draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-04.txt   draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-05.txt 
I2NSF Working Group J. Jeong I2NSF Working Group J. Jeong
Internet-Draft Sungkyunkwan University Internet-Draft Sungkyunkwan University
Intended status: Informational S. Hyun Intended status: Informational S. Hyun
Expires: January 18, 2019 Chosun University Expires: March 15, 2019 Chosun University
T. Ahn T. Ahn
Korea Telecom Korea Telecom
S. Hares S. Hares
Huawei Huawei
D. Lopez D. Lopez
Telefonica I+D Telefonica I+D
July 17, 2018 September 11, 2018
Applicability of Interfaces to Network Security Functions to Network- Applicability of Interfaces to Network Security Functions to Network-
Based Security Services Based Security Services
draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-04 draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-05
Abstract Abstract
This document describes the applicability of Interface to Network This document describes the applicability of Interface to Network
Security Functions (I2NSF) to network-based security services in Security Functions (I2NSF) to network-based security services in
Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) environments, such as Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) environments, such as
firewall, deep packet inspection, or attack mitigation engines. firewall, deep packet inspection, or attack mitigation engines.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
skipping to change at page 1, line 41 skipping to change at page 1, line 41
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 18, 2019. This Internet-Draft will expire on March 15, 2019.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. I2NSF Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. I2NSF Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Time-dependent Web Access Control Service . . . . . . . . 5 4. Time-dependent Web Access Control Service . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. I2NSF Framework with SFC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5. I2NSF Framework with SFC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. I2NSF Framework with SDN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 6. I2NSF Framework with SDN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1. Firewall: Centralized Firewall System . . . . . . . . . . 11 6.1. Firewall: Centralized Firewall System . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.2. Deep Packet Inspection: Centralized VoIP/VoLTE Security 6.2. Deep Packet Inspection: Centralized VoIP/VoLTE Security
System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.3. Attack Mitigation: Centralized DDoS-attack Mitigation 6.3. Attack Mitigation: Centralized DDoS-attack Mitigation
System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6. I2NSF Framework with NFV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 7. I2NSF Framework with NFV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
9. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 10. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
10. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 11. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Appendix A. Changes from draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-03 . . . 23 Appendix A. Changes from draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-04 . . . 22
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) defined a framework Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) defines a framework
and interfaces for interacting with Network Security Functions and interfaces for interacting with Network Security Functions
(NSFs). The I2NSF framework allows heterogeneous NSFs developed by (NSFs). The I2NSF framework allows heterogeneous NSFs developed by
different security solution vendors to be used in the NFV environment different security solution vendors to be used in the Network
by utilizing the capabilities of such products and the virtualization Functions Virtualization (NFV) environment [ETSI-NFV] by utilizing
of security functions in the NFV platform. In the I2NSF framework, the capabilities of such products and the virtualization of security
each NSF initially registers the profile of its own capabilities into functions in the NFV platform. In the I2NSF framework, each NSF
the system in order for themselves to be available in the system. In initially registers the profile of its own capabilities into the
addition, the Security Controller registers itself to the I2NSF user system in order for themselves to be available in the system. In
so that the user can request security services to the Security addition, the Security Controller is validated by the I2NSF Client
Controller. (also called I2NSF User) that the user is employing, so that the user
can request security services through the Security Controller.
This document describes the applicability of I2NSF framework to
network-based security services with a use case of time-dependent web
access control. This document also describes integrating I2NSF
framework with Software-Defined Networking (SDN) technology for
efficient security services and use cases, such as firewall
[opsawg-firewalls], Deep Packet Inspection (DPI), and Distributed This document illustrates the applicability of the I2NSF framework
Denial of Service (DDoS) attack mitigation. We implemented the I2NSF with four different scenarios: (i) the enforcement of time-dependent
framework based on SDN for these use cases, and the implementation web access control; (ii) the application of I2NSF to a Service
successfully verified the effectiveness of the I2NSF framework. Function Chaining (SFC) environment [RFC7665]; (iii) the integration
of the I2NSF framework with Software-Defined Networking (SDN)
[RFC7149] to provide different security functionality such as
firewalls [opsawg-firewalls], Deep Packet Inspection (DPI), and
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack mitigation; (iv) the use
of NFV as supporting technology. The implementation of I2NSF in
these scenarios has allowed us to verify the applicability and
effectiveness of the I2NSF framework for a variety of use cases.
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
This document uses the terminology described in [RFC7149], This document uses the terminology described in [RFC7149],
[ITU-T.Y.3300], [ONF-OpenFlow], [ONF-SDN-Architecture], [ITU-T.Y.3300], [ONF-OpenFlow], [ONF-SDN-Architecture],
[ITU-T.X.1252], [ITU-T.X.800], [RFC8329], [i2nsf-terminology], [ITU-T.X.1252], [ITU-T.X.800], [RFC8329], [i2nsf-terminology],
[consumer-facing-inf-im], [consumer-facing-inf-dm], [consumer-facing-inf-im], [consumer-facing-inf-dm],
[i2nsf-nsf-cap-im], [nsf-facing-inf-dm], [registration-inf-im], [i2nsf-nsf-cap-im], [nsf-facing-inf-dm], [registration-inf-dm], and
[registration-inf-dm], and [nsf-triggered-steering]. In addition, [nsf-triggered-steering]. In addition, the following terms are
the following terms are defined below: defined below:
o Software-Defined Networking (SDN): A set of techniques that o Software-Defined Networking (SDN): A set of techniques that
enables to directly program, orchestrate, control, and manage enables to directly program, orchestrate, control, and manage
network resources, which facilitates the design, delivery and network resources, which facilitates the design, delivery and
operation of network services in a dynamic and scalable manner operation of network services in a dynamic and scalable manner
[ITU-T.Y.3300]. [ITU-T.Y.3300].
o Firewall: A service function at the junction of two network o Firewall: A service function at the junction of two network
segments that inspects every packet that attempts to cross the segments that inspects every packet that attempts to cross the
boundary. It also rejects any packet that does not satisfy boundary. It also rejects any packet that does not satisfy
certain criteria for, for example, disallowed port numbers or IP certain criteria for, for example, disallowed port numbers or IP
addresses. addresses.
o Centralized Firewall System: A centralized firewall that can o Centralized Firewall System: A centralized firewall that can
establish and distribute policy rules into network resources for establish and distribute policy rules into network resources for
efficient firewall management. These rules can be managed efficient firewall management.
dynamically by a centralized server for firewall. SDN can work as
a network-based firewall system through a standard interface
between an SDN switch and a firewall function as a vitual network
function (VNF).
o Centralized VoIP Security System: A centralized security system o Centralized VoIP Security System: A centralized security system
that handles the security functions required for VoIP and VoLTE that handles the security functions required for VoIP and VoLTE
services. SDN can work as a network-based security system through services.
a standard interface between an SDN switch and a VoIP/VoLTE
security function as a VNF.
o Centralized DDoS-attack Mitigation System: A centralized mitigator o Centralized DDoS-attack Mitigation System: A centralized mitigator
that can establish and distribute access control policy rules into that can establish and distribute access control policy rules into
network resources for efficient DDoS-attack mitigation. These network resources for efficient DDoS-attack mitigation.
rules can be managed dynamically by a centralized server for DDoS-
attack mitigation. The SDN controller and switches can
cooperatively work as a network-based firewall system through a
standard interface between an SDN switch and a firewall function
as a VNF running in the SDN controller.
