draft-ietf-dime-e2e-sec-req-01.txt   draft-ietf-dime-e2e-sec-req-02.txt 
DIME H. Tschofenig, Ed. DIME H. Tschofenig
Internet-Draft Nokia Solutions and Networks Internet-Draft
Intended status: Informational J. Korhonen Intended status: Informational J. Korhonen
Expires: April 24, 2014 Broadcom Expires: July 30, 2015 Broadcom
G. Zorn G. Zorn
Network Zen Network Zen
K. Pillay K. Pillay
Oracle Communications Oracle Communications
October 21, 2013 January 26, 2015
Diameter AVP Level Security: Scenarios and Requirements Diameter AVP Level Security End-to-End Security: Scenarios and
draft-ietf-dime-e2e-sec-req-01.txt Requirements
draft-ietf-dime-e2e-sec-req-02.txt
Abstract Abstract
This specification discusses requirements for providing Diameter This specification discusses requirements for providing Diameter
security at the level of individual Attribute Value Pairs. security at the level of individual Attribute Value Pairs.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
skipping to change at page 1, line 36 skipping to change at page 1, line 37
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 24, 2014. This Internet-Draft will expire on July 30, 2015.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Security Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Security Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Scenarios for Diameter AVP-Level Protection . . . . . . . . . 4 4. Scenarios for Diameter AVP-Level Protection . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Diameter Base specification [2] offers security protection The Diameter Base specification [2] offers security protection
between neighboring Diameter peers and mandates that either TLS (for between neighboring Diameter peers and mandates that either TLS (for
TCP), DTLS (for SCTP), or IPsec is used. These security protocols TCP), DTLS (for SCTP), or IPsec is used. These security protocols
offer a wide range of security properties, including entity offer a wide range of security properties, including entity
authentication, data-origin authentication, integrity, authentication, data-origin authentication, integrity,
confidentiality protection and replay protection. They also support confidentiality protection and replay protection. They also support
skipping to change at page 7, line 37 skipping to change at page 8, line 16
provide different security services. Asymmetric algorithms, provide different security services. Asymmetric algorithms,
for example, allow non-repudiation services to be offered. for example, allow non-repudiation services to be offered.
Requirement #8: A solution for dynamic key management MUST be Requirement #8: A solution for dynamic key management MUST be
included in the overall solution framework. However, it is included in the overall solution framework. However, it is
assumed that no "new" key management protocol needs to be assumed that no "new" key management protocol needs to be
developed; instead existing ones are re-used, if at all possible. developed; instead existing ones are re-used, if at all possible.
Rekeying could be triggered by (a) management actions and (b) Rekeying could be triggered by (a) management actions and (b)
expiring keying material. expiring keying material.
Requirement #9: The ability to statically provisioned keys 6. Security Considerations
(symmetric as well as asymmetric keys) has to be supported to
simplify management for small-scale deployments that typically do
not have a back-end network management infrastructure.
6. Open Issues
Open Issue #1: Capability/Policy Discovery: This document talks
about selectively protecting Diameter AVPs between different
Diameter nodes. A Diameter node has to be configured such that it
applies security protection to a certain number of AVPs. A number
of policy related questions arise: What keying material should be
used so that the intended recipient is also able to verify it?
What AVPs shall be protected so that the result is not rejected by
the recipient? In case of confidentiality protection the Diameter
node encrypting AVPs needs to know ahead of time what other node
is intended to decrypt them. Should the list of integrity
protected AVP be indicated in the protected payload itself (or is
it known based on out-of-band information)? Is this policy /
capability information assumed to be established out-of-band
(manually) or is there a protocol mechanism to distribute this
information?
Open Issue #2: Command-Line Support: Should solutions allow the
provisioning of long-term shared symmetric credentials via a
command-line interface / text file? This allows easier management
for small-scale deployments.
7. Security Considerations
This entire document focused on the discussion of new functionality This entire document focused on the discussion of new functionality
for securing Diameter AVPs selectively between non-neighboring nodes. for securing Diameter AVPs selectively between non-neighboring nodes.
8. IANA Considerations 7. IANA Considerations
This document does not require actions by IANA. This document does not require actions by IANA.
9. Acknowledgments 8. Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Guenther Horn, Martin Dolly, for his review We would like to thank Guenther Horn, Martin Dolly, for his review
comments. comments.
10. References 9. References
10.1. Normative References 9.1. Normative References
[1] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [1] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[2] Fajardo, V., Arkko, J., Loughney, J., and G. Zorn, [2] Fajardo, V., Arkko, J., Loughney, J., and G. Zorn,
"Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 6733, October 2012. "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 6733, October 2012.
10.2. Informative References 9.2. Informative References
[3] Calhoun, P., Farrell, S., and W. Bulley, "Diameter CMS [3] Calhoun, P., Farrell, S., and W. Bulley, "Diameter CMS
Security Application", draft-ietf-aaa-diameter-cms-sec-04 Security Application", draft-ietf-aaa-diameter-cms-sec-04
(work in progress), March 2002. (work in progress), March 2002.
[4] Eronen, P., Hiller, T., and G. Zorn, "Diameter Extensible [4] Eronen, P., Hiller, T., and G. Zorn, "Diameter Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application", RFC 4072, Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application", RFC 4072,
August 2005. August 2005.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Hannes Tschofenig (editor) Hannes Tschofenig
Nokia Solutions and Networks Hall in Tirol 6060
Linnoitustie 6 Austria
Espoo 02600
Finland
Phone: +358 (50) 4871445 Email: Hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net
Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net
URI: http://www.tschofenig.priv.at URI: http://www.tschofenig.priv.at
Jouni Korhonen Jouni Korhonen
Broadcom Broadcom
Porkkalankatu 24 Porkkalankatu 24
Helsinki 00180 Helsinki 00180
Finland Finland
Email: jouni.nospam@gmail.com Email: jouni.nospam@gmail.com
 End of changes. 15 change blocks. 
58 lines changed or deleted 27 lines changed or added

This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.41. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/