security function has the absolute time capability, the network security function supports rule execution according to absolute time."; } enum periodic-time { description "periodic time capabilities. If a network security function has the periodic time capability, the network security function supports rule execution according to periodic time."; } } description "Time capabilities"; }container event-capabilities { description "Capabilities of events. If a network security function has the event capabilities, the network security function supports rule execution according to system event and system alarm."; reference "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions -I2NSF Flow Security Policy Structure. draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-04:Section 7. draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-09: I2NSF NSF Monitoring YANG Data Model - System Alarm and System Events."; leaf-list system-event-capability { type identityref { basesystem-event-capability;system-event; } description "System event capabilities"; } leaf-list system-alarm-capability { type identityref { base system-alarm; } description "Systemeventalarm capabilities"; } leaf-listsystem-alarm-capabilitytime-capabilities { type identityref { basesystem-alarm-capability;time; } description"System alarm capabilities";"The capabilities for activating the policy within a specific time."; } } container condition-capabilities { description "Conditions capabilities."; container generic-nsf-capabilities { description "Conditions capabilities. If a network security function has the condition capabilities, the network security function supports rule execution according to conditions of IPv4, IPv6, TCP, UDP, SCTP, DCCP, ICMP,ICMPv6,orpayload.";ICMPv6."; reference "RFC 768: User Datagram Protocol - UDP. RFC 791: Internet Protocol - IPv4. RFC 792: Internet Control Message Protocol - ICMP. RFC 793: Transmission Control Protocol - TCP. RFC768: User Datagram4443: Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification -UDP.ICMPv6. RFC 4960: Stream Control Transmission Protocol - SCTP. RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification - IPv6. RFC4443: Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification - ICMPv6. RFC8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions - I2NSF Flow Security Policy Structure."; leaf-listipv4-capabilityethernet-capability { type identityref { baseipv4-capability;ethernet; } description"IPv4 packet"Media Access Control (MAC) capabilities"; reference"RFC 791: Internet Protocol";"IEEE 802.3: IEEE Standard for Ethernet"; } leaf-listicmp-capabilityipv4-capability { type identityref { baseicmp-capability;ipv4; } description"ICMP"IPv4 packet capabilities"; reference "RFC792:791: InternetControl Message Protocol - ICMP";Protocol"; } leaf-list ipv6-capability { type identityref { baseipv6-capability;ipv6; } description "IPv6 packet capabilities"; reference "RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification - IPv6"; } leaf-list icmpv4-capability { type identityref { base icmpv4; } description "ICMPv4 packet capabilities"; reference "RFC 792: Internet Control Message Protocol - ICMP"; } leaf-list icmpv6-capability { type identityref { baseicmpv6-capability;icmpv6; } description "ICMPv6 packet capabilities"; reference "RFC 4443: Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification - ICMPv6"; } leaf-list tcp-capability { type identityref { basetcp-capability;tcp; } description "TCP packet capabilities"; reference "RFC 793: Transmission Control Protocol - TCPdraft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis-19:draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis-24: Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) Specification"; } leaf-list udp-capability { type identityref { baseudp-capability;udp; } description "UDP packet capabilities"; reference "RFC 768: User Datagram Protocol - UDP"; } leaf-list sctp-capability { type identityref { basesctp-capability;sctp; } description "SCTP packet capabilities"; reference "RFC 4960: Stream Control Transmission Protocol - SCTP"; } leaf-list dccp-capability { type identityref { basedccp-capability;dccp; } description "DCCP packet capabilities"; reference "RFC 4340: Datagram Congestion Control Protocol - DCCP"; } } container advanced-nsf-capabilities { description "Advanced Network Security Function (NSF) capabilities, such asAnti-Virus,Anti-DDoS, IPS, and VoIP/VoLTE. This container contains the leaf-lists of advanced NSF capabilities";reference "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions - Advanced NSFleaf-list anti-ddos-capability { type identityref { base anti-ddos; } description "Anti-DDoS Attack capabilities"; } leaf-list ips-capability { type identityref { base ips; } description "IPS capabilities"; } leaf-list anti-virus-capability { type identityref { baseanti-virus-capability;anti-virus; } description "Anti-Virus capabilities";reference "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions - Advanced NSF Anti-Virus capabilities";} leaf-listanti-ddos-capabilityurl-capability { type identityref { baseanti-ddos-capability;url-filtering; } description"Anti-DDoS Attack capabilities"; reference "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions - Advanced NSF Anti-DDoS Attack"URL capabilities"; } leaf-listips-capabilityvoip-volte-filtering-capability { type identityref { baseips-capability;voip-volte-filtering; } description"IPS"VoIP/VoLTE capabilities";reference "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions - Advanced NSF IPS} } container context-capabilities { description "Security context capabilities"; leaf-list application-filter-capabilities{ type identityref { base