--- 1/draft-ietf-dime-rfc4005bis-11.txt 2013-01-03 11:54:38.192207228 +0100 +++ 2/draft-ietf-dime-rfc4005bis-12.txt 2013-01-03 11:54:38.304207226 +0100 @@ -1,19 +1,19 @@ Network Working Group G. Zorn, Ed. Internet-Draft Network Zen -Obsoletes: 4005 (if approved) July 31, 2012 +Obsoletes: 4005 (if approved) January 2, 2013 Intended status: Standards Track -Expires: February 1, 2013 +Expires: July 6, 2013 Diameter Network Access Server Application - draft-ietf-dime-rfc4005bis-11 + draft-ietf-dime-rfc4005bis-12 Abstract This document describes the Diameter protocol application used for Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) services in the Network Access Server (NAS) environment; it obsoletes RFC 4005. When combined with the Diameter Base protocol, Transport Profile, and Extensible Authentication Protocol specifications, this application specification satisfies typical network access services requirements. @@ -25,235 +25,235 @@ Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." - This Internet-Draft will expire on February 1, 2013. + This Internet-Draft will expire on July 6, 2013. Copyright Notice - Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the + Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.1. Changes from RFC 4005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1.3. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1.4. Advertising Application Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 - 1.5. Application Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 + 1.5. Application Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1.6. Accounting Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2. NAS Calls, Ports, and Sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 - 2.1. Diameter Session Establishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 + 2.1. Diameter Session Establishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.2. Diameter Session Reauthentication or Reauthorization . . . 9 2.3. Diameter Session Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3. Diameter NAS Application Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 - 3.1. AA-Request (AAR) Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 - 3.2. AA-Answer (AAA) Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 - 3.3. Re-Auth-Request (RAR) Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 - 3.4. Re-Auth-Answer (RAA) Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 - 3.5. Session-Termination-Request (STR) Command . . . . . . . . 17 - 3.6. Session-Termination-Answer (STA) Command . . . . . . . . . 18 - 3.7. Abort-Session-Request (ASR) Command . . . . . . . . . . . 19 - 3.8. Abort-Session-Answer (ASA) Command . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 - 3.9. Accounting-Request (ACR) Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 - 3.10. Accounting-Answer (ACA) Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 - 4. Diameter NAS Application AVPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 - 4.1. Derived AVP Data Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 - 4.1.1. QoSFilterRule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 - 4.2. NAS Session AVPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 - 4.2.1. Call and Session Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 - 4.2.2. NAS-Port AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 - 4.2.3. NAS-Port-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 - 4.2.4. NAS-Port-Type AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 - 4.2.5. Called-Station-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 - 4.2.6. Calling-Station-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 - 4.2.7. Connect-Info AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 - 4.2.8. Originating-Line-Info AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 - 4.2.9. Reply-Message AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 - 4.3. NAS Authentication AVPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 - 4.3.1. User-Password AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 - 4.3.2. Password-Retry AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 - 4.3.3. Prompt AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 - 4.3.4. CHAP-Auth AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 - 4.3.5. CHAP-Algorithm AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 - 4.3.6. CHAP-Ident AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 - 4.3.7. CHAP-Response AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 - 4.3.8. CHAP-Challenge AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 - 4.3.9. ARAP-Password AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 - 4.3.10. ARAP-Challenge-Response AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 - 4.3.11. ARAP-Security AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 - 4.3.12. ARAP-Security-Data AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 - 4.4. NAS Authorization AVPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 - 4.4.1. Service-Type AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 - 4.4.2. Callback-Number AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 - 4.4.3. Callback-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 - 4.4.4. Idle-Timeout AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 - 4.4.5. Port-Limit AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 - 4.4.6. NAS-Filter-Rule AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 - 4.4.7. Filter-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 - 4.4.8. Configuration-Token AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 - 4.4.9. QoS-Filter-Rule AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 - 4.4.10. Framed Access Authorization AVPs . . . . . . . . . . . 37 - 4.4.10.1. Framed-Protocol AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 - 4.4.10.2. Framed-Routing AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 - 4.4.10.3. Framed-MTU AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 - 4.4.10.4. Framed-Compression AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 - 4.4.10.5. IP Access Authorization AVPs . . . . . . . . . . 38 - 4.4.10.5.1. Framed-IP-Address AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 - 4.4.10.5.2. Framed-IP-Netmask AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 - 4.4.10.5.3. Framed-Route AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 - 4.4.10.5.4. Framed-Pool AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 - 4.4.10.5.5. Framed-Interface-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . 39 - 4.4.10.5.6. Framed-IPv6-Prefix AVP . . . . . . . . . . . 39 - 4.4.10.5.7. Framed-IPv6-Route AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 - 4.4.10.5.8. Framed-IPv6-Pool AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 - 4.4.10.6. IPX Access AVPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 - 4.4.10.6.1. Framed-IPX-Network AVP . . . . . . . . . . . 40 - 4.4.10.7. AppleTalk Network Access AVPs . . . . . . . . . . 40 - 4.4.10.7.1. Framed-AppleTalk-Link AVP . . . . . . . . . . 40 - 4.4.10.7.2. Framed-AppleTalk-Network AVP . . . . . . . . 41 - 4.4.10.7.3. Framed-AppleTalk-Zone AVP . . . . . . . . . . 41 - 4.4.10.8. AppleTalk Remote Access AVPs . . . . . . . . . . 41 - 4.4.10.8.1. ARAP-Features AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 - 4.4.10.8.2. ARAP-Zone-Access AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 - 4.4.11. Non-Framed Access Authorization AVPs . . . . . . . . . 42 - 4.4.11.1. Login-IP-Host AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 - 4.4.11.2. Login-IPv6-Host AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 - 4.4.11.3. Login-Service AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 - 4.4.11.4. TCP Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 - 4.4.11.4.1. Login-TCP-Port AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 - 4.4.11.5. LAT Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 - 4.4.11.5.1. Login-LAT-Service AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 - 4.4.11.5.2. Login-LAT-Node AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 - 4.4.11.5.3. Login-LAT-Group AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 - 4.4.11.5.4. Login-LAT-Port AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 - 4.5. NAS Tunneling AVPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 - 4.5.1. Tunneling AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 - 4.5.2. Tunnel-Type AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 - 4.5.3. Tunnel-Medium-Type AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 - 4.5.4. Tunnel-Client-Endpoint AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 - 4.5.5. Tunnel-Server-Endpoint AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 - 4.5.6. Tunnel-Password AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 + 3.1. AA-Request (AAR) Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 + 3.2. AA-Answer (AAA) Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 + 3.3. Re-Auth-Request (RAR) Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 + 3.4. Re-Auth-Answer (RAA) Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 + 3.5. Session-Termination-Request (STR) Command . . . . . . . . 16 + 3.6. Session-Termination-Answer (STA) Command . . . . . . . . . 17 + 3.7. Abort-Session-Request (ASR) Command . . . . . . . . . . . 18 + 3.8. Abort-Session-Answer (ASA) Command . