draft-ietf-dhc-forcerenew-nonce-02.txt   draft-ietf-dhc-forcerenew-nonce-03.txt 
softwire D. Miles softwire D. Miles
Internet-Draft Alcatel-Lucent Internet-Draft Alcatel-Lucent
Intended status: Standards Track W. Dec Intended status: Standards Track W. Dec
Expires: March 9, 2012 Cisco Systems Expires: June 23, 2012 Cisco Systems
J. Bristow J. Bristow
Swisscom Schweiz AG Swisscom Schweiz AG
R. Maglione R. Maglione
Telecom Italia Telecom Italia
September 6, 2011 December 21, 2011
Forcerenew Nonce Authentication Forcerenew Nonce Authentication
draft-ietf-dhc-forcerenew-nonce-02 draft-ietf-dhc-forcerenew-nonce-03
Abstract Abstract
DHCP Forcerenew allows for the reconfiguration of a single host by DHCP Forcerenew allows for the reconfiguration of a single host by
forcing the DHCP client into a Renew state on a trigger from the DHCP forcing the DHCP client into a Renew state on a trigger from the DHCP
server. In Forcerenew Nonce Authentication the server exchanges a server. In Forcerenew Nonce Authentication the server sends a nonce
nonce with the client on the initial DHCP ACK that is used for with the client on the initial DHCP ACK that is used for subsequent
subsequent validation of a Forcerenew message. validation of a Forcerenew message.
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on March 9, 2012. This Internet-Draft will expire on June 23, 2012.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Message authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Message authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Forcerenew Nonce Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1. Forcerenew Nonce Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1.1. Forcerenew Nonce Protocol Capability Option . . . . . 5 3.1.1. Forcerenew Nonce Protocol Capability Option . . . . . 4
3.1.2. Forcerenew Nonce Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.1.2. Forcerenew Nonce Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.3. Server considerations for Forcerenew Nonce 3.1.3. Server considerations for Forcerenew Nonce
Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1.4. Client considerations for Forcerenew Nonce 3.1.4. Client considerations for Forcerenew Nonce
Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.1. Protocol vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 6.1. Protocol vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The DHCP Reconfigure Extension defined in [RFC3203] is a useful The DHCP Reconfigure Extension defined in [RFC3203] is a useful
mechanism allowing dynamic reconfiguration of a single host triggered mechanism allowing dynamic reconfiguration of a single host triggered
by the DHCP server. Its application is currently limited by a by the DHCP server. Its application is currently limited by a
requirement that FORCERENEW message is always authenticated using requirement that FORCERENEW message is always authenticated using
procedures as described in [RFC3118]. Authentication for DHCP procedures as described in [RFC3118]. Authentication for DHCP
[RFC3118] is mandatory for Forcerenew, however as it is currently [RFC3118] is mandatory for Forcerenew, however as it is currently
defined [RFC3118] requires distribution of constant token or shared- defined [RFC3118] requires distribution of constant token or shared-
skipping to change at page 7, line 37 skipping to change at page 6, line 37
| | | | | |
| |\ ____________ | | |\ ____________ |
| | DHCPRELEASE \| | | DHCPRELEASE \|
| | | | | |
| | Discards lease | | Discards lease
| | | | | |
v v v v v v
3.1.2. Forcerenew Nonce Protocol 3.1.2. Forcerenew Nonce Protocol
[RFC3118] defined an extensible DHCPv4 authentication option which The Forcerenew Nonce Protocol makes use of both the DHCP
supports multiple protocols. The Forcerenew Nonce Protocol makes use authentication option defined in [RFC3118] re-using the option format
of the DHCP authentication option defined in [RFC3118] re-using the and of the Reconfigure Key Authentication Protocol defined in
option format. [RFC3315].
The following fields are set in an DHCP authentication option for the The following fields are set in an DHCP authentication option for the
Forcerenew Nonce Authentication Protocol: Forcerenew Nonce Authentication Protocol:
protocol <TBD (IANA)> protocol 3
algorithm 1 algorithm 1
RDM 0 RDM 0
The format of the Authentication information for the Forcerenew Nonce The format of the Authentication information for the Forcerenew Nonce
Authentication Protocol is: Authentication Protocol is:
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Value (128 bits) | | Type | Value (128 bits) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
. . . .
. . . .
