draft-ietf-dime-e2e-sec-req-05.txt   rfc7966.txt 
DIME H. Tschofenig Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) H. Tschofenig
Internet-Draft ARM Limited Request for Comments: 7966
Intended status: Informational J. Korhonen, Ed. Category: Informational J. Korhonen, Ed.
Expires: December 10, 2016 Broadcom Limited ISSN: 2070-1721 Broadcom Limited
G. Zorn G. Zorn
Network Zen Network Zen
K. Pillay K. Pillay
Internet Solutions Internet Solutions
June 8, 2016 September 2016
AVP Level Security for Non-neighboring Diameter Nodes: Scenarios and Security at the Attribute-Value Pair (AVP) Level for
Requirements Non-neighboring Diameter Nodes: Scenarios and Requirements
draft-ietf-dime-e2e-sec-req-05.txt
Abstract Abstract
This specification specifies requirements for providing Diameter This specification specifies requirements for providing Diameter
security at the level of individual Attribute-Value Pairs. security at the level of individual Attribute-Value Pairs (AVPs).
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. published for informational purposes.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Security Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Security Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Scenarios for Diameter AVP-Level Protection . . . . . . . . . 5 4. Scenarios for Diameter AVP-Level Protection . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Diameter base protocol specification [2] defines security The Diameter base protocol specification [2] defines security
protection between neighboring Diameter peers. The Diameter mandates protection between neighboring Diameter peers. Diameter mandates
that peer connections must be protected by TLS (for TCP) [6], DTLS that peer connections must be protected by Transport Layer Security
(for SCTP) [7] or using security mechanisms that are independent of (TLS) [6] for TCP, by Datagram TLS (DTLS) [7] for the Stream Control
Diameter such as IPsec [5]. These security protocols offer a wide Transmission Protocol (SCTP), or by security mechanisms that are
range of security properties, including entity authentication, data- independent of Diameter (such as IPsec [5]). These security
origin authentication, integrity, confidentiality protection and protocols offer a wide range of security properties, including entity
replay protection. They also support a large number of cryptographic authentication, data-origin authentication, integrity protection,
algorithms, algorithm negotiation, and different types of confidentiality protection, and replay protection. They also support
credentials. It should be understood that TLS/DTLS/IPsec in Diameter a large number of cryptographic algorithms, algorithm negotiation,
context does not provide end-to-end security unless the Diameter and different types of credentials. It should be understood that
nodes are direct peers i.e., neighboring Diameter nodes. The current TLS/DTLS/IPsec in the Diameter context does not provide end-to-end
Diameter security is realized hop-by-hop. security unless the Diameter nodes are direct peers, i.e.,
neighboring Diameter nodes. The current Diameter security is
realized hop by hop.
The need to also offer additional security protection of Attribute The need to also offer additional security protection of AVPs between
Value Pairs (AVP) between non-neighboring Diameter nodes was non-neighboring Diameter nodes was recognized very early in the work
recognized very early in the work on Diameter. This led to work on on Diameter. This led to work on Diameter security using the
Diameter security using the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [3]. Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [3]. However, due to the lack of
Due to lack of deployment interest at that time (and the complexity deployment interest at that time (and the complexity of the developed
of the developed solution) the specification was, however, never solution), the specification was never completed.
completed.
In the meanwhile Diameter had received a lot of deployment interest In the meanwhile, Diameter had received a lot of deployment interest
from the cellular operator community and because of the from the cellular operator community, and because of the
sophistication of those deployments the need for protecting Diameter sophistication of those deployments, the need for protecting Diameter
AVPs between non-neighboring nodes re-surfaced. Since early 2000 AVPs between non-neighboring nodes resurfaced. Since the early 2000s
(when the work on [3] was discontinued) the Internet community had (when the work on [3] was discontinued), the Internet community has
seen advances in cryptographic algorithms (for example, authenticated seen advances in cryptographic algorithms (for example, authenticated
encryption algorithms) and new security building blocks were encryption algorithms), and new security building blocks have been
developed. developed.
This document specifies requirements for developing a solution to This document specifies requirements for developing a solution to
protect Diameter AVPs between non-neighboring Diameter nodes. protect Diameter AVPs between non-neighboring Diameter nodes.
