draft-ietf-bfd-optimizing-authentication-04.txt		draft-ietf-bfd-optimizing-authentication-05.txt
	Network Working Group M. Jethanandani		Network Working Group M. Jethanandani
	Internet-Draft Cisco Systems		Internet-Draft
	Intended status: Standards Track A. Mishra		Intended status: Standards Track A. Mishra
	Expires: May 25, 2018 O3b Networks		Expires: November 26, 2018 SES Networks
	A. Saxena		A. Saxena
	Ciena Corporation		Ciena Corporation
	M. Bhatia		M. Bhatia
	Ionos Networks		Nokia
	November 21, 2017		May 25, 2018
	Optimizing BFD Authentication		Optimizing BFD Authentication
	draft-ietf-bfd-optimizing-authentication-04		draft-ietf-bfd-optimizing-authentication-05
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document describes an optimization to BFD Authentication as		This document describes an optimization to BFD Authentication as
	described in Section 6.7 of BFD [RFC5880].		described in Section 6.7 of BFD RFC5880.
	Requirements Language		Requirements Language
	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",		The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this		"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
	document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].		document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119]
			[RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown
			here.
	Status of This Memo		Status of This Memo
	This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the		This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
	provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.		provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
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	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on May 25, 2018.		This Internet-Draft will expire on November 26, 2018.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect		carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
	include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of		include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
	the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as		the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
	described in the Simplified BSD License.		described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
	2. Authentication Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		2. Authentication Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	3. NULL Auth TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		3. NULL Auth TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	Authenticating every BFD [RFC5880] packet with a Simple Password, or		Authenticating every BFD [RFC5880] packet with a Simple Password, or
	with a MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm [RFC1321] , or Secure Hash		with a MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm [RFC1321] , or Secure Hash
	Algorithm (SHA-1) algorithms is computationally intensive process,		Algorithm (SHA-1) algorithms is computationally intensive process,
	making it difficult if not impossible to authenticate every packet -		making it difficult if not impossible to authenticate every packet -
	particularly at faster rates. Also, the recent escalating series of		particularly at faster rates. Also, the recent escalating series of
	attacks on MD5 and SHA-1 [SHA-1-attack1] [SHA-1-attack2] raise		attacks on MD5 and SHA-1 [SHA-1-attack1] [SHA-1-attack2] raise
	concerns about their remaining useful lifetime as outlined in Updated		concerns about their remaining useful lifetime as outlined in Updated
	skipping to change at page 5, line 35 ¶		skipping to change at page 6, line 18 ¶
	authentication a BFD session by taking away the onerous requirement		authentication a BFD session by taking away the onerous requirement
	that every frame be authenticated. By authenticating frames that		that every frame be authenticated. By authenticating frames that
	affect the state of the session, the security of the BFD session is		affect the state of the session, the security of the BFD session is
	maintained. As such this document does not change the security		maintained. As such this document does not change the security
	considerations for BFD.		considerations for BFD.
	6. References		6. References
	6.1. Normative References		6.1. Normative References
	[FIPS-180-2]
	National Institute of Standards and Technology, FIPS PUB
	180-2, "The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
	(HMAC)", August 2002.
	[FIPS-198]
	National Institute of Standards and Technology, FIPS PUB
	198, "The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)",
	March 2002.
	[I-D.ietf-bfd-generic-crypto-auth]
	Bhatia, M., Manral, V., Zhang, D., and M. Jethanandani,
	"BFD Generic Cryptographic Authentication", draft-ietf-
	bfd-generic-crypto-auth-06 (work in progress), April 2014.
	[I-D.ietf-bfd-secure-sequence-numbers]		[I-D.ietf-bfd-secure-sequence-numbers]
	Jethanandani, M., Agarwal, S., Mishra, A., Saxena, A., and		Jethanandani, M., Agarwal, S., Mishra, A., Saxena, A., and
	A. DeKok, "Secure BFD Sequence Numbers", draft-ietf-bfd-		A. DeKok, "Secure BFD Sequence Numbers", draft-ietf-bfd-
	secure-sequence-numbers-00 (work in progress), May 2017.		secure-sequence-numbers-01 (work in progress), November
			2017.
	[I-D.ietf-bfd-stability]
	Mishra, A., Jethanandani, M., Saxena, A., Networks, J.,
	Chen, M., and P. Fan, "BFD Stability", draft-ietf-bfd-
	stability-00 (work in progress), May 2017.
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,		DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
	[RFC6039] Manral, V., Bhatia, M., Jaeggli, J., and R. White, "Issues		[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
	with Existing Cryptographic Protection Methods for Routing		2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
	Protocols", RFC 6039, DOI 10.17487/RFC6039, October 2010,		May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6039>.
