--- 1/draft-ietf-detnet-security-11.txt 2020-10-02 20:13:12.878347277 -0700 +++ 2/draft-ietf-detnet-security-12.txt 2020-10-02 20:13:12.974349719 -0700 @@ -1,19 +1,21 @@ -Internet Engineering Task Force T. Mizrahi -Internet-Draft HUAWEI -Intended status: Informational E. Grossman, Ed. -Expires: February 15, 2021 DOLBY - August 14, 2020 +Internet Engineering Task Force E. Grossman, Ed. +Internet-Draft DOLBY +Intended status: Informational T. Mizrahi +Expires: April 5, 2021 HUAWEI + A. Hacker + MISTIQ + October 2, 2020 Deterministic Networking (DetNet) Security Considerations - draft-ietf-detnet-security-11 + draft-ietf-detnet-security-12 Abstract A DetNet (deterministic network) provides specific performance guarantees to its data flows, such as extremely low data loss rates and bounded latency. As a result, securing a DetNet requires that in addition to the best practice security measures taken for any mission-critical network, additional security measures may be needed to secure the intended operation of these novel service properties. @@ -36,21 +38,21 @@ Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." - This Internet-Draft will expire on February 15, 2021. + This Internet-Draft will expire on April 5, 2021. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents @@ -60,109 +62,108 @@ the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Abbreviations and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3. Security Considerations for DetNet Component Design . . . . . 6 3.1. Resource Allocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.2. Explicit Routes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 - 3.3. Redundant Path Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 - 3.4. Timing (or other) Violation Reporting . . . . . . . . . . 8 + 3.3. Redundant Path Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 + 3.4. Timing (or other) Violation Reporting . . . . . . . . . . 9 4. DetNet Security Considerations Compared With DiffServ Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5. Security Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 - 5.1. Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 - 5.2. Threat Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 - 5.2.1. Delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 - 5.2.2. DetNet Flow Modification or Spoofing . . . . . . . . 11 + 5.1. Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 + 5.2. Threat Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 + 5.2.1. Delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 + 5.2.2. DetNet Flow Modification or Spoofing . . . . . . . . 12 5.2.3. Resource Segmentation (Inter-segment Attack) . . . . 12 5.2.4. Packet Replication and Elimination . . . . . . . . . 12 5.2.4.1. Replication: Increased Attack Surface . . . . . . 12 5.2.4.2. Replication-related Header Manipulation . . . . . 12 - 5.2.5. Path Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 - 5.2.5.1. Path Manipulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 - 5.2.5.2. Path Choice: Increased Attack Surface . . . . . . 13 - 5.2.6. Controller Plane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 - 5.2.6.1. Control or Signaling Packet Modification . . . . 13 - 5.2.6.2. Control or Signaling Packet Injection . . . . . . 13 - 5.2.7. Scheduling or Shaping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 - 5.2.7.1. Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 - 5.2.8. Time Synchronization Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . 13 + 5.2.5. Controller Plane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 + 5.2.5.1. Path Choice Manipulation . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 + 5.2.5.2. Compromised Controller . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 + 5.2.6. Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 + 5.2.7. Time Synchronization Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5.3. Threat Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 - 6. Security Threat Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 - 6.1. Delay-Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 - 6.1.1. Data Plane Delay Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 - 6.1.2. Controller Plane Delay Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . 18 - 6.2. Flow Modification and Spoofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 - 6.2.1. Flow Modification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 - 6.2.2. Spoofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 - 6.2.2.1. Dataplane Spoofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 - 6.2.2.2. Controller Plane Spoofing . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 - 6.3. Segmentation Attacks (injection) . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 - 6.3.1. Data Plane Segmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 - 6.3.2. Controller Plane Segmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 - 6.4. Replication and Elimination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 - 6.4.1. Increased Attack Surface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 - 6.4.2. Header Manipulation at Elimination Routers . . . . . 20 - 6.5. Control or Signaling Packet Modification . . . . . . . . 20 - 6.6. Control or Signaling Packet Injection . . . . . . . . . . 20 - 6.7. Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 - 6.8. Attacks on Time Sync Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 - 6.9. Attacks on Path Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 - 7. Security Threat Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 - 7.1. Path Redundancy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 + 6. Security Threat Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 + 6.1. Delay-Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 + 6.1.1. Data Plane Delay Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 + 6.1.2. Controller Plane Delay Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . 19 + 6.2. Flow Modification and Spoofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 + 6.2.1. Flow Modification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 + 6.2.2. Spoofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 + 6.2.2.1. Dataplane Spoofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 + 6.2.2.2. Controller Plane Spoofing . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 + 6.3. Segmentation Attacks (injection) . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 + 6.3.1. Data Plane Segmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 + 6.3.2. Controller Plane Segmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 + 6.4. Replication and Elimination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 + 6.4.1. Increased Attack Surface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 + 6.4.2. Header Manipulation at Elimination Routers . . . . . 