draft-ietf-detnet-security-03.txt | draft-ietf-detnet-security-04.txt | |||
---|---|---|---|---|
Internet Engineering Task Force T. Mizrahi | Internet Engineering Task Force T. Mizrahi | |||
Internet-Draft HUAWEI | Internet-Draft HUAWEI | |||
Intended status: Informational E. Grossman, Ed. | Intended status: Informational E. Grossman, Ed. | |||
Expires: April 19, 2019 DOLBY | Expires: September 3, 2019 DOLBY | |||
A. Hacker | A. Hacker | |||
MISTIQ | MISTIQ | |||
S. Das | S. Das | |||
Applied Communication Sciences | Applied Communication Sciences | |||
J. Dowdell | J. Dowdell | |||
Airbus Defence and Space | Airbus Defence and Space | |||
H. Austad | H. Austad | |||
Cisco Systems | Cisco Systems | |||
K. Stanton | K. Stanton | |||
INTEL | INTEL | |||
N. Finn | N. Finn | |||
HUAWEI | HUAWEI | |||
October 16, 2018 | March 2, 2019 | |||
Deterministic Networking (DetNet) Security Considerations | Deterministic Networking (DetNet) Security Considerations | |||
draft-ietf-detnet-security-03 | draft-ietf-detnet-security-04 | |||
Abstract | Abstract | |||
A deterministic network is one that can carry data flows for real- | A deterministic network is one that can carry data flows for real- | |||
time applications with extremely low data loss rates and bounded | time applications with extremely low data loss rates and bounded | |||
latency. Deterministic networks have been successfully deployed in | latency. Deterministic networks have been successfully deployed in | |||
real-time operational technology (OT) applications for some years | real-time operational technology (OT) applications for some years | |||
(for example [ARINC664P7]). However, such networks are typically | (for example [ARINC664P7]). However, such networks are typically | |||
isolated from external access, and thus the security threat from | isolated from external access, and thus the security threat from | |||
external attackers is low. IETF Deterministic Networking (DetNet) | external attackers is low. IETF Deterministic Networking (DetNet) | |||
skipping to change at page 2, line 20 ¶ | skipping to change at page 2, line 20 ¶ | |||
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering | Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering | |||
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute | Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute | |||
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- | working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- | |||
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. | Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. | |||
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months | Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months | |||
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any | and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any | |||
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference | time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference | |||
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." | material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." | |||
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 19, 2019. | This Internet-Draft will expire on September 3, 2019. | |||
Copyright Notice | Copyright Notice | |||
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the | Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the | |||
document authors. All rights reserved. | document authors. All rights reserved. | |||
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal | This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal | |||
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents | Provisions Relating to IETF Documents | |||
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of | (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of | |||
publication of this document. Please review these documents | publication of this document. Please review these documents | |||
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect | carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect | |||
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must | to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must | |||
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of | include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of | |||
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as | the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as | |||
skipping to change at page 3, line 27 ¶ | skipping to change at page 3, line 27 ¶ | |||
4.2. Flow Modification and Spoofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 | 4.2. Flow Modification and Spoofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 | |||
4.2.1. Flow Modification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 | 4.2.1. Flow Modification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 | |||
4.2.2. Spoofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 | 4.2.2. Spoofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 | |||
