draft-ietf-curdle-rc4-die-die-die-01.txt   draft-ietf-curdle-rc4-die-die-die-02.txt 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) L. Camara Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) L. Camara
Internet-Draft August 1, 2017 Internet-Draft August 8, 2017
Obsoletes: 4345 Obsoletes: 4345
Updates: 3501, 4253, 6649, 6733 Updates: 3501, 4253, 6649, 6733
Intended Status: Best Current Practice Intended Status: Best Current Practice
Expires: February 2, 2018 Expires: February 9, 2018
Deprecating RC4 in all IETF Protocols Deprecating RC4 in all IETF Protocols
draft-ietf-curdle-rc4-die-die-die-01 draft-ietf-curdle-rc4-die-die-die-02
[[RFC-Editor: Please replace all instances of xxxx in this document with [[RFC-Editor: Please replace all instances of xxxx in this document with
the RFC number of draft-ietf-curdle-des-des-des-die-die-die.]] the RFC number of draft-ietf-curdle-des-des-des-die-die-die.]]
[[RFC-Editor: please replace the second character of my surname by [[RFC-Editor: please replace the second character of my surname by
U+00E2 when publishing as RFC in the header and in all pages. U+00E2 when publishing as RFC in the header and in all pages.
Non-ASCII characters are allowed in RFCs as per RFC 7997.]] Non-ASCII characters are allowed in RFCs as per RFC 7997.]]
Abstract Abstract
skipping to change at page 3, line 25 skipping to change at page 3, line 25
As the document is over 14 years old, the second paragraph of As the document is over 14 years old, the second paragraph of
Section 11.1 of [RFC3501] is replaced with the following paragraph: Section 11.1 of [RFC3501] is replaced with the following paragraph:
""" """
IMAP client and server implementations were formerly required to IMAP client and server implementations were formerly required to
implement TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 {TLS}, an extremely weak cipher implement TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 {TLS}, an extremely weak cipher
suite [RFC6151] [RFC6649] [RFC7457] [RFCxxxx] [RFCyyyy] that TLS suite [RFC6151] [RFC6649] [RFC7457] [RFCxxxx] [RFCyyyy] that TLS
clients MUST NOT implement per [RFC7465]. Compatibility requirements clients MUST NOT implement per [RFC7465]. Compatibility requirements
were removed in the grounds of security, and all clients and servers were removed in the grounds of security, and all clients and servers
SHOULD implement TLS 1.2 {TLS} and the SHOULD comply to [RFC7525].
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 {TLS} cipher suite.
""" """
The TLS reference in [RFC3501] should be replaced with a reference to The TLS reference in [RFC3501] should be replaced with a reference to
RFC 5246, and references to RFC 6151, RFC 6649, RFC 7457, RFC 7465, RFC 5246, and references to RFC 6151, RFC 6649, RFC 7457, RFC 7465,
RFC xxxx and this document (as RFC yyyy) should be added. RFC xxxx and this document (as RFC yyyy) should be added.
4. Updates to RFC 4253 4. Updates to RFC 4253
RFC 4253 is updated to note the deprecation of arcfour and 3des-cbc. RFC 4253 is updated to note the deprecation of arcfour and 3des-cbc.
skipping to change at page 4, line 46 skipping to change at page 4, line 46
AES cipher suite). AES cipher suite).
RFC 6733 was published in October 2012, and all paragraphs but the RFC 6733 was published in October 2012, and all paragraphs but the
last of Section 13.1 of [RFC6733] are to be replaced with: last of Section 13.1 of [RFC6733] are to be replaced with:
""" """
Diameter nodes were formerly required to implement insecure RC4 Diameter nodes were formerly required to implement insecure RC4
cipher suites and weak 3DES cipher suites. RC4 MUST NOT be used cipher suites and weak 3DES cipher suites. RC4 MUST NOT be used
because it is prohibited by RFC 7465. because it is prohibited by RFC 7465.
Diameter nodes MUST support at least one of the following cipher Diameter nodes MUST comply to [RFC7525].
suites:
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA was not chosen to be absolutely required TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA was not chosen to be absolutely required
as Diameter nodes may require all connections to use forward secrecy as Diameter nodes may require all connections to use forward secrecy
by only implementing cipher suites with forward secrecy. by only implementing cipher suites with forward secrecy.
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA is not a forward secrecy cipher suite TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA is not a forward secrecy cipher suite
because all connections can be decrypted once the private RSA key is because all connections can be decrypted once the private RSA key is
known by an attacker. known by an attacker.