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 + 3.9. Accounting-Request (ACR) Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 + 3.10. Accounting-Answer (ACA) Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 + 4. Diameter NAS Application AVPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 + 4.1. Derived AVP Data Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 + 4.1.1. QoSFilterRule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 + 4.2. NAS Session AVPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 + 4.2.1. Call and Session Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 + 4.2.2. NAS-Port AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 + 4.2.3. NAS-Port-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 + 4.2.4. NAS-Port-Type AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 + 4.2.5. Called-Station-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 + 4.2.6. Calling-Station-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 + 4.2.7. Connect-Info AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 + 4.2.8. Originating-Line-Info AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 + 4.2.9. Reply-Message AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 + 4.3. NAS Authentication AVPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 + 4.3.1. User-Password AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 + 4.3.2. Password-Retry AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 + 4.3.3. Prompt AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 + 4.3.4. CHAP-Auth AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 + 4.3.5. CHAP-Algorithm AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 + 4.3.6. CHAP-Ident AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 + 4.3.7. CHAP-Response AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 + 4.3.8. CHAP-Challenge AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 + 4.3.9. ARAP-Password AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 + 4.3.10. ARAP-Challenge-Response AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 + 4.3.11. ARAP-Security AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 + 4.3.12. ARAP-Security-Data AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 + 4.4. NAS Authorization AVPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 + 4.4.1. Service-Type AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 + 4.4.2. Callback-Number AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 + 4.4.3. Callback-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 + 4.4.4. Idle-Timeout AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 + 4.4.5. Port-Limit AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 + 4.4.6. NAS-Filter-Rule AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 + 4.4.7. Filter-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 + 4.4.8. Configuration-Token AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 + 4.4.9. QoS-Filter-Rule AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 + 4.4.10. Framed Access Authorization AVPs . . . . . . . . . . . 36 + 4.4.10.1. Framed-Protocol AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 + 4.4.10.2. Framed-Routing AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 + 4.4.10.3. Framed-MTU AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 + 4.4.10.4. Framed-Compression AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 + 4.4.10.5. IP Access Authorization AVPs . . . . . . . . . . 37 + 4.4.10.5.1. Framed-IP-Address AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 + 4.4.10.5.2. Framed-IP-Netmask AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 + 4.4.10.5.3. Framed-Route AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 + 4.4.10.5.4. Framed-Pool AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 + 4.4.10.5.5. Framed-Interface-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . 38 + 4.4.10.5.6. Framed-IPv6-Prefix AVP . . . . . . . . . . . 38 + 4.4.10.5.7. Framed-IPv6-Route AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 + 4.4.10.5.8. Framed-IPv6-Pool AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 + 4.4.10.6. IPX Access AVPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 + 4.4.10.6.1. Framed-IPX-Network AVP . . . . . . . . . . . 39 + 4.4.10.7. AppleTalk Network Access AVPs . . . . . . . . . . 39 + 4.4.10.7.1. Framed-AppleTalk-Link AVP . . . . . . . . . . 39 + 4.4.10.7.2. Framed-AppleTalk-Network AVP . . . . . . . . 40 + 4.4.10.7.3. Framed-AppleTalk-Zone AVP . . . . . . . . . . 40 + 4.4.10.8. AppleTalk Remote Access AVPs . . . . . . . . . . 40 + 4.4.10.8.1. ARAP-Features AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 + 4.4.10.8.2. ARAP-Zone-Access AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 + 4.4.11. Non-Framed Access Authorization AVPs . . . . . . . . . 41 + 4.4.11.1. Login-IP-Host AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 + 4.4.11.2. Login-IPv6-Host AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 + 4.4.11.3. Login-Service AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 + 4.4.11.4. TCP Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 + 4.4.11.4.1. Login-TCP-Port AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 + 4.4.11.5. LAT Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 + 4.4.11.5.1. Login-LAT-Service AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 + 4.4.11.5.2. Login-LAT-Node AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 + 4.4.11.5.3. Login-LAT-Group AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 + 4.4.11.5.4. Login-LAT-Port AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 + 4.5. NAS Tunneling AVPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 + 4.5.1. Tunneling AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 + 4.5.2. Tunnel-Type AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 + 4.5.3. Tunnel-Medium-Type AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 + 4.5.4. Tunnel-Client-Endpoint AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 + 4.5.5. Tunnel-Server-Endpoint AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 + 4.5.6. Tunnel-Password AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 4.5.7. Tunnel-Private-Group-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 - 4.5.8. Tunnel-Assignment-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 - 4.5.9. Tunnel-Preference AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 - 4.5.10. Tunnel-Client-Auth-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 - 4.5.11. Tunnel-Server-Auth-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 - 4.6. NAS Accounting AVPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 - 4.6.1. Accounting-Input-Octets AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 - 4.6.2. Accounting-Output-Octets AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 + 4.5.8. Tunnel-Assignment-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 + 4.5.9. Tunnel-Preference AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 + 4.5.10. Tunnel-Client-Auth-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 + 4.5.11. Tunnel-Server-Auth-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 + 4.6. NAS Accounting AVPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 + 4.6.1. Accounting-Input-Octets AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 + 4.6.2. Accounting-Output-Octets AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 4.6.3. Accounting-Input-Packets AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 - 4.6.4. Accounting-Output-Packets AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 - 4.6.5. Acct-Session-Time AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 - 4.6.6. Acct-Authentic AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 - 4.6.7. Accounting-Auth-Method AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 - 4.6.8. Acct-Delay-Time AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 - 4.6.9. Acct-Link-Count AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 + 4.6.4. Accounting-Output-Packets AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 + 4.6.5. Acct-Session-Time AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 + 4.6.6. Acct-Authentic AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 + 4.6.7. Accounting-Auth-Method AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 + 4.6.8. Acct-Delay-Time AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 + 4.6.9. Acct-Link-Count AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 4.6.10. Acct-Tunnel-Connection AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 - 4.6.11. Acct-Tunnel-Packets-Lost AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 - 5. AVP Occurrence Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 - 5.1. AA-Request/Answer AVP Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 - 5.2. Accounting AVP Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 - 5.2.1. Framed Access Accounting AVP Table . . . . . . . . . . 59 - 5.2.2. Non-Framed Access Accounting AVP Table . . . . . . . . 61 - 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 - 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 + 4.6.11. Acct-Tunnel-Packets-Lost AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 + 5. AVP Occurrence Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 + 5.1. AA-Request/Answer AVP Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 + 5.2. Accounting AVP Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 + 5.2.1. Framed Access Accounting AVP Table . . . . . . . . . . 58 + 5.2.2. Non-Framed Access Accounting AVP Table . . . . . . . . 