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL NOT', The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL NOT',
'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this
documents are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [1]. document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [1].
This document re-uses terminology from the Diameter base This document reuses terminology from the Diameter base specification
specification [2]. [2].
In the figures below Attribute Value Pair (AVP) refers to an In the figures below, AVP refers to an unprotected AVP, and {AVP}k
unprotected AVP and {AVP}k refers to an AVP that experiences security refers to an AVP that experiences security protection (using key "k")
protection (using key "k") without further distinguishing between without further distinguishing between integrity and confidentiality
integrity and confidentiality protection. protection.
The following terms are also used in this document: The following terms are also used in this document:
AAA Broker AAA broker
An entity that manages AAA traffic between roaming partner An entity that manages Authentication, Authorization, and
networks. Accounting (AAA) traffic between roaming partner networks.
AAA Broker Network AAA broker network
A network operated by an AAA Broker, which consists of necessary A network operated by a AAA broker, which consists of necessary
AAA functions to provide AAA brokering services for its customer AAA functions to provide AAA brokering services for its customer
AAA networks. AAA networks.
Diameter Firewall Diameter firewall
A Diameter firewall is a proxy (or a relay) agent that acts A Diameter firewall is a proxy (or a relay) agent that acts
similarly to conventional IP traffic firewalls but only at the similarly to conventional IP traffic firewalls but only at the
Diameter AVP and command level. A Diameter firewall may, for Diameter AVP and command level. A Diameter firewall may, for
example, discard security policy offending AVPs from traversing example, discard AVPs that violate security policy, thus
through it. The Diameter firewall may even discard entire preventing them from traversing the firewall. The Diameter
Diameter messages based on the security policy. firewall may even discard entire Diameter messages based on the
security policy.
3. Security Threats 3. Security Threats
The following description aims to illustrate various security threats This section describes various security threats that raise the need
that raise the need for protecting Diameter Attribute-Value Pairs for protecting Diameter Attribute-Value Pairs (AVPs). Figure 1
(AVPs). Figure 1 illustrates an example of Diameter based roaming illustrates an example of a Diameter-based roaming architecture in
architecture in which Diameter clients within the visited networks which Diameter clients within the visited networks need to interact
need to interact with Diameter servers in the home domain. AAA with Diameter servers in the home domain. AAA domains are
domains are interconnected using a Diameter-based AAA interconnection interconnected using a Diameter-based AAA interconnection network
network labeled as AAA Broker. labeled as "AAA broker network".
+oooooooooooooooooo+ +====================+ +oooooooooooooooooo+ +====================+
| Example.net | | | | Example.net | | |
| | | | | | | |
+--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+
|Diameter| |Diameter+--------+Diameter| |Diameter| |Diameter| |Diameter+--------+Diameter| |Diameter|
|Client 1| |Proxy A1| |Proxy B | |Proxy C | |Client 1| |Proxy A1| |Proxy B | |Proxy C |
| (NAS) +------+ | +------+ +--------+ |----+ | (NAS) +------+ | +------+ +--------+ |----+
+--------+ +--------+ | +--------+ +--------+ | +--------+ +--------+ | +--------+ +--------+ |
| | | | | | | | | | | |
skipping to change at page 4, line 38 skipping to change at page 5, line 44
| | | +--------+ +---------+Proxy D |-+ | | | +--------+ +---------+Proxy D |-+
+--------+ +--------+ | |Diameter| | +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ | |Diameter| | +--------+
|Diameter| |Diameter| | |Server Y+--+ | |Diameter| |Diameter| | |Server Y+--+ |
|Client 2+------+Proxy A2+-+ +--------+ Home Domain | |Client 2+------+Proxy A2+-+ +--------+ Home Domain |
| (NAS) | | | +////////////////////+ | (NAS) | | | +////////////////////+
+--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+
| | | |
| Visited Domain 2 | | Visited Domain 2 |
+oooooooooooooooooo+ +oooooooooooooooooo+
Figure 1: Example Diameter Deployment. Figure 1: Example Diameter Deployment
