draft-ietf-dime-e2e-sec-req-00.txt		draft-ietf-dime-e2e-sec-req-01.txt
	DIME H. Tschofenig, Ed.		DIME H. Tschofenig, Ed.
	Internet-Draft Nokia Solutions and Networks		Internet-Draft Nokia Solutions and Networks
	Intended status: Standards Track J. Korhonen		Intended status: Informational J. Korhonen
	Expires: March 30, 2014 Renesas Mobile		Expires: April 24, 2014 Broadcom
	G. Zorn		G. Zorn
	Network Zen		Network Zen
	K. Pillay		K. Pillay
	Oracle Communications		Oracle Communications
	September 26, 2013		October 21, 2013
	Diameter AVP Level Security: Scenarios and Requirements		Diameter AVP Level Security: Scenarios and Requirements
	draft-ietf-dime-e2e-sec-req-00.txt		draft-ietf-dime-e2e-sec-req-01.txt
	Abstract		Abstract
	This specification discusses requirements for providing Diameter		This specification discusses requirements for providing Diameter
	security at the level of individual Attribute Value Pairs.		security at the level of individual Attribute Value Pairs.
	Status of This Memo		Status of This Memo
	This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the		This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
	provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.		provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
	skipping to change at page 1, line 36		skipping to change at page 1, line 36
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on March 30, 2014.		This Internet-Draft will expire on April 24, 2014.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect		carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
	include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of		include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
	the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as		the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
	described in the Simplified BSD License.		described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
	2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	3. Use Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		3. Security Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	4. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		4. Scenarios for Diameter AVP-Level Protection . . . . . . . . . 4
	5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		5. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		6. Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
			10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
			Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	The Diameter Base specification [2] offers security protection		The Diameter Base specification [2] offers security protection
	between neighboring Diameter peers and mandates that either TLS (for		between neighboring Diameter peers and mandates that either TLS (for
	TCP), DTLS (for SCTP), or IPsec is used. These security protocols		TCP), DTLS (for SCTP), or IPsec is used. These security protocols
	offer a wide range of security properties, including entity		offer a wide range of security properties, including entity
	authentication, data-origin authentication, integrity,		authentication, data-origin authentication, integrity,
	confidentiality protection and replay protection. They also support		confidentiality protection and replay protection. They also support
	a large number of cryptographic algorithms, algorithm negotiation,		a large number of cryptographic algorithms, algorithm negotiation,
	skipping to change at page 2, line 45		skipping to change at page 2, line 47
	Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [3]. Due to lack of deployment		Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [3]. Due to lack of deployment
	interest at that time (and the complexity of the developed solution)		interest at that time (and the complexity of the developed solution)
	the specification was, however, never completed.		the specification was, however, never completed.
	In the meanwhile Diameter had received a lot of deployment interest		In the meanwhile Diameter had received a lot of deployment interest
	from the cellular operator community and because of the		from the cellular operator community and because of the
	sophistication of those deployments the need for protecting Diameter		sophistication of those deployments the need for protecting Diameter
	AVPs between non-neighboring nodes re-surfaced. Since early 2000		AVPs between non-neighboring nodes re-surfaced. Since early 2000
	(when the work on [3] was discontinued) the Internet community had		(when the work on [3] was discontinued) the Internet community had
	seen advances in cryptographic algorithms (for example, authenticated		seen advances in cryptographic algorithms (for example, authenticated
	encryption algorithms were developed) and new security building		encryption algorithms) and new security building blocks were
	blocks were developed.		developed.
	This document collects requirements for developing a solution to		This document collects requirements for developing a solution to
	protect Diameter AVPs.		protect Diameter AVPs.
	2. Terminology		2. Terminology
	The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL NOT',		The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL NOT',
	'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this		'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this
	specification are to be interpreted as described in [1].		specification are to be interpreted as described in [1].
	This document re-uses terminology from the Diameter base		This document re-uses terminology from the Diameter base
	specification [2].		specification [2].
	3. Use Case		In the figures below we use the symbols 'AVP' and '{AVP}k'. AVP
			refers to an unprotected AVP and {AVP}k refers to an AVP that
			experiences security protection (using key "k") without further
			distinguishing between integrity and confidentiality protection.