21 + 6.5. Control or Signaling Packet Modification . . . . . . . . 21 + 6.6. Control or Signaling Packet Injection . . . . . . . . . . 21 + 6.7. Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 + 6.8. Attacks on Time Sync Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 + 6.9. Attacks on Path Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 + 7. Security Threat Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 + 7.1. Path Redundancy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 7.2. Integrity Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 - 7.3. DetNet Node Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 - 7.4. Dummy Traffic Insertion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 - 7.5. Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 + 7.3. DetNet Node Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 + 7.4. Dummy Traffic Insertion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 + 7.5. Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 7.5.1. Encryption Considerations for DetNet . . . . . . . . 24 7.6. Control and Signaling Message Protection . . . . . . . . 25 - 7.7. Dynamic Performance Analytics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 - 7.8. Mitigation Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 - 8. Association of Attacks to Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 - 8.1. Association of Attacks to Use Case Common Themes . . . . 27 - 8.1.1. Sub-Network Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 - 8.1.2. Central Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 - 8.1.3. Hot Swap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 - 8.1.4. Data Flow Information Models . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 - 8.1.5. L2 and L3 Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 - 8.1.6. End-to-End Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 + 7.7. Dynamic Performance Analytics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 + 7.8. Mitigation Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 + 8. Association of Attacks to Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 + 8.1. Association of Attacks to Use Case Common Themes . . . . 28 + 8.1.1. Sub-Network Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 + 8.1.2. Central Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 + 8.1.3. Hot Swap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 + 8.1.4. Data Flow Information Models . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 + 8.1.5. L2 and L3 Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 + 8.1.6. End-to-End Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 8.1.7. Replacement for Proprietary Fieldbuses and Ethernet- - based Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 - 8.1.8. Deterministic vs Best-Effort Traffic . . . . . . . . 30 - 8.1.9. Deterministic Flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 - 8.1.10. Unused Reserved Bandwidth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 - 8.1.11. Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 - 8.1.12. Cost Reductions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 - 8.1.13. Insufficiently Secure Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 - 8.1.14. DetNet Network Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 - 8.1.15. Multiple Hops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 - 8.1.16. Level of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 - 8.1.17. Bounded Latency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 - 8.1.18. Low Latency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 - 8.1.19. Bounded Jitter (Latency Variation) . . . . . . . . . 34 - 8.1.20. Symmetrical Path Delays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 - 8.1.21. Reliability and Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 - 8.1.22. Redundant Paths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 - 8.1.23. Security Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 - 8.2. Summary of Attack Types per Use Case Common Theme . . . . 35 - 8.3. Security Considerations for OAM Traffic . . . . . . . . . 38 - 9. DetNet Technology-Specific Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 - 9.1. IP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 - 9.2. MPLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 - 10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 - 11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 - 12. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 - 13. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 - Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 + based Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 + 8.1.8. Deterministic vs Best-Effort Traffic . . . . . . . . 31 + 8.1.9. Deterministic Flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 + 8.1.10. Unused Reserved Bandwidth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 + 8.1.11. Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 + 8.1.12. Cost Reductions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 + 8.1.13. Insufficiently Secure Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 + 8.1.14. DetNet Network Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 + 8.1.15. Multiple Hops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 + 8.1.16. Level of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 + 8.1.17. Bounded Latency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 + 8.1.18. Low Latency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 + 8.1.19. Bounded Jitter (Latency Variation) . . . . . . . . . 35 + 8.1.20. Symmetrical Path Delays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 + 8.1.21. Reliability and Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 + 8.1.22. Redundant Paths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 + 8.1.23. Security Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 + 8.2. Summary of Attack Types per Use Case Common Theme . . . . 36 + 8.3. Security Considerations for OAM Traffic . . . . . . . . . 39 + 9. DetNet Technology-Specific Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 + 9.1. IP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 + 9.2. MPLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 + 10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 + 11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 + 12. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 + 13. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 + 14. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 + 14.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 + 14.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 + Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 1. Introduction A deterministic network is one that can carry data flows for real- time applications with extremely low data loss rates and bounded latency. Deterministic networks have been successfully deployed in real-time Operational Technology (OT) applications for some years. However, such networks are typically isolated from external access, and thus the security threat from external attackers is low. IETF Deterministic Networking (DetNet, [RFC8655]) specifies a set of @@ -262,22 +263,20 @@ IT Information Technology (the application of computers to store, study, retrieve, transmit, and manipulate data or information, often in the context of a business or other enterprise - [IT_DEF]). OT Operational Technology (the hardware and software dedicated to detecting or causing changes in physical processes through direct monitoring and/or control of physical devices such as valves, pumps, etc. - [OT_DEF]) - MITM Man in the Middle - Component A component of a DetNet system - used here to refer to any hardware or software element of a DetNet network which implements DetNet-specific functionality, for example all or part of a router, switch, or end system. Resource Segmentation Used as a more general form for Network Segmentation (the act or practice of splitting a computer network into subnetworks, each being a network segment - [RS_DEF]) 3. Security Considerations for DetNet Component Design @@ -292,24 +291,41 @@ A DetNet system security designer relies on the premise that any resources allocated to a resource-reserved (OT-type) flow are inviolable, in other words there is no physical possibility within a DetNet component that resources allocated to a given flow can be compromised by any type of traffic in the network; this includes both malicious traffic as well as inadvertent traffic such as might be produced by a malfunctioning component, for example one made by a different manufacturer. From a security standpoint, this is a critical assumption, for example when designing against DOS attacks. + It is the responsibility of the component designer to ensure that this condition is met; this implies protection against excess traffic from adjacent flows, and against compromises to the resource - allocation/deallocation process. + allocation/deallocation process, for example through the use of + traffic shaping and policing. + + As an example, consider the implementation of Flow Aggregation for + DetNet flows (as discussed in + [I-D.ietf-detnet-data-plane-framework]). In this example say there + are N flows that are to be aggregated, thus the bandwidth resources + of the aggregate flow must be sufficient to contain the sum of the + bandwidth reservation for the N flows. However if one of those flows + were to consume more than its individually allocated BW, this could + cause starvation of the other flows. Thus simply providing and + enforcing the calculated aggregate bandwidth may not be a complete + solution - the bandwidth for each individual flow must still be + guaranteed, for example via ingress policing of each flow (i.e. + before it is aggregated). Alternatively, if by some other means each + flow to be aggregated can be trusted not to exceed its allocated + bandwidth, the same goal can be achieved. 3.2. Explicit Routes The DetNet-specific purpose for constraining the network's ability to re-route OT traffic is to maintain the specified service parameters (such as upper and lower latency boundaries) for a given flow. For example if the network were to re-route a flow (or some part of a flow) based exclusively on statistical path usage metrics, or due to malicious activity, it is possible that the new path would have a latency that is outside the required latency bounds which were @@ -335,47 +351,48 @@ a degree which is implementation-dependent) through hitless redundant packet delivery. (Note that PREOF is not defined for a DetNet IP data plane). It is the responsibility of the system designer to determine the level of reliability required by their use case, and to specify redundant paths sufficient to provide the desired level of reliability (in as much as that reliability can be provided through the use of redundant paths). It is the responsibility of the component designer to ensure that the relevant PREOF operations are - executed reliably and securely. (However, note that not all PREOF - operations are necessarily implemented in every network; for example - a packet re-ordering function may not be necessary if the packets are - either not required to be in order, or if the ordering is performed - in some other part of the network.) + executed reliably and securely, to avoid potentially catastrophic + situations for the operational technology relying on them. - As noted in Section 7.2, Integrity Protection, there is a trust - relationship between the pair of devices that replicate and remove - packets, so it is the responsibility of the system designer to define - these relationships with the appropriate security considerations, and - the components must each uphold the security rights implied by these - relationships. + However, note that not all PREOF operations are necessarily + implemented in every network; for example a packet re-ordering + function may not be necessary if the packets are either not required + to be in order, or if the ordering is performed in some other part of + the network. Ideally a redundant path could be specified from end to end of the flow's path, however given that this is not always possible (as described in [RFC8655]) the system designer will need to consider the resulting end-to-end reliability and security resulting from any given arrangment of network segments along the path, each of which provides its individual PREOF implementation and thus its individual level of reliabiilty and security. At the data plane the implementation of PREOF depends on the correct assignment and interpretation of packet sequence numbers, as well as - the actions taken based on them, such as elimination. Thus the + the actions taken based on them, such as elimination (including + elimination of packets with spurious sequence numbers). Thus the integrity of these values must be maintained by the component as they are assigned by the DetNet Data Plane's Service sub-layer, and - transported by the Forwarding sub-layer. + transported by the Forwarding sub-layer. This is no different than + the integrity of the values in any header used by the DetNet (or any + other) data plane, and is not unique to redundant paths. From the + sequence number injection perspective, it is no different from any + other protocols that use sequence numbers. 