application-protocol; } description "Context capabilities based on the application protocol"; } leaf-listurl-capabilitytarget-capabilities { type identityref { baseurl-capability;target-device; } description"URL capabilities"; reference "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions - Advanced"Context capabilities based on the device attribute that can identify a device type (i.e., router, switch, pc, ios, or android)."; } leaf-list user-condition-capabilities { type identityref { base user-condition; } description "Context capabilities based on user condition, such as user-id or user-name. The users can collected into a user-group and identified with group-id or group-name. An NSFURL capabilities"; } leaf-list voip-volte-capability { type identityref { base voip-volte-capability; } description "VoIP/VoLTE capabilities"; reference "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions - Advancedis aware of the IP address of the user provided by a unified user management system via network. Based on name-address association, an NSFVoIP/VoLTE capabilities"; }is able to enforce the security functions over the given user (or user group)"; } leaf-listcontext-capabilitiesgeography-capabilities { type identityref { basecontext-capability;geography-location; } description"Security context capabilities";"Context condition capabilities based on the geographical location of the source or destination"; } } } container action-capabilities { description "Action capabilities. If a network security function has the action capabilities, the network security function supports the attendant actions for policy rules."; leaf-list ingress-action-capability { type identityref { baseingress-action-capability;ingress-action; } description "Ingress-action capabilities"; } leaf-list egress-action-capability { type identityref { baseegress-action-capability;egress-action; } description "Egress-action capabilities"; } leaf-list log-action-capability { type identityref { baselog-action-capability;log-action; } description "Log-action capabilities"; } } leaf-list resolution-strategy-capabilities { type identityref { baseresolution-strategy-capability;resolution-strategy; } description "Resolution strategy capabilities. The resolution strategies can be used to specify how to resolve conflicts that occur between the actions of the same or different policy rules that are matched for the same packet and by particular NSF."; } leaf-list default-action-capabilities { type identityref { basedefault-action-capability;default-action; } description "Default action capabilities. A default action is used to execute I2NSF policy rules when no rule matches a packet. The default action is defined as pass, drop,alert,rate-limit, ormirror. Note that alert makes a packet dropped and logged."; reference "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions - Ingress and egress actions."; } leaf-list ipsec-method { type identityref { base ipsec-capability; } description "IPsec method capabilities"; reference "draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection-12: Software-Defined Networking (SDN)-based IPsec Flow Protection - IPsec methods such as IKE and IKE-less";mirror."; } } /* * Data nodes */ list nsf { key "nsf-name"; description "The list of Network Security Functions (NSFs)"; leaf nsf-name { type string; mandatory true; description "The name of Network Security Function (NSF)"; } uses nsf-capabilities; } } <CODE ENDS> Figure 3: YANG Data Module of I2NSF Capability 7. IANA Considerations This document requests IANA to register the following URI in the "IETF XML Registry" [RFC3688]: ID: yang:ietf-i2nsf-capability URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-capability Registrant Contact: The IESG. XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace. Filename: [ TBD-at-Registration ] Reference: [ RFC-to-be ] This document requests IANA to register the following YANG module in the "YANG Module Names" registry [RFC7950][RFC8525]: Name: ietf-i2nsf-capability Maintained by IANA? N Namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-capability Prefix: nsfcap Module: Reference: [ RFC-to-be ] 8. Privacy Considerations This YANG modulespecified in this document make a trade-off between privacy and security.specifies the capabilities for NSFs. Somepartof theYANG data model specifiedcapabilities in this documentmight useMAY require highly sensitive private dataof the client.to operate properly. Thedata used in this YANG data model canusage of such capability MUST beused forreported to theNSFsusers and permitted before using the private information related toimprovethesecuritycapability. Using any of thenetwork.capabilities that require private data MUST preserve the privacy by preventing any leakage or unauthorized disclosure of the private data. In regards to the privacy data used, the security for accessibility of the data should be tightly secured and monitored. The Security Considerations are discussed in Section 9. 