draft-ietf-dime-e2e-sec-req-04.txt		draft-ietf-dime-e2e-sec-req-05.txt
	DIME H. Tschofenig		DIME H. Tschofenig
	Internet-Draft ARM Limited		Internet-Draft ARM Limited
	Intended status: Informational J. Korhonen, Ed.		Intended status: Informational J. Korhonen, Ed.
	Expires: July 16, 2016 Broadcom Corporation		Expires: December 10, 2016 Broadcom Limited
	G. Zorn		G. Zorn
	Network Zen		Network Zen
	K. Pillay		K. Pillay
	Oracle Communications		Internet Solutions
	January 13, 2016		June 8, 2016
	Diameter AVP Level Security End-to-End Security: Scenarios and		AVP Level Security for Non-neighboring Diameter Nodes: Scenarios and
	Requirements		Requirements
	draft-ietf-dime-e2e-sec-req-04.txt		draft-ietf-dime-e2e-sec-req-05.txt
	Abstract		Abstract
	This specification discusses requirements for providing Diameter		This specification specifies requirements for providing Diameter
	security at the level of individual Attribute-Value Pairs.		security at the level of individual Attribute-Value Pairs.
	Status of This Memo		Status of This Memo
	This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the		This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
	provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.		provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on July 16, 2016.		This Internet-Draft will expire on December 10, 2016.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	skipping to change at page 2, line 18 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 18 ¶
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
	2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	3. Security Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		3. Security Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	4. Scenarios for Diameter AVP-Level Protection . . . . . . . . . 5		4. Scenarios for Diameter AVP-Level Protection . . . . . . . . . 5
	5. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		5. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	The Diameter base protocol specification [2] offers security		The Diameter base protocol specification [2] defines security
	protection between neighboring Diameter peers and mandates that peer		protection between neighboring Diameter peers. The Diameter mandates
	connections must be protected by TLS (for TCP), DTLS (for SCTP) or		that peer connections must be protected by TLS (for TCP) [6], DTLS
	alternative security mechanisms independent of Diameter (e.g., IPsec)		(for SCTP) [7] or using security mechanisms that are independent of
	is used. These security protocols offer a wide range of security		Diameter such as IPsec [5]. These security protocols offer a wide
	properties, including entity authentication, data-origin		range of security properties, including entity authentication, data-
	authentication, integrity, confidentiality protection and replay		origin authentication, integrity, confidentiality protection and
	protection. They also support a large number of cryptographic		replay protection. They also support a large number of cryptographic
	algorithms, algorithm negotiation, and different types of		algorithms, algorithm negotiation, and different types of
	credentials. It should be understood that TLS/DTLS/IPsec in Diameter		credentials. It should be understood that TLS/DTLS/IPsec in Diameter
	context does not provide end-to-end security unless the Diameter		context does not provide end-to-end security unless the Diameter
	nodes are direct peers i.e., neighboring Diameter nodes. The current		nodes are direct peers i.e., neighboring Diameter nodes. The current
	Diameter security is realized hop-by-hop.		Diameter security is realized hop-by-hop.
	The need to also offer additional security protection of AVPs between		The need to also offer additional security protection of Attribute
	non-neighboring Diameter nodes was recognized very early in the work		Value Pairs (AVP) between non-neighboring Diameter nodes was
	on Diameter. This led to work on Diameter security using the		recognized very early in the work on Diameter. This led to work on
	Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [3]. Due to lack of deployment		Diameter security using the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [3].
	interest at that time (and the complexity of the developed solution)		Due to lack of deployment interest at that time (and the complexity
	the specification was, however, never completed.		of the developed solution) the specification was, however, never
			completed.
	In the meanwhile Diameter had received a lot of deployment interest		In the meanwhile Diameter had received a lot of deployment interest
	from the cellular operator community and because of the		from the cellular operator community and because of the
	sophistication of those deployments the need for protecting Diameter		sophistication of those deployments the need for protecting Diameter
	AVPs between non-neighboring nodes re-surfaced. Since early 2000		AVPs between non-neighboring nodes re-surfaced. Since early 2000
	(when the work on [3] was discontinued) the Internet community had		(when the work on [3] was discontinued) the Internet community had
	seen advances in cryptographic algorithms (for example, authenticated		seen advances in cryptographic algorithms (for example, authenticated
	encryption algorithms) and new security building blocks were		encryption algorithms) and new security building blocks were
	developed.		developed.