60 + 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 + 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 + 7.1. Authentication Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 + 7.2. AVP Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 - 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 - Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 - A.1. RFC 4005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 - A.2. RFC 4005bis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 + 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 + Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 + A.1. This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 + A.2. RFC 4005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 1. Introduction This document describes the Diameter protocol application used for AAA in the Network Access Server (NAS) environment. When combined - with the Diameter Base protocol [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis], Transport - Profile [RFC3539], and EAP [RFC4072] specifications, this - specification satisfies the NAS-related requirements defined in - Aboba, et al. [RFC2989] and Beadles & Mitton [RFC3169]. + with the Diameter Base protocol [RFC6733], Transport Profile + [RFC3539], and EAP [RFC4072] specifications, this specification + satisfies the NAS-related requirements defined in Aboba, et + al. [RFC2989] and Beadles & Mitton [RFC3169]. First, this document describes the operation of a Diameter NAS application. Then it defines the Diameter message Command-Codes. The following sections list the AVPs used in these messages, grouped by common usage. These are session identification, authentication, authorization, tunneling, and accounting. The authorization AVPs are further broken down by service type. 1.1. Changes from RFC 4005 This document obsoletes RFC 4005 and is not backward compatible with - that document. An overview of some the major changes are given + that document. An overview of some of the major changes is given below. o All of the material regarding RADIUS/Diameter protocol interactions has been removed. - o The Command Code Format (CCF) [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis] for the - Accounting-Request and Accounting-Answer messages has been changed - to explicitly require the inclusion of the Acct-Application-Id AVP - and exclude the Vendor-Specific-Application-Id AVP. Normally, - this type of change would also require the allocation of a new - command code and consequently, a new application-id (See Section - 1.3.3 of [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis]). However, the presence of an - instance of the Acct-Application-Id AVP was required in RFC 4005, - as well: + o The Command Code Format (CCF) [RFC6733] for the Accounting-Request + and Accounting-Answer messages has been changed to explicitly + require the inclusion of the Acct-Application-Id AVP and exclude + the Vendor-Specific-Application-Id AVP. Normally, this type of + change would also require the allocation of a new command code and + consequently, a new application-id (See Section 1.3.3 of + [RFC6733]). However, the presence of an instance of the Acct- + Application-Id AVP was required in RFC 4005, as well: The ACR message [BASE] is sent by the NAS to report its session information to a target server downstream. Either of Acct-Application-Id or Vendor-Specific-Application-Id AVPs MUST be present. If the Vendor-Specific-Application-Id grouped AVP is present, it must have an Acct-Application-Id inside. Thus, though the syntax of the commands has changed, the semantics have not (with the caveat that the Acct-Application-Id AVP can no longer be contained in the Vendor-Specific-Application-Id AVP). o The lists of RADIUS attribute values have been deleted in favor of references to the appropriate IANA registries. o The accounting model to be used is now specified (see Section 1.6). - There are many other many miscellaneous fixes that have been - introduced in this document that may not be considered significant - but they are useful nonetheless. Examples are fixes to example IP - addresses, addition of clarifying references, etc. All of the errata - previously filed against RFC 4005 have been fixed. A comprehensive - list of changes is not shown here for practical reasons. + There are many other miscellaneous fixes that have been introduced in + this document that may not be considered significant but they are + useful nonetheless. Examples are fixes to example IP addresses, + addition of clarifying references, etc. All of the errata previously + filed against RFC 4005 have been fixed. A comprehensive list of + changes is not shown here for practical reasons. 1.2. Terminology - Section 1.2 of the Diameter base protocol specification - [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis] defines most of the terminology used in - this document. Additionally, the following terms and acronyms are - used in this application: + Section 1.2 of the Diameter base protocol specification [RFC6733] + defines most of the terminology used in this document. Additionally, + the following terms and acronyms are used in this application: NAS (Network Access Server) A device that provides an access service for a user to a network. The service may be a network connection or a value-added service such as terminal emulation [RFC2881]. PPP (Point-to-Point Protocol) A multiprotocol serial datalink. PPP is the primary IP datalink used for dial-in NAS connection service [RFC1661]. @@ -310,183 +310,175 @@ The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. 1.4. Advertising Application Support Diameter nodes conforming to this specification MUST advertise support by including the value of one (1) in the Auth-Application-Id - of the Capabilities-Exchange-Request (CER) message. + of the Capabilities-Exchange-Request (CER) message [RFC6733]. 1.5. Application Identification When used in this application, the Auth-Application-Id AVP MUST be set to the value one (1) in the following messages o AA-Request (Section 3.1) - o Re-Auth-Request(Section 3.3) o Session-Termination-Request (Section 3.5) o Abort-Session-Request (Section 3.7) 1.6. Accounting Model It is RECOMMENDED that the coupled accounting model (Section 9.3 of - [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis]) be used with this application; therefore, - the value of the Acct-Application-Id AVP in the Accounting-Request - (Section 3.10) and Accounting-Answer (Section 3.9) messages SHOULD be - set to one (1). + [RFC6733]) be used with this application; therefore, the value of the + Acct-Application-Id AVP in the Accounting-Request (Section 3.10) and + Accounting-Answer (Section 3.9) messages SHOULD be set to one (1). 2. NAS Calls, Ports, and Sessions The arrival of a new call or service connection at a port of a - Network Access Server (NAS) starts a Diameter NAS message exchange. - Information about the call, the identity of the user, and the user's - authentication information are packaged into a Diameter AA-Request - (AAR) message and sent to a server. + Network Access Server (NAS) starts a Diameter NAS Application message + exchange. Information about the call, the identity of the user, and + the user's authentication information are packaged into a Diameter + AA-Request (AAR) message and sent to a server. The server processes the information and responds with a Diameter AA- Answer (AAA) message that contains authorization information for the NAS, or a failure code (Result-Code AVP). A value of DIAMETER_MULTI_ROUND_AUTH indicates an additional authentication exchange, and several AAR and AAA messages may be exchanged until the transaction completes. Depending on the value of the Auth-Request-Type AVP, the Diameter protocol allows authorization-only requests that contain no authentication information from the client. This capability goes beyond the Call Check capabilities provided by RADIUS (Section 5.6 of - [RFC2865]) in that no access decision is requested. As a result, - service cannot be started as a result of a response to an + [RFC2865]) in that no access decision is requested. As a result, a + new session cannot be started as a result of a response to an authorization-only request without introducing a significant security vulnerability. 2.1. Diameter Session Establishment When the authentication or authorization exchange completes successfully, the NAS application SHOULD start a session context. If the Result-Code of DIAMETER_MULTI_ROUND_AUTH is returned, the exchange continues until a success or error is returned. If accounting is active, the application MUST also send an Accounting - message [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis]. An Accounting-Record-Type of - START_RECORD is sent for a new session. If a session fails to start, - the EVENT_RECORD message is sent with the reason for the failure - described. + message [RFC6733]. An Accounting-Record-Type of START_RECORD is sent + for a new session. If a session fails to start, the EVENT_RECORD + message is sent with the reason for the failure described. Note that the return of an unsupportable Accounting-Realtime-Required - value [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis] would result in a failure to - establish the session. + value [RFC6733] would result in a failure to establish the session. 2.2. Diameter Session Reauthentication or Reauthorization The Diameter Base protocol allows users to be periodically reauthenticated and/or reauthorized. In such instances, the Session-Id AVP in the AAR message MUST be the same as the one present in the original authentication/authorization message. A Diameter server informs the NAS of the maximum time allowed before reauthentication or reauthorization via the Authorization-Lifetime - AVP [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis]. A NAS MAY reauthenticate and/or - reauthorize before the end, but A NAS MUST reauthenticate and/or - reauthorize at the end of the period provided by the Authorization- - Lifetime AVP. The failure of a reauthentication exchange will - terminate the service. + AVP [RFC6733]. A NAS MAY reauthenticate and/or reauthorize before + the end, but A NAS MUST reauthenticate and/or reauthorize at the end + of the period provided by the Authorization-Lifetime AVP. The + failure of a reauthentication exchange will terminate the service. Furthermore, it is possible for Diameter servers to issue an unsolicited reauthentication and/or reauthorization request (e.g., - Re-Auth-Request (RAR) message [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis]) to the NAS. - Upon receipt of such a message, the NAS MUST respond to the request - with a Re-Auth-Answer (RAA) message [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis]. + Re-Auth-Request (RAR) message [RFC6733]) to the NAS. Upon receipt of + such a message, the NAS MUST respond to the request with a Re-Auth- + Answer (RAA) message [RFC6733]. If the RAR properly identifies an active session, the NAS will initiate a new local reauthentication or authorization sequence as indicated by the Re-Auth-Request-Type value. This will cause the NAS to send a new AAR message using the existing Session-Id. The server will respond with an AAA message to specify the new service parameters. If accounting is active, every change of authentication or authorization SHOULD generate an accounting message. If the NAS service is a continuation of the prior user context, then an Accounting-Record-Type of INTERIM_RECORD indicating the new session attributes and cumulative status would be appropriate. If a new user or a significant change in authorization is detected by the NAS, then the service may send two messages of the types STOP_RECORD and START_RECORD. Accounting may change the subsession identifiers (Acct-Session-ID, or Acct-Sub-Session-Id) to indicate such sub- sessions. A service may also use a different Session-Id value for - accounting (see Section 9.6 of [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis]). + accounting (see Section 9.6 of [RFC6733]). However, the Diameter Session-ID AVP value used for the initial authorization exchange MUST be used to generate an STR message when the session context is terminated. 