9. Security Considerations The YANG module specified in this document defines a data schema designed to be accessed through network management protocols such as NETCONF [RFC6241] or RESTCONF [RFC8040]. The lowest layer of NETCONF protocol layerscanMUST use Secure Shell (SSH) [RFC4254][RFC6242] as a secure transport layer. The lowest layer of RESTCONF protocol layerscanMUST use HTTP over Transport Layer Security (TLS), that is, HTTPS [RFC7230][RFC8446] as a secure transport layer. The Network Configuration Access Control Model (NACM) [RFC8341] provides a means of restricting access to specific NETCONF or RESTCONF users to a preconfigured subset of all available NETCONF or RESTCONF protocol operations and contents. Thus, NACMcanSHOULD be used to restrict the NSF registration from unauthorized users. There are a number of data nodes defined in this YANG module that are writable, creatable, and deletable (i.e., config true, which is the default). These data nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. Write operations to these data nodes could have a negative effect on network and security operations. These data nodes are collected into a single list node. This list node is defined by list nsf with the following sensitivity/ vulnerability:o* list nsf: An attacker could alter the security capabilities associated with an NSF by disabling or enabling the functionality of the security capabilities of the NSF. Some of the readable data nodes in this YANG module may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus important to control read access (e.g., via get, get-config, or notification) to these data nodes. These are the subtrees and data nodes with their sensitivity/vulnerability: * list nsf:AnThe leak of this node to an attacker couldalterreveal the specific configuration of securitycapabilities associated withcontrols to anNSF by disablingattacker. An attacker can craft an attack path that avoids observation orenablingmitigations; one may reveal topology information to inform additional targets or enable lateral movement; one enables thefunctionalityconstruction of an attack path that avoids observation or mitigations; one provides an indication that thesecurity capabilities ofoperator has discovered theNSF.attack. Some of the features that this document defines capability indicators for are highly sensitive and/or privileged operations(e.g., listening to VoIP/VoLTE audio to identify individuals and web filtering)that inherently require access to individuals' private data. These are subtrees and data nodes that are considered privacy sensitive: * voip-volte-filtering-capability: The NSF that is able to filter VoIP/VoLTE calls might identify certain individual identification. * user-condition-capabilities: The capability uses a set of IP addresses mapped to users. * geography-capabilities: The IP address used in this capability can identify a user's geographical location. It is noted that some private information is made accessible in this manner. Thus, the nodes/entities given access to this dataneed toMUST be tightlysecured andsecured, monitored, and audited to prevent leakage or other unauthorized disclosure of private data. Refer to [RFC6973] for the description of privacy aspects that protocol designers (including YANG data model designers) should consider along with regular security and privacy analysis. 10. References 10.1. Normative References[I-D.ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model] Jeong, J., Lingga, P., Hares, S., Xia, L., and H. Birkholz, "I2NSF NSF Monitoring YANG Data Model", draft- ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-04 (work in progress), September 2020. [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection] Marin-Lopez, R., Lopez-Millan, G., and F. Pereniguez- Garcia, "Software-Defined Networking (SDN)-based IPsec Flow Protection", draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow- protection-12 (work in progress), October 2020. [I-D.ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn] Briscoe, B., Kuehlewind, M., and R. Scheffenegger, "More Accurate ECN Feedback in TCP", draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate- ecn-13 (work in progress), November 2020. [I-D.ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis] Eddy, W., "Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) Specification", draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis-20 (work in progress), January 2021. [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-udp-options] Touch, J., "Transport Options for UDP", draft-ietf-tsvwg- udp-options-09 (work in progress), November 2020.[RFC0768] Postel, J., "User Datagram Protocol", STD 6, RFC 768, DOI 10.17487/RFC0768, August 1980, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc768>. [RFC0791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791, DOI 10.17487/RFC0791, September 1981, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc791>. [RFC0792] Postel, J., "Internet Control Message Protocol", STD 5, RFC 792, DOI 10.17487/RFC0792, September 1981, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc792>. [RFC0793] Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7, RFC 793, DOI 10.17487/RFC0793, September 1981, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc793>. [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. [RFC2474] Nichols, K., Blake, S., Baker, F., and D. Black, "Definition of the Differentiated Services Field (DS Field) in the IPv4 and IPv6 Headers", RFC 2474, DOI 10.17487/RFC2474, December 1998, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2474>. [RFC3168] Ramakrishnan, K., Floyd, S., and D. Black, "The Addition of Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) to IP", RFC 3168, DOI 10.17487/RFC3168, September 2001, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3168>. [RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261, DOI 10.17487/RFC3261, June 2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3261>. [RFC3501] Crispin, M., "INTERNET MESSAGE ACCESS PROTOCOL - VERSION 4rev1", RFC 3501, DOI 10.17487/RFC3501, March 2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3501>. [RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688, DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>. [RFC4254] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH) Connection Protocol", RFC 4254, DOI 10.17487/RFC4254, January 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4254>. [RFC4340] Kohler, E., Handley, M., and