	[RFC6151] Turner, S. and L. Chen, "Updated Security Considerations
	for the MD5 Message-Digest and the HMAC-MD5 Algorithms",
	RFC 6151, DOI 10.17487/RFC6151, March 2011,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6151>.
	[RFC6194] Polk, T., Chen, L., Turner, S., and P. Hoffman, "Security
	Considerations for the SHA-0 and SHA-1 Message-Digest
	Algorithms", RFC 6194, DOI 10.17487/RFC6194, March 2011,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6194>.
	6.2. Informative References		6.2. Informative References
	[Dobb96a] Dobbertin, H., "Cryptanalysis of MD5 Compress", May 1996.
	[Dobb96b] Dobbertin, H., "The Status of MD5 After a Recent Attack",
	CryptoBytes", 1996.
	[I-D.ietf-karp-design-guide]
	Lebovitz, G. and M. Bhatia, "Keying and Authentication for
	Routing Protocols (KARP) Design Guidelines", draft-ietf-
	karp-design-guide-10 (work in progress), December 2011.
	[MD5-attack]
	Wang, X., Feng, D., Lai, X., and H. Yu, "Collisions for
	Hash Functions MD4, MD5, HAVAL-128 and RIPEMD", August
	2004.
	[NIST-HMAC-SHA]
	National Institute of Standards and Technology, Available
	online at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/hash/policy.html,
	"NIST's Policy on Hash Functions", 2006.
	[RFC1321] Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321,		[RFC1321] Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC1321, April 1992,		DOI 10.17487/RFC1321, April 1992,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1321>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1321>.
	[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
	Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.
	[RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
	"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.
	[RFC4822] Atkinson, R. and M. Fanto, "RIPv2 Cryptographic
	Authentication", RFC 4822, DOI 10.17487/RFC4822, February
	2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4822>.
	[RFC5310] Bhatia, M., Manral, V., Li, T., Atkinson, R., White, R.,
	and M. Fanto, "IS-IS Generic Cryptographic
	Authentication", RFC 5310, DOI 10.17487/RFC5310, February
	2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5310>.
	[RFC5709] Bhatia, M., Manral, V., Fanto, M., White, R., Barnes, M.,
	Li, T., and R. Atkinson, "OSPFv2 HMAC-SHA Cryptographic
	Authentication", RFC 5709, DOI 10.17487/RFC5709, October
	2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5709>.
	[RFC5880] Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection		[RFC5880] Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection
	(BFD)", RFC 5880, DOI 10.17487/RFC5880, June 2010,		(BFD)", RFC 5880, DOI 10.17487/RFC5880, June 2010,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5880>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5880>.
	[RFC6234] Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms		[RFC6151] Turner, S. and L. Chen, "Updated Security Considerations
	(SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234,		for the MD5 Message-Digest and the HMAC-MD5 Algorithms",
	DOI 10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011,		RFC 6151, DOI 10.17487/RFC6151, March 2011,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6234>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6151>.
			[RFC6194] Polk, T., Chen, L., Turner, S., and P. Hoffman, "Security
			Considerations for the SHA-0 and SHA-1 Message-Digest
			Algorithms", RFC 6194, DOI 10.17487/RFC6194, March 2011,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6194>.
	[SHA-1-attack1]		[SHA-1-attack1]
	Wang, X., Yin, Y., and H. Yu, "Finding Collisions in the		Wang, X., Yin, Y., and H. Yu, "Finding Collisions in the
	Full SHA-1", 2005.		Full SHA-1", 2005.
	[SHA-1-attack2]		[SHA-1-attack2]
	Wang, X., Yao, A., and F. Yao, "New Collision Search for		Wang, X., Yao, A., and F. Yao, "New Collision Search for
	SHA-1", 2005.		SHA-1", 2005.
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Mahesh Jethanandani		Mahesh Jethanandani
	Cisco Systems
	170 W. Tasman Drive
	San Jose, CA 95134
	USA		USA
	Phone: +1 (408) 526-8763
	Email: mjethanandani@gmail.com		Email: mjethanandani@gmail.com
	Ashesh Mishra		Ashesh Mishra
	O3b Networks		SES Networks
	Email: mishra.ashesh@gmail.com		Email: mishra.ashesh@gmail.com
	Ankur Saxena		Ankur Saxena
	Ciena Corporation		Ciena Corporation
	3939 N 1st Street		3939 N 1st Street
	San Jose, CA 95134		San Jose, CA 95134
	USA		USA
	Email: ankurpsaxena@gmail.com		Email: ankurpsaxena@gmail.com
	Manav Bhatia		Manav Bhatia
	Ionos Networks		Nokia
	Bangalore		Bangalore
	India		India
	Email: manavbhatia@gmail.com		Email: manav.bhatia@nokia.com
End of changes. 21 change blocks.
	102 lines changed or deleted		31 lines changed or added
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