--- 1/draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-12.txt 2020-11-02 16:13:11.804417788 -0800 +++ 2/draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-13.txt 2020-11-02 16:13:11.908420402 -0800 @@ -1,120 +1,141 @@ I2NSF Working Group S. Hares, Ed. Internet-Draft Huawei Intended status: Standards Track J. Jeong, Ed. -Expires: March 19, 2021 J. Kim +Expires: May 6, 2021 J. Kim Sungkyunkwan University R. Moskowitz HTT Consulting Q. Lin Huawei - September 15, 2020 + November 2, 2020 I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model - draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-12 + draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-13 Abstract - This document defines a YANG data model for the capabilities of - various Network Security Functions (NSFs) in the Interface to Network - Security Functions (I2NSF) framework to centrally manage the - capabilities of the various NSFs. + This document defines an information model and the corresponding YANG + data model for the capabilities of various Network Security Functions + (NSFs) in the Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) + framework to centrally manage the capabilities of the various NSFs. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." - This Internet-Draft will expire on March 19, 2021. + This Internet-Draft will expire on May 6, 2021. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 - 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 - 3. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 - 4. YANG Tree Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 - 4.1. Network Security Function (NSF) Capabilities . . . . . . 6 - 5. YANG Data Model of I2NSF NSF Capability . . . . . . . . . . . 9 - 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 - 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 - 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 - 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 - 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 - Appendix A. Configuration Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 + 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 + 3. Capability Information Model Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 + 3.1. Design Principles and ECA Policy Model Overview . . . . . 5 + 3.2. Matched Policy Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 + 3.3. Conflict, Resolution Strategy and Default Action . . . . 8 + 4. Overview of YANG Data Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 + 5. YANG Tree Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 + 5.1. Network Security Function (NSF) Capabilities . . . . . . 12 + 6. YANG Data Model of I2NSF NSF Capability . . . . . . . . . . . 15 + 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 + 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 + 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 + 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 + 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 + Appendix A. Configuration Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 A.1. Example 1: Registration for the Capabilities of a General - Firewall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 + Firewall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 A.2. Example 2: Registration for the Capabilities of a Time- - based Firewall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 + based Firewall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 A.3. Example 3: Registration for the Capabilities of a Web - Filter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 + Filter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 A.4. Example 4: Registration for the Capabilities of a - VoIP/VoLTE Filter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 + VoIP/VoLTE Filter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 A.5. Example 5: Registration for the Capabilities of a HTTP - and HTTPS Flood Mitigator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 - Appendix B. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 - Appendix C. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 - Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 + and HTTPS Flood Mitigator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 + Appendix B. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 + Appendix C. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 + Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 1. Introduction As the industry becomes more sophisticated and network devices (e.g., Internet of Things, Self-driving vehicles, and smartphone using Voice - over IP (VoIP) and Voice over LTE (VoLTE)), service providers have a - lot of problems described in [RFC8192]. To resolve these problems, - [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability] specifies the information model of the - capabilities of Network Security Functions (NSFs) in a framework of - the Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) [RFC8329]. + over IP (VoIP) and Voice over LTE (VoLTE)) requires advanced security + protection in various scenario, service providers have a lot of + problems described in [RFC8192]. To resolve these problems, this + document specifies the information and data model of the capabilities + of Network Security Functions (NSFs) in a framework of the Interface + to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) [RFC8329]. - This document provides a YANG data model [RFC6020][RFC7950] that - defines the capabilities of NSFs to centrally manage the capabilities - of those security devices. The security devices can register their - own capabilities into a Network Operator Management (Mgmt) System - (i.e., Security Controller) with this YANG data model through the - registration interface [RFC8329]. With the capabilities of those - security devices maintained centrally, those security devices can be - more easily managed [RFC8329]. This YANG data model is based on the - information model for I2NSF NSF capabilities - [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability]. + NSFs produced by multiple security vendors provide various security + capabilities to customers. Multiple NSFs can be combined together to + provide security services over the given network traffic, regardless + of whether the NSFs are implemented as physical or virtual functions. + Security Capabilities describe the functions that Network Security + Functions (NSFs) are available to provide for security policy + enforcement purposes. Security Capabilities are independent of the + actual security control mechanisms that will implement them. + + Every NSF SHOULD be described with the set of capabilities it offers. + Security Capabilities enable security functionality to be described + in a vendor-neutral manner. That is, it is not needed to refer to a + specific product or technology when designing the network; rather, + the functions characterized by their capabilities are considered. + Security Capabilities are a market enabler, providing a way to define + customized security protection by unambiguously describing the + security features offered by a given NSF. + + This document provides an information model and the corresponding + YANG data model [RFC6020][RFC7950] that defines the capabilities of + NSFs to centrally manage the capabilities of those security devices. + The security devices can register their own capabilities into a + Network Operator Management (Mgmt) System (i.e., Security Controller) + with this YANG data model through the registration interface + [RFC8329]. With the database of the capabilities of those security + devices maintained centrally, those security devices can be more + easily managed [RFC8329]. This YANG data model uses an "Event-Condition-Action" (ECA) policy model that is used as the basis for the design of I2NSF Policy as - described in [RFC8329] and [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability]. The "ietf- - i2nsf-capability" YANG module defined in this document provides the - following features: + described in [RFC8329] and Section 3.1. The "ietf-i2nsf-capability" + YANG module defined in this document provides the following features: - o Definition for general capabilities of network security functions. + o Definition for time capabilities of network security functions. o Definition for event capabilities of generic network security functions. o Definition for condition capabilities of generic network security functions. o Definition for condition capabilities of advanced network security functions. @@ -129,48 +150,317 @@ 2. Terminology This document uses the terminology described in [RFC8329]. This document follows the guidelines of [RFC8407], uses the common YANG types defined in [RFC6991], and adopts the Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA). The meaning of the symbols in tree diagrams is defined in [RFC8340]. -3. Overview +3. Capability Information Model Design + + A Capability Information Model (CapIM) is a formalization of the + functionality that an NSF advertises. This enables the precise + specification of what an NSF can do in terms of security policy + enforcement, so that computer-based tasks can unambiguously refer to, + use, configure, and manage NSFs. Capabilities MUST be defined in a + vendor- and technology-independent manner (e.g., regardless of the + differences among vendors and individual products). + + Humans are able to refer to categories of security controls and + understand each other. For instance, security experts agree on what + is meant by the terms "NAT", "filtering", and "VPN concentrator". As + a further example, network security experts unequivocally refer to + "packet filters" as stateless devices able to allow or deny packet + forwarding based on various conditions (e.g., source and destination + IP addresses, source and destination ports, and IP protocol type + fields) [Alshaer]. + + However, more information is required in case of other devices, like + stateful firewalls or application layer filters. These devices + filter packets or communications, but there are differences in the + packets and communications that they can categorize and the states + they maintain. Humans deal with these differences by asking more + questions to determine the specific category and functionality of the + device. Machines can follow a similar approach, which is commonly + referred to as question-answering [Hirschman] [Galitsky]. In this + context, the CapIM and