S. Floyd, "Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP)", RFC 4340, DOI 10.17487/RFC4340, March 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4340>. [RFC4443] Conta, A., Deering, S., and M. Gupta, Ed., "Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", STD 89, RFC 4443, DOI 10.17487/RFC4443, March 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4443>. [RFC4960] Stewart, R., Ed., "Stream Control Transmission Protocol", RFC 4960, DOI 10.17487/RFC4960, September 2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4960>. [RFC5595] Fairhurst, G., "The Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP) Service Codes", RFC 5595, DOI 10.17487/RFC5595, September 2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5595>. [RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020, DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6020>. [RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>. [RFC6242] Wasserman, M., "Using the NETCONF Protocol over Secure Shell (SSH)", RFC 6242, DOI 10.17487/RFC6242, June 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6242>. [RFC6335] Cotton, M., Eggert, L., Touch, J., Westerlund, M., and S. Cheshire, "Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) Procedures for the Management of the Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Number Registry", BCP 165, RFC 6335, DOI 10.17487/RFC6335, August 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6335>. [RFC6437] Amante, S., Carpenter, B., Jiang, S., and J. Rajahalme, "IPv6 Flow Label Specification", RFC 6437, DOI 10.17487/RFC6437, November 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6437>.[RFC6691] Borman, D., "TCP Options and Maximum Segment Size (MSS)", RFC 6691, DOI 10.17487/RFC6691, July 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6691>.[RFC6864] Touch, J., "Updated Specification of the IPv4 ID Field", RFC 6864, DOI 10.17487/RFC6864, February 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6864>.[RFC6973] Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J., Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973, DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6973>.[RFC6991] Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., "Common YANG Data Types", RFC 6991, DOI 10.17487/RFC6991, July 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6991>. [RFC7230] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing", RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>. [RFC7231] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231, DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>. [RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T. Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>. [RFC7323] Borman, D., Braden, B., Jacobson, V., and R. Scheffenegger, Ed., "TCP Extensions for High Performance", RFC 7323, DOI 10.17487/RFC7323, September 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7323>. [RFC7950] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language", RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950>. [RFC8040] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., andK. Watsen, "RESTCONF Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, January 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8040>. [RFC8192] Hares, S., Lopez, D., Zarny, M., Jacquenet, C., Kumar, R., and J. Jeong, "Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF): Problem Statement and Use Cases",K. Watsen, "RESTCONF Protocol", RFC8192,8040, DOI10.17487/RFC8192, July10.17487/RFC8040, January 2017,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8192>.<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8040>. [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. [RFC8200] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", STD 86, RFC 8200, DOI 10.17487/RFC8200, July 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8200>.[RFC8329] Lopez, D., Lopez, E., Dunbar, L., Strassner, J., and R. Kumar, "Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions", RFC 8329, DOI 10.17487/RFC8329, February 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8329>.[RFC8340] Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, Ed., "YANG Tree Diagrams", BCP 215, RFC 8340, DOI 10.17487/RFC8340, March 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8340>. [RFC8341] Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration Access Control Model", STD 91, RFC 8341, DOI 10.17487/RFC8341, March 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8341>. [RFC8407] Bierman, A., "Guidelines for Authors and Reviewers of Documents Containing YANG Data Models", BCP 216, RFC 8407, DOI 10.17487/RFC8407, October 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8407>. [RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>. [RFC8525] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., Watsen, K., and R. Wilton, "YANG Library", RFC 8525, DOI 10.17487/RFC8525, March 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8525>. [RFC8519] Jethanandani, M., Agarwal, S., Huang, L., and D. Blair, "YANG Data Model for Network Access Control Lists (ACLs)", RFC 8519, DOI 10.17487/RFC8519, March 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8519>.[RFC8525] Bierman,[I-D.ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn] Briscoe, B., Kühlewind, M., and R. Scheffenegger, "More Accurate ECN Feedback in TCP", Work in Progress, Internet- Draft, draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn-15, 12 July 2021, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate- ecn-15.txt>. [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-udp-options] Touch, J., "Transport Options for UDP", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-tsvwg-udp-options-13, 19 June 2021, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-tsvwg- udp-options-13.txt>. [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model] Jeong, J. (., Lingga, P., Hares, S., Xia, L. (., and H. Birkholz, "I2NSF NSF Monitoring Interface YANG Data Model", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf- i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-08, 29 April 2021, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf- monitoring-data-model-08.txt>. [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-nsf-facing-interface-dm] Kim, J. (., Jeong, J. (., Park, J., Hares, S., and Q. Lin, "I2NSF Network Security Function-Facing Interface YANG Data Model", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf- i2nsf-nsf-facing-interface-dm-12, 8 March 2021, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf- facing-interface-dm-12.txt>. [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-registration-interface-dm] Hyun, S., Jeong, J. P., Roh, T., Wi, S., and J. Park, "I2NSF Registration Interface YANG Data Model", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-i2nsf-registration- interface-dm-10, 21 February 2021, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-i2nsf- registration-interface-dm-10.txt>. 10.2. Informative References [RFC6691] Borman, D., "TCP Options and Maximum Segment Size (MSS)", RFC 6691, DOI 10.17487/RFC6691, July 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6691>. [RFC6973] Cooper, A.,Bjorklund,Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J., Morris, J., Hansen, M.,Schoenwaelder,and R. Smith, "Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973, DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6973>. [RFC8192] Hares, S., Lopez, D., Zarny, M., Jacquenet, C., Kumar, R., and J. Jeong, "Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF): Problem Statement and Use Cases", RFC 8192, DOI 10.17487/RFC8192, July 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8192>. [RFC8329] Lopez, D., Lopez, E., Dunbar, L., Strassner, J.,Watsen,and R. Kumar, "Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions", RFC 8329, DOI 10.17487/RFC8329, February 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8329>. [RFC8805] Kline, E., Duleba, K., Szamonek, Z., Moser, S., andR. Wilton, "YANG Library",W. Kumari, "A Format for Self-Published IP Geolocation Feeds", RFC8525,8805, DOI10.17487/RFC8525, March 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8525>. 10.2. Informative References10.17487/RFC8805, August 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8805>. [I-D.ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis] Eddy, W. M., "Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) Specification", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis-24, 12 July 2021, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-tcpm- rfc793bis-24.txt>. [IANA-Protocol-Numbers] "Assigned Internet Protocol Numbers", Available: https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol- numbers/protocol-numbers.xhtml, September 2020. [Alshaer] Shaer, Al., Hamed, E., and H. Hamed, "Modeling and management of firewall policies", 2004. [Galitsky] Galitsky, B. and R. Pampapathi, "Can many agents answer questions better than one", First Monday http://dx.doi.org/10.5210/fm.v10i1.1204, 2005. [Hirschman] Hirschman, L. and R. Gaizauskas, "Natural Language Question Answering: The View from Here", Natural Language Engineering 7:4, pgs 275-300, Cambridge University Press ,NovNovember 2001. [Hohpe] Hohpe, G. and B. Woolf, "Enterprise Integration Patterns", ISBN 0-32-120068-3 , 2003.[IANA-Protocol-Numbers] "Assigned Internet Protocol Numbers", Available: https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol- numbers/protocol-numbers.xhtml, September 2020.[Martin] Martin,R.,R.C., "Agile Software Development, Principles, Patterns, and Practices", Prentice-Hall , ISBN: 0-13-597444-5 , 2002. [OODMP] "http://www.oodesign.com/mediator-pattern.html". [OODOP] "http://www.oodesign.com/mediator-pattern.html". [OODSRP] "http://www.oodesign.com/mediator-pattern.html".[RFC8805] Kline, E., Duleba, K., Szamonek, Z., Moser, S., and W. Kumari, "A Format for Self-Published IP Geolocation Feeds", RFC 8805, DOI 10.17487/RFC8805, August 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8805>.Appendix A. Configuration Examples This section shows configuration examples of "ietf-i2nsf-capability" module for capabilities registration of general firewall. A.1. Example 1: Registration for the Capabilities of a General Firewall This section shows a configuration example for the capabilities registration of a general firewall in either an IPv4 network or an IPv6 network. <nsf xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-capability"> <nsf-name>general_firewall</nsf-name> <condition-capabilities> <generic-nsf-capabilities><ipv4-capability>ipv4-protocol</ipv4-capability> <ipv4-capability>prefix-ipv4-address-flow-direction</ipv4-capability> <ipv4-capability>prefix-ipv4-address</ipv4-capability> <ipv4-capability>range-ipv4-address-flow-direction</ipv4-capability> <ipv4-capability>range-ipv4-address</ipv4-capability> <tcp-capability>exact-tcp-port-num-flow-direction</tcp-capability> <tcp-capability>exact-tcp-src-port-num</tcp-capability> <tcp-capability>exact-tcp-dst-port-num</tcp-capability> <tcp-capability>range-tcp-port-num-flow-direction</tcp-capability> <tcp-capability>range-tcp-src-port-num</tcp-capability> <tcp-capability>range-tcp-dst-port-num</tcp-capability> <udp-capability>exact-udp-port-num-flow-direction</udp-capability> <udp-capability>exact-udp-src-port-num</udp-capability> <udp-capability>exact-udp-dst-port-num</udp-capability> <udp-capability