Eavesdropping: Some Diameter applications carry information that is Eavesdropping: Some Diameter applications carry information that is
only intended for consumption by end points, either by the only intended for consumption by end points, either by the
Diameter client or by the Diameter server but not by Diameter client or by the Diameter server but not by
intermediaries. As an example, consider the Diameter EAP intermediaries. As an example, consider the Diameter Extensible
application [4] that allows the transport of keying material Authentication Protocol (EAP) application [4] that allows the
between the Diameter server to the Diameter client (using the EAP- transport of keying material between the Diameter server to the
Master-Session-Key AVP) for the protection of the air interface Diameter client (using the EAP-Master-Session-Key AVP) for the
(i.e., the wireless link) between the end device (such as a mobile protection of the air interface (i.e., the wireless link) between
phone; not shown in the figure) and the Network Access Server the end device (such as a mobile phone; not shown in the figure)
(NAS). The content of the EAP-Master-Session-Key AVP should and the Network Access Server (NAS). The content of the EAP-
benefit from protection against eavesdropping by intermediaries. Master-Session-Key AVP should benefit from protection against
Other AVPs, for example those listed in Section 13.3 of [2], might eavesdropping by intermediaries. Other AVPs (for example, those
also carry sensitive personal data that, when collected by listed in Section 13.3 of [2]) might also carry sensitive personal
intermediaries, allow for traffic analysis. data that, when collected by intermediaries, allow for traffic
analysis.
In context of the deployment shown in Figure 1 the adversary In the context of the deployment shown in Figure 1, the adversary
could, for example, be in the AAA broker network. could, for example, be in the AAA broker network.
Injection and Manipulation: The Diameter base protocol specification Injection and Manipulation: The Diameter base protocol specification
mandates security protection between neighboring nodes but mandates security protection between neighboring nodes, but
Diameter agents may be compromised or misconfigured and inject or Diameter agents may be compromised or misconfigured and inject or
manipulate AVPs. To detect such actions additional security manipulate AVPs. To detect such actions, additional security
protection needs to be applied at the Diameter layer. protection needs to be applied at the Diameter layer.
Nodes that could launch such an attack are any Diameter agents Nodes that could launch such an attack are any Diameter agents
along the end-to-end communication path. along the end-to-end communication path.
Impersonation: Imagine a case where a Diameter message from Impersonation: Imagine a case where a Diameter message from
Example.net contains information claiming to be from Example.org. Example.net contains information claiming to be from Example.org.
This would either require strict verification at the edge of the This would either require strict verification at the edge of the
AAA broker network or cryptographic assurance at the Diameter AAA broker network or cryptographic assurance at the Diameter
layer to prevent a successful impersonation attack. layer to prevent a successful impersonation attack.
skipping to change at page 5, line 38 skipping to change at page 7, line 13
financial benefits or to disrupt service availability. financial benefits or to disrupt service availability.
4. Scenarios for Diameter AVP-Level Protection 4. Scenarios for Diameter AVP-Level Protection
This scenario outlines a number of cases for deploying security This scenario outlines a number of cases for deploying security
protection of individual Diameter AVPs. protection of individual Diameter AVPs.
In the first scenario, shown in Figure 2, end-to-end security In the first scenario, shown in Figure 2, end-to-end security
protection is provided between the Diameter client and the Diameter protection is provided between the Diameter client and the Diameter
server with any number of intermediate Diameter agents. Diameter server with any number of intermediate Diameter agents. Diameter
AVPs exchanged between these two Diameter nodes may be protected end- AVPs exchanged between these two Diameter nodes may be protected end
to-end (notation '{AVP}k') or unprotected (notation 'AVP'). to end (notation '{AVP}k') or unprotected (notation 'AVP').