the derived Data Models provide important and + rich information sources. + + Analogous considerations can be applied for channel protection + protocols, where we all understand that they will protect packets by + means of symmetric algorithms whose keys could have been negotiated + with asymmetric cryptography, but they may work at different layers + and support different algorithms and protocols. To ensure + protection, these protocols apply integrity, optionally + confidentiality, anti-reply protections, and authenticate peers. + + The CapIM is intended to clarify these ambiguities by providing a + formal description of NSF functionality. The set of functions that + are advertised MAY be restricted according to the privileges of the + user or application that is viewing those functions. I2NSF + Capabilities enable unambiguous specification of the security + capabilities available in a (virtualized) networking environment, and + their automatic processing by means of computer-based techniques. + + This includes enabling the security controller to properly identify + and manage NSFs, and allow NSFs to properly declare their + functionality, so that they can be used in the correct way. + +3.1. Design Principles and ECA Policy Model Overview + + This document defines an information model for representing NSF + capabilities. Some basic design principles for security capabilities + and the systems that manage them are: + + o Independence: each security capability SHOULD be an independent + function, with minimum overlap or dependency on other + capabilities. This enables each security capability to be + utilized and assembled together freely. More importantly, changes + to one capability SHOULD NOT affect other capabilities. This + follows the Single Responsibility Principle [Martin] [OODSRP]. + + o Abstraction: each capability MUST be defined in a vendor- + independent manner. + + o Advertisement: A dedicated, well-known interface MUST be used to + advertise and register the capabilities of each NSF. This same + interface MUST be used by other I2NSF Components to determine what + Capabilities are currently available to them. + + o Execution: a dedicated, well-known interface MUST be used to + configure and monitor the use of a capability. This provides a + standardized ability to describe its functionality, and report its + processing results. This facilitates multi-vendor + interoperability. + + o Automation: the system MUST have the ability to auto-discover, + auto-negotiate, and auto-update its security capabilities (i.e., + without human intervention). These features are especially useful + for the management of a large number of NSFs. They are essential + for adding smart services (e.g., refinement, analysis, capability + reasoning, and optimization) to the security scheme employed. + These features are supported by many design patterns, including + the Observer Pattern [OODOP], the Mediator Pattern [OODMP], and a + set of Message Exchange Patterns [Hohpe]. + + o Scalability: the management system SHOULD have the capability to + scale up/down or scale in/out. Thus, it can meet various + performance requirements derived from changeable network traffic + or service requests. In addition, security capabilities that are + affected by scalability changes SHOULD support reporting + statistics to the security controller to assist its decision on + whether it needs to invoke scaling or not. + + Based on the above principles, this document defines a capability + model that enables an NSF to register (and hence advertise) its set + of capabilities that other I2NSF Components can use. These + capabilities MAY have their access control restricted by policy; this + is out of scope for this document. The set of capabilities provided + by a given set of NSFs unambiguously define the security offered by + the set of NSFs used. The security controller can compare the + requirements of users and applications to the set of capabilities + that are currently available in order to choose which capabilities of + which NSFs are needed to meet those requirements. Note that this + choice is independent of vendor, and instead relies specifically on + the capabilities (i.e., the description) of the functions provided. + + Furthermore, when an unknown threat (e.g., zero-day exploits and + unknown malware) is reported by an NSF, new capabilities may be + created, and/or existing capabilities may be updated (e.g., by + updating its signature and algorithm). This results in enhancing the + existing NSFs (and/or creating new NSFs) to address the new threats. + New capabilities may be sent to and stored in a centralized + repository, or stored separately in a vendor's local repository. In + either case, a standard interface facilitates the update process. + This document specifies a metadata model that MAY be used to further + describe and/or prescribe the characteristics and behavior of the + I2NSF capability model. For example, in this case, metadata could be + used to describe the updating of the capability, and prescribe the + particular version that an implementation should use. This initial + version of the model covers and has been validated to describe NSFs + that are designed with a set of capabilities (which covers most of + the existing NSFs). Checking the behavior of the model with systems + that change capabilities dynamically at runtime has been extensively + explored (e.g., impact on automatic registration). + + The "Event-Condition-Action" (ECA) policy model in [RFC8329] is used + as the basis for the design of the capability model; definitions of + all I2NSF policy-related terms are also defined in + [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-terminology]. The following three terms define the + structure and behavior of an I2NSF imperative policy rule: + + o Event: An Event is defined as any important occurrence in time of + a change in the system being managed, and/or in the environment of + the system being managed. When used in the context of I2NSF + Policy Rules, it is used to determine whether the Condition clause + of the I2NSF Policy Rule can be evaluated or not. Examples of an + I2NSF Event include time and user actions (e.g., logon, logoff, + and actions that violate an ACL). + + o Condition: A condition is defined as a set of attributes, + features, and/or values that are to be compared with a set of + known attributes, features, and/or values in order to determine + whether or not the set of Actions in that (imperative) I2NSF + Policy Rule can be executed or not. Examples of I2NSF Conditions + include matching attributes of a packet or flow, and comparing the + internal state of an NSF to a desired state. + + o Action: An action is used to control and monitor aspects of flow- + based NSFs when the event and condition clauses are satisfied. + NSFs provide security functions by executing various Actions. + Examples of I2NSF Actions include providing intrusion detection + and/or protection, web and flow filtering, and deep packet + inspection for packets and flows. + + An I2NSF Policy Rule is made up of three Boolean clauses: an Event + clause, a Condition clause, and an Action clause. This structure is + also called an ECA (Event-Condition-Action) Policy Rule. A Boolean + clause is a logical statement that evaluates to either TRUE or FALSE. + It may be made up of one or more terms; if more than one term is + present, then each term in the Boolean clause is combined using + logical connectives (i.e., AND, OR, and NOT). + + An I2NSF ECA Policy Rule has the following semantics: + + IF is TRUE + + IF is TRUE + + THEN execute [constrained by metadata] + + END-IF + + END-IF + + Technically, the "Policy Rule" is really a container that aggregates + the above three clauses, as well as metadata. Aggregating metadata + enables business logic to be used to prescribe behavior. For + example, suppose a particular ECA Policy Rule contains three actions + (A1, A2, and A3, in that order). Action A2 has a priority of 10; + actions A1 and A3 have no priority specified. Then, metadata may be + used to restrict the set of actions that can be executed when the + event and condition clauses of this ECA Policy Rule are evaluated to + be TRUE; two examples are: (1) only the first action (A1) is + executed, and then the policy rule returns to its caller, or (2) all + actions are executed, starting with the highest priority. + + The above ECA policy model is very general and easily extensible. + +3.2. Matched Policy Rule + + The concept of a "matched" policy rule is defined as one in which its + event and condition clauses both evaluate to true. To precisely + describe what an NSF can do in terms of security, the things need to + describe are the events it can catch, the conditions it can evaluate, + and the actions it can enforce. + + Therefore, the properties that to characterize the capabilities of a + NSF are as below: + + o Ac is the set of Actions currently available from the NSF; + + o Ec is the set of Events that an NSF can catch. Note that for NSF + (e.g., a packet filter) that are not able to react to events, this + set will be empty; + + o Cc is the set of Conditions currently available from the NSF; + + o EVc defines the set of Condition Clause Evaluation Rules that can + be used at the NSF to decide when the Condition Clause is true + given the result of the evaluation of the individual Conditions. + +3.3. Conflict, Resolution Strategy and Default Action + + Formally, two I2NSF Policy Rules conflict with each other if: + + o the Event Clauses of each evaluate to TRUE; + + o the Condition Clauses of each evaluate to TRUE; + + o the Action Clauses affect the same object in different ways. + + For example, if we have two Policy Rules in the same Policy: + + R1: During 8am-6pm, if traffic is external, then run through FW + + R2: During 7am-8pm, conduct anti-malware investigation + + There is no conflict between R1 and R2, since the actions are + different. However, consider these two rules: + + R3: During 8am-6pm, John gets GoldService + + R4: During 10am-4pm, FTP from all users gets BronzeService + + R3 and R4 are now in conflict, between the hours of 10am and 4pm, + because the actions of R3 and R4 are different and apply to the same + user (i.e., John). + + Conflicts theoretically compromise the correct functioning of devices + (as happened for routers several year ago). However, NSFs have been + designed to cope with these issues. Since