draft-ietf-dime-e2e-sec-req-04.txt   draft-ietf-dime-e2e-sec-req-05.txt 
DIME H. Tschofenig DIME H. Tschofenig
Internet-Draft ARM Limited Internet-Draft ARM Limited
Intended status: Informational J. Korhonen, Ed. Intended status: Informational J. Korhonen, Ed.
Expires: July 16, 2016 Broadcom Corporation Expires: December 10, 2016 Broadcom Limited
G. Zorn G. Zorn
Network Zen Network Zen
K. Pillay K. Pillay
Oracle Communications Internet Solutions
January 13, 2016 June 8, 2016
Diameter AVP Level Security End-to-End Security: Scenarios and AVP Level Security for Non-neighboring Diameter Nodes: Scenarios and
Requirements Requirements
draft-ietf-dime-e2e-sec-req-04.txt draft-ietf-dime-e2e-sec-req-05.txt
Abstract Abstract
This specification discusses requirements for providing Diameter This specification specifies requirements for providing Diameter
security at the level of individual Attribute-Value Pairs. security at the level of individual Attribute-Value Pairs.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on July 16, 2016. This Internet-Draft will expire on December 10, 2016.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Security Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Security Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Scenarios for Diameter AVP-Level Protection . . . . . . . . . 5 4. Scenarios for Diameter AVP-Level Protection . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Diameter base protocol specification [2] offers security The Diameter base protocol specification [2] defines security
protection between neighboring Diameter peers and mandates that peer protection between neighboring Diameter peers. The Diameter mandates
connections must be protected by TLS (for TCP), DTLS (for SCTP) or that peer connections must be protected by TLS (for TCP) [6], DTLS
alternative security mechanisms independent of Diameter (e.g., IPsec) (for SCTP) [7] or using security mechanisms that are independent of
is used. These security protocols offer a wide range of security Diameter such as IPsec [5]. These security protocols offer a wide
properties, including entity authentication, data-origin range of security properties, including entity authentication, data-
authentication, integrity, confidentiality protection and replay origin authentication, integrity, confidentiality protection and
protection. They also support a large number of cryptographic replay protection. They also support a large number of cryptographic
algorithms, algorithm negotiation, and different types of algorithms, algorithm negotiation, and different types of
credentials. It should be understood that TLS/DTLS/IPsec in Diameter credentials. It should be understood that TLS/DTLS/IPsec in Diameter
context does not provide end-to-end security unless the Diameter context does not provide end-to-end security unless the Diameter
nodes are direct peers i.e., neighboring Diameter nodes. The current nodes are direct peers i.e., neighboring Diameter nodes. The current
Diameter security is realized hop-by-hop. Diameter security is realized hop-by-hop.
The need to also offer additional security protection of AVPs between The need to also offer additional security protection of Attribute
non-neighboring Diameter nodes was recognized very early in the work Value Pairs (AVP) between non-neighboring Diameter nodes was
on Diameter. This led to work on Diameter security using the recognized very early in the work on Diameter. This led to work on
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [3]. Due to lack of deployment Diameter security using the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [3].
interest at that time (and the complexity of the developed solution) Due to lack of deployment interest at that time (and the complexity
the specification was, however, never completed. of the developed solution) the specification was, however, never
completed.
In the meanwhile Diameter had received a lot of deployment interest In the meanwhile Diameter had received a lot of deployment interest
from the cellular operator community and because of the from the cellular operator community and because of the
sophistication of those deployments the need for protecting Diameter sophistication of those deployments the need for protecting Diameter
AVPs between non-neighboring nodes re-surfaced. Since early 2000 AVPs between non-neighboring nodes re-surfaced. Since early 2000
(when the work on [3] was discontinued) the Internet community had (when the work on [3] was discontinued) the Internet community had
seen advances in cryptographic algorithms (for example, authenticated seen advances in cryptographic algorithms (for example, authenticated
encryption algorithms) and new security building blocks were encryption algorithms) and new security building blocks were
developed. developed.
This document collects requirements for developing a solution to This document specifies requirements for developing a solution to
protect Diameter AVPs. protect Diameter AVPs between non-neighboring Diameter nodes.