>range-udp-port-num-flow-direction</udp-capability> <udp-capability>range-udp-src-port-num</udp-capability> <udp-capability>range-udp-dst-port-num</udp-capability><ipv4-capability>next-header</ipv4-capability> <ipv4-capability>flow-direction</ipv4-capability> <ipv4-capability>source-address</ipv4-capability> <ipv4-capability>destination-address</ipv4-capability> <tcp-capability>source-port-number</tcp-capability> <tcp-capability>destination-port-number</tcp-capability> <udp-capability>source-port-num</udp-capability> <udp-capability>destination-port-num</udp-capability> </generic-nsf-capabilities> </condition-capabilities> <action-capabilities> <ingress-action-capability>pass</ingress-action-capability> <ingress-action-capability>drop</ingress-action-capability><ingress-action-capability>alert</ingress-action-capability><ingress-action-capability>mirror</ingress-action-capability> <egress-action-capability>pass</egress-action-capability> <egress-action-capability>drop</egress-action-capability><egress-action-capability>alert</egress-action-capability><egress-action-capability>mirror</egress-action-capability> </action-capabilities> </nsf> Figure 4: Configuration XML for the Capabilities Registration of a General Firewall in an IPv4 Network Figure 4 shows the configuration XML for the capabilities registration of a general firewall as an NSF in an IPv4 network. Its capabilities are as follows. 1. The name of the NSF is general_firewall. 2. The NSF can inspecta protocol, a prefix ofthe IPv4addresses,protocol header field, flow direction, source address(es), anda range of IPv4 addresses for IPv4 packets.destination address(es) 3. The NSF can inspectan exactthe portnumbernumber(s) anda range of port numbersflow direction for the transport layer(TCPprotocol, i.e., TCP andUDP).UDP. 4. The NSF can control whether the packets are allowed to pass, drop, oralert.mirror. <nsf xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-capability"> <nsf-name>general_firewall</nsf-name> <condition-capabilities> <generic-nsf-capabilities><ipv6-capability>ipv6-next-header</ipv6-capability> <ipv6-capability>prefix-ipv6-address-flow-direction</ipv6-capability> <ipv6-capability>prefix-ipv6-address</ipv6-capability> <ipv6-capability>range-ipv6-address-flow-direction</ipv6-capability> <ipv6-capability>range-ipv6-address</ipv6-capability> <tcp-capability>exact-tcp-port-num-flow-direction</tcp-capability> <tcp-capability>exact-tcp-src-port-num</tcp-capability> <tcp-capability>exact-tcp-dst-port-num</tcp-capability> <tcp-capability>range-tcp-port-num-flow-direction</tcp-capability> <tcp-capability>range-tcp-src-port-num</tcp-capability> <tcp-capability>range-tcp-dst-port-num</tcp-capability> <udp-capability>exact-udp-port-num-flow-direction</udp-capability> <udp-capability>exact-udp-src-port-num</udp-capability> <udp-capability>exact-udp-dst-port-num</udp-capability> <udp-capability>range-udp-port-num-flow-direction</udp-capability> <udp-capability>range-udp-src-port-num</udp-capability> <udp-capability>range-udp-dst-port-num</udp-capability><ipv6-capability>next-header</ipv6-capability> <ipv6-capability>flow-direction</ipv6-capability> <ipv6-capability>source-address</ipv6-capability> <ipv6-capability>destination-address</ipv6-capability> <tcp-capability>source-port-number</tcp-capability> <tcp-capability>destination-port-number</tcp-capability> <udp-capability>source-port-num</udp-capability> <udp-capability>destination-port-num</udp-capability> </generic-nsf-capabilities> </condition-capabilities> <action-capabilities> <ingress-action-capability>pass</ingress-action-capability> <ingress-action-capability>drop</ingress-action-capability><ingress-action-capability>alert</ingress-action-capability><ingress-action-capability>mirror</ingress-action-capability> <egress-action-capability>pass</egress-action-capability> <egress-action-capability>drop</egress-action-capability><egress-action-capability>alert</egress-action-capability><egress-action-capability>mirror</egress-action-capability> </action-capabilities> </nsf> Figure 5: Configuration XML for the Capabilities Registration of a General Firewall in an IPv6 Network In addition, Figure 5 shows the configuration XML for the capabilities registration of a general firewall as an NSF in an IPv6 network. Its capabilities are as follows. 1. The name of the NSF is general_firewall. 2. The NSF can inspecta protocol (Next-Header), a prefix ofIPv6addresses,next header, flow direction, source address(es), anda range of IPv6 addresses for IPv6 packets.destination address(es) 3. The NSF can inspectan exactthe portnumbernumber(s) anda range of port numbersflow direction for the transport layer(TCPprotocol, i.e., TCP andUDP).UDP. 4. The NSF can control whether the packets are allowed to pass, drop, oralert.mirror. A.2. Example 2: Registration for the Capabilities of a Time-based Firewall This section shows a configuration example for the capabilities registration of a time-based firewall in either an IPv4 network or an IPv6 network. <nsf xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-capability"> <nsf-name>time_based_firewall</nsf-name> <event-capabilities> <time-capabilities>absolute-time</time-capabilities> <time-capabilities>periodic-time</time-capabilities> </event-capabilities> <condition-capabilities> <generic-nsf-capabilities> <ipv4-capability>ipv4-protocol</ipv4-capability><ipv4-capability>prefix-ipv4-address-flow-direction</ipv4-capability> <ipv4-capability>prefix-ipv4-address</ipv4-capability> <ipv4-capability>range-ipv4-address-flow-direction</ipv4-capability> <ipv4-capability>range-ipv4-address</ipv4-capability><ipv4-capability>flow-direction</ipv4-capability> <ipv4-capability>source-address</ipv4-capability> <ipv4-capability>destination-address</ipv4-capability> </generic-nsf-capabilities> </condition-capabilities> <action-capabilities> <ingress-action-capability>pass</ingress-action-capability> <ingress-action-capability>drop</ingress-action-capability><ingress-action-capability>alert</ingress-action-capability><ingress-action-capability>mirror</ingress-action-capability> <egress-action-capability>pass</egress-action-capability> <egress-action-capability>drop</egress-action-capability><egress-action-capability>alert</egress-action-capability><egress-action-capability>mirror</egress-action-capability> </action-capabilities> </nsf> Figure 