3.4. Timing (or other) Violation Reporting Another fundamental assumption of a secure DetNet is that in any case in which an incoming packet arrives with any timing or bandwidth violation, something can be done about it which doesn't cause damage to the system. For example having the network shut down a link if a packet arrives outside of its prescribed time window may serve the attacker better than it serves the network. That means that the component's data plane must be able to detect and act on a variety of @@ -446,57 +463,59 @@ as if it were entering the domain at an ingress node). The remarks in [RFC2474] regarding IPsec and Tunnelling Interactions are also relevant (though this is not to say that other sections are less relevant). 5. Security Threats This section presents a threat model, and analyzes the possible threats in a DetNet-enabled network. The threats considered in this section are independent of any specific technologies used to - implement the DetNet; Section 9) considers attacks that are - associated with the DetNet technologies encompassed by + implement the DetNet; Section 9 considers attacks that are associated + with the DetNet technologies encompassed by [I-D.ietf-detnet-data-plane-framework]. We distinguish controller plane threats from data plane threats. The attack surface may be the same, but the types of attacks as well as the motivation behind them, are different. For example, a delay attack is more relevant to data plane than to controller plane. There is also a difference in terms of security solutions: the way you secure the data plane is often different than the way you secure the controller plane. 5.1. Threat Model - The threat model used in this memo is based on the threat model of - Section 3.1 of [RFC7384]. This model classifies attackers based on - two criteria: + The threat model used in this memo employs organizational elements of + the threat models of [RFC7384] and [RFC7835] . This model classifies + attackers based on two criteria: o Internal vs. external: internal attackers either have access to a trusted segment of the network or possess the encryption or authentication keys. External attackers, on the other hand, do not have the keys and have access only to the encrypted or authenticated traffic. - o Man in the Middle (MITM) vs. packet injector: MITM attackers are - located in a position that allows interception and modification of - in-flight protocol packets, whereas a traffic injector can only - attack by generating protocol packets. + o On-path vs. off-path: on-path attackers are located in a position + that allows interception and modification of in-flight protocol + packets, whereas off-path attackers can only attack by generating + protocol packets. Care has also been taken to adhere to Section 5 of [RFC3552], both with respect to which attacks are considered out-of-scope for this document, but also which are considered to be the most common threats (explored further in Section 5.2, Threat Analysis). Most of the - direct threats to DetNet are active attacks, but it is highly - suggested that DetNet application developers take appropriate - measures to protect the content of the DetNet flows from passive - attacks. + direct threats to DetNet are active attacks (i.e. attacks that modify + DetNet traffic), but it is highly suggested that DetNet application + developers take appropriate measures to protect the content of the + DetNet flows from passive attacks (i.e. attacks that observe but do + not modify DetNet traffic) for example through the use of TLS or + DTLS. DetNet-Service, one of the service scenarios described in [I-D.varga-detnet-service-model], is the case where a service connects DetNet networking islands, i.e. two or more otherwise independent DetNet network domains are connected via a link that is not intrinsically part of either network. This implies that there could be DetNet traffic flowing over a non-DetNet link, which may provide an attacker with an advantageous opportunity to tamper with DetNet traffic. The security properties of non-DetNet links are outside of the scope of DetNet Security, but it should be noted that @@ -564,83 +583,100 @@ every SN value S with a higher value S+C, where C is a constant integer. Thus, the attacker creates a false illusion that the attacked path has the lowest delay, causing all packets from other paths to be eliminated in favor of the attacked path. Once the flow from the compromised path is favored by the elminating bridge, the flow is hijacked by the attacker. It is now posible to either replace en route packets with malicious packets, or simply injecting errors, causing the packets to be dropped at their destination. -5.2.5. Path Choice + o Amplification - an attacker who injects packets into a flow that + is to be replicated will have their attack amplified through the + replication process. This is no different than any attacker who + injects packets that are delivered through multicast, broadcast, + or other point-to-multi-point mechanisms. -5.2.5.1. Path Manipulation +5.2.5. Controller Plane - An attacker can maliciously change, add, or remove a path, thereby - affecting the corresponding DetNet flows that use the path. +5.2.5.1. Path Choice Manipulation -5.2.5.2. Path Choice: Increased Attack Surface +5.2.5.1.1. Control or Signaling Packet Modification + + An attacker can maliciously modify en route control packets in order + to disrupt or manipulate the DetNet path/resource allocation. + +5.2.5.1.2. Control or Signaling Packet Injection + + An attacker can maliciously inject control packets in order to + disrupt or manipulate the DetNet path/resource allocation. + +5.2.5.1.3. Increased Attack Surface One of the possible consequences of a path manipulation attack is an increased attack surface. Thus, when the attack described in the previous subsection is implemented, it may increase the potential of other attacks to be performed. -5.2.6. Controller Plane - -5.2.6.1. Control or Signaling Packet Modification - - An attacker can maliciously modify en route control packets in order - to disrupt or manipulate the DetNet path/resource allocation. +5.2.5.2. Compromised Controller -5.2.6.2. Control or Signaling Packet Injection + An attacker can subvert a controller, or enable a compromised + controller to falsely represent itself as a controller so that the + network nodes believe it to be authorized to instruct them. - An attacker can maliciously inject control packets