2.3. Diameter Session Termination When a NAS receives an indication that a user's session is being disconnected by the client (e.g., an LCP Terminate-Request message [RFC1661] is received) or an administrative command, the NAS MUST - issue a Session-Termination-Request (STR) [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis] - to its Diameter Server. This will ensure that any resources - maintained on the servers are freed appropriately. + issue a Session-Termination-Request (STR) [RFC6733] to its Diameter + Server. This will ensure that any resources maintained on the + servers are freed appropriately. Furthermore, a NAS that receives an Abort-Session-Request (ASR) - [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis] MUST issue an Abort-Session-Answer (ASA) - if the session identified is active and disconnect the PPP (or - tunneling) session. + [RFC6733] MUST issue an Abort-Session-Answer (ASA) if the session + identified is active and disconnect the PPP (or tunneling) session. - If accounting is active, an Accounting STOP_RECORD message - [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis] MUST be sent upon termination of the - session context. + If accounting is active, an Accounting STOP_RECORD message [RFC6733] + MUST be sent upon termination of the session context. More information on Diameter Session Termination can be found in - Sections 8.4 and 8.5 of [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis]. + Sections 8.4 and 8.5 of [RFC6733]. 3. Diameter NAS Application Messages - This section defines the Diameter message Command-Code - [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis] values that MUST be supported by all - Diameter implementations conforming to this specification. The - Command Codes are as follows: + This section defines the Diameter message Command-Code [RFC6733] + values that MUST be supported by all Diameter implementations + conforming to this specification. The Command Codes are as follows: +-----------------------------------+---------+------+--------------+ | Command Name | Abbrev. | Code | Reference | +-----------------------------------+---------+------+--------------+ | AA-Request | AAR | 265 | Section 3.1 | | AA-Answer | AAA | 265 | Section 3.2 | | Re-Auth-Request | RAR | 258 | Section 3.3 | | Re-Auth-Answer | RAA | 258 | Section 3.4 | | Session-Termination-Request | STR | 275 | Section 3.5 | | Session-Termination-Answer | STA | 275 | Section 3.6 | | Abort-Session-Request | ASR | 274 | Section 3.7 | | Abort-Session-Answer | ASA | 274 | Section 3.8 | | Accounting-Request | ACR | 271 | Section 3.9 | | Accounting-Answer | ACA | 271 | Section 3.10 | +-----------------------------------+---------+------+--------------+ Note that the message formats in the following sub-sections use the - standard Diameter Command Code Format ([I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis], - Section 3.2). + standard Diameter Command Code Format ([RFC6733], Section 3.2). 3.1. AA-Request (AAR) Command The AA-Request (AAR), which is indicated by setting the Command-Code field to 265 and the 'R' bit in the Command Flags field, is used to request authentication and/or authorization for a given NAS user. + The type of request is identified through the Auth-Request-Type AVP - [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis]. The recommended value for most - situations is AUTHORIZE_AUTHENTICATE. + [RFC6733]. The recommended value for most situations is + AUTHORIZE_AUTHENTICATE. If Authentication is requested, the User-Name attribute SHOULD be present, as well as any additional authentication AVPs that would carry the password information. A request for authorization SHOULD only include the information from which the authorization will be performed, such as the User-Name, Called-Station-Id, or Calling- Station-Id AVPs. All requests SHOULD contain AVPs uniquely identifying the source of the call, such as Origin-Host and NAS-Port. Certain networks MAY use different AVPs for authorization purposes. A request for authorization will include some AVPs defined in @@ -567,24 +559,24 @@ defined in Section 4.4. For authentication exchanges requiring more than a single round trip, the server MUST set the Result-Code AVP to DIAMETER_MULTI_ROUND_AUTH. An AAA message with this result code MAY include one Reply-Message or more and MAY include zero or one State AVPs. If the Reply-Message AVP was present, the network access server SHOULD send the text to the user's client to display to the user, instructing the client to prompt the user for a response. For - example, this capability can be achieved in PPP via PAP. If the - access client is unable to prompt the user for a new response, it - MUST treat the AA-Answer (AAA) with the Reply-Message AVP as an error - and deny access. + example, this can be achieved in PPP via PAP. If it is impossible to + deliver the text prompt to the user, the Diameter NAS Application + client MUST treat the AA-Answer (AAA) with the Reply-Message AVP as + an error and deny access. Message Format ::= < Diameter Header: 265, PXY > < Session-Id > { Auth-Application-Id } { Auth-Request-Type } { Result-Code } { Origin-Host } { Origin-Realm } @@ -641,30 +633,29 @@ [ Login-LAT-Node ] [ Login-LAT-Port ] [ Login-LAT-Service ] [ Login-Service ] [ Login-TCP-Port ] * [ NAS-Filter-Rule ] * [ QoS-Filter-Rule ] * [ Tunneling ] * [ Redirect-Host ] [ Redirect-Host-Usage ] - [ Redirect-Max-Cache-Time ] * [ Proxy-Info ] * [ AVP ] 3.3. Re-Auth-Request (RAR) Command - A Diameter server may initiate a re-authentication and/or re- - authorization service for a particular session by issuing a Re-Auth- - Request (RAR) message [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis]. + A Diameter server can initiate re-authentication and/or re- + authorization for a particular session by issuing a Re-Auth-Request + (RAR) message [RFC6733]. For example, for pre-paid services, the Diameter server that originally authorized a session may need some confirmation that the user is still using the services. If a NAS receives an RAR message with Session-Id equal to a currently active session and a Re-Auth-Type that includes authentication, it MUST initiate a re-authentication toward the user, if the service supports this particular feature. @@ -698,23 +689,23 @@ [ Acct-Multi-Session-Id ] [ State ] * [ Class ] [ Reply-Message ] * [ Proxy-Info ] * [ Route-Record ] * [ AVP ] 3.4. Re-Auth-Answer (RAA) Command - The Re-Auth-Answer (RAA) message [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis] is sent - in response to the RAR. The Result-Code AVP MUST be present and - indicates the disposition of the request. + The Re-Auth-Answer (RAA) message [RFC6733] is sent in response to the + RAR. The Result-Code AVP MUST be present and indicates the + disposition of the request. A successful RAA transaction MUST be followed by an AAR message. Message Format ::= < Diameter Header: 258, PXY > < Session-Id > { Result-Code } { Origin-Host } { Origin-Realm } @@ -735,24 +726,23 @@ [ Re-Auth-Request-Type ] [ State ] * [ Class ] * [ Reply-Message ] [ Prompt ] * [ Proxy-Info ] * [ AVP ] 3.5. Session-Termination-Request (STR) Command - The Session-Termination-Request (STR) message - [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis] is sent by the NAS to inform the Diameter - Server that an authenticated and/or authorized session is being - terminated. + The Session-Termination-Request (STR) message [RFC6733] is sent by + the NAS to inform the Diameter Server that an authenticated and/or + authorized session is being terminated. Message Format ::= < Diameter Header: 275, REQ, PXY > < Session-Id > { Origin-Host } { Origin-Realm } { Destination-Realm } { Auth-Application-Id } { Termination-Cause } @@ -760,30 +750,30 @@ [ Destination-Host ] * [ Class ] [ Origin-AAA-Protocol ] [ Origin-State-Id ] * [ Proxy-Info ] * [ Route-Record ] * [ AVP ] 3.6. Session-Termination-Answer (STA) Command - The Session-Termination-Answer (STA) message - [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis] is sent by the Diameter Server to - acknowledge the notification that the session has been terminated. - The Result-Code AVP MUST be present and MAY contain an indication - that an error occurred while the STR was being serviced. + The Session-Termination-Answer (STA) message [RFC6733] is sent by the + Diameter Server to acknowledge the notification that the session has + been terminated. The Result-Code AVP MUST be present and MAY contain + an indication that an error occurred while the STR was being + serviced. - Upon sending or receiving the STA, the Diameter Server MUST release - all resources for the session indicated by the Session-Id AVP. Any - intermediate server in the Proxy-Chain MAY also release any - resources, if necessary. + Upon sending the STA, the Diameter Server MUST release all resources + for the session indicated by the Session-Id AVP. Any intermediate + server in the Proxy-Chain MAY also release any resources, if + necessary. Message Format ::= < Diameter Header: 275, PXY > < Session-Id > { Result-Code } { Origin-Host } { Origin-Realm } [ User-Name ] * [ Class ] @@ -793,24 +783,23 @@ [ Origin-AAA-Protocol ] [ Origin-State-Id ] * [ Redirect-Host ] [ Redirect-Host-Usase ] [ Redirect-Max-Cache-Time ] * [ Proxy-Info ] * [ AVP ] 3.7. Abort-Session-Request (ASR) Command - The Abort-Session-Request (ASR) message [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis] - may be sent by any Diameter server to the NAS providing session - service, to request that the session identified by the Session-Id be - stopped. + The Abort-Session-Request (ASR) message [RFC6733] can be sent by any + Diameter server to the NAS providing session service to request that + the session identified by the Session-Id be stopped. Message Format ::= < Diameter Header: 274, REQ, PXY > < Session-Id > { Origin-Host } { Origin-Realm } { Destination-Realm } { Destination-Host } { Auth-Application-Id } @@ -834,23 +823,23 @@ [ Acct-Multi-Session-Id ] [ State ] * [ Class ] * [ Reply-Message ] * [ Proxy-Info ] * [ Route-Record ] * [ AVP ] 3.8. Abort-Session-Answer (ASA) Command - The ASA message [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis] is sent in response to the - ASR. The Result-Code AVP MUST be present and indicates the - disposition of the request. + The ASA message [RFC6733] is sent in response to the ASR. The + Result-Code AVP MUST be present and indicates the disposition of the + request. If the session identified by Session-Id in the ASR was successfully terminated, Result-Code is set to DIAMETER_SUCCESS. If the session is not currently active, the Result-Code AVP is set to DIAMETER_UNKNOWN_SESSION_ID. If the access device does not stop the session for any other reason, the Result-Code AVP is set to DIAMETER_UNABLE_TO_COMPLY. Message Format @@ -867,29 +856,29 @@ [ Error-Reporting-Host ] * [ Failed-AVP ] * [ Redirected-Host ] [ Redirected-Host-Usage ] [ Redirected-Max-Cache-Time ] * [ Proxy-Info ] * [ AVP ] 3.9. Accounting-Request (ACR) Command - The ACR message [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis] is sent by the NAS to - report its session information to a target server downstream. + The ACR message [RFC6733] is sent by the NAS to report its session + information to a target server downstream. The Acct-Application-Id AVP MUST be present. - The AVPs listed in the Base protocol specification - [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis] MUST be assumed to be present, as - appropriate. NAS service-specific accounting AVPs SHOULD be present - as described in Section 4.6 and the rest of this specification. + The AVPs listed in the Base protocol specification [RFC6733] MUST be + assumed to be present, as appropriate. NAS service-specific + accounting AVPs SHOULD be present as described in Section 4.6 and the + rest of this specification. Message Format ::= < Diameter Header: 271, REQ, PXY > < Session-Id > { Origin-Host } { Origin-Realm } { Destination-Realm } { Accounting-Record-Type } { Accounting-Record-Number } @@ -963,33 +952,33 @@ [ Login-LAT-Service ] [ Login-Service ] [ Login-TCP-Port ] * [ Tunneling ] * [ Proxy-Info ] * [ Route-Record ] * [ AVP ] 3.10. Accounting-Answer (ACA) Command - The ACA message [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis] is used to acknowledge an - Accounting-Request command. The Accounting-Answer command contains - the same Session-Id as the Request. + The ACA message [RFC6733] is used to acknowledge an Accounting- + Request command. The Accounting-Answer command contains the same + Session-Id as the Request. Only the target Diameter Server or home Diameter Server SHOULD respond with the Accounting-Answer command. The Acct-Application-Id AVP MUST be present. - The AVPs listed in the Base protocol specification - [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis] MUST be assumed to be present, as - appropriate. NAS service-specific accounting AVPs SHOULD be present - as described in Section 4.6 and the rest of this specification. + The AVPs listed in the Base protocol specification [RFC6733] MUST be + assumed to be present, as appropriate. NAS service-specific + accounting AVPs SHOULD be present as described in Section 4.6 and the + rest of this specification. Message Format ::= < Diameter Header: 271, PXY > < Session-Id > { Result-Code } { Origin-Host } { Origin-Realm } { Accounting-Record-Type } { Accounting-Record-Number } @@ -1051,47 +1040,47 @@ QoSFilterRule filters MUST follow the following format: action dir proto from src to dst [options] where action tag Mark packet with a specific DSCP [RFC2474] meter Meter traffic dir The format is as described under IPFilterRule - [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis] + [RFC6733] proto The format is as described under IPFilterRule - [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis] + [RFC6733] src and dst The format is as described under IPFilterRule - [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis] + [RFC6733] The options are described in Section 4.4.9. The rule syntax is a modified subset of ipfw(8) from FreeBSD, and the ipfw.c code may provide a useful base for implementations. 4.2. NAS Session AVPs Diameter reserves the AVP Codes 0 - 255 for RADIUS Attributes that are implemented in Diameter. 4.2.1. Call and Session Information This section describes the AVPs specific to Diameter applications that are needed to identify the call and session context and status information. On a request, this information allows the server to qualify the session. These AVPs are used in addition to the following AVPs from the base - protocol specification [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis]: + protocol specification [RFC6733]: Session-Id Auth-Application-Id Origin-Host Origin-Realm Auth-Request-Type Termination-Cause The following table gives the possible flag values for the session level AVPs. @@ -1120,78 +1109,78 @@ the user. Note that "port" is meant in its sense as a service connection on the NAS, not as an IP protocol identifier. Either the NAS-Port AVP or the NAS-Port-Id AVP (Section 4.2.3) SHOULD be present in the AA-Request (AAR, Section 3.1) command if the NAS differentiates among its ports. 4.2.3. NAS-Port-Id AVP The NAS-Port-Id AVP (AVP Code 87) is of type UTF8String and consists - of ASCII text identifying the port of the NAS authenticating the - user. Note that "port" is meant in its sense as a service connection - on the NAS, not as an IP protocol identifier. + of 7-bit ASCII text identifying the port of the NAS authenticating + the user. Note that "port" is meant in its sense as a service + connection on the NAS, not as an IP protocol identifier. Either the NAS-Port-Id AVP or the NAS-Port AVP (Section 4.2.2) SHOULD be present in the AA-Request (AAR, Section 3.1) command if the NAS differentiates among its ports. NAS-Port-Id is intended for use by NASes that cannot conveniently number their ports. 4.2.4. NAS-Port-Type AVP The NAS-Port-Type AVP (AVP Code 61) is of type Enumerated and contains the type of the port on which the NAS is authenticating the user. This AVP SHOULD be present if the NAS uses the same NAS-Port number ranges for different service types concurrently. The currently supported values of the NAS-Port-Type AVP are listed in [RADIUSAttrVals]. 4.2.5. Called-Station-Id AVP The Called-Station-Id AVP (AVP Code 30) is of type UTF8String and - allows the NAS to send the ASCII string describing the Layer 2 + allows the NAS to send a 7-bit ASCII string describing the Layer 2 address the user contacted in the request. For dialup access, this can be a phone number obtained by using the Dialed Number Identification Service (DNIS) or a similar technology. Note that this may be different from the phone number the call comes in on. For use with IEEE 802 access, the Called-Station-Id MAY contain a MAC address formatted as described in Congdon, et al. [RFC3580]. If the Called-Station-Id AVP is present in an AAR message, Auth- Request-Type AVP is set to AUTHORIZE_ONLY and the User-Name AVP is absent, the Diameter Server MAY perform authorization based on this AVP. This can be used by a NAS to request whether a call should be answered based on the DNIS result. - The codification of this field's allowed usage range is outside the - scope of this specification. + Further codification of this field's allowed content and usage is + outside the scope of this specification. 4.2.6. Calling-Station-Id AVP The Calling-Station-Id AVP (AVP Code 31) is of type UTF8String and - allows the NAS to send the ASCII string describing the Layer 2 + allows the NAS to send a 7-bit ASCII string describing the Layer 2 address from which the user connected in the request. For dialup access, this is the phone number the call came from, using Automatic Number Identification (ANI) or a similar technology. For use with IEEE 802 access, the Calling-Station-Id AVP MAY contain a MAC address, formated as described in RFC 3580. If the Calling-Station-Id AVP is present in an AAR message, the Auth- Request-Type AVP is set to AUTHORIZE_ONLY and the User-Name AVP is absent, the Diameter Server MAY perform authorization based on the value of this AVP. This can be used by a NAS to request whether a call should be answered based on the Layer 2 address (ANI, MAC Address, etc.) - The codification of this field's allowed usage range is outside the - scope of this specification. + Further codification of this field's allowed content and usage is + outside the scope of this specification. 4.2.7. Connect-Info AVP The Connect-Info AVP (AVP Code 77) is of type UTF8String and is sent in the AA-Request message or an ACR message with the value of the Accounting-Record-Type AVP set to STOP. When sent in the AA-Request, it indicates the nature of the user's connection. The connection speed SHOULD be included at the beginning of the first Connect-Info AVP in the message. If the transmit and receive connection speeds differ, both may be included in the first AVP with the transmit speed @@ -1239,22 +1228,21 @@ another AA-Request attempt. When used in an AA-Answer message containing a Result-Code AVP with the value DIAMETER_MULTI_ROUND_AUTH or in an Re-Auth-Request message, it MAY contain text to prompt the user for a response. 