6: Configuration XML for the Capabilities Registration of a Time-based Firewall in an IPv4 Network Figure 6 shows the configuration XML for the capabilities registration of a time-based firewall as an NSF in an IPv4 network. Its capabilities are as follows. 1. The name of the NSF is time_based_firewall. 2. The NSF can execute the security policy rule according to absolute time and periodic time. 3. The NSF can inspecta protocol (Next-Header), an exactthe IPv4address,protocol header field, flow direction, source address(es), anda range of IPv4 addresses for IPv4 packets.destination address(es). 4. The NSF can control whether the packets are allowed to pass, drop, oralert.mirror. <nsf xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-capability"> <nsf-name>time_based_firewall</nsf-name> <event-capabilities> <time-capabilities>absolute-time</time-capabilities> <time-capabilities>periodic-time</time-capabilities> </event-capabilities> <condition-capabilities> <generic-nsf-capabilities><ipv6-capability>ipv6-next-header</ipv6-capability> <ipv6-capability>prefix-ipv6-address-flow-direction</ipv6-capability> <ipv6-capability>prefix-ipv6-address</ipv6-capability> <ipv6-capability>range-ipv6-address-flow-direction</ipv6-capability> <ipv6-capability>range-ipv6-address</ipv6-capability><ipv6-capability>next-header</ipv6-capability> <ipv6-capability>flow-direction</ipv6-capability> <ipv6-capability>source-address</ipv6-capability> <ipv6-capability>destination-address</ipv6-capability> </generic-nsf-capabilities> </condition-capabilities> <action-capabilities> <ingress-action-capability>pass</ingress-action-capability> <ingress-action-capability>drop</ingress-action-capability><ingress-action-capability>alert</ingress-action-capability><ingress-action-capability>mirror</ingress-action-capability> <egress-action-capability>pass</egress-action-capability> <egress-action-capability>drop</egress-action-capability><egress-action-capability>alert</egress-action-capability><egress-action-capability>mirror</egress-action-capability> </action-capabilities> </nsf> Figure 7: Configuration XML for the Capabilities Registration of a Time-based Firewall in an IPv6 Network In addition, Figure 7 shows the configuration XML for the capabilities registration of a time-based firewall as an NSF in an IPv6 network. Its capabilities are as follows. 1. The name of the NSF is time_based_firewall. 2. The NSF can execute the security policy rule according to absolute time and periodic time. 3. The NSF can inspecta protocol (Next-Header), an exactthe IPv6address,protocol header field, flow direction, source address(es), anda range of IPv6 addresses for IPv6 packets.destination address(es). 4. The NSF can control whether the packets are allowed to pass, drop, oralert.mirror. A.3. Example 3: Registration for the Capabilities of a Web Filter This section shows a configuration example for the capabilities registration of a web filter. <nsf xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-capability"> <nsf-name>web_filter</nsf-name> <condition-capabilities> <advanced-nsf-capabilities> <url-capability>user-defined</url-capability> </advanced-nsf-capabilities> </condition-capabilities> <action-capabilities> <ingress-action-capability>pass</ingress-action-capability> <ingress-action-capability>drop</ingress-action-capability><ingress-action-capability>alert</ingress-action-capability><ingress-action-capability>mirror</ingress-action-capability> <egress-action-capability>pass</egress-action-capability> <egress-action-capability>drop</egress-action-capability><egress-action-capability>alert</egress-action-capability><egress-action-capability>mirror</egress-action-capability> </action-capabilities> </nsf> Figure 8: Configuration XML for the Capabilities Registration of a Web Filter Figure 8 shows the configuration XML for the capabilities registration of a web filter as an NSF. Its capabilities are as follows. 1. The name of the NSF is web_filter. 2. The NSF can inspect a URL matched from a user-definedURL Database.URL. User canadd the new URL to the database.specify their own URL. 3. The NSF can control whether the packets are allowed to pass, drop, oralert.mirror. A.4. Example 4: Registration for the Capabilities of a VoIP/VoLTE Filter This section shows a configuration example for the capabilities registration of a VoIP/VoLTE filter. <nsf xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-capability"> <nsf-name>voip_volte_filter</nsf-name> <condition-capabilities> <advanced-nsf-capabilities><voip-volte-capability>voip-volte-call-id</voip-volte-capability><voip-volte-capability>call-id</voip-volte-capability> </advanced-nsf-capabilities> </condition-capabilities> <action-capabilities> <ingress-action-capability>pass</ingress-action-capability> <ingress-action-capability>drop</ingress-action-capability><ingress-action-capability>alert</ingress-action-capability><ingress-action-capability>mirror</ingress-action-capability> <egress-action-capability>pass</egress-action-capability> <egress-action-capability>drop</egress-action-capability><egress-action-capability>alert</egress-action-capability><egress-action-capability>mirror</egress-action-capability> </action-capabilities> </nsf> Figure 9: Configuration XML for the Capabilities Registration of a VoIP/VoLTE Filter Figure 9 shows the configuration XML for the capabilities registration of a VoIP/VoLTE filter as an NSF. Its capabilities are as follows. 