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL NOT', The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL NOT',
'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this
documents are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [1]. documents are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [1].
This document re-uses terminology from the Diameter base This document re-uses terminology from the Diameter base
specification [2]. specification [2].
In the figures below we use the symbols 'AVP' and '{AVP}k'. AVP In the figures below Attribute Value Pair (AVP) refers to an
refers to an unprotected AVP and {AVP}k refers to an AVP that unprotected AVP and {AVP}k refers to an AVP that experiences security
experiences security protection (using key "k") without further protection (using key "k") without further distinguishing between
distinguishing between integrity and confidentiality protection. integrity and confidentiality protection.
The following terms are also used in this document:
AAA Broker
An entity that manages AAA traffic between roaming partner
networks.
AAA Broker Network
A network operated by an AAA Broker, which consists of necessary
AAA functions to provide AAA brokering services for its customer
AAA networks.
Diameter Firewall
A Diameter firewall is a proxy (or a relay) agent that acts
similarly to conventional IP traffic firewalls but only at the
Diameter AVP and command level. A Diameter firewall may, for
example, discard security policy offending AVPs from traversing
through it. The Diameter firewall may even discard entire
Diameter messages based on the security policy.
3. Security Threats 3. Security Threats
The following description aims to illustrate various security threats The following description aims to illustrate various security threats
that raise the need for protecting Diameter Attribute-Value Pairs that raise the need for protecting Diameter Attribute-Value Pairs
(AVPs). Figure 1 illustrates an example of Diameter based roaming (AVPs). Figure 1 illustrates an example of Diameter based roaming
architecture in which Diameter clients within the visited networks architecture in which Diameter clients within the visited networks
need to interact with Diameter servers in the home domain. AAA need to interact with Diameter servers in the home domain. AAA
domains are interconnected using a Diameter-based AAA interconnection domains are interconnected using a Diameter-based AAA interconnection
network labeled as AAA Broker. network labeled as AAA Broker.
+oooooooooooooooooo+ +====================+ +oooooooooooooooooo+ +====================+
| Example.net | | | | Example.net | | |
| | | | | | | |
+--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+
|Diameter| |Diameter+--------+Diameter| |Diameter| |Diameter| |Diameter+--------+Diameter| |Diameter|
|Client 1+------+Proxy A1| +------+Proxy B +--------+Proxy C |----+ |Client 1| |Proxy A1| |Proxy B | |Proxy C |
| (NAS) +------+ | +------+ +--------+ |----+
+--------+ +--------+ | +--------+ +--------+ | +--------+ +--------+ | +--------+ +--------+ |
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| Visited Domain 1 | | | AAA Broker | | | Visited Domain 1 | | | AAA Broker Network | |
+oooooooooooooooooo+ | +====================+ | +oooooooooooooooooo+ | +====================+ |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| +\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\+ | | +\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\+ |
| +--------+ Example.com | | | +--------+ Example.com | |
| |Diameter| | | | |Diameter| | |
+oooooooooooooooooo+ | |Server X+--+ +--------+ | +oooooooooooooooooo+ | |Server X+--+ +--------+ |
| Example.org | | +--------+ | |Diameter| | | Example.org | | +--------+ | |Diameter| |
| | | +--------+ +---------+Proxy D |-+ | | | +--------+ +---------+Proxy D |-+
+--------+ +--------+ | |Diameter| | +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ | |Diameter| | +--------+
|Diameter| |Diameter| | |Server Y+--+ | |Diameter| |Diameter| | |Server Y+--+ |
|Client 2+------+Proxy A2+-+ +--------+ Home Domain | |Client 2+------+Proxy A2+-+ +--------+ Home Domain |
+--------+ +--------+ +////////////////////+ | (NAS) | | | +////////////////////+
+--------+ +--------+
| | | |
| Visited Domain 2 | | Visited Domain 2 |
+oooooooooooooooooo+ +oooooooooooooooooo+
Figure 1: Example Diameter Deployment. Figure 1: Example Diameter Deployment.