conflicts are originated + by simultaneously matching rules, an additional process decides the + action to be applied, e.g., among the ones the matching rule would + have enforced. This process is described by means of a resolution + strategy + + On the other hand, it may happen that, if an event is caught, none of + the policy rules matches. As a simple case, no rules may match a + packet arriving at border firewall. In this case, the packet is + usually dropped, that is, the firewall has a default behavior to + manage cases that are not covered by specific rules. + + Therefore, we introduce another security capability that serves to + characterize valid policies for an NSF that solve conflicts with + resolution strategies and enforce default actions if no rules match: + + o RSc is the set of Resolution Strategy that can be used to specify + how to resolve conflicts that occur between the actions of the + same or different policy rules that are matched and contained in + this particular NSF; + + o Dc defines the notion of a Default action. This action can be + either an explicit action that has been chosen {a}, or a set of + actions {F}, where F is a dummy symbol (i.e., a placeholder value) + that can be used to indicate that the default action can be freely + selected by the policy editor. This is denoted as {F} U {a}. + +4. Overview of YANG Data Model This section provides as overview of how the YANG data model can be used in the I2NSF framework described in [RFC8329]. Figure 1 shows the capabilities (e.g., firewall and web filter) of NSFs in the I2NSF Framework. As shown in this figure, an NSF Developer's Management System can register NSFs and the capabilities that the network - security device can support. To register NSFs in this way, the + security devices can support. To register NSFs in this way, the Developer's Management System utilizes this standardized capability YANG data model through the I2NSF Registration Interface [RFC8329]. That is, this Registration Interface uses the YANG module described - in this document to describe the capability of a network security + in this document to describe the capabilities of a network security function that is registered with the Security Controller. With the capabilities of those network security devices maintained centrally, those security devices can be more easily managed, which can resolve many of the problems described in [RFC8192]. In Figure 1, a new NSF at a Developer's Management Systems has capabilities of Firewall (FW) and Web Filter (WF), which are denoted as (Cap = {FW, WF}), to support Event-Condition-Action (ECA) policy rules where 'E', 'C', and 'A' mean "Event", "Condition", and "Action", respectively. The condition involves IPv4 or IPv6 datagrams, and the action includes "Allow" and "Deny" for those datagrams. Note that the NSF-Facing Interface [RFC8329] is used to configure the security policy rules of the generic network security functions, and - The configuration of advanced security functions over the NSF-Facing + the configuration of advanced security functions over the NSF-Facing Interface is used to configure the security policy rules of advanced network security functions (e.g., anti-virus and Distributed-Denial- of-Service (DDoS) attack mitigator), respectively, according to the capabilities of NSFs registered with the I2NSF Framework. +------------------------------------------------------+ | I2NSF User (e.g., Overlay Network Mgmt, Enterprise | | Network Mgmt, another network domain's mgmt, etc.) | +--------------------+---------------------------------+ I2NSF ^ @@ -204,69 +494,70 @@ A use case of an NSF with the capabilities of firewall and web filter is described as follows. o If a network manager wants to apply security policy rules to block malicious users with firewall and web filter, it is a tremendous burden for a network administrator to apply all of the needed rules to NSFs one by one. This problem can be resolved by managing the capabilities of NSFs in this document. - o If a network administrator wants to block malicious users for IPv6 - traffic, he sends a security policy rule to block the users to the - Network Operator Management System using the I2NSF User (i.e., web - application). + o If a network administrator wants to block malicious users for IPv4 + or IPv6 traffic, he sends a security policy rule to block the + users to the Network Operator Management System using the I2NSF + Consumer-Facing Interface. o When the Network Operator Management System receives the security policy rule, it automatically sends that security policy rules to appropriate NSFs (i.e., NSF-m in Developer's Management System A and NSF-1 in Developer's Management System B) which can support the capabilities (i.e., IPv6). This lets an I2NSF User not consider NSFs where the rule is applied. - o If NSFs encounter the suspicious IPv6 packets of malicious users, - they can filter the packets out according to the configured + o If NSFs encounter the suspicious IPv4 or IPv6 packets of malicious + users, they can filter the packets out according to the configured security policy rule. Therefore, the security policy rule against the malicious users' packets can be automatically applied to appropriate NSFs without human intervention. -4. YANG Tree Diagram +5. YANG Tree Diagram This section shows a YANG tree diagram of capabilities of network - security functions, as defined in the [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability]. + security functions, as defined in the Section 3. -4.1. Network Security Function (NSF) Capabilities +5.1. Network Security Function (NSF) Capabilities This section explains a YANG tree diagram of NSF capabilities and its features. Figure 2 shows a YANG tree diagram of NSF capabilities. The NSF capabilities in the tree include time capabilities, event capabilities, condition capabilities, action capabilities, resolution strategy capabilities, and default action capabilities. Those capabilities can be tailored or extended according to a vendor's specific requirements. Refer to the NSF capabilities information - model for detailed discussion [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability]. + model for detailed discussion Section 3. module: ietf-i2nsf-capability +--rw nsf* [nsf-name] +--rw nsf-name string +--rw time-capabilities* enumeration +--rw event-capabilities | +--rw system-event-capability* identityref | +--rw system-alarm-capability* identityref +--rw condition-capabilities | +--rw generic-nsf-capabilities | | +--rw ipv4-capability* identityref | | +--rw icmp-capability* identityref | | +--rw ipv6-capability* identityref | | +--rw icmpv6-capability* identityref | | +--rw tcp-capability* identityref | | +--rw udp-capability* identityref + | | +--rw sctp-capability* identityref | +--rw advanced-nsf-capabilities | | +--rw anti-virus-capability* identityref | | +--rw anti-ddos-capability* identityref | | +--rw ips-capability* identityref | | +--rw url-capability* identityref | | +--rw voip-volte-capability* identityref | +--rw context-capabilities* identityref +--rw action-capabilities | +--rw ingress-action-capability* identityref | +--rw egress-action-capability* identityref @@ -275,99 +566,86 @@ +--rw default-action-capabilities* identityref +--rw ipsec-method* identityref Figure 2: YANG Tree Diagram of Capabilities of Network Security Functions Time capabilities are used to specify the capabilities which describe when to execute the I2NSF policy rule. The time capabilities are defined in terms of absolute time and periodic time. The absolute time means the exact time to start or end. The periodic time means - repeated time like day, week, or month. See Section 3.4.6 - (Capability Algebra) in [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability] for more - information about the time-based condition (e.g., time period) in the - capability algebra. + repeated time like day, week, or month.. Event capabilities are used to specify the capabilities that describe the event that would trigger the evaluation of the condition clause of the I2NSF Policy Rule. The defined event capabilities are system - event and system alarm. See Section 3.1 (Design Principles and ECA - Policy Model Overview) in [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability] for more - information about the event in the ECA policy model. + event and system alarm. Condition capabilities are used to specify capabilities of a set of attributes, features, and/or values that are to be compared with a set of known attributes, features, and/or values in order to determine whether or not the set of actions in that (imperative) I2NSF policy rule can be executed. The condition capabilities are classified in terms of generic network security functions and advanced network security functions. The condition capabilities of generic network security functions are defined as IPv4 capability, - IPv6 capability, TCP capability, UDP capability, and ICMP capability. - The condition capabilities of advanced network security functions are - defined as anti-virus capability, anti-DDoS capability, Intrusion - Prevention System (IPS) capability, HTTP capability, and VoIP/VoLTE - capability. See Section 3.1 (Design Principles and ECA Policy Model - Overview) in [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability] for more information about - the condition in the ECA policy model. Also, see Section 3.4.3 - (I2NSF Condition Clause Operator Types) in - [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability] for more information about the operator - types in an I2NSF condition clause. + IPv6 capability, TCP capability, UDP capability, SCTP capability and + ICMP capability. The condition capabilities of advanced network + security functions are defined as anti-virus capability, anti-DDoS + capability, Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) capability, HTTP + capability, and VoIP/VoLTE capability. See Section 3.1 for more + information about the condition in the ECA policy model. Action capabilities are used to specify the capabilities that describe the control and monitoring aspects of flow-based NSFs when the event and condition clauses are satisfied. The action capabilities are defined as ingress-action capability, egress-action - capability, and log-action capability. See Section 3.1 (Design - Principles and ECA Policy Model Overview) in - [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability] for more information about the action