4.2.2.1. Dataplane Spoofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 | 4.2.2.1. Dataplane Spoofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 | |||
4.2.2.2. Control Plane Spoofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 | 4.2.2.2. Control Plane Spoofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 | |||
4.3. Segmentation attacks (injection) . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 | 4.3. Segmentation attacks (injection) . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 | |||
4.3.1. Data Plane Segmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 | 4.3.1. Data Plane Segmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 | |||
4.3.2. Control Plane segmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 | 4.3.2. Control Plane segmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 | |||
4.4. Replication and Elimination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 | 4.4. Replication and Elimination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 | |||
4.4.1. Increased Attack Surface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 | 4.4.1. Increased Attack Surface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 | |||
4.4.2. Header Manipulation at Elimination Bridges . . . . . 15 | 4.4.2. Header Manipulation at Elimination Bridges . . . . . 16 | |||
4.5. Control or Signaling Packet Modification . . . . . . . . 16 | 4.5. Control or Signaling Packet Modification . . . . . . . . 16 | |||
4.6. Control or Signaling Packet Injection . . . . . . . . . . 16 | 4.6. Control or Signaling Packet Injection . . . . . . . . . . 16 | |||
4.7. Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 | 4.7. Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 | |||
4.8. Attacks on Time Sync Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 | 4.8. Attacks on Time Sync Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 | |||
4.9. Attacks on Path Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 | 4.9. Attacks on Path Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 | |||
5. Security Threat Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 | 5. Security Threat Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 | |||
5.1. Path Redundancy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 | 5.1. Path Redundancy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 | |||
5.2. Integrity Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 | 5.2. Integrity Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 | |||
5.3. DetNet Node Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 | 5.3. DetNet Node Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 | |||
5.4. Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 | 5.4. Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 | |||
5.5. Control and Signaling Message Protection . . . . . . . . 18 | 5.4.1. Encryption Considerations for DetNet . . . . . . . . 18 | |||
5.6. Dynamic Performance Analytics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 | 5.5. Control and Signaling Message Protection . . . . . . . . 19 | |||
5.7. Mitigation Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 | 5.6. Dynamic Performance Analytics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 | |||
6. Association of Attacks to Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 | 5.7. Mitigation Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 | |||
6.1. Use Cases by Common Themes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 | 6. Association of Attacks to Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 | |||
6.1.1. Network Layer - AVB/TSN Ethernet . . . . . . . . . . 20 | 6.1. Use Cases by Common Themes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 | |||
6.1.2. Central Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 | 6.1.1. Network Layer - AVB/TSN Ethernet . . . . . . . . . . 22 | |||
6.1.3. Hot Swap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 | 6.1.2. Central Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 | |||
6.1.4. Data Flow Information Models . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 | 6.1.3. Hot Swap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 | |||
6.1.5. L2 and L3 Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 | 6.1.4. Data Flow Information Models . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 | |||
6.1.6. End-to-End Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 | 6.1.5. L2 and L3 Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 | |||
6.1.7. Proprietary Deterministic Ethernet Networks . . . . . 23 | 6.1.6. End-to-End Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 | |||
6.1.8. Replacement for Proprietary Fieldbuses . . . . . . . 23 | 6.1.7. Proprietary Deterministic Ethernet Networks . . . . . 24 | |||
6.1.9. Deterministic vs Best-Effort Traffic . . . . . . . . 23 | 6.1.8. Replacement for Proprietary Fieldbuses . . . . . . . 24 | |||