in order to - disrupt or manipulate the DetNet path/resource allocation. + Presence of compromised nodes in a DetNet is not a "new" threat that + arises as a result of determinism or time sensitivity; the same + techniques used to prevent or mitigate against compromised nodes in + any network are equally applicable in the DetNet case. However this + underscores the requirement for careful system security design in a + DetNet, given that the effects of even one bad actor on the network + can be potentially catastrophic. -5.2.7. Scheduling or Shaping + Security concerns specific to any given controller plane technology + used in DetNet will be addressed by the DetNet documents associated + with that technology. -5.2.7.1. Reconnaissance +5.2.6. Reconnaissance A passive eavesdropper can identify DetNet flows and then gather information about en route DetNet flows, e.g., the number of DetNet flows, their bandwidths, their schedules, or other temporal properties. The gathered information can later be used to invoke other attacks on some or all of the flows. Note that in some cases DetNet flows may be identified based on an explicit DetNet header, but in some cases the flow identification may be based on fields from the L3/L4 headers. If L3/L4 headers are involved, for the purposes of this document we assume they are encrypted and/or integrity-protected from external attackers. -5.2.8. Time Synchronization Mechanisms +5.2.7. Time Synchronization Mechanisms An attacker can use any of the attacks described in [RFC7384] to attack the synchronization protocol, thus affecting the DetNet service. 5.3. Threat Summary A summary of the attacks that were discussed in this section is presented in Figure 1. For each attack, the table specifies the type of attackers that may invoke the attack. In the context of this summary, the distinction between internal and external attacks is under the assumption that a corresponding security mechanism is being used, and that the corresponding network equipment takes part in this mechanism. +-----------------------------------------+----+----+----+----+ | Attack | Attacker Type | | +---------+---------+ | |Internal |External | - | |MITM|Inj.|MITM|Inj.| + | |On-P|Off-P|On-P|Off-P| +-----------------------------------------+----+----+----+----+ |Delay attack | + | + | + | + | +-----------------------------------------+----+----+----+----+ |DetNet Flow Modification or Spoofing | + | + | | | +-----------------------------------------+----+----+----+----+ |Inter-segment Attack | + | + | | | +-----------------------------------------+----+----+----+----+ |Replication: Increased Attack Surface | + | + | + | + | +-----------------------------------------+----+----+----+----+ |Replication-related Header Manipulation | + | | | | @@ -977,45 +1012,47 @@ typically use a subset of these tools, based on a system-specific threat analysis. 7.1. Path Redundancy Description A DetNet flow that can be forwarded simultaneously over multiple paths. Path replication and elimination [RFC8655] provides resiliency to dropped or delayed packets. This redundancy - improves the robustness to failures and to man-in-the-middle - attacks. Note: At the time of this writing, PREOF is not defined - for the IP data plane. + improves the robustness to failures and to on-path attacks. Note: + At the time of this writing, PREOF is not defined for the IP data + plane. Related attacks - Path redundancy can be used to mitigate various man-in-the-middle - attacks, including attacks described in Section 5.2.1, - Section 5.2.2, Section 5.2.3, and Section 5.2.8. However it is - also possible that multiple paths may make it more difficult to - locate the source of a MITM attacker. + Path redundancy can be used to mitigate various on-path attacks, + including attacks described in Section 5.2.1, Section 5.2.2, + Section 5.2.3, and Section 5.2.7. However it is also possible + that multiple paths may make it more difficult to locate the + source of an on-path attacker. A delay modulation attack could result in extensively exercising parts of the code that wouldn't normally be extensively exercised and thus might expose flaws in the system that might otherwise not be exposed. 7.2. Integrity Protection Description - - An integrity protection mechanism, such as a Hash-based Message - Authentication Code (HMAC) can be used to mitigate modification - attacks on IP packets. Integrity protection in the controller - plane is discussed in Section 7.6. + An integrity protection mechanism, such as a hash-based Message + Authentication Code (MAC) can be used to mitigate modification + attacks on IP packets. Such MAC usage needs to be part of a + security association that is established and managed by a security + association protocol (such as IKEv2 for IPsec security + associations). Integrity protection in the controller plane is + discussed in Section 7.6. Packet Sequence Number Integrity Considerations The use of PREOF in a DetNet implementation implies the use of a sequence number for each packet. There is a trust relationship between the device that adds the sequence number and the device that removes the sequence number. The sequence number may be end- to-end source to destination, or may be added/deleted by network edge devices. The adder and remover(s) have the trust relationship because they are the ones that ensure that the @@ -1032,30 +1069,29 @@ Related attacks Integrity protection mitigates attacks related to modification and tampering, including the attacks described in Section 5.2.2 and Section 5.2.4. 7.3. DetNet Node Authentication Description - Source authentication verifies the authenticity of DetNet sources, - enabling mitigation of spoofing attacks. Note that while - integrity protection (Section 7.2) prevents intermediate nodes - from modifying information, authentication can provide traffic - origin verification, i.e. to verify that each packet in a DetNet - flow is from a trusted source. Authentication may be implemented - as part of ingress filtering, for example. + Authentication verifies the identity of DetNet nodes (including + DetNet Controller Plane nodes), enabling mitigation of spoofing + attacks. Note that while integrity protection (Section 7.2) + prevents intermediate nodes from modifying information, + authentication (such as provided by IPsec or MACsec) can provide + traffic origin verification, i.e. to verify that each packet in a + DetNet flow is from a trusted source. Related attacks - DetNet node authentication is used to mitigate attacks related to spoofing, including the attacks of Section 5.2.2, and Section 5.2.4. 