in - the ECA policy model. Also, see Section 7.2 (NSF-Facing Flow - Security Policy Structure) in [RFC8329] for more information about - the ingress and egress actions. In addition, see Section 9.1 (Flow- - Based NSF Capability Characterization) for more information about - logging at NSFs. + capability, and log-action capability. See Section 3.1 for more + information about the action in the ECA policy model. Also, see + Section 7.2 (NSF-Facing Flow Security Policy Structure) in [RFC8329] + for more information about the ingress and egress actions. In + addition, see Section 9.1 (Flow-Based NSF Capability + Characterization) in [RFC8329] for more information about logging at + NSFs. Resolution strategy capabilities are used to specify the capabilities that describe conflicts that occur between the actions of the same or different policy rules that are matched and contained in this particular NSF. The resolution strategy capabilities are defined as First Matching Rule (FMR), Last Matching Rule (LMR), Prioritized Matching Rule (PMR), Prioritized Matching Rule with Errors (PMRE), - and Prioritized Matching Rule with No Errors (PMRN). See - Section 3.4.2 (Conflict, Resolution Strategy and Default Action) in - [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability] for more information about the resolution - strategy. + and Prioritized Matching Rule with No Errors (PMRN). See Section 3.3 + for more information about the resolution strategy. Default action capabilities are used to specify the capabilities that describe how to execute I2NSF policy rules when no rule matches a packet. The default action capabilities are defined as pass, drop, - alert, and mirror. See Section 3.4.2 (Conflict, Resolution Strategy - and Default Action) in [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability] for more - information about the default action. + alert, and mirror. See Section 3.3 for more information about the + default action. IPsec method capabilities are used to specify capabilities of how to support an Internet Key Exchange (IKE) [RFC7296] for the security communication. The default action capabilities are defined as IKE or IKE-less. See [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection] for more information about the SDN-based IPsec flow protection in I2NSF. -5. YANG Data Model of I2NSF NSF Capability +6. YANG Data Model of I2NSF NSF Capability This section introduces a YANG module for NSFs' capabilities, as - defined in the [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability]. + defined in the Section 3. This YANG module imports from [RFC6991]. It makes references to [RFC 0768][IANA-Protocol-Numbers][RFC0791][RFC0792][RFC0793][RFC3261][RFC4 - 443][RFC8200][RFC8329][I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability][I-D.ietf-i2nsf-nsf- - monitoring-data-model][I-D.ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection]. + 443][RFC4960][RFC8200][RFC8329][I-D.ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-mo + del][I-D.ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection]. - file "ietf-i2nsf-capability@2020-09-15.yang" + file "ietf-i2nsf-capability@2020-11-02.yang" module ietf-i2nsf-capability { yang-version 1.1; namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-capability"; prefix nsfcap; organization "IETF I2NSF (Interface to Network Security Functions) @@ -399,36 +677,36 @@ set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info). This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see the RFC itself for full legal notices."; // RFC Ed.: replace XXXX with an actual RFC number and remove // this note. - revision "2020-09-15"{ + revision "2020-11-02"{ description "Initial revision."; reference "RFC XXXX: I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model"; // RFC Ed.: replace XXXX with an actual RFC number and remove // this note. } /* * Identities */ identity event { description - "Base identity for I2NSF policy events."; + "Base identity for I2NSF events."; reference "draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-04: I2NSF NSF Monitoring YANG Data Model - Event"; // RFC Ed.: replace the above draft with an actual RFC in the // YANG module and remove this note. } identity system-event-capability { base event; @@ -465,157 +742,140 @@ "Identity for configuration change event"; reference "draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-04: I2NSF NSF Monitoring YANG Data Model - System event for configuration change"; } identity memory-alarm { base system-alarm-capability; description - "Identity for memory alarm"; + "Identity for memory alarm. Alarm when memory usage + exceed the threshold."; reference "draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-04: I2NSF NSF Monitoring YANG Data Model - System alarm for memory"; } identity cpu-alarm { base system-alarm-capability; description - "Identity for CPU alarm"; + "Identity for CPU alarm. Alarm when CPU usage + exceed the threshold."; reference "draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-04: I2NSF NSF Monitoring YANG Data Model - System alarm for CPU"; } identity disk-alarm { base system-alarm-capability; description - "Identity for disk alarm"; + "Identity for disk alarm. Alarm when disk usage + exceed the threshold."; + reference "draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-04: I2NSF NSF Monitoring YANG Data Model - System alarm for disk"; } identity hardware-alarm { base system-alarm-capability; description - "Identity for hardware alarm"; + "Identity for hardware alarm. Alarm when a hardware failure + occur."; reference "draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-04: I2NSF NSF Monitoring YANG Data Model - System alarm for hardware"; } identity interface-alarm { base system-alarm-capability; description "Identity for interface alarm"; reference "draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-04: I2NSF NSF Monitoring YANG Data Model - System alarm for interface"; } identity condition { description - "Base identity for policy conditions"; + "Base identity for I2NSF conditions"; } identity context-capability { base condition; description - "Identity for context condition capabilities for an NSF"; - reference - "draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-05: Information Model of NSFs - Capabilities - The operating context of an NSF."; + "Base identity for context condition capabilities for an NSF."; } identity access-control-list { base context-capability; description "Identity for Access Control List (ACL) condition capability"; reference - "draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-05: Information Model of NSFs - Capabilities - The context of an NSF. - RFC 8519: YANG Data Model for Network Access Control Lists + "RFC 8519: YANG Data Model for Network Access Control Lists (ACLs) - A user-ordered set of rules used to configure the forwarding behavior in an NSF."; } identity application-layer-filter { base context-capability; description "Identity for application-layer-filter condition capability"; - reference - "draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-05: Information Model of NSFs - Capabilities - An application-layer filtering (e.g., web - filter) as an NSF."; } identity target { base context-capability; description "Identity for target condition capability"; reference - "draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-05: Information Model of NSFs - Capabilities - A target (or destination) of a policy rule - to be applied by an NSF. - RFC 8519: YANG Data Model for Network Access Control Lists + "RFC 8519: YANG Data Model for Network Access Control Lists (ACLs) - An access control for a target (e.g., the corresponding IP address) in an NSF."; } identity user { base context-capability; description "Identity for user condition capability"; reference - "draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-05: Information Model of NSFs - Capabilities - A user in an application of a policy rule - to be applied by an NSF. - RFC 8519: YANG Data Model for Network Access Control Lists + "RFC 8519: YANG Data Model for Network Access Control Lists (ACLs) - An access control for a user (e.g., the corresponding IP address) in an NSF."; } identity group { base context-capability; description "Identity for group condition capability"; reference - "draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-05: Information Model of NSFs - Capabilities - A group (i.e., a set of users) in an - application of a policy rule to be applied by an NSF. - RFC 8519: YANG Data Model for Network Access Control Lists + "RFC 8519: YANG Data Model for Network Access Control Lists (ACLs) - An access control for a group (e.g., the - corresponding IP address) in an NSF."; + corresponding IP addresses) in an NSF."; } identity geography { base context-capability; description "Identity for geography condition capability"; reference - "draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-05: Information Model of NSFs - Capabilities - A group (i.e., a set of users) in an - application of a policy rule to be applied by an NSF. - RFC 8519: YANG Data Model for Network Access Control Lists - (ACLs) - An access control for a geographical location - i.e., geolocation (e.g., the corresponding IP address) in - an NSF. - RFC 8805: A Format for Self-Published IP Geolocation Feeds - - An IP address with geolocation information."; + "draft-google-self-published-geofeeds-02: Self-published + IP Geolocation Data - An access control for a geographical + location i.e., geolocation (e.g., the corresponding IP + address)."; } identity ipv4-capability { base condition; description - "Identity for IPv4 condition capability"; + "Base identity for IPv4 condition capability"; + reference "RFC 791: Internet Protocol"; } identity exact-ipv4-header-length { base ipv4-capability; description "Identity for exact-match IPv4 header-length condition capability"; reference @@ -651,27 +910,28 @@ } identity range-ipv4-total-length { base ipv4-capability; description "Identity for range-match IPv4 total length condition capability"; reference "RFC 791: Internet Protocol - Total Length"; } - identity ipv4-id { base ipv4-capability; description - "Identity for identification condition capability"; + "Identity for IPv4 identification condition capability. + IPv4 ID Field is used for fragmentation"; reference - "RFC 791: Internet Protocol - Identification"; + "RFC 791: Internet Protocol - Identification + RFC 6864: Updated Specification of the