6.1.10. Deterministic Flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 | 6.1.9. Deterministic vs Best-Effort Traffic . . . . . . . . 25 | |||
6.1.11. Unused Reserved Bandwidth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 | 6.1.10. Deterministic Flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 | |||
6.1.12. Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 | 6.1.11. Unused Reserved Bandwidth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 | |||
6.1.13. Cost Reductions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 | 6.1.12. Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 | |||
6.1.14. Insufficiently Secure Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 | 6.1.13. Cost Reductions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 | |||
6.1.15. DetNet Network Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 | 6.1.14. Insufficiently Secure Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 | |||
6.1.16. Multiple Hops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 | 6.1.15. DetNet Network Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 | |||
6.1.17. Level of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 | 6.1.16. Multiple Hops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 | |||
6.1.18. Bounded Latency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 | 6.1.17. Level of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 | |||
6.1.19. Low Latency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 | 6.1.18. Bounded Latency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 | |||
6.1.20. Bounded Jitter (Latency Variation) . . . . . . . . . 27 | 6.1.19. Low Latency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 | |||
6.1.21. Symmetrical Path Delays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 | 6.1.20. Bounded Jitter (Latency Variation) . . . . . . . . . 29 | |||
6.1.22. Reliability and Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 | 6.1.21. Symmetrical Path Delays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 | |||
6.1.23. Redundant Paths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 | 6.1.22. Reliability and Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 | |||
6.1.24. Security Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 | 6.1.23. Redundant Paths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 | |||
6.2. Attack Types by Use Case Common Theme . . . . . . . . . . 28 | 6.1.24. Security Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 | |||
6.3. Security Considerations for OAM Traffic . . . . . . . . . 31 | 6.2. Attack Types by Use Case Common Theme . . . . . . . . . . 30 | |||
7. Appendix A: DetNet Draft Security-Related Statements . . . . 31 | 6.3. Security Considerations for OAM Traffic . . . . . . . . . 32 | |||
7.1. Architecture (draft 8) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 | 7. Appendix A: DetNet Draft Security-Related Statements . . . . 32 | |||
7.1.1. Fault Mitigation (sec 4.5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 | 7.1. Architecture (draft 8) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 | |||
7.1.2. Security Considerations (sec 7) . . . . . . . . . . . 32 | 7.1.1. Fault Mitigation (sec 4.5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 | |||
7.2. Data Plane Alternatives (draft 4) . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 | 7.1.2. Security Considerations (sec 7) . . . . . . . . . . . 33 | |||
7.2.1. Security Considerations (sec 7) . . . . . . . . . . . 32 | 7.2. Data Plane Alternatives (draft 4) . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 | |||
7.3. Problem Statement (draft 5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 | 7.2.1. Security Considerations (sec 7) . . . . . . . . . . . 34 | |||
7.3.1. Security Considerations (sec 5) . . . . . . . . . . . 33 | 7.3. Problem Statement (draft 5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 | |||
7.4. Use Cases (draft 11) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 | 7.3.1. Security Considerations (sec 5) . . . . . . . . . . . 34 | |||
7.4. Use Cases (draft 11) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 | ||||
7.4.1. (Utility Networks) Security Current Practices and | 7.4.1. (Utility Networks) Security Current Practices and | |||
Limitations (sec 3.2.1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 | Limitations (sec 3.2.1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 | |||
7.4.2. (Utility Networks) Security Trends in Utility | 7.4.2. (Utility Networks) Security Trends in Utility | |||
Networks (sec 3.3.3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 | Networks (sec 3.3.3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 | |||
7.4.3. (BAS) Security Considerations (sec 4.2.4) . . . . . . 36 | 7.4.3. (BAS) Security Considerations (sec 4.2.4) . . . . . . 38 | |||
7.4.4. (6TiSCH) Security Considerations (sec 5.3.3) . . . . 37 | 7.4.4. (6TiSCH) Security Considerations (sec 5.3.3) . . . . 38 | |||