+--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+
|Diameter| AVP, {AVP}k |Diameter| |Diameter| AVP, {AVP}k |Diameter|
|Client +-----------------........... -------------------+Server | |Client +-----------------........... -------------------+Server |
+--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+
Figure 2: End-to-End Diameter AVP Security Protection. Figure 2: End-to-End Diameter AVP Security Protection
In the second scenario, shown in Figure 3, a Diameter proxy acts on In the second scenario, shown in Figure 3, a Diameter proxy acts on
behalf of the Diameter client with regard to security protection. It behalf of the Diameter client with regard to security protection. It
applies security protection to outgoing Diameter AVPs and verifies applies security protection to outgoing Diameter AVPs and verifies
incoming AVPs. Typically, the proxy enforcing the security incoming AVPs. Typically, the proxy enforcing the security
protection belongs to the same domain as the Diameter client/server protection belongs to the same domain as the Diameter client/server
without end-to-end security features. without end-to-end security features.
+--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+
|Diameter| AVP |Diameter| AVP, {AVP}k |Diameter| |Diameter| AVP |Diameter| AVP, {AVP}k |Diameter|
|Client +-----+Proxy A +---------- .......... -----------+Server | |Client +-----+Proxy A +---------- .......... -----------+Server |
+--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+
Figure 3: Middle-to-End Diameter AVP Security Protection. Figure 3: Middle-to-End Diameter AVP Security Protection
In the third scenario shown in Figure 4 a Diameter proxy acts on In the third scenario, shown in Figure 4, a Diameter proxy acts on
behalf of the Diameter server. behalf of the Diameter server.
+--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+
|Diameter| AVP, {AVP}k |Diameter| AVP |Diameter| |Diameter| AVP, {AVP}k |Diameter| AVP |Diameter|
|Client +-----------------........... ----+Proxy D +-----+Server | |Client +-----------------........... ----+Proxy D +-----+Server |
+--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+
Figure 4: End-to-Middle Diameter AVP Security Protection. Figure 4: End-to-Middle Diameter AVP Security Protection
The fourth and the final scenario (see Figure 5) is a combination of The fourth and the final scenario (see Figure 5) is a combination of
the end-to-middle and the middle-to-end scenario shown in Figure 4 the middle-to-end and the end-to-middle scenarios shown in Figures 3
and in Figure 3. From a deployment point of view this scenario is and 4. From a deployment point of view, this scenario is easier to
easier to accomplish for two reasons: First, Diameter clients and accomplish for two reasons. First, Diameter clients and Diameter
Diameter servers remain unmodified. This ensures that no servers remain unmodified. This ensures that no modifications are
modifications are needed to the installed Diameter infrastructure, needed to the installed Diameter infrastructure, except for the
except for the security enabled proxies obviously. Second, the key security-enabled proxies, obviously. Second, the key management is
management is also simplified since fewer number of keys need to be also simplified since a fewer number of keys need to be negotiated
negotiated and provisioned. The assumption here is that the number and provisioned. The assumption here is that the number of security-
of security enabled proxies would be significantly less than enabled proxies would be significantly less than unprotected Diameter
unprotected Diameter nodes in the installed base. nodes in the installed base.
+--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+
|Diameter| AVP |Diameter| AVP, {AVP}k |Diameter| AVP |Diameter| |Diameter| AVP |Diameter| AVP, {AVP}k |Diameter| AVP |Diameter|
|Client +-----+Proxy A +-- .......... ----+Proxy D +-----+Server | |Client +-----+Proxy A +-- .......... ----+Proxy D +-----+Server |
+--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+
Figure 5: Middle-to-Middle Diameter AVP Security Protection. Figure 5: Middle-to-Middle Diameter AVP Security Protection
5. Requirements 5. Requirements
Requirement #1: The solution MUST support an extensible set of Requirement #1: The solution MUST support an extensible set of
cryptographic algorithms. cryptographic algorithms.
Motivation: Solutions MUST be able to evolve to adapt to Motivation: Solutions MUST be able to evolve to adapt to
evolving cryptographic algorithms and security requirements. evolving cryptographic algorithms and security requirements.
This may include the provision of a modular mechanism to allow This may include the provision of a modular mechanism to allow
cryptographic algorithms to be updated without substantial cryptographic algorithms to be updated without substantial
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Requirement #2: The solution MUST support confidentiality, Requirement #2: The solution MUST support confidentiality,
integrity, and data-origin authentication. Solutions for integrity, and data-origin authentication. Solutions for
integrity protection MUST work in a backwards-compatible way with integrity protection MUST work in a backwards-compatible way with
existing Diameter applications and therefore be able to traverse existing Diameter applications and therefore be able to traverse
legacy proxy and relay agents. legacy proxy and relay agents.