Eavesdropping: Some Diameter applications carry information that is Eavesdropping: Some Diameter applications carry information that is
only intended for consumption by end points, either by the only intended for consumption by end points, either by the
Diameter client or by the Diameter server but not by Diameter client or by the Diameter server but not by
intermediaries. As an example, consider the Diameter EAP intermediaries. As an example, consider the Diameter EAP
application [4] that allows the transport of keying material application [4] that allows the transport of keying material
between the Diameter server to the Diameter client (using the EAP- between the Diameter server to the Diameter client (using the EAP-
Master-Session-Key AVP) for the protection of air interface Master-Session-Key AVP) for the protection of the air interface
between the end device and the network access server. The content (i.e., the wireless link) between the end device (such as a mobile
of the EAP-Master-Session-Key AVP should benefit from protection phone; not shown in the figure) and the Network Access Server
against eavesdropping by intermediaries. Other AVPs, for example (NAS). The content of the EAP-Master-Session-Key AVP should
those listed in Section 13.3 of [2], might also carry sensitive benefit from protection against eavesdropping by intermediaries.
personal data that, when collected by intermediaries, allow for Other AVPs, for example those listed in Section 13.3 of [2], might
traffic analysis. also carry sensitive personal data that, when collected by
intermediaries, allow for traffic analysis.
In context of the deployment shown in Figure 1 the adversary In context of the deployment shown in Figure 1 the adversary
could, for example, be in the AAA broker network. could, for example, be in the AAA broker network.
Injection and Manipulation: The Diameter base protocol specification Injection and Manipulation: The Diameter base protocol specification
mandates security protection between neighboring nodes but mandates security protection between neighboring nodes but
Diameter agents may be compromised or misconfigured and inject/ Diameter agents may be compromised or misconfigured and inject or
manipulate AVPs. To detect such actions additional security manipulate AVPs. To detect such actions additional security
protection needs to be applied at the Diameter layer. protection needs to be applied at the Diameter layer.
Nodes that could launch such an attack are any Diameter agents Nodes that could launch such an attack are any Diameter agents
along the end-to-end communication path. along the end-to-end communication path.
Impersonation: Imagine a case where a Diameter message from Impersonation: Imagine a case where a Diameter message from
Example.net contains information claiming to be from Example.org. Example.net contains information claiming to be from Example.org.
This would either require strict verification at the edge of the This would either require strict verification at the edge of the
AAA broker network or cryptographic assurance at the Diameter AAA broker network or cryptographic assurance at the Diameter
skipping to change at page 6, line 27 skipping to change at page 6, line 31
|Client +-----------------........... ----+Proxy D +-----+Server | |Client +-----------------........... ----+Proxy D +-----+Server |
+--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+
Figure 4: End-to-Middle Diameter AVP Security Protection. Figure 4: End-to-Middle Diameter AVP Security Protection.
The fourth and the final scenario (see Figure 5) is a combination of The fourth and the final scenario (see Figure 5) is a combination of
the end-to-middle and the middle-to-end scenario shown in Figure 4 the end-to-middle and the middle-to-end scenario shown in Figure 4
and in Figure 3. From a deployment point of view this scenario is and in Figure 3. From a deployment point of view this scenario is
easier to accomplish for two reasons: First, Diameter clients and easier to accomplish for two reasons: First, Diameter clients and
Diameter servers remain unmodified. This ensures that no Diameter servers remain unmodified. This ensures that no
modifications are needed to the installed Diameter infrastructure. modifications are needed to the installed Diameter infrastructure,
Second, key management is also simplified since fewer number of keys except for the security enabled proxies obviously. Second, the key
need to be negotiated and provisioned. management is also simplified since fewer number of keys need to be
negotiated and provisioned. The assumption here is that the number
of security enabled proxies would be significantly less than
unprotected Diameter nodes in the installed base.
+--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+
|Diameter| AVP |Diameter| AVP, {AVP}k |Diameter| AVP |Diameter| |Diameter| AVP |Diameter| AVP, {AVP}k |Diameter| AVP |Diameter|
|Client +-----+Proxy A +-- .......... ----+Proxy D +-----+Server | |Client +-----+Proxy A +-- .......... ----+Proxy D +-----+Server |
+--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+
Figure 5: Middle-to-Middle Diameter AVP Security Protection. Figure 5: Middle-to-Middle Diameter AVP Security Protection.