3. I2NSF Framework 3. I2NSF Framework
This section describes an I2NSF framework and its use case. Figure 1 This section summarizes the I2NSF framework as defined in [RFC8329].
shows an I2NSF framework [RFC8329] to support network-based security As shown in Figure 1, an I2NSF User can use security functions by
services. As shown in Figure 1, I2NSF User can use security delivering high-level security policies, which specify security
functions by delivering high-level security policies, which specify requirements that the I2NSF user wants to enforce, to the Security
security requirements the I2NSF user wants to enforce, to the Controller via the Consumer-Facing Interface
Security Controller via the Consumer-Facing Interface
[consumer-facing-inf-im][consumer-facing-inf-dm]. [consumer-facing-inf-im][consumer-facing-inf-dm].
The Security Controller receives and analyzes the high-level security The Security Controller receives and analyzes the high-level security
policies from an I2NSF User, and identifies what types of security policies from an I2NSF User, and identifies what types of security
capabilities are required to meet these high-level security policies. capabilities are required to meet these high-level security policies.
The Security Controller then identifies NSFs that have the required The Security Controller then identifies NSFs that have the required
security capabilities, and generates low-level security policies for security capabilities, and generates low-level security policies for
each of the NSFs so that the high-level security policies are each of the NSFs so that the high-level security policies are
eventually enforced by those NSFs. Finally, the Security Controller eventually enforced by those NSFs [policy-translation]. Finally, the
sends the generated low-level security policies to the NSFs Security Controller sends the generated low-level security policies
[i2nsf-nsf-cap-im][nsf-facing-inf-dm]. to the NSFs [i2nsf-nsf-cap-im][nsf-facing-inf-dm].
The Security Controller requests NSFs to perform low-level security The Security Controller requests NSFs to perform low-level security
services via the NSF-Facing Interface. The NSFs are enabled as services via the NSF-Facing Interface. The developers (or vendors)
Virtual Network Functions (VNFs) on top of virtual machines through inform the Security Controller of the capabilities of the NSFs
Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) [ETSI-NFV]. In addition, the through the I2NSF Registration Interface [registration-inf-dm] for
Security Controller uses the I2NSF Registration Interface registering (or deregistering) the corresponding NSFs.
[registration-inf-im][registration-inf-dm] to communicate with
Developer's Management System (called Developer's Mgmt System) for
registering (or deregistering) the developer's NSFs into (or from)
the NFV system using the I2NSF framework.
The Consumer-Facing Interface between an I2NSF User and the Security The Consumer-Facing Interface between an I2NSF User and the Security
Controller can be implemented using, for example, RESTCONF [RFC8040]. Controller can be implemented using, for example, RESTCONF [RFC8040].
Data models specified by YANG [RFC6020] describe high-level security Data models specified by YANG [RFC6020] describe high-level security
policies to be specified by an I2NSF User. The data model defined in policies to be specified by an I2NSF User. The data model defined in
[consumer-facing-inf-dm] can be used for the I2NSF Consumer-Facing [consumer-facing-inf-dm] can be used for the I2NSF Consumer-Facing
Interface. Interface.
+------------+ +------------+
| I2NSF User | | I2NSF User |
+------------+ +------------+
^ ^
| Consumer-Facing Interface | Consumer-Facing Interface
v v
+-------------------+ Registration +-----------------------+ +-------------------+ Registration +-----------------------+
|Security Controller|<-------------------->|Developer's Mgmt System| |Security Controller|<-------------------->|Developer's Mgmt System|
+-------------------+ Interface +-----------------------+ +-------------------+ Interface +-----------------------+
^ ^
| NSF-Facing Interface | NSF-Facing Interface
v v
+----------------+ +---------------+ +-----------------------+ +----------------+ +---------------+ +-----------------------+
| NSF-1 |-| NSF-2 |...| NSF-n | | NSF-1 |-| NSF-2 |...| NSF-n |
| (Firewall) | | (Web Filter) | |(DDoS-Attack Mitigator)| | (Firewall) | | (Web Filter) | |(DDoS-Attack Mitigator)|
+----------------+ +---------------+ +-----------------------+ +----------------+ +---------------+ +-----------------------+
Figure 1: I2NSF Framework Figure 1: I2NSF Framework
The NSF-Facing Interface between the Security Controller and NSFs can The NSF-Facing Interface between the Security Controller and NSFs can
be implemented using NETCONF [RFC6241]. YANG data models describe be implemented using NETCONF [RFC6241]. YANG data models describe
low-level security policies for the sake of NSFs, which are low-level security policies for the sake of NSFs, which are
translated from the high-level security policies by the Security translated from the high-level security policies by the Security
Controller. The data model defined in [nsf-facing-inf-dm] can be Controller. The data model defined in [nsf-facing-inf-dm] can be
used for the I2NSF NSF-Facing Interface. used for the I2NSF NSF-Facing Interface.
The Registration Interface between the Security Controller and the The Registration Interface between the Security Controller and the
Developer's Mgmt System can be implemented by RESTCONF [RFC8040]. Developer's Management System can be implemented by RESTCONF
The data model defined in [registration-inf-dm] can be used for the [RFC8040]. The data model defined in [registration-inf-dm] can be
I2NSF Registration Interface. used for the I2NSF Registration Interface.
Also, the I2NSF framework can enforce multiple chained NSFs for the Also, the I2NSF framework can enforce multiple chained NSFs for the
low-level security policies by means of service function chaining low-level security policies by means of SFC techniques for the I2NSF
(SFC) techniques for the I2NSF architecture described in architecture described in [nsf-triggered-steering].
[nsf-triggered-steering].
The following describes a security service scenario using the I2NSF The following sections describe different security service scenarios
framework. illustrating the applicability of the I2NSF framework.