	Consider the following use case shown in Figure 1 where a a Diameter		3. Security Threats
	client wants to interact with its home Diameter server in the
	example.com realm. The visited domain the Diameter client is		The follow description aims to illustrate various security threats
	attached to makes use of a AAA interconnection provider, shown as AAA		that raise the need for protecting Diameter Attribute Value Pairs
	Broker in our example. While both the administrators of the visited		(AVPs). Figure 1 illustrates an example Diameter topology where a
	as well as the home domain are likely to main a business relationship		Diameter clients want to interact with the example.com home domain.
	with the intermediate AAA broker network they may want to ensure that		To interconnect the two visited networks a AAA interconnection
	certain Diameter AVPs are not sent in the clear or are integrity		provider, labeled as AAA Broker, is used.
	protected. Note that the security services are likely offered
	between Diameter Proxy A and Diameter Proxy D for ease of deployment.
	Proxy A may act on behalf of the Diameter client and Diameter Proxy D
	acts on behalf of Diameter Server X and Y it serves.
	+oooooooooooooooooo+ +====================+		+oooooooooooooooooo+ +====================+
	| | | |		| Example.net | | |
	| | | |		| | | |
	+--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+		+--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+
	|Diameter| |Diameter| |Diameter| |Diameter|		|Diameter| |Diameter+--------+Diameter| |Diameter|
	|Client +------+Proxy A +--------+Proxy B +--------+Proxy C |----+		|Client 1+------+Proxy A1| +------+Proxy B +--------+Proxy C |----+
	+--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ |		+--------+ +--------+ | +--------+ +--------+ |
	| | | | |		| | | | | |
	| Visited Domain | | AAA Broker | |		| Visited Domain 1 | | | AAA Broker | |
	+oooooooooooooooooo+ +====================+ |		+oooooooooooooooooo+ | +====================+ |
	|		| |
	|		| |
	|		| |
	+\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\+ |		| +\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\+ |
	+--------+ Example.com | |		| +--------+ Example.com | |
	|Diameter| | |		| |Diameter| | |
	|Server X+--+ +--------+ |		+oooooooooooooooooo+ | |Server X+--+ +--------+ |
	+--------+ | |Diameter| |		| Example.org | | +--------+ | |Diameter| |
	+--------+ +---------+Proxy D |----+		| | | +--------+ +---------+Proxy D |-+
	|Diameter| | +--------+		+--------+ +--------+ | |Diameter| | +--------+
	|Server Y+--+ |		|Diameter| |Diameter| | |Server Y+--+ |
	+--------+ Home Domain |		|Client 2+------+Proxy A2+-+ +--------+ Home Domain |
	+////////////////////+		+--------+ +--------+ +////////////////////+
			| |
			| Visited Domain 2 |
			+oooooooooooooooooo+
	Figure 1: Example Diameter Deployment Setup.		Figure 1: Example Diameter Deployment.
	Based on Figure 1 the following use cases can be differentiated. AVP		Eavesdropping: Some Diameter applications carry information that is
	refers to an unprotected AVP and {AVP}k refers to an AVP that		only intended for consumption by end points, either by the
	experiences security protection without further distinguishing		Diameter client or by the Diameter server but not by
	between integrity and confidentiality protection.		intermediaries. As an example, consider the Diameter EAP
			application [4] that allows keying material for the protection of
			air interface between the end device and the network access server
			to be carried from the Diameter server to the Diameter client
			(using the EAP-Master-Session-Key AVP). The content of the EAP-
			Master-Session-Key AVP would benefit from protection against
			eavesdropping by intermediaries. Other AVPs might also carry
			sensitive personal data that, when collected by intermediaries,
			allow for traffic analysis.
			In context of the deployment shown in Figure 1 the adversary
			could, for example, be in the AAA broker network.
			Injection and Manipulation: The Diameter base specification mandates
			security protection between neighboring nodes but Diameter agents
			may be compromised or misconfigured and inject/manipulate AVPs.
			To detect such actions additional security protection needs to be
			applied at the Diameter layer.
			Nodes that could launch such an attack are any Diameter agents
			along the end-to-end communication path.
			Impersonation: Imagine a case where a Diameter message from
			Example.net contains information claiming to be from Example.org.
			This would either require strict verification at the edge of the
			AAA broker network or cryptographic assurance at the Diameter
			layer to provent a successful impersonation attack.
			Any Diameter realm could launch such an attack aiming for
			financial benefits or to disrupt service availability.