4.3. NAS Authentication AVPs This section defines the AVPs necessary to carry the authentication information in the Diameter protocol. The functionality defined here provides a RADIUS-like AAA service [RFC2865] over a more reliable and - secure transport, as defined in the base protocol - [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis]. + secure transport, as defined in the base protocol [RFC6733]. The following table gives the possible flag values for the session level AVPs. +----------+ | AVP Flag | | rules | |----+-----| |MUST| MUST| Attribute Name Section Defined | | NOT| @@ -1274,25 +1262,25 @@ -----------------------------------------|----+-----| 4.3.1. User-Password AVP The User-Password AVP (AVP Code 2) is of type OctetString and contains the password of the user to be authenticated, or the user's input in a multi-round authentication exchange. The User-Password AVP contains a user password or one-time password and therefore represents sensitive information. As required by - Fajardo, et al. [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis], Diameter messages are - encrypted by using IPsec [RFC4301] or TLS [RFC5246]. Unless this AVP - is used for one-time passwords, the User-Password AVP SHOULD NOT be - used in untrusted proxy environments without encrypting it by using - end-to-end security techniques. + Fajardo, et al. [RFC6733], Diameter messages are encrypted by using + IPsec [RFC4301] or TLS [RFC5246]. Unless this AVP is used for one- + time passwords, the User-Password AVP SHOULD NOT be used in untrusted + proxy environments without encrypting it by using end-to-end security + techniques. The clear-text password (prior to encryption) MUST NOT be longer than 128 bytes in length. 4.3.2. Password-Retry AVP The Password-Retry AVP (AVP Code 75) is of type Unsigned32 and MAY be included in the AA-Answer if the Result-Code indicates an authentication failure. The value of this AVP indicates how many authentication attempts a user is permitted before being @@ -1373,30 +1361,29 @@ DES encryption on this value with the authenticating user's password as the key. If the user's password is fewer than 8 octets in length, the password is padded at the end with NULL octets to a length of 8 before it is used as a key. 4.3.11. ARAP-Security AVP The ARAP-Security AVP (AVP Code 73) is of type Unsigned32 and MAY be present in the AA-Answer message if the Framed-Protocol AVP (Section 4.4.10.1) is set to the value of ARAP, and the Result-Code - AVP ([I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis], Section 7.1) is set to - DIAMETER_MULTI_ROUND_AUTH. See RFC 2869 for more information on the - contents of this AVP. + AVP ([RFC6733], Section 7.1) is set to DIAMETER_MULTI_ROUND_AUTH. + See RFC 2869 for more information on the contents of this AVP. 4.3.12. ARAP-Security-Data AVP The ARAP-Security-Data AVP (AVP Code 74) is of type OctetString and MAY be present in the AA-Request or AA-Answer message if the Framed- Protocol AVP (Section 4.4.10.1) is set to the value of ARAP and the - Result-Code AVP ([I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis], Section 7.1) is set to + Result-Code AVP ([RFC6733], Section 7.1) is set to DIAMETER_MULTI_ROUND_AUTH. This AVP contains the security module challenge or response associated with the ARAP Security Module specified in the ARAP-Security AVP (Section 4.3.11). 4.4. NAS Authorization AVPs This section contains the authorization AVPs supported in the NAS Application. The Service-Type AVP SHOULD be present in all messages and, based on its value, additional AVPs defined in this section and Section 4.5 MAY be present. @@ -1532,22 +1519,23 @@ 4.4.6. NAS-Filter-Rule AVP The NAS-Filter-Rule AVP (AVP Code 400) is of type IPFilterRule and provides filter rules that need to be configured on the NAS for the user. One or more of these AVPs MAY be present in an authorization response. 4.4.7. Filter-Id AVP The Filter-Id AVP (AVP Code 11) is of type UTF8String and contains - the name of the filter list for this user. Zero or more Filter-Id - AVPs MAY be sent in an authorization answer. + the name of the filter list for this user. It is intended to be + human-readable. Zero or more Filter-Id AVPs MAY be sent in an + authorization answer message. Identifying a filter list by name allows the filter to be used on different NASes without regard to filter-list implementation details. However, this AVP is not roaming-friendly, as filter naming differs from one service provider to another. In environments where backward compatibility with RADIUS is not required, it is RECOMMENDED that the NAS-Filter-Rule AVP (Section 4.4.6) be used instead. @@ -1664,23 +1652,23 @@ contains the four octets of the IPv4 netmask to be configured for the user when the user is a router to a network. It MAY be used in an authorization request as a hint to the server that a specific netmask is desired, but the server is not required to honor the hint in the corresponding response. This AVP MUST be present in a response if the request included this AVP with a value of 0xFFFFFFFF. 4.4.10.5.3. Framed-Route AVP The Framed-Route AVP (AVP Code 22) is of type UTF8String and contains - the ASCII routing information to be configured for the user on the - NAS. Zero or more of these AVPs MAY be present in an authorization - response. + the 7-bit ASCII routing information to be configured for the user on + the NAS. Zero or more of these AVPs MAY be present in an + authorization response. The string MUST contain a destination prefix in dotted quad form optionally followed by a slash and a decimal length specifier stating how many high-order bits of the prefix should be used. This is followed by a space, a gateway address in dotted quad form, a space, and one or more metrics separated by spaces; for example, "192.0.2.0/24 192.0.2.1 1" The length specifier may be omitted, in which case it should default @@ -2070,72 +2058,79 @@ 4.5.4. Tunnel-Client-Endpoint AVP The Tunnel-Client-Endpoint AVP (AVP Code 66) is of type UTF8String and contains the address of the initiator end of the tunnel. It MAY be used in an authorization request as a hint to the server that a specific endpoint is desired, but the server is not required to honor the hint in the corresponding response. This AVP SHOULD be included in the corresponding ACR messages, in which case it indicates the address from which the tunnel was initiated. This AVP, along with the Tunnel-Server-Endpoint (Section 4.5.5) and Session-Id AVPs - ([I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis], Section 8.8), can be used to provide a - globally unique means to identify a tunnel for accounting and - auditingpurposes. + ([RFC6733], Section 8.8), can be used to provide a globally unique + means to identify a tunnel for accounting and auditingpurposes. If the value of the Tunnel-Medium-Type AVP (Section 4.5.3) is IPv4 (1), then this string is either the fully qualified domain name (FQDN) of the tunnel client machine, or a "dotted-decimal" IP address. Implementations MUST support the dotted-decimal format and SHOULD support the FQDN format for IP addresses. If Tunnel-Medium-Type is IPv6 (2), then this string is either the FQDN of the tunnel client machine, or a text representation of the address in either the preferred or alternate form [RFC3516]. Conforming implementations MUST support the preferred form and SHOULD support both the alternate text form and the FQDN format for IPv6 addresses. If Tunnel-Medium-Type is neither IPv4 nor IPv6, then this string is a tag referring to configuration data local to the Diameter client that describes the interface or medium-specific client address to use. + Note that this application handles internationalized domain names in + the same way as the Diameter base protocol (see Appendix D of RFC + 6733 for details). + 4.5.5. Tunnel-Server-Endpoint AVP The Tunnel-Server-Endpoint AVP (AVP Code 67) is of type UTF8String and contains the address of the server end of the tunnel. It MAY be used in an authorization request as a hint to the server that a specific endpoint is desired, but the server is not required to honor the hint in the corresponding response. This AVP SHOULD be included in the corresponding ACR messages, in which case it indicates the address from which the tunnel was initiated. This AVP, along with the Tunnel-Client-Endpoint - (Section 4.5.4) and Session-Id AVP ([I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis], - Section 8.8), can be used to provide a globally unique means to - identify a tunnel for accounting and auditing purposes. + (Section 4.5.4) and Session-Id AVP ([RFC6733], Section 8.8), can be + used to provide a globally unique means to identify a tunnel for + accounting and auditing purposes. If Tunnel-Medium-Type is IPv4 (1), then this string is either the fully qualified domain name (FQDN) of the tunnel server machine, or a "dotted-decimal" IP address. Implementations MUST support the dotted-decimal format and SHOULD support the FQDN format for IP addresses. If Tunnel-Medium-Type is IPv6 (2), then this string is either the FQDN of the tunnel server machine, or a text representation of the address in either the preferred or alternate form [RFC3516]. Implementations MUST support the preferred form and SHOULD support both the alternate text form and the FQDN format for IPv6 addresses. If Tunnel-Medium-Type is not IPv4 or IPv6, this string is a tag referring to configuration data local to the Diameter client that describes the interface or medium-specific server address to use. + Note that this application handles internationalized domain names in + the same way as the Diameter base protocol (see Appendix D of RFC + 6733 for details). + 4.5.6. Tunnel-Password AVP The Tunnel-Password AVP (AVP Code 69) is of type OctetString and may contain a password to be used to authenticate to a remote server. The Tunnel-Password AVP SHOULD NOT be used in untrusted proxy environments without encrypting it by using end-to-end security techniques. 