7.4. Dummy Traffic Insertion Description With some queueing methods such as [IEEE802.1Qch-2017] it is possible to introduce dummy traffic in order to regularize the @@ -1058,41 +1094,41 @@ Description With some queueing methods such as [IEEE802.1Qch-2017] it is possible to introduce dummy traffic in order to regularize the timing of packet transmission. Related attacks Removing distinctive temporal properties of individual packets or flows can be used to mitigate against reconnaissance attacks - Section 5.2.7. + Section 5.2.6. 7.5. Encryption Description DetNet flows can in principle be forwarded in encrypted form at the DetNet layer, however, regarding encryption of IP headers see Section 9. DetNet nodes do not have any need to inspect the payload of any DetNet packets, making them data-agnostic. This means that end- to- end encryption at the application layer is an acceptable way to protect user data. Encryption can also be applied at the subnet layer, for example for Ethernet using MACSec, as noted in Section 9. Related attacks - Encryption can be used to mitigate recon attacks (Section 5.2.7). + Encryption can be used to mitigate recon attacks (Section 5.2.6). However, for a DetNet network to give differentiated quality of service on a flow-by-flow basis, the network must be able to identify the flows individually. This implies that in a recon attack the attacker may also be able to track individual flows to learn more about the system. 7.5.1. Encryption Considerations for DetNet Any compute time which is required for encryption and decryption processing ('crypto') must be included in the flow latency @@ -1141,46 +1177,52 @@ 7.6. Control and Signaling Message Protection Description Control and sigaling messages can be protected using authentication and integrity protection mechanisms. Related attacks These mechanisms can be used to mitigate various attacks on the - controller plane, as described in Section 5.2.6, Section 5.2.8 and - Section 5.2.5. + controller plane, as described in Section 5.2.5, Section 5.2.7 and + Section 5.2.5.1. 7.7. Dynamic Performance Analytics Description The expectation is that the network will have a way to monitor to detect if timing guarantees are not being met, and a way to alert the controller plane in that event. Information about the network performance can be gathered in real-time in order to detect anomalies and unusual behavior that may be the symptom of a security attack. The gathered information can be based, for example, on per-flow counters, bandwidth measurement, and monitoring of packet arrival times. Unusual behavior or potentially malicious nodes can be reported to a management system, or can be used as a trigger for taking corrective actions. The information can be tracked by DetNet end systems and transit nodes, and exported to a management system, for example using YANG. + If the monitoring or reporting mechanism itself is attacked or + subverted, this can result in malfunction of the network. The + design of the monitoring system needs to take this into account + based on the specifics of the monitoring or reporting system being + considered. + Related attacks Performance analytics can be used to mitigate various attacks, including the ones described in Section 5.2.1 (Delay Attack), - Section 5.2.3 (Resource Segmentation Attack), and Section 5.2.8 + Section 5.2.3 (Resource Segmentation Attack), and Section 5.2.7 (Time Sync Attack). For example, in the case of data plane delay attacks, one possible mitigation is to timestamp the data at the source, and timestamp it again at the destination, and if the resulting latency exceeds the promised bound, discard that data and warn the operator (and/ or enter a fail-safe mode). Note that DetNet specifies packet sequence numbering, however it does not specify use of packet timestamps, although they may be used by the underlying transport (for example TSN) to provide the service. @@ -1288,29 +1330,24 @@ implemented to provide analogous protection. 8.1.2. Central Administration A DetNet network can be controlled by a centralized network configuration and control system. Such a system may be in a single central location, or it may be distributed across multiple control entities that function together as a unified control system for the network. - In this document we distinguish between attacks on the DetNet - Controller plane vs. Data Plane. But is an attack affecting - controller plane packets synonymous with an attack on the controller - plane itself? For the purposes of this document let us consider an - attack on the control system itself to be out of scope, and consider - all attacks named in this document which are relevant to controller - plane packets to be relevant to this theme, including Path - Manipulation, Path Choice, Control Packet Modification or Injection, - Reconaissance and Attacks on Time Sync Mechanisms. + All attacks named in this document which are relevant to controller + plane packets (and the controller itself) are relevant to this theme, + including Path Manipulation, Path Choice, Control Packet Modification + or Injection, Reconaissance and Attacks on Time Sync Mechanisms. 8.1.3. Hot Swap A DetNet network is not expected to be "plug and play" - it is expected that there is some centralized network configuration and control system. However, the ability to "hot swap" components (e.g. due to malfunction) is similar enough to "plug and play" that this kind of behavior may be expected in DetNet networks, depending on the implementation. @@ -1358,22 +1395,22 @@ Packets sent over DetNet are not to be dropped by the network due to congestion. (Packets may however intentionally be dropped for intended reasons, e.g. per security measures). A data plane attack may force packets to be dropped, for example a "long" Delay or Replication/Elimination or Flow Modification attack. The same result might be obtained by a controller plane attack, e.g. Path Manipulation or Signaling Packet Modification. - It may be that such attacks are limited to Internal MITM attackers, - but other possibilities should be considered. + It may be that such attacks are limited to Internal on-path + attackers, but other possibilities should be considered. An attack may also cause packets that should not be delivered to be delivered, such as by forcing packets from one (e.g. replicated) path to be preferred over another path when they should not be (Replication attack), or by Flow Modification, or by Path Choice or Packet Injection. A Time Sync attack could cause a system that was expecting certain packets at certain times to accept unintended packets based on compromised system time or time windowing in the scheduler. @@ -1628,67 +1665,72 @@ provide redundant paths that can be seamlessly switched between, all the while maintaining the required performance of that system. Replication-related attacks are by definition applicable here. Controller plane attacks can also interfere with the configuration of redundant paths. 