3.1. Time-dependent Web Access Control Service 4. Time-dependent Web Access Control Service
This service scenario assumes that an enterprise network This service scenario assumes that an enterprise network
administrator wants to control the staff members' access to Facebook administrator wants to control the staff members' access to a
during business hours. The following is an example high-level particular Interner service (e.g., Example.com) during business
security policy rule that the administrator requests: Block the staff hours. The following is an example high-level security policy rule
members' access to Facebook from 9 am to 6 pm. The administrator that the administrator requests: Block the staff members' access to
sends this high-level security policy to the security controller, Example.com from 9 AM to 6 PM. The administrator sends this high-
then the security controller identifies required secuity level security policy to the Security Controller, then the Security
capabilities, e.g., IP address and port number inspection Controller identifies required security capabilities, e.g., IP
capabilities and URL inspection capability. In this scenario, it is address and port number inspection capabilities and URL inspection
assumed that the IP address and port number inspection capabilities capability. In this scenario, it is assumed that the IP address and
are required to check whether a received packet is an HTTP packet port number inspection capabilities are required to check whether a
from a staff member. The URL inspection capability is required to received packet is an HTTP packet from a staff member. The URL
check whether the target URL of a received packet is facebook.com or inspection capability is required to check whether the target URL of
not. a received packet is in the Example.com domain or not.
The Security Controller maintains the security capabilities of each The Security Controller maintains the security capabilities of each
NSF running in the I2NSF system, which have been reported by the NSF running in the I2NSF system, which have been reported by the
Developer's Management System via the Registation interface. Based Developer's Management System via the Registation interface. Based
on this information, the Security Controller identifies NSFs that can on this information, the Security Controller identifies NSFs that can
perform the IP address and port number inspection and URL inspection. perform the IP address and port number inspection and URL inspection
In this scenario, it is assumed that an NSF of firewall has the IP [policy-translation]. In this scenario, it is assumed that an NSF of
address and port number inspection capabilities and an NSF of web firewall has the IP address and port number inspection capabilities
filter has URL inspection capability. and an NSF of web filter has URL inspection capability.
The Security Controller generates low-level security rules for the The Security Controller generates low-level security rules for the
NSFs to perform IP address and port number inspection, URL NSFs to perform IP address and port number inspection, URL
inspection, and time checking. Specifically, the Security Controller inspection, and time checking. Specifically, the Security Controller
may interoperate with an access control server in the enterprise may interoperate with an access control server in the enterprise
network in order to retrieve the information (e.g., IP address in network in order to retrieve the information (e.g., IP address in
use, company identifier (ID), and role) of each employee that is use, company identifier (ID), and role) of each employee that is
currently using the network. Based on the retrieved information, the currently using the network. Based on the retrieved information, the
Security Controller generates low-level security rules to check Security Controller generates low-level security rules to check
whether the source IP address of a received packet matches any one whether the source IP address of a received packet matches any one
being used by a staff member. In addition, the low-level security being used by a staff member. In addition, the low-level security
rules should be able to determine that a received packet is of HTTP rules should be able to determine that a received packet is of HTTP
protocol. The low-level security rules for web filter checks that protocol. The low-level security rules for web filter checks that
the target URL field of a received packet is equal to facebook.com. the target URL field of a received packet is equal to Example.com.
Finally, the Security Controller sends the low-level security rules Finally, the Security Controller sends the low-level security rules
of the IP address and port number inspection to the NSF of firewall of the IP address and port number inspection to the NSF of firewall
and the low-level rules for URL inspection to the NSF of web filter. and the low-level rules for URL inspection to the NSF of web filter.
The following describes how the time-dependent web access control The following describes how the time-dependent web access control
service is enforced by the NSFs of firewall and web filter. service is enforced by the NSFs of firewall and web filter.
1. A staff member tries to access Fackbook.com during business 1. A staff member tries to access Example.com during business hours,
hours, e.g., 10 am. e.g., 10 AM.
2. The packet is forwarded from the staff member's device to the 2. The packet is forwarded from the staff member's device to the
firewall, and the firewall checks the source IP address and port firewall, and the firewall checks the source IP address and port
number. Now the firewall identifies the received packet is an number. Now the firewall identifies the received packet is an
HTTP packet from the staff member. HTTP packet from the staff member.
3. The firewall triggers the web filter to further inspect the 3. The firewall triggers the web filter to further inspect the
packet, and the packet is forwarded from the firewall to the web packet, and the packet is forwarded from the firewall to the web
filter. Service Function Chaining (SFC) technology can be filter. SFC technology can be utilized to support such packet
utilized to support such packet forwarding in the I2NSF framework forwarding in the I2NSF framework [nsf-triggered-steering].
[nsf-triggered-steering].
4. The web filter checks the target URL field of the received 4. The web filter checks the target URL field of the received
packet, and realizes the packet is toward Facebook.com. The web packet, and realizes the packet is toward Example.com. The web
filter then checks that the current time is in business hours. filter then checks that the current time is in business hours.
If so, the web filter drops the packet, and consequently the If so, the web filter drops the packet, and consequently the
staff member's access to Facebook during business hours is staff member's access to Example.com during business hours is
blocked. blocked.
4. I2NSF Framework with SFC 5. I2NSF Framework with SFC
In the I2NSF architecture, an NSF can trigger an advanced security In the I2NSF architecture, an NSF can trigger an advanced security
action (e.g., DPI and DDoS attack mitigation) on a packet based on action (e.g., DPI or DDoS attack mitigation) on a packet based on the
the result of its own security inspection of the packet. For result of its own security inspection of the packet. For example, a
example, a firewall triggers further inspection of a suspicious firewall triggers further inspection of a suspicious packet with DPI.
packet with DPI. For this advanced security action to be fulfilled, For this advanced security action to be fulfilled, the suspicious
the suspicious packet should be forwarded from the current NSF to the packet should be forwarded from the current NSF to the successor NSF.
successor NSF. Service Function Chaining (SFC) [RFC7665] is a SFC [RFC7665] is a technology that enables this advanced security
technology that enables this advanced security action by steering a action by steering a packet with multiple service functions (e.g.,
packet with multiple service functions (e.g., NSFs), and this NSFs), and this technology can be utilized by the I2NSF architecture
technology can be utilized by the I2NSF architecture to support the to support the advanced security action.
advanced security action.