	This document collects requirements for developing a solution to		This document specifies requirements for developing a solution to
	protect Diameter AVPs.		protect Diameter AVPs between non-neighboring Diameter nodes.
	2. Terminology		2. Terminology
	The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL NOT',		The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL NOT',
	'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this		'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this
	documents are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [1].		documents are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [1].
	This document re-uses terminology from the Diameter base		This document re-uses terminology from the Diameter base
	specification [2].		specification [2].
	In the figures below we use the symbols 'AVP' and '{AVP}k'. AVP		In the figures below Attribute Value Pair (AVP) refers to an
	refers to an unprotected AVP and {AVP}k refers to an AVP that		unprotected AVP and {AVP}k refers to an AVP that experiences security
	experiences security protection (using key "k") without further		protection (using key "k") without further distinguishing between
	distinguishing between integrity and confidentiality protection.		integrity and confidentiality protection.
			The following terms are also used in this document:
			AAA Broker
			An entity that manages AAA traffic between roaming partner
			networks.
			AAA Broker Network
			A network operated by an AAA Broker, which consists of necessary
			AAA functions to provide AAA brokering services for its customer
			AAA networks.
			Diameter Firewall
			A Diameter firewall is a proxy (or a relay) agent that acts
			similarly to conventional IP traffic firewalls but only at the
			Diameter AVP and command level. A Diameter firewall may, for
			example, discard security policy offending AVPs from traversing
			through it. The Diameter firewall may even discard entire
			Diameter messages based on the security policy.
	3. Security Threats		3. Security Threats
	The following description aims to illustrate various security threats		The following description aims to illustrate various security threats
	that raise the need for protecting Diameter Attribute-Value Pairs		that raise the need for protecting Diameter Attribute-Value Pairs
	(AVPs). Figure 1 illustrates an example of Diameter based roaming		(AVPs). Figure 1 illustrates an example of Diameter based roaming
	architecture in which Diameter clients within the visited networks		architecture in which Diameter clients within the visited networks
	need to interact with Diameter servers in the home domain. AAA		need to interact with Diameter servers in the home domain. AAA
	domains are interconnected using a Diameter-based AAA interconnection		domains are interconnected using a Diameter-based AAA interconnection
	network labeled as AAA Broker.		network labeled as AAA Broker.
	+oooooooooooooooooo+ +====================+		+oooooooooooooooooo+ +====================+
	| Example.net | | |		| Example.net | | |
	| | | |		| | | |
	+--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+		+--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+
	|Diameter| |Diameter+--------+Diameter| |Diameter|		|Diameter| |Diameter+--------+Diameter| |Diameter|
	|Client 1+------+Proxy A1| +------+Proxy B +--------+Proxy C |----+		|Client 1| |Proxy A1| |Proxy B | |Proxy C |
			| (NAS) +------+ | +------+ +--------+ |----+
	+--------+ +--------+ | +--------+ +--------+ |		+--------+ +--------+ | +--------+ +--------+ |
	| | | | | |		| | | | | |
	| Visited Domain 1 | | | AAA Broker | |		| Visited Domain 1 | | | AAA Broker Network | |
	+oooooooooooooooooo+ | +====================+ |		+oooooooooooooooooo+ | +====================+ |
	| |		| |
	| |		| |
	| |		| |
	| +\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\+ |		| +\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\+ |
	| +--------+ Example.com | |		| +--------+ Example.com | |
	| |Diameter| | |		| |Diameter| | |
	+oooooooooooooooooo+ | |Server X+--+ +--------+ |		+oooooooooooooooooo+ | |Server X+--+ +--------+ |
	| Example.org | | +--------+ | |Diameter| |		| Example.org | | +--------+ | |Diameter| |
	| | | +--------+ +---------+Proxy D |-+		| | | +--------+ +---------+Proxy D |-+
	+--------+ +--------+ | |Diameter| | +--------+		+--------+ +--------+ | |Diameter| | +--------+
	|Diameter| |Diameter| | |Server Y+--+ |		|Diameter| |Diameter| | |Server Y+--+ |
	|Client 2+------+Proxy A2+-+ +--------+ Home Domain |		|Client 2+------+Proxy A2+-+ +--------+ Home Domain |
	+--------+ +--------+ +////////////////////+		| (NAS) | | | +////////////////////+
			+--------+ +--------+
	| |		| |
	| Visited Domain 2 |		| Visited Domain 2 |
	+oooooooooooooooooo+		+oooooooooooooooooo+
	Figure 1: Example Diameter Deployment.		Figure 1: Example Diameter Deployment.