8.1.23. Security Measures A DetNet network must be made secure against devices failures, - attackers, misbehaving devices, and so on. Does the threat affect - such security measures themselves, e.g. by attacking SW designed to - protect against device failure? - - This is TBD, thus there are no specific entries in the mapping table - Figure 4, however that does not imply that there could be no relevant - attacks. + attackers, misbehaving component, and so on. If the security + mechanisms protecting the DetNet are attacked or subverted, this can + result in malfunction of the network. The design of the security + system itself needs to take this into account based on the specifics + of the security system being considered. The general topic of + protection of security mechanisms is not unique to DetNet; it is + identical to the case of securing any security mechanism for any + network. The text of this document addresses these concerns to the + extent that they are relevant to DetNet. 8.2. Summary of Attack Types per Use Case Common Theme The List of Attacks table Figure 4 lists the attacks of Section 5, Security Threats, assigning a number to each type of attack. That number is then used as a short form identifier for the attack in Figure 5, Mapping Between Themes and Attacks. - +--+----------------------------------------+----------------------+ - | | Attack | Section | - +--+----------------------------------------+----------------------+ - | 1|Delay Attack | Section 3.2.1 | - +--+----------------------------------------+----------------------+ - | 2|DetNet Flow Modification or Spoofing | Section 3.2.2 | - +--+----------------------------------------+----------------------+ - | 3|Inter-Segment Attack | Section 3.2.3 | - +--+----------------------------------------+----------------------+ - | 4|Replication: Increased attack surface | Section 3.2.4.1 | - +--+----------------------------------------+----------------------+ - | 5|Replication-related Header Manipulation | Section 3.2.4.2 | - +--+----------------------------------------+----------------------+ - | 6|Path Manipulation | Section 3.2.5.1 | - +--+----------------------------------------+----------------------+ - | 7|Path Choice: Increased Attack Surface | Section 3.2.5.2 | - +--+----------------------------------------+----------------------+ - | 8|Control or Signaling Packet Modification| Section 3.2.6.1 | - +--+----------------------------------------+----------------------+ - | 9|Control or Signaling Packet Injection | Section 3.2.6.2 | - +--+----------------------------------------+----------------------+ - |10|Reconnaissance | Section 3.2.7 | - +--+----------------------------------------+----------------------+ - |11|Attacks on Time Sync Mechanisms | Section 3.2.8 | - +--+----------------------------------------+----------------------+ + +----+----------------------------------------+ + | | Attack | + +----+----------------------------------------+ + | 1 |Delay Attack | + +----+----------------------------------------+ + | 2 |DetNet Flow Modification or Spoofing | + +----+----------------------------------------+ + | 3 |Inter-Segment Attack | + +----+----------------------------------------+ + | 4 |Replication: Increased attack surface | + +----+----------------------------------------+ + | 5 |Replication-related Header Manipulation | + +----+----------------------------------------+ + | 6 |Path Manipulation | + +----+----------------------------------------+ + | 7 |Path Choice: Increased Attack Surface | + +----+----------------------------------------+ + | 8 |Control or Signaling Packet Modification| + +----+----------------------------------------+ + | 9 |Control or Signaling Packet Injection | + +----+----------------------------------------+ + | 10 |Reconnaissance | + +----+----------------------------------------+ + | 11 |Attacks on Time Sync Mechanisms | + +--+----------------------------------------+ Figure 4: List of Attacks The Mapping Between Themes and Attacks table Figure 5 maps the use case themes of [RFC8578] (as also enumerated in this document) to the attacks of Figure 4. Each row specifies a theme, and the attacks - relevant to this theme are marked with a '+'. + relevant to this theme are marked with a '+'. The row items which + have no threats associated with them are included in the table for + completeness of the list of Use Case Common Themes, and do not have + DetNet-specific threats associated with them. +----------------------------+--------------------------------+ | Theme | Attack | | +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ | | 1| 2| 3| 4| 5| 6| 7| 8| 9|10|11| +----------------------------+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ |Network Layer - AVB/TSN Eth.| +| +| +| +| +| +| +| +| +| +| +| +----------------------------+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ |Central Administration | | | | | | +| +| +| +| +| +| +----------------------------+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ @@ -1756,22 +1798,27 @@ administration, presumably transparent to the customer. Security considerations for such traffic are not DetNet-specific (apart from such traffic being subject to the same DetNet-specific security considerations as any other DetNet data flow) and are thus not covered in this document. o OAM traffic generated by the customer. From a DetNet security point of view, DetNet security considerations for such traffic are exactly the same as for any other customer data flows. - Thus OAM traffic presents no additional (i.e. OAM-specific) DetNet - security considerations. + From the perspective of an attack, OAM traffic is indistinguishable + from DetNet traffic and the network needs to be secure against + injection, removal, or modification of traffic of any kind, including + OAM traffic. A DetNet is sensitive to any form of packet injection, + removal or manipulation and in this respect DetNet OAM traffic is no + different. Techniques for securing a DetNet against these threats + have been discussed elsewhere in this document. 