SFC generally requires classifiers and service function forwarders SFC generally requires classifiers and service function forwarders
(SFFs); classifiers are responsible for determining which service (SFFs); classifiers are responsible for determining which service
function path (SFP) (i.e., an ordered sequence of service functions) function path (SFP) (i.e., an ordered sequence of service functions)
a given packet should pass through, according to pre-configured a given packet should pass through, according to pre-configured
classification rules, and SFFs perform forwarding the given packet to classification rules, and SFFs perform forwarding the given packet to
the next service function (e.g., NSF) on the SFP of the packet by the next service function (e.g., NSF) on the SFP of the packet by
referring to their forwarding tables. In the I2NSF architecture with referring to their forwarding tables. In the I2NSF architecture with
SFC, the Security Controller can take responsibilities of generating SFC, the Security Controller can take responsibilities of generating
classification rules for classifiers and forwarding tables for SFFs. classification rules for classifiers and forwarding tables for SFFs.
skipping to change at page 9, line 5 skipping to change at page 9, line 5
the packet to the classifier. Based on the metadata information, the the packet to the classifier. Based on the metadata information, the
classifier searches an SFP which includes an NSF with the required classifier searches an SFP which includes an NSF with the required
security capability, changes the SFP-related information (e.g., security capability, changes the SFP-related information (e.g.,
service path identifier and service index [RFC8300]) of the packet service path identifier and service index [RFC8300]) of the packet
with the new SFP that has been found, and then forwards the packet to with the new SFP that has been found, and then forwards the packet to
the SFF. When receiving the packet, the SFF checks the SFP-related the SFF. When receiving the packet, the SFF checks the SFP-related
information such as the service path identifier and service index information such as the service path identifier and service index
contained in the packet and forwards the packet to the next NSF on contained in the packet and forwards the packet to the next NSF on
the SFP of the packet, according to its forwarding table. the SFP of the packet, according to its forwarding table.
5. I2NSF Framework with SDN 6. I2NSF Framework with SDN
This section describes an I2NSF framework with SDN for I2NSF This section describes an I2NSF framework with SDN for I2NSF
applicability and use cases, such as firewall, deep packet applicability and use cases, such as firewall, deep packet
inspection, and DDoS-attack mitigation functions. SDN enables some inspection, and DDoS-attack mitigation functions. SDN enables some
packet filtering rules to be enforced in the network switches by packet filtering rules to be enforced in network forwarding elements
controlling their packet forwarding rules. By taking advantage of (e.g., switch) by controlling their packet forwarding rules. By
this capability of SDN, it is possible to optimize the process of taking advantage of this capability of SDN, it is possible to
security service enforcement in the I2NSF system. optimize the process of security service enforcement in the I2NSF
system.
Figure 3 shows an I2NSF framework [RFC8329] with SDN networks to Figure 3 shows an I2NSF framework [RFC8329] with SDN networks to
support network-based security services. In this system, the support network-based security services. In this system, the
enforcement of security policy rules is divided into the SDN switches enforcement of security policy rules is divided into the SDN
and NSFs. Especially, SDN switches enforce simple packet filtering forwarding elements (e.g., switch) and NSFs. Especially, SDN
rules that can be translated into their packet forwarding rules, forwarding elements enforce simple packet filtering rules that can be
whereas NSFs enforce NSF-related security rules requiring the translated into their packet forwarding rules, whereas NSFs enforce
security capabilities of the NSFs. For this purpose, the Security NSF-related security rules requiring the security capabilities of the
Controller instructs the Switch Controller via NSF-Facing Interface NSFs. For this purpose, the Security Controller instructs the SDN
so that SDN switches can perform the required security services with Controller via NSF-Facing Interface so that SDN forwarding elements
flow tables under the supervision of the Switch Controller (i.e., SDN can perform the required security services with flow tables under the
Controller). supervision of the SDN Controller.
As an example, let us consider two different types of security rules: As an example, let us consider two different types of security rules:
Rule A is a simple packet fltering rule that checks only the IP Rule A is a simple packet fltering rule that checks only the IP
address and port number of a given packet, whereas rule B is a time- address and port number of a given packet, whereas rule B is a time-
consuming packet inspection rule for analyzing whether an attached consuming packet inspection rule for analyzing whether an attached
file being transmitted over a flow of packets contains malware. Rule file being transmitted over a flow of packets contains malware. Rule
A can be translated into packet forwarding rules of SDN switches and A can be translated into packet forwarding rules of SDN forwarding
thus be enforced by the switches. In contrast, rule B cannot be elements and thus be enforced by these elements. In contrast, rule B
enforced by switches, but it can be enforced by NSFs with anti- cannot be enforced by forwarding elements, but it has to be enforced
malware capability. Specifically, a flow of packets is forwarded to by NSFs with anti-malware capability. Specifically, a flow of
and reassembled by an NSF to reconstruct the attached file stored in packets is forwarded to and reassembled by an NSF to reconstruct the
the flow of packets. The NSF then analyzes the file to check the attached file stored in the flow of packets. The NSF then analyzes
existence of malware. If the file contains malware, the NSF drops the file to check the existence of malware. If the file contains
the packets. malware, the NSF drops the packets.
In an I2NSF framework with SDN, the Security Controller can analyze In an I2NSF framework with SDN, the Security Controller can analyze
given security policy rules and automatically determine which of the given security policy rules and automatically determine which of the
given security policy rules should be enforced by SDN switches and given security policy rules should be enforced by SDN forwarding
which should be enforced by NSFs. If some of the given rules elements and which should be enforced by NSFs. If some of the given
requires security capabilities that can be provided by SDN switches, rules requires security capabilities that can be provided by SDN
then the Security Controller instructs the Switch Controller via NSF- forwarding elements, then the Security Controller instructs the SDN
Facing Interface so that SDN switches can enforce those security Controller via NSF-Facing Interface so that SDN forwarding elements
policy rules with flow tables under the supervision of the Switch can enforce those security policy rules with flow tables under the
Controller (i.e., SDN Controller). Or if some rules require security supervision of the SDN Controller. Or if some rules require security
capabilities that can be provided by not SDN switches but NSFs, then capabilities that cannot be provided by SDN forwarding elements but
the Security Controller instructs relevant NSFs to enforce those by NSFs, then the Security Controller instructs relevant NSFs to
rules. enforce those rules.