4.5.7. Tunnel-Private-Group-Id AVP @@ -2258,30 +2253,29 @@ authorization request as a hint to the server that a specific preference is desired, but the server is not required to honor the hint in the corresponding response. This AVP MUST be present in the authorization response if an authentication name other than the default is desired. This AVP SHOULD be included in the ACR messages pertaining to the tunneled session. 4.6. NAS Accounting AVPs Applications implementing this specification use Diameter Accounting - (as defined in [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis]) and the AVPs in the - following section. Service-specific AVP usage is defined in the - tables in Section 5. + (as defined in [RFC6733]) and the AVPs in the following section. + Service-specific AVP usage is defined in the tables in Section 5. If accounting is active, Accounting Request (ACR) messages SHOULD be sent after the completion of any Authentication or Authorization transaction and at the end of a Session. The value of the - Accounting-Record-Type AVP [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis] indicates the - type of event. All other AVPs identify the session and provide - additional information relevant to the event. + Accounting-Record-Type AVP [RFC6733] indicates the type of event. + All other AVPs identify the session and provide additional + information relevant to the event. The successful completion of the first Authentication or Authorization transaction SHOULD cause a START_RECORD to be sent. If additional Authentications or Authorizations occur in later transactions, the first exchange should generate a START_RECORD, and the later an INTERIM_RECORD. For a given session, there MUST only be one set of matching START and STOP records, with any number of INTERIM_RECORDS in between, or one EVENT_RECORD indicating the reason a session wasn't started. @@ -2308,22 +2302,22 @@ Acct-Tunnel-Packets-Lost 4.6.11 | M | V | -----------------------------------------|----+-----| 4.6.1. Accounting-Input-Octets AVP The Accounting-Input-Octets AVP (AVP Code 363) is of type Unsigned64 and contains the number of octets received from the user. For NAS usage, this AVP indicates how many octets have been received from the port in the course of this session. It can only be present - in ACR messages with an Accounting-Record-Type - [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis] of INTERIM_RECORD or STOP_RECORD. + in ACR messages with an Accounting-Record-Type [RFC6733] of + INTERIM_RECORD or STOP_RECORD. 4.6.2. Accounting-Output-Octets AVP The Accounting-Output-Octets AVP (AVP Code 364) is of type Unsigned64 and contains the number of octets sent to the user. For NAS usage, this AVP indicates how many octets have been sent to the port in the course of this session. It can only be present in ACR messages with an Accounting-Record-Type of INTERIM_RECORD or STOP_RECORD. @@ -2441,23 +2435,23 @@ 4.6.11. Acct-Tunnel-Packets-Lost AVP The Acct-Tunnel-Packets-Lost AVP (AVP Code 86) is of type Unsigned32 and contains the number of packets lost on a given tunnel. 5. AVP Occurrence Tables The following tables present the AVPs used by NAS applications in NAS messages and specify in which Diameter messages they may or may not be present. Messages and AVPs defined in the base Diameter protocol - [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis] are not described in this document. Note - that AVPs that can only be present within a Grouped AVP are not - represented in this table. + [RFC6733] are not described in this document. Note that AVPs that + can only be present within a Grouped AVP are not represented in this + table. The tables use the following symbols: 0 The AVP MUST NOT be present in the message. 0+ Zero or more instances of the AVP MAY be present in the message. 0-1 Zero or one instance of the AVP MAY be present in the message. 1 Exactly one instance of the AVP MUST be present in the message. @@ -2568,21 +2562,21 @@ Tunneling | 0+ | 0+ | User-Name | 0-1 | 0-1 | User-Password | 0-1 | 0 | ------------------------------|-----+-----+ 5.2. Accounting AVP Tables The tables in this section are used to show which AVPs defined in this document are to be present and used in NAS application Accounting messages. These AVPs are defined in this document, as - well as in [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis] and [RFC2866]. + well as in [RFC6733] and [RFC2866]. 5.2.1. Framed Access Accounting AVP Table The table in this section is used when the Service-Type AVP (Section 4.4.1) specifies Framed Access. +-----------+ | Command | |-----+-----+ Attribute Name | ACR | ACA | @@ -2758,247 +2752,258 @@ in the "Application IDs" sub-registry of the "Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) Parameters" registry to point to this document, as well. RFC Editor: Please remove both this note and the IANA note above before publication. 7. Security Considerations This document describes the extension of Diameter for the NAS - application. The security considerations of the Diameter protocol - itself are discussed in [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis]. Use of this - application of Diameter MUST take into consideration the security - issues and requirements of the Base protocol. + application. Security considerations regarding the Diameter protocol + itself are discussed in [RFC6733]. Use of this application of + Diameter MUST take into consideration the security issues and + requirements of the Base protocol. - The use of the User-Password (Section 4.3.1) and Tunnel-Password - (Section 4.5.6) AVPs is not safe in the absence of end-to-end - security; however, end-to-end security for the Diameter protocol is - outside the scope of this document. +7.1. Authentication Considerations This document does not contain a security protocol but does discuss how PPP authentication protocols can be carried within the Diameter protocol. The PPP authentication protocols described are PAP and CHAP. The use of PAP SHOULD be discouraged, as it exposes users' passwords to possibly non-trusted entities. However, PAP is also frequently used for use with One-Time Passwords, which do not expose a security risk. This document also describes how CHAP can be carried within the Diameter protocol, which is required for RADIUS backward compatibility. The CHAP protocol, as used in a RADIUS environment, facilitates authentication replay attacks. The use of the EAP authentication protocols [RFC4072] can offer better security, given a method suitable for the circumstances. +7.2. AVP Considerations + + Diameter AVPs often contain security-sensitive data; for example, + user passwords and location data, network addresses and cryptographic + keys. With the exception of the Configuration-Token (Section 4.4.8), + QoS-Filter-Rule (Section 4.4.9) and Tunneling (Section 4.5.1) AVPs, + all of the AVPs defined in this document are considered to be + security-sensitive. + + Diameter messages containing any AVPs considered to be security- + sensitive MUST only be sent protected via mutually authenticated TLS + or IPsec. In addition, those messages MUST NOT be sent via + intermediate nodes unless there is end-to-end security between the + originator and recipient or the originator has locally trusted + configuration that indicates that end-to-end security is not needed. + For example, end-to-end security may not be required in the case + where an intermediary node is known to be operated as part of the + same administrative domain as the endpoints so that an ability to + successfully compromise the intermediary would imply a high + probability of being able to compromise the endpoints as well. Note + that no end-to-end security mechanism is specified in this document. + 8. References 8.1. Normative References - [ANITypes] NANPA Number Resource Info, "ANI - Assignments", . - [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis] Fajardo, V., Arkko, J., Loughney, J., and - G. Zorn, "Diameter Base Protocol", - draft-ietf-dime-rfc3588bis-34 (work in - progress), June 2012. - [RFC1994] Simpson, W., "PPP Challenge Handshake - Authentication Protocol (CHAP)", - RFC 1994, August 1996. + Authentication Protocol (CHAP)", RFC 1994, + August 1996. - [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs - to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, - RFC 2119, March 1997. + [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to + Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, + March 1997. - [RFC2865] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and - W. Simpson, "Remote Authentication Dial - In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 2865, - June 2000. + [RFC2865] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. + Simpson, "Remote Authentication Dial In User + Service (RADIUS)", RFC 2865, June 2000. - [RFC3162] Aboba, B., Zorn, G., and D. Mitton, - "RADIUS and IPv6", RFC 3162, August 2001. + [RFC3162] Aboba, B., Zorn, G., and D. Mitton, "RADIUS and + IPv6", RFC 3162, August 2001. - [RFC3516] Nerenberg, L., "IMAP4 Binary Content - Extension", RFC 3516, April 2003. + [RFC3516] Nerenberg, L., "IMAP4 Binary Content Extension", + RFC 3516, April 2003. [RFC3539] Aboba, B. and J. Wood, "Authentication, - Authorization and Accounting (AAA) - Transport Profile", RFC 3539, June 2003. + Authorization and Accounting (AAA) Transport + Profile", RFC 3539, June 2003. + + [RFC5777] Korhonen, J., Tschofenig, H., Arumaithurai, M., + Jones, M., and A. Lior, "Traffic Classification + and Quality of Service (QoS) Attributes for + Diameter", RFC 5777, February 2010. + + [RFC6733] Fajardo, V., Arkko, J., Loughney, J., and G. Zorn, + "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 6733, October 2012. 