. +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ . +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type Type of data in Value field carried in this option: Type Type of data in Value field carried in this option:
1 Forcerenew Nonce value (used in ACK message) 1 Reconfigure Key value (used in ACK message)
2 HMAC-MD5 digest of the message (FORCERENEW message) 2 HMAC-MD5 digest of the message (FORCERENEW message)
Value Data as defined by field Value Data as defined by field
3.1.3. Server considerations for Forcerenew Nonce Authentication 3.1.3. Server considerations for Forcerenew Nonce Authentication
The use of Forcerenew Nonce Protocol is dependent on the client The use of Forcerenew Nonce Protocol is dependent on the client
indicating its capability through the FORCERENEW_NONCE_CAPABLE(<TBD>) indicating its capability through the FORCERENEW_NONCE_CAPABLE(<TBD>)
DHCP option in any DHCP Discover or Request messages. The DHCP DHCP option in any DHCP Discover or Request messages. The DHCP
skipping to change at page 10, line 17 skipping to change at page 9, line 17
4. Acknowledgements 4. Acknowledgements
Comments are solicited and should be addressed to the DHC WG mailing Comments are solicited and should be addressed to the DHC WG mailing
list (dhcwg@ietf.org) and/or the authors. This contribution is based list (dhcwg@ietf.org) and/or the authors. This contribution is based
on work by Vitali Vinokour. Major sections of this draft use on work by Vitali Vinokour. Major sections of this draft use
modified text from [RFC3315]. The authors wish to thank Ted Lemon modified text from [RFC3315]. The authors wish to thank Ted Lemon
and Bernie Volz for their support. and Bernie Volz for their support.
5. IANA Considerations 5. IANA Considerations
This document requests IANA to allocate an option code for the newly This document requests IANA to assign the following new DHCPv4 option
defined DHCP option FORCERENEW_NONCE_CAPABALE as described in the code from the registry "BOOTP Vendor Extensions and DHCP Options"
text. maintained at http://www.iana.org/assignments/bootp-dhcp-parameters:
This document requests IANA to allocate a DHCP Authentication
Option(90) protocol number be assigned for Forcerenew Nonce
Authentication, per [RFC3118].
This document requests IANA to create a new namespace associated with an option code of TBD1 for FORCERENEW_NONCE_CAPABALE
the Forcerenew Nonce Authentication protocol: algorithm, per
[RFC3118].
6. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
As in some network environments FORCERENEW can be used to snoop and As in some network environments FORCERENEW can be used to snoop and
spoof traffic, the FORCERENEW message MUST be authenticated using the spoof traffic, the FORCERENEW message MUST be authenticated using the
procedures as described in [RFC3118] or this proposal. In this procedures as described in [RFC3118] or this proposal. In this
proposal any party able intercept the nonce exchange could proposal any party able intercept the nonce exchange could
impersonate a server and thus offers no protection from man-in-the- impersonate a server and thus offers no protection from man-in-the-
middle attacks. FORCERENEW messages failing the authentication middle attacks. FORCERENEW messages failing the authentication
should be silently discarded by the client. should be silently discarded by the client.
skipping to change at page 11, line 21 skipping to change at page 10, line 15
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3118] Droms, R. and W. Arbaugh, "Authentication for DHCP [RFC3118] Droms, R. and W. Arbaugh, "Authentication for DHCP
Messages", RFC 3118, June 2001. Messages", RFC 3118, June 2001.
[RFC3203] T'Joens, Y., Hublet, C., and P. De Schrijver, "DHCP [RFC3203] T'Joens, Y., Hublet, C., and P. De Schrijver, "DHCP
reconfigure extension", RFC 3203, December 2001. reconfigure extension", RFC 3203, December 2001.
7.2. Informative References
[RFC3315] Droms, R., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins, C., [RFC3315] Droms, R., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins, C.,
and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for
IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, July 2003. IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, July 2003.
7.2. Informative References
[TR-101i2] [TR-101i2]
Anschutz, T., "Migration to Ethernet-Based Broadband Anschutz, T., "Migration to Ethernet-Based Broadband
Aggregation Broadband Forum TR-101 Issue 2", July 2011. Aggregation Broadband Forum TR-101 Issue 2", July 2011.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
David Miles David Miles
Alcatel-Lucent Alcatel-Lucent
L3 / 215 Spring St L3 / 215 Spring St
Melbourne, Victoria 3000, Melbourne, Victoria 3000,
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