+------------+ +------------+
| I2NSF User | | I2NSF User |
+------------+ +------------+
^ ^
| Consumer-Facing Interface | Consumer-Facing Interface
v v
+-------------------+ Registration +-----------------------+ +-------------------+ Registration +-----------------------+
|Security Controller|<-------------------->|Developer's Mgmt System| |Security Controller|<-------------------->|Developer's Mgmt System|
+-------------------+ Interface +-----------------------+ +-------------------+ Interface +-----------------------+
^ ^ ^ ^
| | NSF-Facing Interface | | NSF-Facing Interface
| v | v
| +----------------+ +---------------+ +-----------------------+ | +----------------+ +---------------+ +-----------------------+
| | NSF-1 |-| NSF-2 |...| NSF-n | | | NSF-1 |-| NSF-2 |...| NSF-n |
| | (Firewall) | | (DPI) | |(DDoS-Attack Mitigator)| | | (Firewall) | | (DPI) | |(DDoS-Attack Mitigator)|
| +----------------+ +---------------+ +-----------------------+ | +----------------+ +---------------+ +-----------------------+
| ^ | ^
| | | |
| v | v
| +--------+ | +--------+
| | SFF | | | SFF |
| +--------+ | +--------+
| ^ | ^
| | | |
| V SDN Network | V SDN Network
+--|----------------------------------------------------------------+ +--|----------------------------------------------------------------+
| V NSF-Facing Interface | | V NSF-Facing Interface |
| +-----------------+ | | +----------------+ |
| |Switch Controller| | | | SDN Controller | |
| +-----------------+ | | +----------------+ |
| ^ | | ^ |
| | SDN Southbound Interface | | | SDN Southbound Interface |
| v | | v |
| +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ | | +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ |
| |Switch 1|-|Switch 2|-|Switch 3|......|Switch m| | | |Switch 1|-|Switch 2|-|Switch 3|......|Switch m| |
| +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ | | +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ |
+-------------------------------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------------------------------+
Figure 3: An I2NSF Framework with SDN Network Figure 3: An I2NSF Framework with SDN Network
The following subsections introduce three use cases for cloud-based The following subsections introduce three use cases for cloud-based
security services: (i) firewall system, (ii) deep packet inspection security services: (i) firewall system, (ii) deep packet inspection
system, and (iii) attack mitigation system. [RFC8192] system, and (iii) attack mitigation system. [RFC8192]
5.1. Firewall: Centralized Firewall System 6.1. Firewall: Centralized Firewall System
A centralized network firewall can manage each network resource and A centralized network firewall can manage each network resource and
firewall rules can be managed flexibly by a centralized server for apply common rules to individual network elements (e.g., switch).
firewall (called Firewall). The centralized network firewall The centralized network firewall controls each forwarding element,
controls each switch for the network resource management and the and firewall rules can be added or deleted dynamically.
firewall rules can be added or deleted dynamically.
The procedure of firewall operations in this system is as follows: The procedure of firewall operations in this system is as follows:
1. A switch forwards an unknown flow's packet to one of the Switch 1. A switch forwards an unknown flow's packet to one of the SDN
Controllers. Controllers.
2. The Switch Controller forwards the unknown flow's packet to an 2. The SDN Controller forwards the unknown flow's packet to an
appropriate security service application, such as the Firewall. appropriate security service application, such as the Firewall.
3. The Firewall analyzes, typically, the headers and contents of the 3. The Firewall analyzes, typically, the headers and contents of the
packet. packet.
4. If the Firewall regards the packet as a malicious one with a 4. If the Firewall regards the packet as a malicious one with a
suspicious pattern, it reports the malicious packet to the Switch suspicious pattern, it reports the malicious packet to the SDN
Controller. Controller.
5. The Switch Controller installs new rules (e.g., drop packets with 5. The SDN Controller installs new rules (e.g., drop packets with
the suspicious pattern) into underlying switches. the suspicious pattern) into underlying switches.
6. The suspected packets are dropped by these switches. 6. The suspected packets are dropped by these switches.
Existing SDN protocols can be used through standard interfaces Existing SDN protocols can be used through standard interfaces
between the firewall application and switches between the firewall application and switches
[RFC7149][ITU-T.Y.3300][ONF-OpenFlow] [ONF-SDN-Architecture]. [RFC7149][ITU-T.Y.3300][ONF-OpenFlow] [ONF-SDN-Architecture].
Legacy firewalls have some challenges such as the expensive cost, Legacy firewalls have some challenges such as the expensive cost,
performance, management of access control, establishment of policy, performance, management of access control, establishment of policy,
skipping to change at page 12, line 25 skipping to change at page 12, line 23
are permitted or denied for firewall within a specific are permitted or denied for firewall within a specific
organization network under management. Thus, a centralized view organization network under management. Thus, a centralized view
is helpful to determine security policies for such a network. is helpful to determine security policies for such a network.
o Packet-based access mechanism: Packet-based access mechanism is o Packet-based access mechanism: Packet-based access mechanism is
not enough for firewall in practice since the basic unit of access not enough for firewall in practice since the basic unit of access
control is usually users or applications. Therefore, application control is usually users or applications. Therefore, application
level rules can be defined and added to the firewall system level rules can be defined and added to the firewall system
through the centralized server. through the centralized server.
5.2. Deep Packet Inspection: Centralized VoIP/VoLTE Security System 6.2. Deep Packet Inspection: Centralized VoIP/VoLTE Security System
A centralized VoIP/VoLTE security system can monitor each VoIP/VoLTE A centralized VoIP/VoLTE security system can monitor each VoIP/VoLTE
flow and manage VoIP/VoLTE security rules controlled by a centralized flow and manage VoIP/VoLTE security rules, according to the
server for VoIP/VoLTE security service called VoIP Intrusion configuration of a VoIP/VoLTE security service called VoIP Intrusion
Prevention System (IPS). The VoIP/VoLTE security system controls Prevention System (IPS). This centralized VoIP/VoLTE security system
each switch for the VoIP/VoLTE call flow management by manipulating controls each switch for the VoIP/VoLTE call flow management by
the rules that can be added, deleted or modified dynamically. manipulating the rules that can be added, deleted or modified
dynamically.
A centralized VoIP/VoLTE security system can cooperate with a network The centralized VoIP/VoLTE security system can cooperate with a
firewall to realize VoIP/VoLTE security service. Specifically, a network firewall to realize VoIP/VoLTE security service.
network firewall performs basic security checks of an unknown flow's Specifically, a network firewall performs basic security checks of an
packet observed by a switch. If the network firewall detects that unknown flow's packet observed by a switch. If the network firewall
the packet is an unknown VoIP call flow's packet that exhibits some detects that the packet is an unknown VoIP call flow's packet that
suspicious patterns, then it triggers the VoIP/VoLTE security system exhibits some suspicious patterns, then it triggers the VoIP/VoLTE
for more specialized security analysis of the suspicious VoIP call security system for more specialized security analysis of the
packet. suspicious VoIP call packet.
The procedure of VoIP/VoLTE security operations in this system is as The procedure of VoIP/VoLTE security operations in this system is as
follows: follows:
1. A switch forwards an unknown flow's packet to the Switch 1. A switch forwards an unknown flow's packet to the SDN Controller,
Controller, and the Switch Controller further forwards the and the SDN Controller further forwards the unknown flow's packet
unknown flow's packet to the Firewall for basic security to the Firewall for basic security inspection.
inspection.