9. DetNet Technology-Specific Threats Section 5, Security Threats, described threats which are independent of a DetNet implementation. This section considers threats specifically related to the IP- and MPLS-specific aspects of DetNet implementations. The primary security considerations for the data plane specifically are to maintain the integrity of the data and the delivery of the @@ -1830,21 +1877,21 @@ Another way to look at DetNet IP security is to consider it in the light of VPN security; as an industry we have a lot of experience with VPNs running through networks with other VPNs, it is well known how to secure the network for that. However for a DetNet we have the additional subtlety that any possible interaction of one packet with another can have a potentially deleterious effect on the time properties of the flows. So the network must provide sufficient isolation between flows, for example by protecting the forwarding bandwidth and related resources so that they are available to detnet traffic, by whatever means are appropriate for that network's data - plane. + plane, for example through the use of queueing mechanisms. In a VPN, bandwidth is generally guaranteed over a period of time, whereas in DetNet it is not aggregated over time. This implies that any VPN-type protection mechanism must also maintain the DetNet timing constraints. 9.2. MPLS An MPLS network carrying DetNet traffic is expected to be a "well- managed" network. Given that this is the case, it is difficult for @@ -1880,41 +1927,46 @@ which are NTP [RFC5905] and Precision Time Protocol [IEEE1588]. The security requirements for these are described in [RFC7384]. One particular problem that has been observed in operational tests of TWTT protocols is the ability for two closely but not completely synchronized flows to beat and cause a sudden phase hit to one of the flows. This can be mitigated by the careful use of a scheduling system in the underlying packet transport. Further consideration of protection against dynamic attacks is work - in progress. + in progress. New work on MPLS security may also be applicable, for + example [I-D.ietf-mpls-opportunistic-encrypt]. 10. IANA Considerations This memo includes no requests from IANA. 11. Security Considerations The security considerations of DetNet networks are presented throughout this document. -12. Contributors +12. Privacy Considerations + + Privacy in the context of DetNet is maintained by the base + technologies specific to the DetNet and user traffic. For example + TSN can use MACsec, IP can use IPsec, applications can use IP + transport protocol-provided methods e.g. TLS and DTLS. MPLS + typically uses L2/L3 VPNs combined with the previously mentioned + privacy methods. + +13. Contributors The Editor would like to recognize the contributions of the following individuals to this draft. - Andrew J. Hacker (MistIQ Technologies, Inc) - Harrisburg, PA, USA - email ajhacker@mistiqtech.com, - web http://www.mistiqtech.com - Subir Das (Applied Communication Sciences) 150 Mount Airy Road, Basking Ridge New Jersey, 07920, USA email sdas@appcomsci.com John Dowdell (Airbus Defence and Space) Celtic Springs, Newport, NP10 8FZ, United Kingdom email john.dowdell.ietf@gmail.com Henrik Austad (SINTEF Digital) @@ -1928,51 +1980,65 @@ Futurewei Technologies email: stewart.bryant@gmail.com David Black Dell EMC 176 South Street, Hopkinton, MA 01748, USA email: david.black@dell.com Carsten Bormann -13. Informative References +14. References + +14.1. Normative References + + [I-D.ietf-detnet-ip] + Varga, B., Farkas, J., Berger, L., Fedyk, D., and S. + Bryant, "DetNet Data Plane: IP", draft-ietf-detnet-ip-07 + (work in progress), July 2020. + + [I-D.ietf-detnet-mpls] + Varga, B., Farkas, J., Berger, L., Malis, A., Bryant, S., + and J. Korhonen, "DetNet Data Plane: MPLS", draft-ietf- + detnet-mpls-12 (work in progress), September 2020. + + [RFC8655] Finn, N., Thubert, P., Varga, B., and J. Farkas, + "Deterministic Networking Architecture", RFC 8655, + DOI 10.17487/RFC8655, October 2019, + . + +14.2. Informative References [ARINC664P7] ARINC, "ARINC 664 Aircraft Data Network, Part 7, Avionics Full-Duplex Switched Ethernet Network", 2009. [I-D.ietf-detnet-data-plane-framework] Varga, B., Farkas, J., Berger, L., Malis, A., and S. Bryant, "DetNet Data Plane Framework", draft-ietf-detnet- data-plane-framework-06 (work in progress), May 2020. [I-D.ietf-detnet-flow-information-model] Varga, B., Farkas, J., Cummings, R., Jiang, Y., and D. Fedyk, "DetNet Flow Information Model", draft-ietf-detnet- flow-information-model-10 (work in progress), May 2020. - [I-D.ietf-detnet-ip] - Varga, B., Farkas, J., Berger, L., Fedyk, D., and S. - Bryant, "DetNet Data Plane: IP", draft-ietf-detnet-ip-07 - (work in progress), July 2020. - [I-D.ietf-detnet-ip-over-tsn] Varga, B., Farkas, J., Malis, A., and S. Bryant, "DetNet Data Plane: IP over IEEE 802.1 Time Sensitive Networking (TSN)", draft-ietf-detnet-ip-over-tsn-03 (work in progress), June 2020. - [I-D.ietf-detnet-mpls] - Varga, B., Farkas, J., Berger, L., Malis, A., Bryant, S., - and J. Korhonen, "DetNet Data Plane: MPLS", draft-ietf- - detnet-mpls-10 (work in progress), July 2020. + [I-D.ietf-mpls-opportunistic-encrypt] + Farrel, A. and S. Farrell, "Opportunistic Security in MPLS + Networks", draft-ietf-mpls-opportunistic-encrypt-03 (work + in progress), March 2017. [I-D.varga-detnet-service-model] Varga, B. and J. Farkas, "DetNet Service Model", draft- varga-detnet-service-model-02 (work in progress), May 2017. [IEEE1588] IEEE, "IEEE 1588 Standard for a Precision Clock Synchronization Protocol for Networked Measurement and Control Systems Version 2", 2008. @@ -2062,37 +2128,46 @@ [RFC6941] Fang, L., Ed., Niven-Jenkins, B., Ed., Mansfield, S., Ed., and R. Graveman, Ed., "MPLS Transport Profile (MPLS-TP) Security Framework", RFC 6941, DOI 10.17487/RFC6941, April 2013, . [RFC7384] Mizrahi, T., "Security Requirements of Time Protocols in Packet Switched Networks", RFC 7384, DOI 10.17487/RFC7384, October 2014, . + [RFC7835] Saucez, D., Iannone, L., and O. Bonaventure, "Locator/ID + Separation Protocol (LISP) Threat Analysis", RFC 7835, + DOI 10.17487/RFC7835, April 2016, + . + [RFC8578] Grossman, E., Ed., "Deterministic Networking Use Cases", RFC 8578, DOI 10.17487/RFC8578, May 2019, . - [RFC8655] Finn, N., Thubert, P., Varga, B., and J. Farkas, - "Deterministic Networking Architecture", RFC 8655, - DOI 10.17487/RFC8655, October 2019, - . - [RS_DEF] Wikipedia, "RS Definition", 2020, . Authors' Addresses - Tal Mizrahi - Huawei Network.IO Innovation Lab - - Email: tal.mizrahi.phd@gmail.com Ethan Grossman (editor) Dolby Laboratories, Inc. 1275 Market Street San Francisco, CA 94103 USA - Phone: +1 415 645 4726 - Email: ethan.grossman@dolby.com + Phone: +1 415 465 4339 + Email: ethan@ieee.org URI: http://www.dolby.com + + Tal Mizrahi + Huawei Network.IO Innovation Lab + + Email: tal.mizrahi.phd@gmail.com + + Andrew J. Hacker + MistIQ Technologies, Inc + Harrisburg, PA + USA + + Email: ajhacker@mistiqtech.com + URI: http://www.mistiqtech.com