""" """
Several choices were given because of patent concerns with Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECC) and problems of older implementations with
ECC and GCM cipher suites, as well as problems of new implementations
with DHE, as they may not support DHE because ECDHE is more
efficient.
7. Action to be taken 7. Action to be taken
RC4 MUST NOT be used in new implementations of IETF protocols, and RC4 MUST NOT be used in new implementations of IETF protocols, and
RC4 MUST be eliminated as fast as possible from the existing Internet RC4 MUST be eliminated as fast as possible from the existing Internet
infrastructure, as RC4 is insecure [RFC6649] [RFC7457] [RFCxxxx]. infrastructure, as RC4 is insecure [RFC6649] [RFC7457] [RFCxxxx].
Microsoft Corporation SHOULD take action to eradicate RC4 in all Vendors SHOULD take action to eradicate RC4 in all their software
its software and systems. and systems.
New IETF protocols MUST NOT allow RC4, and new versions of existing New IETF protocols MUST NOT allow RC4, and new versions of existing
IETF protocols MUST either not allow RC4 or recommend not to use RC4 IETF protocols MUST either not allow RC4 or recommend not to use RC4
(for example, using "NOT RECOMMENDED" or "SHOULD NOT"). (for example, using "NOT RECOMMENDED" or "SHOULD NOT").
8. IANA Considerations 8. IANA Considerations
IANA may need to take action as the status for RC4 and 3DES IANA may need to take action as the status for RC4 and 3DES
algorithms for Secure Shell (SSH) is changed by this document algorithms for Secure Shell (SSH) is changed by this document
(see Section 6, that updates [RFC4253]). (see Section 6, that updates [RFC4253]).
skipping to change at page 5, line 53 skipping to change at page 5, line 35
This document deprecates RC4, that is obsolete cryptography, and This document deprecates RC4, that is obsolete cryptography, and
several attacks that render it useless have been published [RFC6649]. several attacks that render it useless have been published [RFC6649].
Refer to Section 5 of [RFCxxxx] for further security considerations. Refer to Section 5 of [RFCxxxx] for further security considerations.
10. Acknowledgements 10. Acknowledgements
[[RFC-Editor: When possible, add native names according to the [[RFC-Editor: When possible, add native names according to the
conventions of RFC 7997.]] conventions of RFC 7997.]]
Thanks to the following people for writing reference material: Thanks to the following people:
* Sean Turner and Lily Chen for writing RFC 6151, that contains * Sean Turner and Lily Chen for writing RFC 6151, that contains
updated security considerations for MD5 and HMAC-MD5. updated security considerations for MD5 and HMAC-MD5.
* Love Hornquist Astrand and Tom Yu for writing RFC 6649, that * Love Hornquist Astrand and Tom Yu for writing RFC 6649, that
deprecates weak cryptographic algorithms in Kerberos. deprecates weak cryptographic algorithms in Kerberos.
* Yaron Sheffer, Ralph Holz and Peter Saint-Andre for writing * Yaron Sheffer, Ralph Holz and Peter Saint-Andre for writing
RFC 7457, that summarises known attacks against Transport Layer RFC 7457, that summarises known attacks against Transport Layer
Security (TLS). Security (TLS), and RFC 7525, that provides recommendations for
the use of TLS and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS).
* Andrei Popov for writing RFC 7465, that prohibits RC4 cipher * Andrei Popov for writing RFC 7465, that prohibits RC4 cipher
suites in Transport Layer Security (TLS). suites in Transport Layer Security (TLS).
* Julien Elie for sending me an email about the requirements to * Julien Elie for sending me an email about the requirements to
implement RC4 cipher suites in RFC 3501 and RFC 6733. implement RC4 cipher suites in RFC 3501 and RFC 6733.
Also thanks to SSL Labs for capping server grades to B (RC4 only used Also thanks to SSL Labs for capping server grades to B (RC4 only used
with older protocols) and C (RC4 used with modern protocols) when with older protocols) and C (RC4 used with modern protocols) when
servers support RC4, and flagging cipher suites and clients using RC4 servers support RC4, and flagging cipher suites and clients using RC4
skipping to change at page 6, line 41 skipping to change at page 6, line 25
11.1. Normative References 11.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC6649] Hornquist Astrand, L. and T. Yu, "Deprecate DES, RC4-HMAC- [RFC6649] Hornquist Astrand, L. and T. Yu, "Deprecate DES, RC4-HMAC-
EXP, and Other Weak Cryptographic Algorithms in Kerberos", EXP, and Other Weak Cryptographic Algorithms in Kerberos",
BCP 179, RFC 6649, July 2012. BCP 179, RFC 6649, July 2012.
[RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, May 2015.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in
RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, May 2017. RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, May 2017.
[RFCxxxx] Kaduk, B., and M. Short, "Deprecate 3DES and RC4 in [RFCxxxx] Kaduk, B., and M. Short, "Deprecate 3DES and RC4 in
Kerberos", draft-ietf-curdle-des-des-des-die-die-die-04, Kerberos", draft-ietf-curdle-des-des-des-die-die-die-04,
Work in Progress. Work in Progress.
11.2. Informative References 11.2. Informative References
[RFC3501] Crispin, M., "INTERNET MESSAGE ACCESS PROTOCOL - Version [RFC3501] Crispin, M., "INTERNET MESSAGE ACCESS PROTOCOL - Version
4rev1", RFC 3501, March 2003. 4rev1", RFC 3501, March 2003.
[RFC3961] Raeburn, K., "Encryption and Checksum Specifications for
Kerberos 5", RFC 3961, February 2005.
[RFC4253] Ylonen, T., and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH) [RFC4253] Ylonen, T., and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
Transport Layer Protocol", RFC 4253, January 2006. Transport Layer Protocol", RFC 4253, January 2006.
[RFC4757] Jaganathan, K., Zhu, L., and J. Brezak, "The RC4-HMAC [RFC4757] Jaganathan, K., Zhu, L., and J. Brezak, "The RC4-HMAC
Kerberos Encryption Types Used by Microsoft Windows", Kerberos Encryption Types Used by Microsoft Windows",
RFC 4757, December 2006. RFC 4757, December 2006.
[RFC6151] Turner, S., and L. Chen, "Updated Security Considerations [RFC6151] Turner, S., and L. Chen, "Updated Security Considerations
for the MD5 Message-Digest and the HMAC-MD5 Algorithms", for the MD5 Message-Digest and the HMAC-MD5 Algorithms",
RFC 6151, March 2011. RFC 6151, March 2011.
[RFC6733] Fajardo, V., Ed., Arkko, J., Loughney, J., and G. Zorn, [RFC6733] Fajardo, V., Ed., Arkko, J., Loughney, J., and G. Zorn,
Ed., "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 6733, October 2012. Ed., "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 6733, October 2012.
[RFC7457] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre, "Summarizing [RFC7457] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre, "Summarizing
Known Attacks on Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Known Attacks on Transport Layer Security (TLS) and
Datagram TLS (DTLS)", RFC 7457, February 2015. Datagram TLS (DTLS)", RFC 7457, February 2015.
[RFC7465] Popov, A., "Deprecating RC4 Cipher Suites", RFC 7465, [RFC7465] Popov, A., "Prohibiting RC4 Cipher Suites", RFC 7465,
February 2015. February 2015.
[[RFC-Editor: please replace the 'i' in my name by U+00ED and the [[RFC-Editor: please replace the 'i' in my name by U+00ED and the
first 'a' in the surname by U+00E2, as non-ASCII characters are first 'a' in the surname by U+00E2, as non-ASCII characters are
allowed as per RFC 7997]] allowed as per RFC 7997]]
12. Author's Address 12. Author's Address
Luis Camara Luis Camara
EMail: <luis.camara@live.com.pt> EMail: <luis.camara@live.com.pt>
Appendix A. Changelog Appendix A. Changelog
[[RFC-Editor: please remove this section when publishing.]] [[RFC-Editor: please remove this section when publishing.]]
WG draft (draft-ietf-curdle-rc4-die-die-die): WG draft (draft-ietf-curdle-rc4-die-die-die):
02 - addressed Todd Short's concerns.
01 - massive simplification: removed informational updates, removed 01 - massive simplification: removed informational updates, removed
all Pre-5378 Material, retracted all "Obsoletes:" except for all Pre-5378 Material, retracted all "Obsoletes:" except for
RFC 4345, removed Appendix A and renamed changelog to Appendix A. RFC 4345, removed Appendix A and renamed changelog to Appendix A.
00 - dummy update to get the draft into the curdle WG. 00 - dummy update to get the draft into the curdle WG.
Individual draft (draft-luis140219-curdle-rc4-die-die-die): Individual draft (draft-luis140219-curdle-rc4-die-die-die):
02 - changed title to "Deprecating RC4 in all IETF Protocols", changed 02 - changed title to "Deprecating RC4 in all IETF Protocols", changed
the header of all pages to "Deprecating RC4 in all Protocols", the header of all pages to "Deprecating RC4 in all Protocols",
 End of changes. 13 change blocks. 
32 lines changed or deleted 18 lines changed or added

This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.45. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/