2. The Firewall analyzes the header fields of the packet, and 2. The Firewall analyzes the header fields of the packet, and
figures out that this is an unknown VoIP call flow's signal figures out that this is an unknown VoIP call flow's signal
packet (e.g., SIP packet) of a suspicious pattern. packet (e.g., SIP packet) of a suspicious pattern.
3. The Firewall triggers an appropriate security service function, 3. The Firewall triggers an appropriate security service function,
such as VoIP IPS, for detailed security analysis of the such as VoIP IPS, for detailed security analysis of the
suspicious signal packet. That is, the firewall sends the packet suspicious signal packet. That is, the firewall sends the packet
to the Service Function Forwarder (SFF) in the I2NSF framework to the Service Function Forwarder (SFF) in the I2NSF framework
[nsf-triggered-steering], as shown in Figure 3. The SFF forwards [nsf-triggered-steering], as shown in Figure 3. The SFF forwards
the suspicious signal packet to the VoIP IPS. the suspicious signal packet to the VoIP IPS.
4. The VoIP IPS analyzes the headers and contents of the signal 4. The VoIP IPS analyzes the headers and contents of the signal
packet, such as calling number and session description headers packet, such as calling number and session description headers
[RFC4566]. [RFC4566].
5. If, for example, the VoIP IPS regards the packet as a spoofed 5. If, for example, the VoIP IPS regards the packet as a spoofed
packet by hackers or a scanning packet searching for VoIP/VoLTE packet by hackers or a scanning packet searching for VoIP/VoLTE
devices, it drops the packet. In addition, the VoIP IPS requests devices, it drops the packet. In addition, the VoIP IPS requests
the Switch Controller to block that packet and the subsequent the SDN Controller to block that packet and the subsequent
packets that have the same call-id. packets that have the same call-id.
6. The Switch Controller installs new rules (e.g., drop packets) 6. The SDN Controller installs new rules (e.g., drop packets) into
into underlying switches. underlying switches.
7. The illegal packets are dropped by these switches. 7. The illegal packets are dropped by these switches.
Existing SDN protocols can be used through standard interfaces Existing SDN protocols can be used through standard interfaces
between the VoIP IPS application and switches [RFC7149][ITU-T.Y.3300] between the VoIP IPS application and switches [RFC7149][ITU-T.Y.3300]
[ONF-OpenFlow][ONF-SDN-Architecture]. [ONF-OpenFlow][ONF-SDN-Architecture].
Legacy hardware based VoIP IPS has some challenges, such as Legacy hardware based VoIP IPS has some challenges, such as
provisioning time, the granularity of security, expensive cost, and provisioning time, the granularity of security, expensive cost, and
the establishment of policy. The I2NSF framework can resolve the the establishment of policy. The I2NSF framework can resolve the
skipping to change at page 14, line 17 skipping to change at page 14, line 13
that we need to add VoIP IPS on each network resource. To solve that we need to add VoIP IPS on each network resource. To solve
this, each network resource can be managed centrally such that a this, each network resource can be managed centrally such that a
single VoIP IPS is manipulated by a centralized server. single VoIP IPS is manipulated by a centralized server.
o The establishment of policy: Policy should be established for each o The establishment of policy: Policy should be established for each
network resource. However, it is difficult to describe what flows network resource. However, it is difficult to describe what flows
are permitted or denied for VoIP IPS within a specific are permitted or denied for VoIP IPS within a specific
organization network under management. Thus, a centralized view organization network under management. Thus, a centralized view
is helpful to determine security policies for such a network. is helpful to determine security policies for such a network.
5.3. Attack Mitigation: Centralized DDoS-attack Mitigation System 6.3. Attack Mitigation: Centralized DDoS-attack Mitigation System
A centralized DDoS-attack mitigation can manage each network resource A centralized DDoS-attack mitigation can manage each network resource
and manipulate rules to each switch through a centralized server for and manipulate rules to each switch through a common server for DDoS-
DDoS-attack mitigation (called DDoS-attack Mitigator). The attack mitigation (called DDoS-attack Mitigator). The centralized
centralized DDoS-attack mitigation system defends servers against DDoS-attack mitigation system defends servers against DDoS attacks
DDoS attacks outside private network, that is, from public network. outside the private network, that is, from public networks.
Servers are categorized into stateless servers (e.g., DNS servers) Servers are categorized into stateless servers (e.g., DNS servers)
and stateful servers (e.g., web servers). For DDoS-attack and stateful servers (e.g., web servers). For DDoS-attack
mitigation, traffic flows in switches are dynamically configured by mitigation, traffic flows in switches are dynamically configured by
traffic flow forwarding path management according to the category of traffic flow forwarding path management according to the category of
servers [AVANT-GUARD]. Such a managenent should consider the load servers [AVANT-GUARD]. Such a managenent should consider the load
balance among the switches for the defense against DDoS attacks. balance among the switches for the defense against DDoS attacks.
The procedure of DDoS-attack mitigation operations in this system is The procedure of DDoS-attack mitigation operations in this system is
as follows: as follows:
1. A Switch periodically reports an inter-arrival pattern of a 1. A Switch periodically reports an inter-arrival pattern of a
flow's packets to one of the Switch Controllers. flow's packets to one of the SDN Controllers.
2. The Switch Controller forwards the flow's inter-arrival pattern 2. The SDN Controller forwards the flow's inter-arrival pattern to
to an appropriate security service application, such as DDoS- an appropriate security service application, such as DDoS-attack
attack Mitigator. Mitigator.
3. The DDoS-attack Mitigator analyzes the reported pattern for the 3. The DDoS-attack Mitigator analyzes the reported pattern for the
flow. flow.
4. If the DDoS-attack Mitigator regards the pattern as a DDoS 4. If the DDoS-attack Mitigator regards the pattern as a DDoS
attack, it computes a packet dropping probability corresponding attack, it computes a packet dropping probability corresponding
to suspiciousness level and reports this DDoS-attack flow to to suspiciousness level and reports this DDoS-attack flow to the
Switch Controller. SDN Controller.
5. The Switch Controller installs new rules into switches (e.g., 5. The SDN Controller installs new rules into switches (e.g.,
forward packets with the suspicious inter-arrival pattern with a forward packets with the suspicious inter-arrival pattern with a
dropping probability). dropping probability).
6. The suspicious flow's packets are randomly dropped by switches 6. The suspicious flow's packets are randomly dropped by switches
with the dropping probability. with the dropping probability.