Various security threats are mitigated by selectively applying
security protection for individual Diameter AVPs. Without protection
there is the possibility for password sniffing, confidentiality
violation, AVP insertion, deletion or modification. Additionally,
applying digital signature offers non-repudiation capabilities; a
feature not yet available in today's Diameter deployment.
Modification of certain Diameter AVPs may not necessarily be the act
of malicious behavior but could also be the result of
misconfiguration. An over-aggressively configured firewalling
Diameter proxy may also remove certain AVPs. In most cases data
origin authentication and integrity protection of AVPs will provide
the most benefits for existing deployments with minimal overhead and
(potentially) operating in a full-backwards compatible manner.
5. Requirements 5. Requirements
Requirement #1: The solution MUST support an extensible set of Requirement #1: The solution MUST support an extensible set of
cryptographic algorithms. cryptographic algorithms.
Motivation: Solutions MUST be able to evolve to adapt to Motivation: Solutions MUST be able to evolve to adapt to
evolving cryptographic algorithms and security requirements. evolving cryptographic algorithms and security requirements.
This may include the provision of a modular mechanism to allow This may include the provision of a modular mechanism to allow
cryptographic algorithms to be updated without substantial cryptographic algorithms to be updated without substantial
disruption to deployed implementations. disruption to deployed implementations.
Requirement #2: The solution MUST support confidentiality, Requirement #2: The solution MUST support confidentiality,
integrity, and data-origin authentication. Solutions for integrity, and data-origin authentication. Solutions for
integrity protection MUST work in a backwards-compatible way with integrity protection MUST work in a backwards-compatible way with
existing Diameter applications. existing Diameter applications and therefore be able to traverse
legacy proxy and relay agents.
Requirement #3: The solution MUST support replay protection. All Requirement #3: The solution MUST support replay protection.
Diameter nodes have access to network time and thus can
synchronize their clocks.
Requirement #4: The solution MUST support the ability to delegate Requirement #4: The solution MUST support the ability to delegate
security functionality to another entity security functionality to another entity
Motivation: As described in Section 4 the ability to let a Motivation: As described in Section 4 the ability to let a
Diameter proxy to perform security services on behalf of all Diameter proxy to perform security services on behalf of all
clients within the same administrative domain is important for clients within the same administrative domain is important for
incremental deployability. The same applies to the other incremental deployability. The same applies to the other
communication side where a load balancer terminates security communication side where a load balancer terminates security
services for the servers it interfaces. services for the servers it interfaces.
Requirement #5: The solution MUST be able to selectively apply their Requirement #5: The solution MUST be able to selectively apply their
cryptographic protection to certain Diameter AVPs. cryptographic protection to certain Diameter AVPs.
Motivation: Some Diameter applications assume that certain AVPs Motivation: Some Diameter applications assume that certain AVPs
are added, removed, or modified by intermediaries. As such, it are added, removed, or modified by intermediaries. As such, it
MUST be possible to apply security protection selectively. must be possible to apply security protection selectively.
Furthermore, there are AVPs that MUST NOT be confidentiality Furthermore, there are AVPs that must not be confidentiality
protected but MAY still be integrity protected such as those protected but may still be integrity protected such as those
required for Diameter message routing. required for Diameter message routing.
Requirement #6: The solution MUST define a mandatory-to-implement Requirement #6: The solution MUST define a mandatory-to-implement
cryptographic algorithm. cryptographic algorithm.
Motivation: For interoperability purposes it is beneficial to Motivation: For interoperability purposes it is beneficial to
have a mandatory-to-implement cryptographic algorithm specified have a mandatory-to-implement cryptographic algorithm specified
(unless profiles for specific usage environments specify (unless profiles for specific usage environments specify
otherwise). otherwise).
skipping to change at page 8, line 30 skipping to change at page 8, line 25
However, it is assumed that no "new" key management protocol However, it is assumed that no "new" key management protocol
needs to be developed; instead existing ones are re-used, if at needs to be developed; instead existing ones are re-used, if at
all possible. Rekeying could be triggered by (a) management all possible. Rekeying could be triggered by (a) management
actions and (b) expiring keying material. actions and (b) expiring keying material.
6. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
This entire document focused on the discussion of new functionality This entire document focused on the discussion of new functionality
for securing Diameter AVPs selectively between non-neighboring nodes. for securing Diameter AVPs selectively between non-neighboring nodes.
Various security threats are mitigated by selectively applying
security protection for individual Diameter AVPs. Without protection
there is the possibility for password sniffing, confidentiality
violation, AVP insertion, deletion or modification. Additionally,
applying digital signature offers non-repudiation capabilities; a
feature not yet available in today's Diameter deployment.
Modification of certain Diameter AVPs may not necessarily be the act
of malicious behavior but could also be the result of
misconfiguration. An over-aggressively configured firewalling
Diameter proxy may also remove certain AVPs. In most cases data
origin authentication and integrity protection of AVPs will provide
the most benefits for existing deployments with minimal overhead and
(potentially) operating in a full-backwards compatible manner.
7. IANA Considerations 7. IANA Considerations
This document does not require actions by IANA. This document does not require actions by IANA.
8. Acknowledgments 8. Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Guenther Horn, Martin Dolly, Steve Donovan, We would like to thank Guenther Horn, Martin Dolly, Steve Donovan,
Lionel Morand and Tom Taylor (rest in peace Tom) for their review Lionel Morand and Tom Taylor (rest in peace Tom) for their review
comments. comments.
The authors also thank Qin Wu, Christer Holmberg, Ben Campbell and
Radia Perlman who provided additional reviews during the Last Call.
9. References 9. References
9.1. Normative References 9.1. Normative References
[1] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [1] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[2] Fajardo, V., Ed., Arkko, J., Loughney, J., and G. Zorn, [2] Fajardo, V., Ed., Arkko, J., Loughney, J., and G. Zorn,
skipping to change at page 9, line 16 skipping to change at page 9, line 30
[3] Calhoun, P., Farrell, S., and W. Bulley, "Diameter CMS [3] Calhoun, P., Farrell, S., and W. Bulley, "Diameter CMS
Security Application", draft-ietf-aaa-diameter-cms-sec-04 Security Application", draft-ietf-aaa-diameter-cms-sec-04
(work in progress), March 2002. (work in progress), March 2002.
[4] Eronen, P., Ed., Hiller, T., and G. Zorn, "Diameter [4] Eronen, P., Ed., Hiller, T., and G. Zorn, "Diameter
Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application", Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application",
RFC 4072, DOI 10.17487/RFC4072, August 2005, RFC 4072, DOI 10.17487/RFC4072, August 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4072>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4072>.
[5] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, DOI 10.17487/RFC4301,
December 2005, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4301>.
[6] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[7] Tuexen, M., Seggelmann, R., and E. Rescorla, "Datagram
Transport Layer Security (DTLS) for Stream Control
Transmission Protocol (SCTP)", RFC 6083,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6083, January 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6083>.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Hannes Tschofenig Hannes Tschofenig
ARM Limited ARM Limited
Austria Austria
Email: Hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net Email: Hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net
URI: http://www.tschofenig.priv.at URI: http://www.tschofenig.priv.at
Jouni Korhonen (editor) Jouni Korhonen (editor)
Broadcom Corporation Broadcom Limited
3151 Zanker Rd. 3151 Zanker Rd.
San Jose, CA 95134 San Jose, CA 95134
USA USA
Email: jouni.nospam@gmail.com Email: jouni.nospam@gmail.com
Glen Zorn Glen Zorn
Network Zen Network Zen
227/358 Thanon Sanphawut 227/358 Thanon Sanphawut
Bang Na Bangkok 10260 Bang Na Bangkok 10260
Thailand Thailand
Email: glenzorn@gmail.com Email: glenzorn@gmail.com
Kervin Pillay Kervin Pillay
Oracle Communications Internet Solutions
100 Crosby Drive South Africa
Bedford, Massachusettes 01730
USA
Email: kervin.pillay@oracle.com Email: kervin.pillay@gmail.com
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