			4. Scenarios for Diameter AVP-Level Protection
			This scenario outlines a number of cases for deploying security
			protection of individual Diameter AVPs.
	In the first scenario, shown in Figure 2, end-to-end security		In the first scenario, shown in Figure 2, end-to-end security
	protection is provided between the Diameter client and the Diameter		protection is provided between the Diameter client and the Diameter
	server. Diameter AVPs exchanged between these two Diameter nodes are		server. Diameter AVPs exchanged between these two Diameter nodes are
	protected.		protected.
	+--------+ +--------+		+--------+ +--------+
	|Diameter| AVP, {AVP}k |Diameter|		|Diameter| AVP, {AVP}k |Diameter|
	|Client +-----------------........... -------------------+Server |		|Client +-----------------........... -------------------+Server |
	+--------+ +--------+		+--------+ +--------+
	skipping to change at page 5, line 5		skipping to change at page 5, line 39
	In the third scenario shown in Figure 4 a Diameter proxy acts on		In the third scenario shown in Figure 4 a Diameter proxy acts on
	behalf of the Diameter server.		behalf of the Diameter server.
	+--------+ +--------+ +--------+		+--------+ +--------+ +--------+
	|Diameter| AVP, {AVP}k |Diameter| AVP |Diameter|		|Diameter| AVP, {AVP}k |Diameter| AVP |Diameter|
	|Client +-----------------........... ----+Proxy D +-----+Server |		|Client +-----------------........... ----+Proxy D +-----+Server |
	+--------+ +--------+ +--------+		+--------+ +--------+ +--------+
	Figure 4: End-to-Middle Diameter AVP Security Protection.		Figure 4: End-to-Middle Diameter AVP Security Protection.
	The forth and final scenario (see Figure 5) is a combination of the		The fourth and the final scenario (see Figure 5) is a combination of
	end-to-middle and the middle-to-end scenario shown in Figure 4 and in		the end-to-middle and the middle-to-end scenario shown in Figure 4
	Figure 3. From a deployment point of view this scenario is easier to		and in Figure 3. From a deployment point of view this scenario is
	accomplish for two reasons: First, Diameter clients and Diameter		easier to accomplish for two reasons: First, Diameter clients and
	servers remain unmodified. This ensures that no modifications are		Diameter servers remain unmodified. This ensures that no
	needed to the installed Diameter infrastructure. Second, key		modifications are needed to the installed Diameter infrastructure.
	management is also simplified since fewer number of key pairs need to		Second, key management is also simplified since fewer number of key
	be negotiated and provisioned.		pairs need to be negotiated and provisioned.
	+--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+		+--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+
	|Diameter| AVP |Diameter| AVP, {AVP}k |Diameter| AVP |Diameter|		|Diameter| AVP |Diameter| AVP, {AVP}k |Diameter| AVP |Diameter|
	|Client +-----+Proxy A +-- .......... ----+Proxy D +-----+Server |		|Client +-----+Proxy A +-- .......... ----+Proxy D +-----+Server |
	+--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+		+--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+
	Figure 5: Middle-to-Middle Diameter AVP Security Protection.		Figure 5: Middle-to-Middle Diameter AVP Security Protection.
	Various security threats are mitigated by selectively applying		Various security threats are mitigated by selectively applying
	security protection for individual Diameter AVPs. Without protection		security protection for individual Diameter AVPs. Without protection
	skipping to change at page 5, line 35		skipping to change at page 6, line 26
	applying digital signature offers non-repudiation capabilities; a		applying digital signature offers non-repudiation capabilities; a
	feature not yet available in today's Diameter deployment.		feature not yet available in today's Diameter deployment.
	Modification of certain Diameter AVPs may not necessarily be the act		Modification of certain Diameter AVPs may not necessarily be the act
	of malicious behavior but could also be the result of		of malicious behavior but could also be the result of
	misconfiguration. An over-aggressively configured firewalling		misconfiguration. An over-aggressively configured firewalling
	Diameter proxy may also remove certain AVPs. In most cases data		Diameter proxy may also remove certain AVPs. In most cases data
	origin authentication and integrity protection of AVPs will provide		origin authentication and integrity protection of AVPs will provide
	most benefits for existing deployments with minimal overhead and		most benefits for existing deployments with minimal overhead and
	(potentially) operating in a full-backwards compatible manner.		(potentially) operating in a full-backwards compatible manner.