For the above centralized DDoS-attack mitigation system, the existing For the above centralized DDoS-attack mitigation system, the existing
SDN protocols can be used through standard interfaces between the SDN protocols can be used through standard interfaces between the
DDoS-attack mitigator application and switches [RFC7149] DDoS-attack mitigator application and switches [RFC7149]
[ITU-T.Y.3300][ONF-OpenFlow][ONF-SDN-Architecture]. [ITU-T.Y.3300][ONF-OpenFlow][ONF-SDN-Architecture].
skipping to change at page 15, line 49 skipping to change at page 15, line 46
for DDoS-attack mitigation. In addition, DDoS-attack mitigation for DDoS-attack mitigation. In addition, DDoS-attack mitigation
rules can be dynamically added for new DDoS attacks. rules can be dynamically added for new DDoS attacks.
o The establishment of policy: Policy should be established for each o The establishment of policy: Policy should be established for each
network resource. However, it is difficult to describe what flows network resource. However, it is difficult to describe what flows
are permitted or denied for new DDoS-attacks (e.g., DNS reflection are permitted or denied for new DDoS-attacks (e.g., DNS reflection
attack) within a specific organization network under management. attack) within a specific organization network under management.
Thus, a centralized view is helpful to determine security policies Thus, a centralized view is helpful to determine security policies
for such a network. for such a network.
So far this document has described the procedure and impact of the So far this section has described the procedure and impact of the
three use cases for network-based security services using the I2NSF three use cases for network-based security services using the I2NSF
framework with SDN networks. To support these use cases in the framework with SDN networks. To support these use cases in the
proposed data-driven security service framework, YANG data models proposed data-driven security service framework, YANG data models
described in [consumer-facing-inf-dm], [nsf-facing-inf-dm], and described in [consumer-facing-inf-dm], [nsf-facing-inf-dm], and
[registration-inf-dm] can be used as Consumer-Facing Interface, NSF- [registration-inf-dm] can be used as Consumer-Facing Interface, NSF-
Facing Interface, and Registration Interface, respectively, along Facing Interface, and Registration Interface, respectively, along
with RESTCONF [RFC8040] and NETCONF [RFC6241]. with RESTCONF [RFC8040] and NETCONF [RFC6241].
6. I2NSF Framework with NFV 7. I2NSF Framework with NFV
This section discusses the implementation of the I2NSF framework with This section discusses the implementation of the I2NSF framework
Network Functions Virtualization (called NFV). using Network Functions Virtualization (NFV).
+--------------------+ +--------------------+
+-------------------------------------------+ | ---------------- | +-------------------------------------------+ | ---------------- |
| I2NSF User (OSS/BSS) | | | NFV | | | I2NSF User (OSS/BSS) | | | NFV | |
+------+------------------------------------+ | | Orchestrator +-+ | +------+------------------------------------+ | | Orchestrator +-+ |
| Consumer-Facing Interface | -----+---------- | | | Consumer-Facing Interface | -----+---------- | |
+------|------------------------------------+ | | | | +------|------------------------------------+ | | | |
| -----+---------- (a) ----------------- | | | | | | -----+---------- (a) ----------------- | | | | |
| | Security |-------| Developer's | | | | | | | | Security |-------| Developer's | | | | | |
| |Controller(EM)| |Mgmt System(EM)| | | | | | | |Controller(EM)| |Mgmt System(EM)| | | | | |
skipping to change at page 17, line 42 skipping to change at page 16, line 49
| | ----------- ----------- ----------- | | | | | | ----------- ----------- ----------- | | | |
| | | Compute | | Storage | | Network | | | | | | | | Compute | | Storage | | Network | | | | |
| | | Hardware| | Hardware| | Hardware| | | | | | | | Hardware| | Hardware| | Hardware| | | | |
| | ----------- ----------- ----------- | | | | | | ----------- ----------- ----------- | | | |
| | Hardware Resources | | | NFV Management | | | Hardware Resources | | | NFV Management |
| +---------------------------------------+ | | and Orchestration | | +---------------------------------------+ | | and Orchestration |
+-------------------------------------------+ +--------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+ +--------------------+
(a) = Registration Interface (a) = Registration Interface
(b) = Ve-Vnfm Interface (b) = Ve-Vnfm Interface
Figure 4: I2NSF Framework Implementation in NFV Reference Figure 4: I2NSF Framework Implementation with respect to the NFV
Architectural Framework Reference Architectural Framework
NFV is a promising technology for improving the elasticity and NFV is a promising technology for improving the elasticity and
efficiency of network resource utilization. In NFV environments, efficiency of network resource utilization. In NFV environments,
NSFs can be deployed in the forms of software-based virtual instances NSFs can be deployed in the forms of software-based virtual instances
rather than physical appliances. Virtualizing NSFs makes it possible rather than physical appliances. Virtualizing NSFs makes it possible
to rapidly and flexibly respond to the amount of service requests by to rapidly and flexibly respond to the amount of service requests by
dynamically increasing or decreasing the number of NSF instances. dynamically increasing or decreasing the number of NSF instances.
Moreover, NFV technology facilitates flexibly including or excluding Moreover, NFV technology facilitates flexibly including or excluding
NSFs from multiple security solution vendors according to the changes NSFs from multiple security solution vendors according to the changes
on security requirements. In order to take advantages of the NFV on security requirements. In order to take advantages of the NFV
skipping to change at page 19, line 9 skipping to change at page 18, line 19
allocated resources. allocated resources.
5. Once the NSF instance has been created by the VNFM, the DMS 5. Once the NSF instance has been created by the VNFM, the DMS
performs the initial configurations of the NSF instance and then performs the initial configurations of the NSF instance and then
notifies the Security Controller of the NSF instance. notifies the Security Controller of the NSF instance.
6. After being notified of the created NSF instance, the Security 6. After being notified of the created NSF instance, the Security
Controller delivers low-level security policy rules to the NSF Controller delivers low-level security policy rules to the NSF
instance for policy enforcement. instance for policy enforcement.
The I2NSF framework can be implemented based on the NFV architecture. We can conclude that the I2NSF framework can be implemented based on
Note that the registration of the capabilities of NSFs is performed the NFV architecture framework. Note that the registration of the
through the Registration Interface and the life-cycle management for capabilities of NSFs is performed through the Registration Interface
NSFs (VNFs) is performed through the Ve-Vnfm interface between the and the lifecycle management for NSFs (VNFs) is performed through the
DMS and VNFM, as shown in Figure 4. More details about the I2NSF Ve-Vnfm interface between the DMS and VNFM, as shown in Figure 4.
framework based on the NFV reference architecture are described in More details about the I2NSF framework based on the NFV reference
[i2nsf-nfv-architecture]. architecture are described in [i2nsf-nfv-architecture].
7. Security Considerations 8. Security Considerations
The I2NSF framework with SDN networks in this document is derived The same security considerations for the I2NSF framework [RFC8329]
from the I2NSF framework [RFC8329], so the security considerations of are applicable to this document.
the I2NSF framework should be included in this document. Therefore,
proper secure communication channels should be used the delivery of
control or management messages among the components in the proposed
framework.