7.4.5. (Cellular radio) Security Considerations (sec 6.1.5) 37 | 7.4.5. (Cellular radio) Security Considerations (sec 6.1.5) 39 | |||
7.4.6. (Industrial M2M) Communication Today (sec 7.2) . . . 37 | 7.4.6. (Industrial M2M) Communication Today (sec 7.2) . . . 39 | |||
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 | 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 | |||
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 | 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 | |||
10. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 | 10. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 | |||
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 | Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 | |||
1. Introduction | 1. Introduction | |||
Security is of particularly high importance in DetNet networks | Security is of particularly high importance in DetNet networks | |||
because many of the use cases which are enabled by DetNet | because many of the use cases which are enabled by DetNet | |||
[I-D.ietf-detnet-use-cases] include control of physical devices | [I-D.ietf-detnet-use-cases] include control of physical devices | |||
(power grid components, industrial controls, building controls) which | (power grid components, industrial controls, building controls) which | |||
can have high operational costs for failure, and present potentially | can have high operational costs for failure, and present potentially | |||
attractive targets for cyber-attackers. | attractive targets for cyber-attackers. | |||
skipping to change at page 13, line 39 ¶ | skipping to change at page 13, line 39 ¶ | |||
Severely delayed messages in a DetNet link can result in the same | Severely delayed messages in a DetNet link can result in the same | |||
behavior as dropped messages in ordinary networks as the services | behavior as dropped messages in ordinary networks as the services | |||
attached to the stream has strict deterministic requirements. | attached to the stream has strict deterministic requirements. | |||
For a single path scenario, disruption is a real possibility, whereas | For a single path scenario, disruption is a real possibility, whereas | |||
in a multipath scenario, large delays or instabilities in one stream | in a multipath scenario, large delays or instabilities in one stream | |||
can lead to increased buffer and CPU resources on the elimination | can lead to increased buffer and CPU resources on the elimination | |||
bridge. | bridge. | |||
A data-plane delay attack on a system controlling substantial moving | ||||
devices, for example in industrial automation, can cause physical | ||||
damage. For example, if the network promises a bounded latency of | ||||
2ms for a flow, yet the machine receives it with 5ms latency, the | ||||
machine's control loop can become unstable. | ||||
4.1.2. Control Plane Delay Attacks | 4.1.2. Control Plane Delay Attacks | |||
In and of itself, this is not directly a threat to the DetNet | In and of itself, this is not directly a threat to the DetNet | |||
service, but the effects of delaying control messages can have quite | service, but the effects of delaying control messages can have quite | |||
adverse effects later. | adverse effects later. | |||
o Delayed tear-down can lead to resource leakage, which in turn can | o Delayed tear-down can lead to resource leakage, which in turn can | |||
result in failure to allocate new streams finally giving rise to a | result in failure to allocate new streams finally giving rise to a | |||
denial of service attack. | denial of service attack. | |||
skipping to change at page 18, line 7 ¶ | skipping to change at page 18, line 13 ¶ | |||
Section 3.2.4. | Section 3.2.4. | |||
5.4. Encryption | 5.4. Encryption | |||
Description | Description | |||
DetNet flows can be forwarded in encrypted form. | DetNet flows can be forwarded in encrypted form. | |||
Related attacks | Related attacks | |||
While confidentiality is not considered an important goal with | Encryption can be used to mitigate recon attacks (Section 3.2.7). | |||
respect to DetNet, encryption can be used to mitigate recon | However, for a DetNet network to give differentiated quality of | |||
attacks (Section 3.2.7). | service on a flow-by-flow basis, the network must be able to | |||
identify the flows individually. This implies that in a recon | ||||
attack the attacker may also be able to track individual flows to | ||||
learn more about the system. | ||||
Encryption can also provide traffic origin verification, i.e. to | ||||
verify that each packet in a DetNet flow is from a trusted source, | ||||
for example as part of ingress filtering. | ||||
5.4.1. Encryption Considerations for DetNet | ||||
Any compute time which is required for encryption and decryption | ||||
processing ('crypto') must be included in the flow latency | ||||
calculations. Thus, crypto algorithms used in a DetNet must have | ||||
bounded worst-case execution times, and these values must be used in | ||||