IPv4 ID Field"; } identity ipv4-fragment-flags { base ipv4-capability; description "Identity for IPv4 fragment flags condition capability"; reference "RFC 791: Internet Protocol - Fragmentation Flags"; } @@ -744,29 +1004,25 @@ description "Identity for IPv4 option condition capability"; reference "RFC 791: Internet Protocol - Options"; } identity ipv4-geo-ip { base ipv4-capability; description "Identity for geography condition capability"; - reference - "draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-05: Information Model - of NSFs Capabilities - Geo-IP"; } - identity ipv6-capability { base condition; description - "Identity for IPv6 condition capabilities"; + "Base identity for IPv6 condition capabilities"; reference "RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification"; } identity ipv6-traffic-class { base ipv6-capability; description "Identity for IPv6 traffic class condition capability"; @@ -775,31 +1031,33 @@ Specification - Traffic Class"; } identity exact-ipv6-flow-label { base ipv6-capability; description "Identity for exact-match IPv6 flow label condition capability"; reference "RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) - Specification - Flow Label"; + Specification - Flow Label + RFC 6437: IPv6 Flow Label Specification"; } identity range-ipv6-flow-label { base ipv6-capability; description "Identity for range-match IPv6 flow label condition capability"; reference "RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) - Specification - Flow Label"; + Specification - Flow Label + RFC 6437: IPv6 Flow Label Specification"; } identity exact-ipv6-payload-length { base ipv6-capability; description "Identity for exact-match IPv6 payload length condition capability"; reference "RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification - Payload Length"; @@ -813,21 +1071,23 @@ reference "RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification - Payload Length"; } identity ipv6-next-header { base ipv6-capability; description "Identity for IPv6 next header condition capability"; reference - "RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) + "IANA Website: Assigned Internet Protocol Numbers + - Protocol Number for IPv6 + RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification - Next Header"; } identity exact-ipv6-hop-limit { base ipv6-capability; description "Identity for exact-match IPv6 hop limit condition capability"; reference "RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) @@ -837,111 +1097,124 @@ identity range-ipv6-hop-limit { base ipv6-capability; description "Identity for range-match IPv6 hop limit condition capability"; reference "RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification - Hop Limit"; } - identity ipv6-protocol { - base ipv6-capability; - description - "Identity for IPv6 protocol condition capability"; - reference - "IANA Website: Assigned Internet Protocol Numbers - - Protocol Number for IPv6 - RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) - Specification - Protocol"; - } - identity exact-ipv6-address { base ipv6-capability; description "Identity for exact-match IPv6 address condition capability"; reference "RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification - Address"; } identity range-ipv6-address { base ipv6-capability; description "Identity for range-match IPv6 address condition capability"; reference "RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification - Address"; } - identity tcp-capability { - base condition; + identity ipv6-header-order { + base ipv6-capability; description - "Identity for TCP condition capabilities"; + "Identity for header order IPv6 address condition + capability"; reference - "RFC 793: Transmission Control Protocol"; + "RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) + Specification - Extension Header Order"; } - identity exact-tcp-port-num { - base tcp-capability; + identity ipv6-options { + base ipv6-capability; description - "Identity for exact-match TCP port number condition + "Identity for options IPv6 address condition capability"; reference - "RFC 793: Transmission Control Protocol - Port Number"; + "RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) + Specification - Options"; } - identity range-tcp-port-num { - base tcp-capability; + identity ipv6-hop-by-hop { + base ipv6-capability; description - "Identity for range-match TCP port number condition + "Identity for hop by hop IPv6 address condition capability"; reference - "RFC 793: Transmission Control Protocol - Port Number"; + "RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) + Specification - Options"; } - identity exact-tcp-seq-num { - base tcp-capability; + identity ipv6-routing-header { + base ipv6-capability; description - "Identity for exact-match TCP sequence number condition + "Identity for routing header IPv6 address condition capability"; reference - "RFC 793: Transmission Control Protocol - Sequence Number"; + "RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) + Specification - Routing Header"; } - identity range-tcp-seq-num { - base tcp-capability; + identity ipv6-fragment-header { + base ipv6-capability; description - "Identity for range-match TCP sequence number condition + "Identity for fragment header IPv6 address condition capability"; reference - "RFC 793: Transmission Control Protocol - Sequence Number"; + "RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) + Specification - Fragment Header"; } - identity exact-tcp-ack-num { + identity ipv6-destination-options { + base ipv6-capability; + description + "Identity for destination options IPv6 address condition + capability"; + reference + "RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) + Specification - Destination Options"; + } + + identity tcp-capability { + base condition; + description + "Base identity for TCP condition capabilities"; + reference + "RFC 793: Transmission Control Protocol"; + } + + identity exact-tcp-port-num { base tcp-capability; description - "Identity for exact-match TCP acknowledgement number condition + "Identity for exact-match TCP port number condition capability"; reference - "RFC 793: Transmission Control Protocol - Acknowledgement Number"; + "RFC 793: Transmission Control Protocol - Port Number"; } - identity range-tcp-ack-num { + identity range-tcp-port-num { base tcp-capability; description - "Identity for range-match TCP acknowledgement number condition + "Identity for range-match TCP port number condition capability"; reference - "RFC 793: Transmission Control Protocol - Acknowledgement Number"; + "RFC 793: Transmission Control Protocol - Port Number"; } identity exact-tcp-window-size { base tcp-capability; description "Identity for exact-match TCP window size condition capability"; reference "RFC 793: Transmission Control Protocol - Window Size"; } @@ -957,21 +1230,21 @@ base tcp-capability; description "Identity for TCP flags condition capability"; reference "RFC 793: Transmission Control Protocol - Flags"; } identity udp-capability { base condition; description - "Identity for UDP condition capabilities"; + "Base identity for UDP condition capabilities"; reference "RFC 768: User Datagram Protocol"; } identity exact-udp-port-num { base udp-capability; description "Identity for exact-match UDP port number condition capability"; reference "RFC 768: User Datagram Protocol - Port Number"; @@ -994,139 +1267,189 @@ } identity range-udp-total-length { base udp-capability; description "Identity for range-match UDP total-length condition capability"; reference "RFC 768: User Datagram Protocol - Total Length"; } + identity sctp-capability { + description + "Identity for SCTP condition capabilities"; + reference + "RFC 4960: Stream Control Transmission Protocol"; + } + + identity exact-sctp-port-num { + base sctp-capability; + description + "Identity for exact-match SCTP port number condition + capability"; + reference + "RFC 4960: Stream Control Transmission Protocol - Port Number"; + } + + identity range-sctp-port-num { + base sctp-capability; + description + "Identity for range-match SCTP port number condition + capability"; + reference + "RFC 4960: Stream Control Transmission Protocol - Port Number"; + } + + identity sctp-chunk-type { + base sctp-capability; + description + "Identity for SCTP chunk type condition capability"; + reference + "RFC 4960: Stream Control Transmission Protocol - Chunk Type"; + } + identity icmp-capability { base condition; description - "Identity for ICMP condition capability"; + "Base identity for ICMP condition capability"; reference "RFC 792: Internet Control Message Protocol"; } identity icmp-type { base icmp-capability; description "Identity for ICMP type condition capability"; reference "RFC 792: Internet Control Message Protocol"; } + identity icmp-code { + base icmp-capability; + description + "Identity for ICMP code condition capability"; + reference + "RFC 792: Internet Control Message Protocol"; + } + identity icmpv6-capability { base condition; description - "Identity for ICMPv6 condition capability"; + "Base identity for ICMPv6 condition capability"; reference "RFC 4443: Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification - ICMPv6"; } identity icmpv6-type { base icmpv6-capability; description "Identity for ICMPv6 type condition capability"; reference "RFC 4443: Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification - ICMPv6"; } + identity icmpv6-code { + base icmpv6-capability; + description + "Identity for ICMPv6 code condition capability"; + reference + "RFC 4443: Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) + for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification + - ICMPv6"; + } + identity url-capability { base condition; description - "Identity for URL condition capability"; + "Base identity for URL condition capability"; } identity pre-defined { base url-capability; description - "Identity for URL pre-defined condition capability"; + "Identity for pre-defined URL Database condition capability. + The NSF capable of using a predefined public URL Database."; } identity user-defined { base url-capability; description - "Identity for URL user-defined condition capability"; + "Identity for user-defined URL Database condition capability. + The NSF capable of using a URL Database that can be added + manually by a user."; } identity log-action-capability { description - "Identity for log-action capability"; + "Base identity for log-action capability"; } + identity rule-log { base log-action-capability; description - "Identity for rule log log-action capability"; + "Identity for rule log log-action capability. + Log the received packet based on the rule"; } identity session-log { base log-action-capability; description - "Identity for session log log-action capability"; + "Identity for session log log-action capability. + Log the received packet based on the session."; } identity ingress-action-capability { description - "Identity for ingress-action capability"; + "Base identity for ingress-action capability"; reference "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions - Ingress action"; } identity egress-action-capability { description "Base identity for egress-action capability"; reference "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions - Egress action"; } identity default-action-capability { description - "Identity for default-action capability"; - reference - "draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-05: Information Model of - NSFs Capabilities - Default action"; + "Base identity for default-action capability"; } identity pass { base ingress-action-capability; base egress-action-capability; base default-action-capability; description "Identity for pass action capability"; reference "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security - Functions - Ingress, egress, and pass actions. - draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-05: Information Model of - NSFs Capabilities - Actions and default action."; + Functions - Ingress, egress, and pass actions."; } + identity drop { base ingress-action-capability; base egress-action-capability; base default-action-capability; description "Identity for drop action capability"; reference "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security - Functions - Ingress, egress, and drop actions. - draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-05: Information Model of - NSFs Capabilities - Actions and default action."; + Functions - Ingress, egress, and drop actions."; } - identity alert { base ingress-action-capability; base egress-action-capability; base default-action-capability; description "Identity for alert action capability"; reference "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions - Ingress, egress, and alert actions. draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-04: I2NSF @@ -1123,55 +1446,41 @@ identity alert { base ingress-action-capability; base egress-action-capability; base default-action-capability; description "Identity for alert action capability"; reference "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions - Ingress, egress, and alert actions. draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-04: I2NSF - NSF Monitoring YANG Data Model - Alarm (i.e., alert). - draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-05: Information Model of - NSFs Capabilities - Actions and default action."; + NSF Monitoring YANG Data Model - Alarm (i.e., alert)."; } identity mirror { base ingress-action-capability; base egress-action-capability; base default-action-capability; description "Identity for mirror action capability"; reference "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security - Functions - Ingress, egress, and mirror actions. - draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-05: Information Model of - NSFs Capabilities - Actions and default action."; + Functions - Ingress, egress, and mirror actions."; } identity invoke-signaling { base egress-action-capability; description "Identity for invoke signaling action capability"; reference "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions - Invoke-signaling action"; - - } - - identity tunnel-encapsulation { - base egress-action-capability; - description - "Identity for tunnel encapsulation action capability"; - reference - "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security - Functions - Tunnel-encapsulation action"; } identity forwarding { base egress-action-capability; description "Identity for forwarding action capability"; reference "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions - Forwarding action"; } @@ -1181,73 +1490,55 @@ description "Identity for redirection action capability"; reference "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions - Redirection action"; } identity resolution-strategy-capability { description "Base identity for resolution strategy capability"; - reference - "draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-05: Information Model of - NSFs Capabilities - Resolution Strategy"; } identity fmr { base resolution-strategy-capability; description "Identity for First Matching Rule (FMR) resolution strategy capability"; - reference - "draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-05: Information Model of - NSFs Capabilities - Resolution Strategy"; } identity lmr { base resolution-strategy-capability; description "Identity for Last Matching Rule (LMR) resolution strategy capability"; - reference - "draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-05: Information Model of - NSFs Capabilities - Resolution Strategy"; } identity pmr { base resolution-strategy-capability; description "Identity for Prioritized Matching Rule (PMR) resolution strategy capability"; - reference - "draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-05: Information Model of - NSFs Capabilities - Resolution Strategy"; } identity pmre { base resolution-strategy-capability; description "Identity for Prioritized Matching Rule with Errors (PMRE) resolution strategy capability"; - reference - "draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-05: Information Model of NSFs - Capabilities - Resolution Strategy"; } identity pmrn { base resolution-strategy-capability; description "Identity for Prioritized Matching Rule with No Errors (PMRN) resolution strategy capability"; - reference - "draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-05: Information Model of NSFs - Capabilities - Resolution Strategy"; } identity advanced-nsf-capability { description "Base identity for advanced Network Security Function (NSF) capability. This can be used for advanced NSFs such as Anti-Virus, Anti-DDoS Attack, IPS, and VoIP/VoLTE Security Service."; reference "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security @@ -1287,26 +1577,22 @@ Functions - Advanced NSF IPS capability"; } identity voip-volte-capability { base advanced-nsf-capability; description "Identity for advanced NSF VoIP/VoLTE Security Service capability. This can be used for an extension point for VoIP/VoLTE Security Service as an advanced NSF."; reference - "RFC 3261: SIP: Session Initiation Protocol - RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security - Functions - Advanced NSF VoIP/VoLTE security service - capability"; + "RFC 3261: SIP: Session Initiation Protocol"; } - identity detect { base anti-virus-capability; description "Identity for advanced NSF Anti-Virus Detection capability. This can be used for an extension point for Anti-Virus Detection as an advanced NSF."; reference "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions - Advanced NSF Anti-Virus Detection capability"; } @@ -1304,44 +1590,20 @@ base anti-virus-capability; description "Identity for advanced NSF Anti-Virus Detection capability. This can be used for an extension point for Anti-Virus Detection as an advanced NSF."; reference "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions - Advanced NSF Anti-Virus Detection capability"; } - identity exception-application { - base anti-virus-capability; - description - "Identity for advanced NSF Anti-Virus Exception Application - capability. This can be used for an extension point for - Anti-Virus Exception Application as an advanced NSF."; - reference - "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security - Functions - Advanced NSF Anti-Virus Exception Application - capability"; - } - - identity exception-signature { - base anti-virus-capability; - description - "Identity for advanced NSF Anti-Virus Exception Signature - capability. This can be used for an extension point for - Anti-Virus Exception Signature as an advanced NSF."; - reference - "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security - Functions - Advanced NSF Anti-Virus Exception Signature - capability"; - } - identity allow-list { base anti-virus-capability; description "Identity for advanced NSF Anti-Virus Allow List capability. This can be used for an extension point for Anti-Virus Allow List as an advanced NSF."; reference "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions - Advanced NSF Anti-Virus Allow List capability"; } @@ -1496,45 +1756,39 @@ description "Identity for advanced NSF IPS Exception Signature capability. This can be used for an extension point for IPS Exception Signature as an advanced NSF."; reference "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions - Advanced NSF IPS Exception Signature Set capability"; } - identity voice-id { + identity voip-volte-call-id { base voip-volte-capability; description - "Identity for advanced NSF VoIP/VoLTE Voice-ID capability. + "Identity for advanced NSF VoIP/VoLTE Call-ID capability. This can be used for an extension point for VoIP/VoLTE Voice-ID as an advanced NSF."; reference - "RFC 3261: SIP: Session Initiation Protocol - RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security - Functions - Advanced NSF VoIP/VoLTE Security Service - capability"; + "RFC 3261: SIP: Session Initiation Protocol"; } identity user-agent { base voip-volte-capability; description "Identity for advanced NSF VoIP/VoLTE User Agent capability. This can be used for an extension point for VoIP/VoLTE User Agent as an advanced NSF."; reference - "RFC 3261: SIP: Session Initiation Protocol - RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security - Functions - Advanced NSF VoIP/VoLTE Security Service - capability"; + "RFC 3261: SIP: Session Initiation Protocol"; } identity ipsec-capability { description "Base identity for an IPsec capability"; reference "draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection-08: Software-Defined Networking (SDN)-based IPsec Flow Protection - IPsec methods such as IKE and IKE-less"; } @@ -1567,23 +1821,21 @@ /* * Grouping */ grouping nsf-capabilities { description "Network Security Function (NSF) Capabilities"; reference "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security - Functions - I2NSF Flow Security Policy Structure. - draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-05: Information Model of - NSFs Capabilities - Capability Information Model Design."; + Functions - I2NSF Flow Security Policy Structure."; leaf-list time-capabilities { type enumeration { enum absolute-time { description "absolute time capabilities. If a network security function has the absolute time capability, the network security function supports rule execution according to absolute time."; } @@ -1602,23 +1854,20 @@ container event-capabilities { description "Capabilities of events. If a network security function has the event capabilities, the network security function supports rule execution according to system event and system alarm."; reference "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions - I2NSF Flow Security Policy Structure. - draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-05: Information Model of - NSFs Capabilities - Design Principles and ECA Policy - Model Overview. draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-04: I2NSF NSF Monitoring YANG Data Model - System Alarm and System Events."; leaf-list system-event-capability { type identityref { base system-event-capability; } description "System event capabilities"; @@ -1636,36 +1884,34 @@ container condition-capabilities { description "Conditions capabilities."; container generic-nsf-capabilities { description "Conditions capabilities. If a network security function has the condition capabilities, the network security function supports rule execution according to conditions of - IPv4, IPv6, TCP, UDP, ICMP, ICMPv6, and payload."; + IPv4, IPv6, TCP, UDP, SCTP, ICMP, ICMPv6, or payload."; reference "RFC 791: Internet Protocol - IPv4. RFC 792: Internet Control Message Protocol - ICMP. RFC 793: Transmission Control Protocol - TCP. RFC 768: User Datagram Protocol - UDP. + RFC 4960: Stream Control Transmission Protocol - SCTP. RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification - IPv6. RFC 4443: Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification - ICMPv6. RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security - Functions - I2NSF Flow Security Policy Structure. - draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-05: Information Model of - NSFs Capabilities - Design Principles and ECA Policy - Model Overview."; + Functions - I2NSF Flow Security Policy Structure."; leaf-list ipv4-capability { type identityref { base ipv4-capability; } description "IPv4 packet capabilities"; reference "RFC 791: Internet Protocol"; } @@ -1715,20 +1961,29 @@ leaf-list udp-capability { type identityref { base udp-capability; } description "UDP packet capabilities"; reference "RFC 768: User Datagram Protocol - UDP"; } + leaf-list sctp-capability { + type identityref { + base sctp-capability; + } + description + "SCTP packet capabilities"; + reference + "RFC 4960: Stream Control Transmission Protocol - SCTP"; + } } container advanced-nsf-capabilities { description "Advanced Network Security Function (NSF) capabilities, such as Anti-Virus, Anti-DDoS, IPS, and VoIP/VoLTE. This container contains the leaf-lists of advanced NSF capabilities"; reference "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security @@ -1833,41 +2090,35 @@ leaf-list resolution-strategy-capabilities { type identityref { base resolution-strategy-capability; } description "Resolution strategy capabilities. The resolution strategies can be used to specify how to resolve conflicts that occur between the actions of the same or different policy rules that are matched for the same packet and by particular NSF"; - reference - "draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-05: Information Model of - NSFs Capabilities - Resolution strategy capabilities"; } leaf-list default-action-capabilities { type identityref { base default-action-capability; } description "Default action capabilities. A default action is used to execute I2NSF policy rules when no rule matches a packet. The default action is defined as pass, drop, alert, or mirror."; reference "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security - Functions - Ingress and egress actions. - draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-05: Information Model of - NSFs Capabilities - Default action capabilities."; + Functions - Ingress and egress actions."; } - leaf-list ipsec-method { type identityref { base ipsec-capability; } description "IPsec method capabilities"; reference "draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection-08: Software-Defined Networking (SDN)-based IPsec Flow Protection - IPsec methods such as IKE and IKE-less"; @@ -1881,28 +2132,29 @@ list nsf { key "nsf-name"; description "The list of Network Security Functions (NSFs)"; leaf nsf-name { type string; mandatory true; description "The name of Network Security Function (NSF)"; } + uses nsf-capabilities; } } Figure 3: YANG Data Module of I2NSF Capability -6. IANA Considerations +7. IANA Considerations This document requests IANA to register the following URI in the "IETF XML Registry" [RFC3688]: ID: yang:ietf-i2nsf-capability URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-capability Registrant Contact: The IESG. XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace. Filename: [ TBD-at-Registration ] Reference: [ RFC-to-be ] @@ -1910,75 +2161,66 @@ This document requests IANA to register the following YANG module in the "YANG Module Names" registry [RFC7950][RFC8525]: Name: ietf-i2nsf-capability Maintained by IANA? N Namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-capability Prefix: nsfcap Module: Reference: [ RFC-to-be ] -7. Security Considerations +8. Security Considerations The YANG module specified in this document defines a data schema designed to be accessed through network management protocols such as NETCONF [RFC6241] or RESTCONF [RFC8040]. The lowest NETCONF layer is the secure transport layer, and the required transport secure transport is Secure Shell (SSH) [RFC6242]. The lowest RESTCONF layer is HTTPS, and the required transport secure transport is TLS [RFC8446]. The NETCONF access control model [RFC8341] provides a means of restricting access to specific NETCONF or RESTCONF users to a preconfigured subset of all available NETCONF or RESTCONF protocol operations and content. There are a number of data nodes defined in this YANG module that are writable, creatable, and deletable (i.e., config true, which is the default). These data nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. Write operations to these data nodes could have a negative effect on network and security operations. - o ietf-i2nsf-capability: An attacker could alter the security - capabilities associated with an NSF whereby disabling or enabling - the evasion of security mitigations. - - Some of the readable data nodes in this YANG module may be considered - sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus - important to control read access (e.g., via get, get-config, or - notification) to these data nodes. These are the subtrees and data - nodes and their sensitivity/vulnerability: - - o ietf-i2nsf-capability: An attacker could gather the security - capability information of any NSF and use this information to - evade detection or filtering. + o list nsf: An attacker could alter the security capabilities + associated with an NSF whereby disabling or enabling the evasion + of security mitigations. -8. References +9. References -8.1. Normative References +9.1. Normative References - [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability] - Xia, L., Strassner, J., Basile, C., and D. Lopez, - "Information Model of NSFs Capabilities", draft-ietf- - i2nsf-capability-05 (work in progress), April 2019. + [I-D.google-self-published-geofeeds] + Kline, E., Duleba, K., Szamonek, Z., Moser, S., and W. + Kumari, "A Format for Self-published IP Geolocation + Feeds", draft-google-self-published-geofeeds-09 (work in + progress), February 2020. [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model] Jeong, J., Lingga, P., Hares, S., Xia, L., and H. Birkholz, "I2NSF NSF Monitoring YANG Data Model", draft- ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-04 (work in progress), September 2020. [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection] Lopez, R., Lopez-Millan, G., and F. Pereniguez-Garcia, "Software-Defined Networking (SDN)-based IPsec Flow - Protection", draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection-08 - (work in progress), June 2020. + Protection", draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection-12 + (work in progress), October 2020. [RFC0768] Postel, J., "User Datagram Protocol", STD 6, RFC 768, DOI 10.17487/RFC0768, August 1980, . [RFC0791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791, DOI 10.17487/RFC0791, September 1981, . [RFC0792] Postel, J., "Internet Control Message Protocol", STD 5, @@ -1993,44 +2235,33 @@ Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . [RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261, DOI 10.17487/RFC3261, June 2002, . - [RFC3444] Pras, A. and J. Schoenwaelder, "On the Difference between - Information Models and Data Models", RFC 3444, - DOI 10.17487/RFC3444, January 2003, - . - [RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688, DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004, . - [RFC3849] Huston, G., Lord, A., and P. Smith, "IPv6 Address Prefix - Reserved for Documentation", RFC 3849, - DOI 10.17487/RFC3849, July 2004, - . - [RFC4443] Conta, A., Deering, S., and M. Gupta, Ed., "Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", STD 89, RFC 4443, DOI 10.17487/RFC4443, March 2006, . - [RFC5737] Arkko, J., Cotton, M., and L. Vegoda, "IPv4 Address Blocks - Reserved for Documentation", RFC 5737, - DOI 10.17487/RFC5737, January 2010, - . + [RFC4960] Stewart, R., Ed., "Stream Control Transmission Protocol", + RFC 4960, DOI 10.17487/RFC4960, September 2007, + . [RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020, DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010, . [RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011, . @@ -2079,51 +2310,85 @@ [RFC8341] Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration Access Control Model", STD 91, RFC 8341, DOI 10.17487/RFC8341, March 2018, . [RFC8407] Bierman, A., "Guidelines for Authors and Reviewers of Documents Containing YANG Data Models", BCP 216, RFC 8407, DOI 10.17487/RFC8407, October 2018, . - [RFC8431] Wang, L., Chen, M., Dass, A., Ananthakrishnan, H., Kini, - S., and N. Bahadur, "A