	Eavesdropping: Some Diameter applications carry information that is		Eavesdropping: Some Diameter applications carry information that is
	only intended for consumption by end points, either by the		only intended for consumption by end points, either by the
	Diameter client or by the Diameter server but not by		Diameter client or by the Diameter server but not by
	intermediaries. As an example, consider the Diameter EAP		intermediaries. As an example, consider the Diameter EAP
	application [4] that allows the transport of keying material		application [4] that allows the transport of keying material
	between the Diameter server to the Diameter client (using the EAP-		between the Diameter server to the Diameter client (using the EAP-
	Master-Session-Key AVP) for the protection of air interface		Master-Session-Key AVP) for the protection of the air interface
	between the end device and the network access server. The content		(i.e., the wireless link) between the end device (such as a mobile
	of the EAP-Master-Session-Key AVP should benefit from protection		phone; not shown in the figure) and the Network Access Server
	against eavesdropping by intermediaries. Other AVPs, for example		(NAS). The content of the EAP-Master-Session-Key AVP should
	those listed in Section 13.3 of [2], might also carry sensitive		benefit from protection against eavesdropping by intermediaries.
	personal data that, when collected by intermediaries, allow for		Other AVPs, for example those listed in Section 13.3 of [2], might
	traffic analysis.		also carry sensitive personal data that, when collected by
			intermediaries, allow for traffic analysis.
	In context of the deployment shown in Figure 1 the adversary		In context of the deployment shown in Figure 1 the adversary
	could, for example, be in the AAA broker network.		could, for example, be in the AAA broker network.
	Injection and Manipulation: The Diameter base protocol specification		Injection and Manipulation: The Diameter base protocol specification
	mandates security protection between neighboring nodes but		mandates security protection between neighboring nodes but
	Diameter agents may be compromised or misconfigured and inject/		Diameter agents may be compromised or misconfigured and inject or
	manipulate AVPs. To detect such actions additional security		manipulate AVPs. To detect such actions additional security
	protection needs to be applied at the Diameter layer.		protection needs to be applied at the Diameter layer.
	Nodes that could launch such an attack are any Diameter agents		Nodes that could launch such an attack are any Diameter agents
	along the end-to-end communication path.		along the end-to-end communication path.
	Impersonation: Imagine a case where a Diameter message from		Impersonation: Imagine a case where a Diameter message from
	Example.net contains information claiming to be from Example.org.		Example.net contains information claiming to be from Example.org.
	This would either require strict verification at the edge of the		This would either require strict verification at the edge of the
	AAA broker network or cryptographic assurance at the Diameter		AAA broker network or cryptographic assurance at the Diameter
	skipping to change at page 6, line 27 ¶		skipping to change at page 6, line 31 ¶
	|Client +-----------------........... ----+Proxy D +-----+Server |		|Client +-----------------........... ----+Proxy D +-----+Server |
	+--------+ +--------+ +--------+		+--------+ +--------+ +--------+
	Figure 4: End-to-Middle Diameter AVP Security Protection.		Figure 4: End-to-Middle Diameter AVP Security Protection.
	The fourth and the final scenario (see Figure 5) is a combination of		The fourth and the final scenario (see Figure 5) is a combination of
	the end-to-middle and the middle-to-end scenario shown in Figure 4		the end-to-middle and the middle-to-end scenario shown in Figure 4
	and in Figure 3. From a deployment point of view this scenario is		and in Figure 3. From a deployment point of view this scenario is
	easier to accomplish for two reasons: First, Diameter clients and		easier to accomplish for two reasons: First, Diameter clients and
	Diameter servers remain unmodified. This ensures that no		Diameter servers remain unmodified. This ensures that no
	modifications are needed to the installed Diameter infrastructure.		modifications are needed to the installed Diameter infrastructure,
	Second, key management is also simplified since fewer number of keys		except for the security enabled proxies obviously. Second, the key
	need to be negotiated and provisioned.		management is also simplified since fewer number of keys need to be
			negotiated and provisioned. The assumption here is that the number
			of security enabled proxies would be significantly less than
			unprotected Diameter nodes in the installed base.
	+--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+		+--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+
	|Diameter| AVP |Diameter| AVP, {AVP}k |Diameter| AVP |Diameter|		|Diameter| AVP |Diameter| AVP, {AVP}k |Diameter| AVP |Diameter|
	|Client +-----+Proxy A +-- .......... ----+Proxy D +-----+Server |		|Client +-----+Proxy A +-- .......... ----+Proxy D +-----+Server |
	+--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+		+--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+
	Figure 5: Middle-to-Middle Diameter AVP Security Protection.		Figure 5: Middle-to-Middle Diameter AVP Security Protection.