the latency calculations. | ||||
Some crypto algorithms are symmetric in encode/decode time (such as | ||||
AES) and others are asymmetric (such as public key algorithms). | ||||
There are advantages and disadvantages to the use of either type in a | ||||
given DetNet context. | ||||
Asymmetrical crypto is typically not used in networks on a packet-by- | ||||
packet basis due to its computational cost. For example, if only | ||||
endpoint checks or checks at a small number of intermediate points | ||||
are required, asymmetric crypto can be used to authenticate | ||||
distribution or exchange of a secret symmetric crypto key; a | ||||
successful check based on that key will provide traffic origin | ||||
verification, as long as the key is kept secret by the participants. | ||||
TLS and IKE (for IPsec) are examples of this for endpoint checks. | ||||
However, if secret symmetrical keys are used for this purpose the key | ||||
must be given to all relays, which increases the probability of a | ||||
secret key being leaked. Also, if any relay is compromised or | ||||
misbehaving it may inject traffic into the flow. | ||||
Alternatively, asymmetric crypto can provide traffic origin | ||||
verification at every intermediate node. For example, a DetNet flow | ||||
can be associated with an (asymmetric) keypair, such that the private | ||||
key is available to the source of the flow and the public key is | ||||
distributed with the flow information, allowing verification at every | ||||
node for every packet. However, this is more computationally | ||||
expensive. | ||||
In either case, origin verification also requires replay detection as | ||||
part of the security protocol to prevent an attacker from recording | ||||
and resending traffic, e.g., as a denial of service attack on flow | ||||
forwarding resources. | ||||
If crypto keys are to be regenerated over the duration of the flow | ||||
then the time required to accomplish this must be accounted for in | ||||
the latency calculations. | ||||
5.5. Control and Signaling Message Protection | 5.5. Control and Signaling Message Protection | |||
Description | Description | |||
Control and sigaling messages can be protected using | Control and sigaling messages can be protected using | |||
authentication and integrity protection mechanisms. | authentication and integrity protection mechanisms. | |||
Related attacks | Related attacks | |||
skipping to change at page 18, line 42 ¶ | skipping to change at page 19, line 50 ¶ | |||
and monitoring of packet arrival times. Unusual behavior or | and monitoring of packet arrival times. Unusual behavior or | |||
potentially malicious nodes can be reported to a management | potentially malicious nodes can be reported to a management | |||
system, or can be used as a trigger for taking corrective actions. | system, or can be used as a trigger for taking corrective actions. | |||
The information can be tracked by DetNet end systems and transit | The information can be tracked by DetNet end systems and transit | |||
nodes, and exported to a management system, for example using | nodes, and exported to a management system, for example using | |||
NETCONF. | NETCONF. | |||
Related attacks | Related attacks | |||
Performance analytics can be used to mitigate various attacks, | Performance analytics can be used to mitigate various attacks, | |||
including the ones described in Section 3.2.1, Section 3.2.3, and | including the ones described in Section 3.2.1 (Delay Attack), | |||
Section 3.2.8. | Section 3.2.3 (Resource Segmentation Attack), and Section 3.2.8 | |||
(Time Sync Attack). | ||||
For example, in the case of data plane delay attacks, one possible | ||||
mitigation is to timestamp the data at the source, and timestamp | ||||
it again at the destination, and if the resulting latency exceeds | ||||
the promised bound, discard that data and warn the operator (and/ | ||||
or enter a fail-safe mode). | ||||
5.7. Mitigation Summary | 5.7. Mitigation Summary | |||
The following table maps the attacks of Section 3 to the impacts of | The following table maps the attacks of Section 3 to the impacts of | |||
Section 4, and to the mitigations of the current section. Each row | Section 4, and to the mitigations of the current section. Each row | |||
specifies an attack, the impact of this attack if it is successfully | specifies an attack, the impact of this attack if it is successfully | |||
implemented, and possible mitigation methods. | implemented, and possible mitigation methods. | |||
+----------------------+---------------------+---------------------+ | +----------------------+---------------------+---------------------+ | |||
| Attack | Impact | Mitigations | | | Attack | Impact | Mitigations | | |||
skipping to change at page 36, line 47 ¶ | skipping to change at page 38, line 13 ¶ | |||
associated with implementing security solutions in OT networks. | associated with implementing security solutions in OT networks. | |||