YANG Data Model for the Routing - Information Base (RIB)", RFC 8431, DOI 10.17487/RFC8431, - September 2018, . - [RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018, . [RFC8519] Jethanandani, M., Agarwal, S., Huang, L., and D. Blair, "YANG Data Model for Network Access Control Lists (ACLs)", RFC 8519, DOI 10.17487/RFC8519, March 2019, . [RFC8525] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., Watsen, K., and R. Wilton, "YANG Library", RFC 8525, DOI 10.17487/RFC8525, March 2019, . [RFC8805] Kline, E., Duleba, K., Szamonek, Z., Moser, S., and W. Kumari, "A Format for Self-Published IP Geolocation Feeds", RFC 8805, DOI 10.17487/RFC8805, August 2020, . -8.2. Informative References +9.2. Informative References + + [Alshaer] Shaer, Al., Hamed, E., and H. Hamed, "Modeling and + management of firewall policies", 2004. + + [Galitsky] + Galitsky, B. and R. Pampapathi, "Can many agents answer + questions better than one", First + Monday http://dx.doi.org/10.5210/fm.v10i1.1204, 2005. + + [Hirschman] + Hirschman, L. and R. Gaizauskas, "Natural Language + Question Answering: The View from Here", Natural Language + Engineering 7:4, pgs 275-300, Cambridge University Press , + Nov 2001. + + [Hohpe] Hohpe, G. and B. Woolf, "Enterprise Integration Patterns", + ISBN 0-32-120068-3 , 2003. + + [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-terminology] + Hares, S., Strassner, J., Lopez, D., Xia, L., and H. + Birkholz, "Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) + Terminology", draft-ietf-i2nsf-terminology-08 (work in + progress), July 2019. + + [I-D.ietf-supa-generic-policy-info-model] + Strassner, J., Halpern, J., and S. Meer, "Generic Policy + Information Model for Simplified Use of Policy + Abstractions (SUPA)", draft-ietf-supa-generic-policy-info- + model-03 (work in progress), May 2017. [IANA-Protocol-Numbers] "Assigned Internet Protocol Numbers", Available: https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol- numbers/protocol-numbers.xhtml, September 2020. + [Martin] Martin, R., "Agile Software Development, Principles, + Patterns, and Practices", Prentice-Hall , ISBN: + 0-13-597444-5 , 2002. + + [OODMP] "http://www.oodesign.com/mediator-pattern.html". + + [OODOP] "http://www.oodesign.com/mediator-pattern.html". + + [OODSRP] "http://www.oodesign.com/mediator-pattern.html". + Appendix A. Configuration Examples This section shows configuration examples of "ietf-i2nsf-capability" module for capabilities registration of general firewall. A.1. Example 1: Registration for the Capabilities of a General Firewall This section shows a configuration example for the capabilities registration of a general firewall in either an IPv4 network or an IPv6 network. @@ -2146,39 +2411,39 @@ pass drop alert Figure 4: Configuration XML for the Capabilities Registration of a General Firewall in an IPv4 Network Figure 4 shows the configuration XML for the capabilities - registration of a general firewall as an NSF in an IPv4 network - [RFC5737]. Its capabilities are as follows. + registration of a general firewall as an NSF in an IPv4 network. Its + capabilities are as follows. 1. The name of the NSF is general_firewall. 2. The NSF can inspect a protocol, an exact IPv4 address, and a range of IPv4 addresses for IPv4 packets. 3. The NSF can inspect an exact port number and a range of port numbers for the fourth layer packets. 4. The NSF can control whether the packets are allowed to pass, drop, or alert. general_firewall - ipv6-protocol + ipv6-next-header exact-ipv6-address range-ipv6-address exact-fourth-layer-port-num range-fourth-layer-port-num pass drop alert @@ -2186,114 +2451,114 @@ drop alert Figure 5: Configuration XML for the Capabilities Registration of a General Firewall in an IPv6 Network In addition, Figure 5 shows the configuration XML for the capabilities registration of a general firewall as an NSF in an IPv6 - network [RFC3849]. Its capabilities are as follows. + network. Its capabilities are as follows. 1. The name of the NSF is general_firewall. - 2. The NSF can inspect a protocol, an exact IPv6 address, and a - range of IPv6 addresses for IPv6 packets. + 2. The NSF can inspect a protocol (Next-Header), an exact IPv6 + address, and a range of IPv6 addresses for IPv6 packets. 3. The NSF can inspect an exact port number and a range of port numbers for the fourth layer packets. 4. The NSF can control whether the packets are allowed to pass, drop, or alert. A.2. Example 2: Registration for the Capabilities of a Time-based Firewall This section shows a configuration example for the capabilities registration of a time-based firewall in either an IPv4 network or an IPv6 network. time_based_firewall absolute-time periodic-time - ipv4-protocol + ipv4-next-header exact-ipv4-address range-ipv4-address pass drop alert pass drop alert Figure 6: Configuration XML for the Capabilities Registration of a Time-based Firewall in an IPv4 Network Figure 6 shows the configuration XML for the capabilities - registration of a time-based firewall as an NSF in an IPv4 network - [RFC5737]. Its capabilities are as follows. + registration of a time-based firewall as an NSF in an IPv4 network. + Its capabilities are as follows. 1. The name of the NSF is time_based_firewall. 2. The NSF can execute the security policy rule according to absolute time and periodic time. - 3. The NSF can inspect a protocol, an exact IPv4 address, and a - range of IPv4 addresses for IPv4 packets. + 3. The NSF can inspect a protocol (Next-Header), an exact IPv4 + address, and a range of IPv4 addresses for IPv4 packets. 4. The NSF can control whether the packets are allowed to pass, drop, or alert. time_based_firewall absolute-time periodic-time - ipv6-protocol + ipv6-next-header exact-ipv6-address range-ipv6-address pass drop alert pass drop alert Figure 7: Configuration XML for the Capabilities Registration of a Time-based Firewall in an IPv6 Network In addition, Figure 7 shows the configuration XML for the capabilities registration of a time-based firewall as an NSF in an - IPv6 network [RFC3849]. Its capabilities are as follows. + IPv6 network. Its capabilities are as follows. 1. The name of the NSF is time_based_firewall. 2. The NSF can execute the security policy rule according to absolute time and periodic time. - 3. The NSF can inspect a protocol, an exact IPv6 address, and a - range of IPv6 addresses for IPv6 packets. + 3. The NSF can inspect a protocol (Next-Header), an exact IPv6 + address, and a range of IPv6 addresses for IPv6 packets. 4. The NSF can control whether the packets are allowed to pass, drop, or alert. A.3. Example 3: Registration for the Capabilities of a Web Filter This section shows a configuration example for the capabilities registration of a web filter. @@ -2315,21 +2580,22 @@ Figure 8: Configuration XML for the Capabilities Registration of a Web Filter Figure 8 shows the configuration XML for the capabilities registration of a web filter as an NSF. Its capabilities are as follows. 1. The name of the NSF is web_filter. - 2. The NSF can inspect url for http and https packets. + 2. The NSF can inspect URL matched from a user-defined URL Database. + User can add a new URL into the database. 3. The NSF can control whether the packets are allowed to pass, drop, or alert. A.4. Example 4: Registration for the Capabilities of a VoIP/VoLTE Filter This section shows a configuration example for the capabilities registration of a VoIP/VoLTE filter. @@ -2390,48 +2656,87 @@ Figure 10: Configuration XML for the Capabilities Registration of a HTTP and HTTPS Flood Mitigator Figure 10 shows the configuration XML for the capabilities registration of a HTTP and HTTPS flood mitigator as an NSF. Its capabilities are as follows. 1. The name of the NSF is http_and_https_flood_mitigation. - 2. The IPv4 address of the NSF is assumed to be 192.0.2.11 - [RFC5737]. Also, the IPv6 address of the NSF is assumed to be - 2001:DB8:0:1::11 [RFC3849]. - - 3. The NSF can control the amount of packets for HTTP and HTTPS + 2. The NSF can control the amount of packets for HTTP and HTTPS packets, which are routed to the NSF's IPv4 address or the NSF's IPv6 address. - 4. The NSF can control whether the packets are allowed to pass, + 3. The NSF can control whether the packets are allowed to pass, drop, or alert. Appendix B. Acknowledgments This work was supported by Institute of Information & Communications Technology Planning & Evaluation (IITP) grant funded by the Korea MSIT (Ministry of Science and ICT) (R-20160222-002755, Cloud based Security Intelligence Technology Development for the Customized - Security Service Provisioning). + Security Service Provisioning). This work was supported in part by + the IITP grant funded by the MSIT (2020-0-00395, Standard Development + of Blockchain based Network Management Automation Technology). Appendix C. Contributors This document is made by the group effort of I2NSF working group. Many people actively contributed to this document, such as Acee Lindem, Roman Danyliw, and Tom Petch. The authors sincerely appreciate their contributions. The following are co-authors of this document: + Patrick Lingga + Department of Computer Science and Engineering + Sungkyunkwan University + 2066 Seo-ro Jangan-gu + Suwon, Gyeonggi-do 16419 + Republic of Korea + + EMail: patricklink@skku.edu + + Liang Xia + Huawei + 101 Software Avenue + Nanjing, Jiangsu 210012 + China + + EMail: Frank.Xialiang@huawei.com + + Cataldo Basile + Politecnico di Torino + Corso Duca degli Abruzzi, 34 + Torino, 10129 + Italy + + EMail: cataldo.basile@polito.it + + John Strassner + Huawei + 2330 Central Expressway + Santa Clara, CA 95050 + USA + + EMail: John.sc.Strassner@huawei.com + + Diego R. Lopez + Telefonica I+D + Zurbaran, 12 + Madrid, 28010 + Spain + + Email: diego.r.lopez@telefonica.com + Hyoungshick Kim Department of Computer Science and Engineering Sungkyunkwan University 2066 Seo-ro Jangan-gu Suwon, Gyeonggi-do 16419 Republic of Korea EMail: hyoung@skku.edu Daeyoung Hyun @@ -2445,27 +2750,20 @@ Dongjin Hong Department of Electronic, Electrical and Computer Engineering Sungkyunkwan University 2066 Seo-ro Jangan-gu Suwon, Gyeonggi-do 16419 Republic of Korea EMail: dong.jin@skku.edu - Liang Xia - Huawei - 101 Software Avenue - Nanjing, Jiangsu 210012 - China - - EMail: Frank.Xialiang@huawei.com Jung-Soo Park Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute 218 Gajeong-Ro, Yuseong-Gu Daejeon, 34129 Republic of Korea EMail: pjs@etri.re.kr Tae-Jin Ahn Korea Telecom