	4. Requirements		5. Requirements
	Requirement #1: Solutions MUST support an extensible set of		Requirement #1: Solutions MUST support an extensible set of
	cryptographic algorithms.		cryptographic algorithms.
	Motivation: Crypto-agility is the ability of a protocol to		Motivation: Crypto-agility is the ability of a protocol to
	adapt to evolving cryptographic algorithms and security		adapt to evolving cryptographic algorithms and security
	requirements. This may include the provision of a modular		requirements. This may include the provision of a modular
	mechanism to allow cryptographic algorithms to be updated		mechanism to allow cryptographic algorithms to be updated
	without substantial disruption to deployed implementations.		without substantial disruption to deployed implementations.
	skipping to change at page 6, line 12		skipping to change at page 6, line 49
	protection MUST work in a backwards-compatible way with existing		protection MUST work in a backwards-compatible way with existing
	Diameter applications.		Diameter applications.
	Requirement #3: Solutions MUST support replay protection. Any		Requirement #3: Solutions MUST support replay protection. Any
	Diameter node has an access to network time and thus can		Diameter node has an access to network time and thus can
	synchronise their clocks.		synchronise their clocks.
	Requirement #4: Solutions MUST support the ability to delegate		Requirement #4: Solutions MUST support the ability to delegate
	security functionality to another entity		security functionality to another entity
	Motivation: As described in Section 3 the ability to let a		Motivation: As described in Section 4 the ability to let a
	Diameter proxy to perform security services on behalf of all		Diameter proxy to perform security services on behalf of all
	clients within the same administrative domain is important for		clients within the same administrative domain is important for
	incremental deployability. The same applies to the other		incremental deployability. The same applies to the other
	communication side where a load balancer terminates security		communication side where a load balancer terminates security
	services for the servers it interfaces.		services for the servers it interfaces.
	Requirement #5: Solutions MUST be able to selectively apply their		Requirement #5: Solutions MUST be able to selectively apply their
	cryptographic protection to certain Diameter AVPs.		cryptographic protection to certain Diameter AVPs.
	Motivation: Some Diameter applications assume that certain AVPs		Motivation: Some Diameter applications assume that certain AVPs
	are added, removed, or modified by intermediaries. As such, it		are added, removed, or modified by intermediaries. As such, it
	may be necessary to apply security protection selectively.		MUST be possible to apply security protection selectively.
	Requirement #6: Solutions MUST recommend a mandatory-to-implement		Requirement #6: Solutions MUST recommend a mandatory-to-implement
	cryptographic algorithm.		cryptographic algorithm.
	Motivation: For interoperability purposes it is beneficial to		Motivation: For interoperability purposes it is beneficial to
	have a mandatory-to-implement cryptographic algorithm specified		have a mandatory-to-implement cryptographic algorithm specified
	(unless profiles for specific usage environments specify		(unless profiles for specific usage environments specify
	otherwise).		otherwise).
	Requirement #7: Solutions MUST support symmetric keys and asymmetric		Requirement #7: Solutions MUST support symmetric keys and asymmetric
	keys.		keys.
	Motivation: Symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic algorithms		Motivation: Symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic algorithms
	provide different security services. Asymmetric algorithms,		provide different security services. Asymmetric algorithms,
	for example, allow non-repudiation services to be offered.		for example, allow non-repudiation services to be offered.
	Requirement #8: A solution for dynamic key management has to be		Requirement #8: A solution for dynamic key management MUST be
	provided. It is assumed that no "new" key management protocol		included in the overall solution framework. However, it is
	needs to be developed; instead existing ones are re-used, if at		assumed that no "new" key management protocol needs to be
	all possible. Rekeying could be triggered by (a) management		developed; instead existing ones are re-used, if at all possible.
	actions and (b) expiring keying material.		Rekeying could be triggered by (a) management actions and (b)
			expiring keying material.
	Requirement #9: The ability to statically provisioned keys		Requirement #9: The ability to statically provisioned keys
	(symmetric as well as asymmetric keys) has to be supported to		(symmetric as well as asymmetric keys) has to be supported to
	simplify management for small-scale deployments that typically do		simplify management for small-scale deployments that typically do
	not have a back-end network management infrastructure.		not have a back-end network management infrastructure.