	Various security threats are mitigated by selectively applying
	security protection for individual Diameter AVPs. Without protection
	there is the possibility for password sniffing, confidentiality
	violation, AVP insertion, deletion or modification. Additionally,
	applying digital signature offers non-repudiation capabilities; a
	feature not yet available in today's Diameter deployment.
	Modification of certain Diameter AVPs may not necessarily be the act
	of malicious behavior but could also be the result of
	misconfiguration. An over-aggressively configured firewalling
	Diameter proxy may also remove certain AVPs. In most cases data
	origin authentication and integrity protection of AVPs will provide
	the most benefits for existing deployments with minimal overhead and
	(potentially) operating in a full-backwards compatible manner.
	5. Requirements		5. Requirements
	Requirement #1: The solution MUST support an extensible set of		Requirement #1: The solution MUST support an extensible set of
	cryptographic algorithms.		cryptographic algorithms.
	Motivation: Solutions MUST be able to evolve to adapt to		Motivation: Solutions MUST be able to evolve to adapt to
	evolving cryptographic algorithms and security requirements.		evolving cryptographic algorithms and security requirements.
	This may include the provision of a modular mechanism to allow		This may include the provision of a modular mechanism to allow
	cryptographic algorithms to be updated without substantial		cryptographic algorithms to be updated without substantial
	disruption to deployed implementations.		disruption to deployed implementations.
	Requirement #2: The solution MUST support confidentiality,		Requirement #2: The solution MUST support confidentiality,
	integrity, and data-origin authentication. Solutions for		integrity, and data-origin authentication. Solutions for
	integrity protection MUST work in a backwards-compatible way with		integrity protection MUST work in a backwards-compatible way with
	existing Diameter applications.		existing Diameter applications and therefore be able to traverse
			legacy proxy and relay agents.
	Requirement #3: The solution MUST support replay protection. All		Requirement #3: The solution MUST support replay protection.
	Diameter nodes have access to network time and thus can
	synchronize their clocks.
	Requirement #4: The solution MUST support the ability to delegate		Requirement #4: The solution MUST support the ability to delegate
	security functionality to another entity		security functionality to another entity
	Motivation: As described in Section 4 the ability to let a		Motivation: As described in Section 4 the ability to let a
	Diameter proxy to perform security services on behalf of all		Diameter proxy to perform security services on behalf of all
	clients within the same administrative domain is important for		clients within the same administrative domain is important for
	incremental deployability. The same applies to the other		incremental deployability. The same applies to the other
	communication side where a load balancer terminates security		communication side where a load balancer terminates security
	services for the servers it interfaces.		services for the servers it interfaces.
	Requirement #5: The solution MUST be able to selectively apply their		Requirement #5: The solution MUST be able to selectively apply their
	cryptographic protection to certain Diameter AVPs.		cryptographic protection to certain Diameter AVPs.
	Motivation: Some Diameter applications assume that certain AVPs		Motivation: Some Diameter applications assume that certain AVPs
	are added, removed, or modified by intermediaries. As such, it		are added, removed, or modified by intermediaries. As such, it
	MUST be possible to apply security protection selectively.		must be possible to apply security protection selectively.
	Furthermore, there are AVPs that MUST NOT be confidentiality		Furthermore, there are AVPs that must not be confidentiality
	protected but MAY still be integrity protected such as those		protected but may still be integrity protected such as those
	required for Diameter message routing.		required for Diameter message routing.
	Requirement #6: The solution MUST define a mandatory-to-implement		Requirement #6: The solution MUST define a mandatory-to-implement
	cryptographic algorithm.		cryptographic algorithm.
	Motivation: For interoperability purposes it is beneficial to		Motivation: For interoperability purposes it is beneficial to
	have a mandatory-to-implement cryptographic algorithm specified		have a mandatory-to-implement cryptographic algorithm specified
	(unless profiles for specific usage environments specify		(unless profiles for specific usage environments specify
	otherwise).		otherwise).
	skipping to change at page 8, line 30 ¶		skipping to change at page 8, line 25 ¶
	However, it is assumed that no "new" key management protocol		However, it is assumed that no "new" key management protocol
	needs to be developed; instead existing ones are re-used, if at		needs to be developed; instead existing ones are re-used, if at
	all possible. Rekeying could be triggered by (a) management		all possible. Rekeying could be triggered by (a) management
	actions and (b) expiring keying material.		actions and (b) expiring keying material.