This document shares all the security issues of SDN that are This document shares all the security issues of SDN that are
specified in the "Security Considerations" section of [ITU-T.Y.3300]. specified in the "Security Considerations" section of [ITU-T.Y.3300].
8. Acknowledgments 9. Acknowledgments
This work was supported by Institute for Information & communications This work was supported by Institute for Information & communications
Technology Promotion (IITP) grant funded by the Korea government Technology Promotion (IITP) grant funded by the Korea government
(MSIP) (No.R-20160222-002755, Cloud based Security Intelligence (MSIP) (No.R-20160222-002755, Cloud based Security Intelligence
Technology Development for the Customized Security Service Technology Development for the Customized Security Service
Provisioning). Provisioning).
9. Contributors 10. Contributors
I2NSF is a group effort. I2NSF has had a number of contributing I2NSF is a group effort. I2NSF has had a number of contributing
authors. The following are considered co-authors: authors. The following are considered co-authors:
o Hyoungshick Kim (Sungkyunkwan University) o Hyoungshick Kim (Sungkyunkwan University)
o Jinyong Tim Kim (Sungkyunkwan University) o Jinyong Tim Kim (Sungkyunkwan University)
o Hyunsik Yang (Soongsil University) o Hyunsik Yang (Soongsil University)
o Younghan Kim (Soongsil University) o Younghan Kim (Soongsil University)
o Jung-Soo Park (ETRI) o Jung-Soo Park (ETRI)
o Se-Hui Lee (Korea Telecom) o Se-Hui Lee (Korea Telecom)
o Mohamed Boucadair (Orange) o Mohamed Boucadair (Orange)
10. Informative References 11. Informative References
[AVANT-GUARD] [AVANT-GUARD]
Shin, S., Yegneswaran, V., Porras, P., and G. Gu, "AVANT- Shin, S., Yegneswaran, V., Porras, P., and G. Gu, "AVANT-
GUARD: Scalable and Vigilant Switch Flow Management in GUARD: Scalable and Vigilant Switch Flow Management in
Software-Defined Networks", ACM CCS, November 2013. Software-Defined Networks", ACM CCS, November 2013.
[consumer-facing-inf-dm] [consumer-facing-inf-dm]
Jeong, J., Kim, E., Ahn, T., Kumar, R., and S. Hares, Jeong, J., Kim, E., Ahn, T., Kumar, R., and S. Hares,
"I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface YANG Data Model", draft- "I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface YANG Data Model", draft-
ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-dm-01 (work in ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-dm-01 (work in
skipping to change at page 21, line 38 skipping to change at page 20, line 42
October 2013. October 2013.
[ONF-SDN-Architecture] [ONF-SDN-Architecture]
ONF, "SDN Architecture", June 2014. ONF, "SDN Architecture", June 2014.
[opsawg-firewalls] [opsawg-firewalls]
Baker, F. and P. Hoffman, "On Firewalls in Internet Baker, F. and P. Hoffman, "On Firewalls in Internet
Security", draft-ietf-opsawg-firewalls-01 (work in Security", draft-ietf-opsawg-firewalls-01 (work in
progress), October 2012. progress), October 2012.
[policy-translation]
Yang, J., Jeong, J., and J. Kim, "Security Policy
Translation in Interface to Network Security Functions",
draft-yang-i2nsf-security-policy-translation-01 (work in
progress), July 2018.
[registration-inf-dm] [registration-inf-dm]
Hyun, S., Jeong, J., Roh, T., Wi, S., and J. Park, "I2NSF Hyun, S., Jeong, J., Roh, T., Wi, S., and J. Park, "I2NSF
Registration Interface YANG Data Model", draft-hyun-i2nsf- Registration Interface YANG Data Model", draft-hyun-i2nsf-
registration-dm-05 (work in progress), July 2018. registration-dm-06 (work in progress), July 2018.
[registration-inf-im]
Hyun, S., Jeong, J., Roh, T., Wi, S., and J. Park, "I2NSF
Registration Interface Information Model", draft-hyun-
i2nsf-registration-interface-im-06 (work in progress),
July 2018.
[RFC4566] Handley, M., Jacobson, V., and C. Perkins, "SDP: Session [RFC4566] Handley, M., Jacobson, V., and C. Perkins, "SDP: Session
Description Protocol", RFC 4566, July 2006. Description Protocol", RFC 4566, July 2006.
[RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for the [RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for the
Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020, Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
October 2010. October 2010.
[RFC6241] Enns, R., Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., and A. [RFC6241] Enns, R., Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., and A.
Bierman, "Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", Bierman, "Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)",
skipping to change at page 23, line 5 skipping to change at page 22, line 5
(I2NSF): Problem Statement and Use Cases", RFC 8192, July (I2NSF): Problem Statement and Use Cases", RFC 8192, July
2017. 2017.
[RFC8300] Quinn, P., Elzur, U., and C. Pignataro, "Network Service [RFC8300] Quinn, P., Elzur, U., and C. Pignataro, "Network Service
Header (NSH)", RFC 8300, January 2018. Header (NSH)", RFC 8300, January 2018.
[RFC8329] Lopez, D., Lopez, E., Dunbar, L., Strassner, J., and R. [RFC8329] Lopez, D., Lopez, E., Dunbar, L., Strassner, J., and R.
Kumar, "Framework for Interface to Network Security Kumar, "Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions", RFC 8329, February 2018. Functions", RFC 8329, February 2018.
Appendix A. Changes from draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-03 Appendix A. Changes from draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-04
The following changes have been made from draft-ietf-i2nsf- The following changes have been made from draft-ietf-i2nsf-
applicability-03: applicability-04:
o In Section 4, NSF-Facing Interface is used between Security o A more precise description of the basic I2NSF flows is provided.
Controller and Classifier (or SFF) in order to configure
Classifier (or SFF) for SFC-based NSF chaining.
o In Section 6, Developer's Management System is implemented as EM o The structure of the document makes each discussed use case be an
rather than VNFM in the NFV reference architecture. applicability statement according to the applied technology, such
as SFC, SDN, and NFV.
o In Section 6, Switch Controller is replaced by SDN Controller for
the terminology consistency in SDN standards. Switch is replaced
by forwarding element as a general term.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Jaehoon Paul Jeong Jaehoon Paul Jeong
Department of Software Department of Software
Sungkyunkwan University Sungkyunkwan University
2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-Gu 2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-Gu
Suwon, Gyeonggi-Do 16419 Suwon, Gyeonggi-Do 16419
Republic of Korea Republic of Korea
 End of changes. 74 change blocks. 
233 lines changed or deleted 215 lines changed or added

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