8.2. Informative References - [ARAP] Apple Computer, "Apple Remote Access - Protocol (ARAP) Version 2.0 External - Reference Specification", R0612LL/B , - September 1994. + [ARAP] Apple Computer, "Apple Remote Access Protocol + (ARAP) Version 2.0 External Reference + Specification", R0612LL/B , September 1994. [AVP-Codes] "IANA AAA AVP Codes Registry", . [AVP-Vals] "IANA AAA AVP Specific Values", . - [App-Ids] "IANA AAA Application IDs Registry", . - [AppleTalk] Sidhu, G., Andrews, R., and A. - Oppenheimer, "Inside AppleTalk", Second - Edition Apple Computer, 1990. + [AppleTalk] Sidhu, G., Andrews, R., and A. Oppenheimer, + "Inside AppleTalk", Second Edition Apple Computer, + 1990. - [Command-Codes] "IANA AAA Command Codes Registry", . [IANA] "Internet Assigned Numbers Authority", . - [IPX] Novell, Inc., "NetWare System Technical - Interface Overview", #883-000780-001, - June 1989. + [IPX] Novell, Inc., "NetWare System Technical Interface + Overview", #883-000780-001, June 1989. - [ISO.8859-1.1987] International Organization for - Standardization, "Information technology - - 8-bit single byte coded graphic - - character sets - Part 1: Latin alphabet - No. 1, JTC1/SC2", ISO Standard 8859-1, - 1987. + [ISO.8859-1.1987] International Organization for Standardization, + "Information technology - 8-bit single byte coded + graphic - character sets - Part 1: Latin alphabet + No. 1, JTC1/SC2", ISO Standard 8859-1, 1987. - [LAT] Digital Equipment Corp., "Local Area - Transport (LAT) Specification V5.0", AA- - NL26A-TE, June 1989. + [LAT] Digital Equipment Corp., "Local Area Transport + (LAT) Specification V5.0", AA-NL26A-TE, + June 1989. - [RADIUSAttrVals] IANA, "IANA Radius Attribute Values - Registry", . - [RFC1334] Lloyd, B. and W. Simpson, "PPP - Authentication Protocols", RFC 1334, - October 1992. - - [RFC1661] Simpson, W., "The Point-to-Point Protocol - (PPP)", STD 51, RFC 1661, July 1994. + [RFC1334] Lloyd, B. and W. Simpson, "PPP Authentication + Protocols", RFC 1334, October 1992. - [RFC1990] Sklower, K., Lloyd, B., McGregor, G., - Carr, D., and T. Coradetti, "The PPP - Multilink Protocol (MP)", RFC 1990, - August 1996. + [RFC1661] Simpson, W., "The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP)", + STD 51, RFC 1661, July 1994. - [RFC2474] Nichols, K., Blake, S., Baker, F., and D. - Black, "Definition of the Differentiated - Services Field (DS Field) in the IPv4 and - IPv6 Headers", RFC 2474, December 1998. + [RFC1990] Sklower, K., Lloyd, B., McGregor, G., Carr, D., + and T. Coradetti, "The PPP Multilink Protocol + (MP)", RFC 1990, August 1996. - [RFC2548] Zorn, G., "Microsoft Vendor-specific - RADIUS Attributes", RFC 2548, March 1999. + [RFC2474] Nichols, K., Blake, S., Baker, F., and D. Black, + "Definition of the Differentiated Services Field + (DS Field) in the IPv4 and IPv6 Headers", + RFC 2474, December 1998. - [RFC2597] Heinanen, J., Baker, F., Weiss, W., and - J. Wroclawski, "Assured Forwarding PHB - Group", RFC 2597, June 1999. + [RFC2548] Zorn, G., "Microsoft Vendor-specific RADIUS + Attributes", RFC 2548, March 1999. - [RFC2637] Hamzeh, K., Pall, G., Verthein, W., - Taarud, J., Little, W., and G. Zorn, - "Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol", - RFC 2637, July 1999. + [RFC2597] Heinanen, J., Baker, F., Weiss, W., and J. + Wroclawski, "Assured Forwarding PHB Group", + RFC 2597, June 1999. - [RFC2866] Rigney, C., "RADIUS Accounting", - RFC 2866, June 2000. + [RFC2637] Hamzeh, K., Pall, G., Verthein, W., Taarud, J., + Little, W., and G. Zorn, "Point-to-Point Tunneling + Protocol", RFC 2637, July 1999. - [RFC2867] Zorn, G., Aboba, B., and D. Mitton, - "RADIUS Accounting Modifications for - Tunnel Protocol Support", RFC 2867, + [RFC2866] Rigney, C., "RADIUS Accounting", RFC 2866, June 2000. - [RFC2868] Zorn, G., Leifer, D., Rubens, A., - Shriver, J., Holdrege, M., and I. Goyret, - "RADIUS Attributes for Tunnel Protocol - Support", RFC 2868, June 2000. + [RFC2867] Zorn, G., Aboba, B., and D. Mitton, "RADIUS + Accounting Modifications for Tunnel Protocol + Support", RFC 2867, June 2000. - [RFC2869] Rigney, C., Willats, W., and P. Calhoun, - "RADIUS Extensions", RFC 2869, June 2000. + [RFC2868] Zorn, G., Leifer, D., Rubens, A., Shriver, J., + Holdrege, M., and I. Goyret, "RADIUS Attributes + for Tunnel Protocol Support", RFC 2868, June 2000. - [RFC2881] Mitton, D. and M. Beadles, "Network - Access Server Requirements Next - Generation (NASREQNG) NAS Model", - RFC 2881, July 2000. + [RFC2869] Rigney, C., Willats, W., and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS + Extensions", RFC 2869, June 2000. - [RFC2989] Aboba, B., Calhoun, P., Glass, S., - Hiller, T., McCann, P., Shiino, H., - Walsh, P., Zorn, G., Dommety, G., - Perkins, C., Patil, B., Mitton, D., - Manning, S., Beadles, M., Chen, X., - Sivalingham, S., Hameed, A., Munson, M., - Jacobs, S., Lim, B., Hirschman, B., Hsu, - R., Koo, H., Lipford, M., Campbell, E., - Xu, Y., Baba, S., and E. Jaques, - "Criteria for Evaluating AAA Protocols - for Network Access", RFC 2989, - November 2000. + [RFC2881] Mitton, D. and M. Beadles, "Network Access Server + Requirements Next Generation (NASREQNG) NAS + Model", RFC 2881, July 2000. - [RFC3169] Beadles, M. and D. Mitton, "Criteria for - Evaluating Network Access Server - Protocols", RFC 3169, September 2001. + [RFC2989] Aboba, B., Calhoun, P., Glass, S., Hiller, T., + McCann, P., Shiino, H., Walsh, P., Zorn, G., + Dommety, G., Perkins, C., Patil, B., Mitton, D., + Manning, S., Beadles, M., Chen, X., Sivalingham, + S., Hameed, A., Munson, M., Jacobs, S., Lim, B., + Hirschman, B., Hsu, R., Koo, H., Lipford, M., + Campbell, E., Xu, Y., Baba, S., and E. Jaques, + "Criteria for Evaluating AAA Protocols for Network + Access", RFC 2989, November 2000. - [RFC3246] Davie, B., Charny, A., Bennet, J., - Benson, K., Le Boudec, J., Courtney, W., - Davari, S., Firoiu, V., and D. Stiliadis, - "An Expedited Forwarding PHB (Per-Hop - Behavior)", RFC 3246, March 2002. + [RFC3169] Beadles, M. and D. Mitton, "Criteria for + Evaluating Network Access Server Protocols", + RFC 3169, September 2001. - [RFC3580] Congdon, P., Aboba, B., Smith, A., Zorn, - G., and J. Roese, "IEEE 802.1X Remote - Authentication Dial In User Service - (RADIUS) Usage Guidelines", RFC 3580, - September 2003. + [RFC3246] Davie, B., Charny, A., Bennet, J., Benson, K., Le + Boudec, J., Courtney, W., Davari, S., Firoiu, V., + and D. Stiliadis, "An Expedited Forwarding PHB + (Per-Hop Behavior)", RFC 3246, March 2002. - [RFC3931] Lau, J., Townsley, M., and I. Goyret, - "Layer Two Tunneling Protocol - Version 3 - (L2TPv3)", RFC 3931, March 2005. + [RFC3580] Congdon, P., Aboba, B., Smith, A., Zorn, G., and + J. Roese, "IEEE 802.1X Remote Authentication Dial + In User Service (RADIUS) Usage Guidelines", + RFC 3580, September 2003. - [RFC4072] Eronen, P., Hiller, T., and G. Zorn, - "Diameter Extensible Authentication - Protocol (EAP) Application", RFC 4072, - August 2005. + [RFC3931] Lau, J., Townsley, M., and I. Goyret, "Layer Two + Tunneling Protocol - Version 3 (L2TPv3)", + RFC 3931, March 2005. - [RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security - Architecture for the Internet Protocol", - RFC 4301, December 2005. + [RFC4072] Eronen, P., Hiller, T., and G. Zorn, "Diameter + Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) + Application", RFC 4072, August 2005. - [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The - Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol - Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008. + [RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for + the Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005. - [RFC5777] Korhonen, J., Tschofenig, H., - Arumaithurai, M., Jones, M., and A. Lior, - "Traffic Classification and Quality of - Service (QoS) Attributes for Diameter", - RFC 5777, February 2010. + [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer + Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, + August 2008. Appendix A. Acknowledgements -A.1. RFC 4005 +A.1. This Document + + The vast majority of the text in this document was taken directly + from RFC 4005; the editor owes a debt of gratitude to the authors + thereof (especially Dave Mitton, who somehow managed to make nroff + paginate the AVP Occurance Tables correctly!). + + Thanks (in no particular order) to Jai-Jin Lim, Liu Hans, Sebastien + Decugis, Jouni Korhonen, Mark Jones, Hannes Tschofenig, Dave Crocker, + David Black, Barry Leiba, Peter Saint-Andre and Stefan Winter for + their useful reviews and helpful comments. + +A.2. RFC 4005 The authors would like to thank Carl Rigney, Allan C. Rubens, William Allen Simpson, and Steve Willens for their work on the original RADIUS protocol, from which many of the concepts in this specification were derived. Thanks, also, to Carl Rigney for + [RFC2866] and [RFC2869]; Ward Willats for [RFC2869]; Glen Zorn, Bernard Aboba, and Dave Mitton for [RFC2867] and [RFC3162]; and Dory Leifer, John Shriver, Matt Holdrege, Allan Rubens, Glen Zorn and Ignacio Goyret for their work on [RFC2868]. This document stole text and concepts from both [RFC2868] and [RFC2869]. Thanks go to Carl Williams for providing IPv6-specific text. The authors would also like to acknowledge the following people for their contributions in the development of the Diameter protocol: Bernard Aboba, Jari Arkko, William Bulley, Kuntal Chowdhury, Daniel @@ -3003,31 +3008,20 @@ their contributions in the development of the Diameter protocol: Bernard Aboba, Jari Arkko, William Bulley, Kuntal Chowdhury, Daniel C. Fox, Lol Grant, Nancy Greene, Jeff Hagg, Peter Heitman, Paul Krumviede, Fergal Ladley, Ryan Moats, Victor Muslin, Kenneth Peirce, Sumit Vakil, John R. Vollbrecht, and Jeff Weisberg. Finally, Pat Calhoun would like to thank Sun Microsystems, as most of the effort put into this document was done while he was in their employ. -A.2. RFC 4005bis - - The vast majority of the text in this document was taken directly - from RFC 4005; the editor owes a debt of gratitude to the authors - thereof (especially Dave Mitton, who somehow managed to make nroff - paginate the AVP Occurance Tables correctly!). - - Thanks (in no particular order) to Jai-Jin Lim, Liu Hans, Sebastien - Decugis, Jouni Korhonen, Mark Jones, Hannes Tschofenig and Stefan - Winter for their useful reviews and helpful comments. - Author's Address Glen Zorn (editor) Network Zen 227/358 Thanon Sanphawut Bang Na, Bangkok 10260 Thailand - Phone: +66 (0) 87-040-4617 + Phone: +66 (0) 909-201060 EMail: glenzorn@gmail.com