	Requirement #10: Capability/Policy Discovery: This document talks		6. Open Issues
			Open Issue #1: Capability/Policy Discovery: This document talks
	about selectively protecting Diameter AVPs between different		about selectively protecting Diameter AVPs between different
	Diameter nodes. A Diameter node has to be configured such that it		Diameter nodes. A Diameter node has to be configured such that it
	applies security protection to a certain number of AVPs. A number		applies security protection to a certain number of AVPs. A number
	of policy related questions arise: What keying material should be		of policy related questions arise: What keying material should be
	used so that the intended recipient is also able to verify it?		used so that the intended recipient is also able to verify it?
	What AVPs shall be protected so that the result is not rejected by		What AVPs shall be protected so that the result is not rejected by
	the recipient? In case of confidentiality protection the Diameter		the recipient? In case of confidentiality protection the Diameter
	node encrypting AVPs needs to know ahead of time what other node		node encrypting AVPs needs to know ahead of time what other node
	is intended to decrypt them. Should the list of integrity		is intended to decrypt them. Should the list of integrity
	protected AVP be indicated in the protected payload itself (or is		protected AVP be indicated in the protected payload itself (or is
	it known based on out-of-band information)? Is this policy /		it known based on out-of-band information)? Is this policy /
	capability information assumed to be established out-of-band		capability information assumed to be established out-of-band
	(manually) or is there a protocol mechanism to distribute this		(manually) or is there a protocol mechanism to distribute this
	information?		information?
	Requirement #11: Command-Line Support: Should solutions allow the		Open Issue #2: Command-Line Support: Should solutions allow the
	provisioning of long-term shared symmetric credentials via a		provisioning of long-term shared symmetric credentials via a
	command-line interface / text file? This allows easier management		command-line interface / text file? This allows easier management
	for small-scale deployments.		for small-scale deployments.
	5. Security Considerations		7. Security Considerations
	This entire document focused on the discussion of new functionality		This entire document focused on the discussion of new functionality
	for securing Diameter AVPs selectively between non-neighboring nodes.		for securing Diameter AVPs selectively between non-neighboring nodes.
	6. IANA Considerations		8. IANA Considerations
	This document does not require actions by IANA.		This document does not require actions by IANA.
	7. Acknowledgments		9. Acknowledgments
	We would like to thank Guenther Horn for his review comments.		We would like to thank Guenther Horn, Martin Dolly, for his review
			comments.
	8. References		10. References
	8.1. Normative References		10.1. Normative References
	[1] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[1] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
	[2] Fajardo, V., Arkko, J., Loughney, J., and G. Zorn,		[2] Fajardo, V., Arkko, J., Loughney, J., and G. Zorn,
	"Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 6733, October 2012.		"Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 6733, October 2012.
	8.2. Informative References		10.2. Informative References
	[3] Calhoun, P., Farrell, S., and W. Bulley, "Diameter CMS		[3] Calhoun, P., Farrell, S., and W. Bulley, "Diameter CMS
	Security Application", draft-ietf-aaa-diameter-cms-sec-04		Security Application", draft-ietf-aaa-diameter-cms-sec-04
	(work in progress), March 2002.		(work in progress), March 2002.
			[4] Eronen, P., Hiller, T., and G. Zorn, "Diameter Extensible
			Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application", RFC 4072,
			August 2005.
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Hannes Tschofenig (editor)		Hannes Tschofenig (editor)
	Nokia Solutions and Networks		Nokia Solutions and Networks
	Linnoitustie 6		Linnoitustie 6
	Espoo 02600		Espoo 02600
	Finland		Finland
	Phone: +358 (50) 4871445		Phone: +358 (50) 4871445
	Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net		Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net
	URI: http://www.tschofenig.priv.at		URI: http://www.tschofenig.priv.at
	Jouni Korhonen		Jouni Korhonen
	Renesas Mobile		Broadcom
	Porkkalankatu 24		Porkkalankatu 24
	Helsinki 00180		Helsinki 00180
	Finland		Finland
	Email: jouni.nospam@gmail.com		Email: jouni.nospam@gmail.com
	Glen Zorn		Glen Zorn
	Network Zen		Network Zen
	227/358 Thanon Sanphawut		227/358 Thanon Sanphawut
	Bang Na Bangkok 10260		Bang Na Bangkok 10260
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