	6. Security Considerations		6. Security Considerations
	This entire document focused on the discussion of new functionality		This entire document focused on the discussion of new functionality
	for securing Diameter AVPs selectively between non-neighboring nodes.		for securing Diameter AVPs selectively between non-neighboring nodes.
			Various security threats are mitigated by selectively applying
			security protection for individual Diameter AVPs. Without protection
			there is the possibility for password sniffing, confidentiality
			violation, AVP insertion, deletion or modification. Additionally,
			applying digital signature offers non-repudiation capabilities; a
			feature not yet available in today's Diameter deployment.
			Modification of certain Diameter AVPs may not necessarily be the act
			of malicious behavior but could also be the result of
			misconfiguration. An over-aggressively configured firewalling
			Diameter proxy may also remove certain AVPs. In most cases data
			origin authentication and integrity protection of AVPs will provide
			the most benefits for existing deployments with minimal overhead and
			(potentially) operating in a full-backwards compatible manner.
	7. IANA Considerations		7. IANA Considerations
	This document does not require actions by IANA.		This document does not require actions by IANA.
	8. Acknowledgments		8. Acknowledgments
	We would like to thank Guenther Horn, Martin Dolly, Steve Donovan,		We would like to thank Guenther Horn, Martin Dolly, Steve Donovan,
	Lionel Morand and Tom Taylor (rest in peace Tom) for their review		Lionel Morand and Tom Taylor (rest in peace Tom) for their review
	comments.		comments.
			The authors also thank Qin Wu, Christer Holmberg, Ben Campbell and
			Radia Perlman who provided additional reviews during the Last Call.
	9. References		9. References
	9.1. Normative References		9.1. Normative References
	[1] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[1] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,		DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
	[2] Fajardo, V., Ed., Arkko, J., Loughney, J., and G. Zorn,		[2] Fajardo, V., Ed., Arkko, J., Loughney, J., and G. Zorn,
	skipping to change at page 9, line 16 ¶		skipping to change at page 9, line 30 ¶
	[3] Calhoun, P., Farrell, S., and W. Bulley, "Diameter CMS		[3] Calhoun, P., Farrell, S., and W. Bulley, "Diameter CMS
	Security Application", draft-ietf-aaa-diameter-cms-sec-04		Security Application", draft-ietf-aaa-diameter-cms-sec-04
	(work in progress), March 2002.		(work in progress), March 2002.
	[4] Eronen, P., Ed., Hiller, T., and G. Zorn, "Diameter		[4] Eronen, P., Ed., Hiller, T., and G. Zorn, "Diameter
	Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application",		Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application",
	RFC 4072, DOI 10.17487/RFC4072, August 2005,		RFC 4072, DOI 10.17487/RFC4072, August 2005,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4072>.		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4072>.
			[5] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
			Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, DOI 10.17487/RFC4301,
			December 2005, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4301>.
			[6] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
			(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
			<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
			[7] Tuexen, M., Seggelmann, R., and E. Rescorla, "Datagram
			Transport Layer Security (DTLS) for Stream Control
			Transmission Protocol (SCTP)", RFC 6083,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC6083, January 2011,
			<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6083>.
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Hannes Tschofenig		Hannes Tschofenig
	ARM Limited		ARM Limited
	Austria		Austria
	Email: Hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net		Email: Hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net
	URI: http://www.tschofenig.priv.at		URI: http://www.tschofenig.priv.at
	Jouni Korhonen (editor)		Jouni Korhonen (editor)
	Broadcom Corporation		Broadcom Limited
	3151 Zanker Rd.		3151 Zanker Rd.
	San Jose, CA 95134		San Jose, CA 95134
	USA		USA
	Email: jouni.nospam@gmail.com		Email: jouni.nospam@gmail.com
	Glen Zorn		Glen Zorn
	Network Zen		Network Zen
	227/358 Thanon Sanphawut		227/358 Thanon Sanphawut
	Bang Na Bangkok 10260		Bang Na Bangkok 10260
	Thailand		Thailand
	Email: glenzorn@gmail.com		Email: glenzorn@gmail.com
	Kervin Pillay		Kervin Pillay
	Oracle Communications		Internet Solutions
	100 Crosby Drive		South Africa
	Bedford, Massachusettes 01730
	USA
	Email: kervin.pillay@oracle.com		Email: kervin.pillay@gmail.com
End of changes. 28 change blocks.
	70 lines changed or deleted		113 lines changed or added
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