1. The name of the NSF is voip_volte_filter. 2. The NSF can inspect a voice call id for VoIP/VoLTE packets. 3. The NSF can control whether the packets are allowed to pass, drop, oralert.mirror. A.5. Example 5: Registration for the Capabilities of a HTTP and HTTPS Flood Mitigator This section shows a configuration example for the capabilities registration of a HTTP and HTTPS flood mitigator. <nsf xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-capability"><nsf-name>http_and_https_flood_mitigation</nsf-name><nsf-name>DDoS_mitigator</nsf-name> <condition-capabilities> <advanced-nsf-capabilities><anti-ddos-capability>http-flood-action</anti-ddos-capability> <anti-ddos-capability>https-flood-action</anti-ddos-capability><anti-ddos-capability>packet-rate</anti-ddos-capability> <anti-ddos-capability>byte-rate</anti-ddos-capability> <anti-ddos-capability>flow-rate</anti-ddos-capability> </advanced-nsf-capabilities> </condition-capabilities> <action-capabilities> <ingress-action-capability>pass</ingress-action-capability> <ingress-action-capability>drop</ingress-action-capability><ingress-action-capability>alert</ingress-action-capability><ingress-action-capability>mirror</ingress-action-capability> <egress-action-capability>pass</egress-action-capability> <egress-action-capability>drop</egress-action-capability><egress-action-capability>alert</egress-action-capability><egress-action-capability>mirror</egress-action-capability> </action-capabilities> </nsf> Figure 10: Configuration XML for the Capabilities Registration of a HTTP and HTTPS Flood Mitigator Figure 10 shows the configuration XML for the capabilities registration of a HTTP and HTTPS flood mitigator as an NSF. Its capabilities are as follows. 1. The name of the NSF ishttp_and_https_flood_mitigation.DDoS_mitigator. 2. The NSF cancontroldetect the amount ofpackets for HTTPpacket, flow, andHTTPS packets, which are routed to the NSF's IPv4 address orbyte rate in theNSF's IPv6 address.network for potential DDoS Attack. 3. The NSF can control whether the packets are allowed to pass, drop, oralert.mirror. Appendix B. Acknowledgments This work was supported by Institute of Information & Communications Technology Planning & Evaluation (IITP) grant funded by the Korea MSIT (Ministry of Science and ICT) (R-20160222-002755, Cloud based Security Intelligence Technology Development for the Customized Security Service Provisioning). This work was supported in part by the IITP grant funded by the MSIT (2020-0-00395, Standard Development of Blockchain based Network Management Automation Technology). Appendix C. Contributors This document is made by the group effort of I2NSF working group. Many people actively contributed to this document, such as Acee Lindem, Roman Danyliw, and Tom Petch. The authors sincerely appreciate their contributions. The following are co-authors of this document: Patrick Lingga Department ofComputer ScienceElectrical and Computer Engineering Sungkyunkwan University 2066 Seo-ro Jangan-gu Suwon, Gyeonggi-do 16419 Republic of Korea EMail: patricklink@skku.edu Liang Xia Huawei 101 Software Avenue Nanjing, Jiangsu 210012 China EMail: Frank.Xialiang@huawei.com Cataldo Basile Politecnico di Torino Corso Duca degli Abruzzi, 34 Torino, 10129 Italy EMail: cataldo.basile@polito.it John Strassner Huawei 2330 Central Expressway Santa Clara, CA 95050 USA EMail: John.sc.Strassner@huawei.com Diego R. Lopez Telefonica I+D Zurbaran, 12 Madrid, 28010 Spain Email: diego.r.lopez@telefonica.com Hyoungshick Kim Department of Computer Science and Engineering Sungkyunkwan University 2066 Seo-ro Jangan-gu Suwon, Gyeonggi-do 16419 Republic of Korea EMail: hyoung@skku.edu Daeyoung Hyun Department of Computer Science and Engineering Sungkyunkwan University 2066 Seo-ro Jangan-gu Suwon, Gyeonggi-do 16419 Republic of Korea EMail: dyhyun@skku.edu Dongjin Hong Department of Electronic, Electrical and Computer Engineering Sungkyunkwan University 2066 Seo-ro Jangan-gu Suwon, Gyeonggi-do 16419 Republic of Korea EMail: dong.jin@skku.edu Jung-Soo Park Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute 218 Gajeong-Ro, Yuseong-Gu Daejeon, 34129 Republic of Korea EMail: pjs@etri.re.kr Tae-Jin Ahn Korea Telecom 70 Yuseong-Ro, Yuseong-Gu Daejeon, 305-811 Republic of Korea EMail: taejin.ahn@kt.com Se-Hui Lee Korea Telecom 70 Yuseong-Ro, Yuseong-Gu Daejeon, 305-811 Republic of Korea EMail: sehuilee@kt.com Authors' Addresses Susan Hares (editor) Huawei 7453 Hickory Hill Saline, MI 48176USAUnited States of America Phone: +1-734-604-0332EMail:Email: shares@ndzh.com Jaehoon (Paul) Jeong (editor) Department of Computer Science and Engineering Sungkyunkwan University 2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-GuSuwon,Suwon Gyeonggi-Do 16419 Republic of Korea Phone: +82 31 299 4957Fax: +82 31 290 7996 EMail:Email: pauljeong@skku.edu URI: http://iotlab.skku.edu/people-jaehoon-jeong.php Jinyong (Tim) Kim Department of Electronic, Electrical and Computer Engineering Sungkyunkwan University 2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-GuSuwon,Suwon Gyeonggi-Do 16419 Republic of Korea Phone: +82 10 8273 0930EMail:Email: timkim@skku.edu Robert Moskowitz HTT Consulting Oak Park, MIUSAUnited States of America Phone: +1-248-968-9809EMail:Email: rgm@htt-consult.com Qiushi Lin Huawei Huawei Industrial BaseShenzhen,Shenzhen Guangdong518129518129, ChinaEMail:Email: linqiushi@huawei.com