Requirement #3: The solution MUST support replay protection. Requirement #3: The solution MUST support replay protection.
Requirement #4: The solution MUST support the ability to delegate Requirement #4: The solution MUST support the ability to delegate
security functionality to another entity security functionality to another entity.
Motivation: As described in Section 4 the ability to let a Motivation: As described in Section 4, the ability to let a
Diameter proxy to perform security services on behalf of all Diameter proxy perform security services on behalf of all
clients within the same administrative domain is important for clients within the same administrative domain is important for
incremental deployability. The same applies to the other incremental deployability. The same applies to the other
communication side where a load balancer terminates security communication side where a load balancer terminates security
services for the servers it interfaces. services for the servers it interfaces.
Requirement #5: The solution MUST be able to selectively apply their Requirement #5: The solution MUST be able to selectively apply its
cryptographic protection to certain Diameter AVPs. cryptographic protection to certain Diameter AVPs.
Motivation: Some Diameter applications assume that certain AVPs Motivation: Some Diameter applications assume that certain AVPs
are added, removed, or modified by intermediaries. As such, it are added, removed, or modified by intermediaries. As such, it
must be possible to apply security protection selectively. must be possible to apply security protection selectively.
Furthermore, there are AVPs that must not be confidentiality Furthermore, there are AVPs that must not be confidentiality
protected but may still be integrity protected such as those protected but may still be integrity protected, such as those
required for Diameter message routing. required for Diameter message routing.
Requirement #6: The solution MUST define a mandatory-to-implement Requirement #6: The solution MUST define a mandatory-to-implement
cryptographic algorithm. cryptographic algorithm.
Motivation: For interoperability purposes it is beneficial to Motivation: For interoperability purposes, it is beneficial to
have a mandatory-to-implement cryptographic algorithm specified have a mandatory-to-implement cryptographic algorithm specified
(unless profiles for specific usage environments specify (unless profiles for specific usage environments specify
otherwise). otherwise).
Requirement #7: The solution MUST support symmetric keys and Requirement #7: The solution MUST support symmetric keys and
asymmetric keys. asymmetric keys.
Motivation: Symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic algorithms Motivation: Symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic algorithms
provide different security services. Asymmetric algorithms, provide different security services. Asymmetric algorithms,
for example, allow non-repudiation services to be offered. for example, allow non-repudiation services to be offered.
Requirement #8: A solution for dynamic key management MUST be Requirement #8: A solution for dynamic key management MUST be
included in the overall solution framework. included in the overall solution framework.
However, it is assumed that no "new" key management protocol However, it is assumed that no "new" key management protocol
needs to be developed; instead existing ones are re-used, if at needs to be developed; instead, existing ones are reused, if at
all possible. Rekeying could be triggered by (a) management all possible. Rekeying could be triggered by (a) management
actions and (b) expiring keying material. actions and (b) expiring keying material.
6. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
This entire document focused on the discussion of new functionality This entire document focuses on the discussion of new functionality
for securing Diameter AVPs selectively between non-neighboring nodes. for securing Diameter AVPs selectively between non-neighboring nodes.
Various security threats are mitigated by selectively applying Various security threats are mitigated by selectively applying
security protection for individual Diameter AVPs. Without protection security protection for individual Diameter AVPs. Without
there is the possibility for password sniffing, confidentiality protection, there is the possibility for password sniffing,
violation, AVP insertion, deletion or modification. Additionally, confidentiality violation, and AVP insertion, deletion, or
applying digital signature offers non-repudiation capabilities; a modification. Additionally, applying a digital signature offers non-
feature not yet available in today's Diameter deployment. repudiation capabilities, a feature not yet available in today's
Modification of certain Diameter AVPs may not necessarily be the act Diameter deployment. Modification of certain Diameter AVPs may not
of malicious behavior but could also be the result of necessarily be the act of malicious behavior but could also be the
misconfiguration. An over-aggressively configured firewalling result of misconfiguration. An over-aggressively configured
Diameter proxy may also remove certain AVPs. In most cases data firewalling Diameter proxy may also remove certain AVPs. In most
origin authentication and integrity protection of AVPs will provide cases, data-origin authentication and integrity protection of AVPs
the most benefits for existing deployments with minimal overhead and will provide the most benefits for existing deployments with minimal
(potentially) operating in a full-backwards compatible manner. overhead and (potentially) operate in a full-backwards compatible
manner.