Securing OT (Operation technology) telecommunications over packet- | Securing OT (Operation technology) telecommunications over packet- | |||
switched IP networks follow the same principles that are foundational | switched IP networks follow the same principles that are foundational | |||
for securing the IT infrastructure, i.e., consideration must be given | for securing the IT infrastructure, i.e., consideration must be given | |||
to enforcing electronic access control for both person-to-machine and | to enforcing electronic access control for both person-to-machine and | |||
machine-to-machine communications, and providing the appropriate | machine-to-machine communications, and providing the appropriate | |||
levels of data privacy, device and platform integrity, and threat | levels of data privacy, device and platform integrity, and threat | |||
detection and mitigation. | detection and mitigation. | |||
Existing power automation security standards can inform network | ||||
security. For example the NERC CIP (North American Electric | ||||
Reliability Corporation Critical Infrastructure Protection) plan is a | ||||
set of requirements designed to secure the assets required for | ||||
operating North America's bulk electric system. Another standardized | ||||
security control technique is Segmentation (zones and conduits | ||||
including access control). | ||||
The requirements in Industrial Automation and Control Systems (IACS) | ||||
are quite similar, especially in new scenarios such as Industry 4.0/ | ||||
Digital Factory where workflows and protocols cross zones, segments, | ||||
and entities. IEC 62443 (ISA99) defines security for IACS, typically | ||||
for installations in other critical infrastructure such as oil and | ||||
gas. | ||||
Availability and integrity are the most important security objectives | ||||
for the lower layers of such networks; confidentiality and privacy | ||||
are relevant if customer or market data is involved, typically | ||||
handled by higher layers. | ||||
7.4.3. (BAS) Security Considerations (sec 4.2.4) | 7.4.3. (BAS) Security Considerations (sec 4.2.4) | |||
When BAS field networks were developed it was assumed that the field | When BAS field networks were developed it was assumed that the field | |||
networks would always be physically isolated from external networks | networks would always be physically isolated from external networks | |||
and therefore security was not a concern. In today's world many BASs | and therefore security was not a concern. In today's world many BASs | |||
are managed remotely and are thus connected to shared IP networks and | are managed remotely and are thus connected to shared IP networks and | |||
so security is definitely a concern, yet security features are not | so security is definitely a concern, yet security features are not | |||
available in the majority of BAS field network deployments . | available in the majority of BAS field network deployments . | |||
The management network, being an IP-based network, has the protocols | The management network, being an IP-based network, has the protocols | |||
skipping to change at page 38, line 19 ¶ | skipping to change at page 39, line 48 ¶ | |||
10. Informative References | 10. Informative References | |||
[ARINC664P7] | [ARINC664P7] | |||
ARINC, "ARINC 664 Aircraft Data Network, Part 7, Avionics | ARINC, "ARINC 664 Aircraft Data Network, Part 7, Avionics | |||
Full-Duplex Switched Ethernet Network", 2009. | Full-Duplex Switched Ethernet Network", 2009. | |||
[I-D.ietf-detnet-architecture] | [I-D.ietf-detnet-architecture] | |||
Finn, N., Thubert, P., Varga, B., and J. Farkas, | Finn, N., Thubert, P., Varga, B., and J. Farkas, | |||
"Deterministic Networking Architecture", draft-ietf- | "Deterministic Networking Architecture", draft-ietf- | |||
detnet-architecture-08 (work in progress), September 2018. | detnet-architecture-11 (work in progress), February 2019. | |||
[I-D.ietf-detnet-use-cases] | [I-D.ietf-detnet-use-cases] | |||
Grossman, E., "Deterministic Networking Use Cases", draft- | Grossman, E., "Deterministic Networking Use Cases", draft- | |||
ietf-detnet-use-cases-18 (work in progress), September | ietf-detnet-use-cases-20 (work in progress), December | |||
2018. | 2018. | |||
[I-D.varga-detnet-service-model] | [I-D.varga-detnet-service-model] | |||
Varga, B. and J. Farkas, "DetNet Service Model", draft- | Varga, B. and J. Farkas, "DetNet Service Model", draft- | |||
varga-detnet-service-model-02 (work in progress), May | varga-detnet-service-model-02 (work in progress), May | |||
2017. | 2017. | |||
[IEEE1588] | [IEEE1588] | |||
IEEE, "IEEE 1588 Standard for a Precision Clock | IEEE, "IEEE 1588 Standard for a Precision Clock | |||
Synchronization Protocol for Networked Measurement and | Synchronization Protocol for Networked Measurement and | |||
End of changes. 16 change blocks. | ||||
65 lines changed or deleted | 150 lines changed or added | |||
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