7. IANA Considerations
This document does not require actions by IANA.
8. Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Guenther Horn, Martin Dolly, Steve Donovan,
Lionel Morand and Tom Taylor (rest in peace Tom) for their review
comments.
The authors also thank Qin Wu, Christer Holmberg, Ben Campbell and
Radia Perlman who provided additional reviews during the Last Call.
9. References 7. References
9.1. Normative References 7.1. Normative References
[1] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [1] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[2] Fajardo, V., Ed., Arkko, J., Loughney, J., and G. Zorn, [2] Fajardo, V., Ed., Arkko, J., Loughney, J., and G. Zorn,
Ed., "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 6733, Ed., "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 6733,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6733, October 2012, DOI 10.17487/RFC6733, October 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6733>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6733>.
9.2. Informative References 7.2. Informative References
[3] Calhoun, P., Farrell, S., and W. Bulley, "Diameter CMS [3] Calhoun, P., Farrell, S., and W. Bulley, "Diameter CMS
Security Application", draft-ietf-aaa-diameter-cms-sec-04 Security Application", Work in Progress,
(work in progress), March 2002. draft-ietf-aaa-diameter-cms-sec-04, March 2002.
[4] Eronen, P., Ed., Hiller, T., and G. Zorn, "Diameter [4] Eronen, P., Ed., Hiller, T., and G. Zorn, "Diameter
Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application", Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application",
RFC 4072, DOI 10.17487/RFC4072, August 2005, RFC 4072, DOI 10.17487/RFC4072, August 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4072>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4072>.
[5] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the [5] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, DOI 10.17487/RFC4301, Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, DOI 10.17487/RFC4301,
December 2005, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4301>. December 2005, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4301>.
skipping to change at page 9, line 45 skipping to change at page 10, line 45
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008, DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[7] Tuexen, M., Seggelmann, R., and E. Rescorla, "Datagram [7] Tuexen, M., Seggelmann, R., and E. Rescorla, "Datagram
Transport Layer Security (DTLS) for Stream Control Transport Layer Security (DTLS) for Stream Control
Transmission Protocol (SCTP)", RFC 6083, Transmission Protocol (SCTP)", RFC 6083,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6083, January 2011, DOI 10.17487/RFC6083, January 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6083>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6083>.
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Guenther Horn, Martin Dolly, Steve Donovan,
Lionel Morand, and Tom Taylor (rest in peace, Tom) for their review
comments.
The authors also thank Qin Wu, Christer Holmberg, Ben Campbell, and
Radia Perlman, who provided additional reviews during the Last Call.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Hannes Tschofenig Hannes Tschofenig
ARM Limited Hall in Tirol 6060
Austria Austria
Email: Hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net Email: Hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net
URI: http://www.tschofenig.priv.at URI: http://www.tschofenig.priv.at
Jouni Korhonen (editor) Jouni Korhonen (editor)
Broadcom Limited Broadcom Limited
3151 Zanker Rd. 3151 Zanker Rd.
San Jose, CA 95134 San Jose, CA 95134
USA United States of America
Email: jouni.nospam@gmail.com Email: jouni.nospam@gmail.com
Glen Zorn Glen Zorn
Network Zen Network Zen
227/358 Thanon Sanphawut 227/358 Thanon Sanphawut
Bang Na Bangkok 10260 Bang Na, Bangkok 10260
Thailand Thailand
Email: glenzorn@gmail.com Email: glenzorn@gmail.com
Kervin Pillay Kervin Pillay
Internet Solutions Internet Solutions
South Africa South Africa
Email: kervin.pillay@gmail.com Email: kervin.pillay@gmail.com
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