ACE                                                      P. van der Stok
Internet-Draft                                                Consultant
Intended status: Standards Track                           P. Kampanakis
Expires: April 11, July 13, 2019                                     Cisco Systems
                                                                S. Kumar
                                               Philips Lighting Research
                                                           M. Richardson
                                                                     SSW
                                                              M. Furuhed
                                                             Nexus Group
                                                                 S. Raza
                                                               RISE SICS
                                                         October 8, 2018
                                                         January 9, 2019

                    EST over secure CoAP (EST-coaps)
                       draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-06
                       draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-07

Abstract

   Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST) is used as a certificate
   provisioning protocol over HTTPS.  Low-resource devices often use the
   lightweight Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) for message
   exchanges.  This document defines how to transport EST payloads over
   secure CoAP (EST-coaps), which allows low-resource constrained devices to use
   existing EST functionality for provisioning certificates.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 11, July 13, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Change Log  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4   5
   3.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Conformance to RFC7925 profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5   6
   5.  Protocol Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6   7
     5.1.  Mandatory/optional EST Functions  . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.2.  Payload format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7   8
       5.2.1.  Content Format application/multipart-core . . . . . .   8
     5.3.  Message Bindings  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8   9
     5.4.  CoAP response codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9  10
     5.5.  Delayed Responses  Message fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     5.6.  Delayed Responses . .   9
     5.6.  Server-side Key Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     5.7.  Message fragmentation . . .  11
     5.7.  Server-side Key Generation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12  13
     5.8.  Deployment limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13  14
   6.  Discovery and URI . URIs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13  15
   7.  DTLS Transport Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15  16
   8.  HTTPS-CoAPS Registrar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17  18
   9.  Parameters  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     10.1.  Content-Format Registry  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     10.2.  Resource Type registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20  21
   11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21  22
     11.1.  EST server considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21  22
     11.2.  HTTPS-CoAPS Registrar considerations . . . . . . . . . .  22  23
   12. Acknowledgements Contributors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22 . .  24
   13. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
   14. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     13.1.  24
     14.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     13.2.  24
     14.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24  25
   Appendix A.  EST messages to EST-coaps  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26  28
     A.1.  cacerts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26  28
     A.2.  csrattrs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31  30
     A.3.  enroll / reenroll . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
     A.4.  serverkeygen  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
   Appendix B.  EST-coaps Block message examples . . . . . . . . . .  35
     B.1.  cacerts block example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35 . . . . . . .  36
     B.2.  enroll block example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38 . . . . . . .  39
   Appendix C.  Message content breakdown  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
     C.1.  cacerts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
     C.2.  enroll / reenroll . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  41
     C.3.  serverkeygen  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39  45

1.  Change Log

   EDNOTE: Remove this section before publication

   -06:

      clarified discovery section, by specifying that no discovery may
      be needed for /.well-known/est URI.

      added resource type values

   -07:

      redone examples from scratch with openssl

      Updated authors.

      Added CoAP RST as a MAY for IANA

      added list of compulsory an equivalent to implement and optional functions.

      Fixed issues pointed out by the an HTTP 204 message.

      Added serialization example of the /skg CBOR response.

      Added text regarding expired IDevIDs and persistent DTLS
      connection that will start using the Explicit TA Database in the
      new DTLS connection.

      Nits and fixes

      Removed CBOR envelop for binary data

      Replaced TBD8 with 62.

      Added RFC8174 reference and text.

      Clarified MTI for server-side key generation and Content-Formats.
      Defined the /skg MTI (PKCS#8) and the cases where CMS encryption
      will be used.

      Moved Fragmentation section up because it was referenced in
      sections above it.

   -06:

      clarified discovery section, by specifying that no discovery may
      be needed for /.well-known/est URI.

      added resource type values for IANA

      added list of compulsory to implement and optional functions.

      Fixed issues pointed out by the idnits tool.

      Updated COAP CoAP response codes section with more mappings between EST
      HTTP codes and EST-coaps COAP CoAP codes.

      Minor updates to the MTI EST Functions section.

      Moved Change Log section higher.

   -05:

      repaired again

      TBD8 = 62 removed from C-F registration, to be done in CT draft.

   -04:

      Updated Delayed response section to reflect short and long delay
      options.

   -03:

      Removed observe and simplified long waits

      Repaired content-format specification

   -02:

      Added parameter discussion in section 8

      Concluded content-format specification using multipart-ct draft

      examples updated

   -01:

      Editorials done.

      Redefinition of proxy to Registrar in Section 8.  Explained better
      the role of https-coaps Registrar, instead of "proxy"

      Provide "observe" option examples

      extended block message example.

      inserted new server key generation text in Section 5.6 5.7 and
      motivated server key generation.

      Broke down details for DTLS 1.3
      New media type uses CBOR array for multiple content-format
      payloads

      provided new content format tables

      new media format for IANA

   -00

      copied from vanderstok-ace-coap-04

2.  Introduction

   "Classical" Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST) [RFC7030] is used
   for authenticated/authorized endpoint certificate enrollment (and
   optionally key provisioning) through a Certificate Authority (CA) or
   Registration Authority (RA).  EST messages run over HTTPS.

   This document defines a new transport for EST based on the
   Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) since some Internet of Things
   (IoT) devices use CoAP instead of HTTP.  Therefore, this
   specification utilizes DTLS [RFC6347], CoAP [RFC7252], and UDP
   instead of TLS [RFC8446], HTTP [RFC7230] and TCP.

   EST messages may responses can be relatively large and for this reason this
   document
   specification also uses CoAP Block-Wise Transfer [RFC7959] to offer a
   fragmentation mechanism of EST messages at the CoAP layer.

   This specification document also profiles the use of EST to only support
   certificate-based client Authentication. authentication.  HTTP Basic or Digest
   authentication (as described in Section 3.2.3 of [RFC7030] are not
   supported.

3.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   Many of the concepts in this document are taken over from [RFC7030].
   Consequently, much text is directly traceable to [RFC7030].  The same
   document structure is followed to point out the differences and
   commonalities between EST and EST-coaps.

4.  Conformance to RFC7925 profiles

   This section shows how EST-coaps fits into the profiles of low-
   resource devices described in [RFC7925].  EST-coaps can transport
   certificates and private keys.  Certificates are responses to
   (re-)enrollment requests or request requests for a trusted certificate list.
   Private keys can be transported as responses to a
   request to a server-side keygeneration key
   generation request as described in section 4.4 of [RFC7030] and snd
   discussed in Section 5.6 5.7 of this document.

   As per [RFC7925] section Sections 3.3 and section 4.4, 4.4 of [RFC7925], the mandatory cipher suite
   for DTLS in EST-coaps is TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8
   defined in [RFC7251], and the curve
   [RFC7251].  Curve secp256r1 MUST be supported [RFC8422]; this curve
   is equivalent to the NIST P-256 curve.  Crypto agility is important,
   and the recommendations in [RFC7925] section 4.4 and any updates to
   RFC7925 concerning Curve25519 and other CFRG curves also apply.

   DTLS1.2 implementations MUST use the Supported Elliptic Curves and
   Supported Point Formats Extensions [RFC8422].  Uncompressed point
   format MUST also be supported.  [RFC6090] can be used as summary of
   the ECC algorithms.  DTLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13] implementations
   differ from DTLS 1.2 because they do not support point format
   negotiation in favor of a single point format for each curve and thus
   support for DTLS 1.3 does not mandate point formation extensions and
   negotiation.

   The EST-coaps client MUST be configured with at least an implicit TA
   database from its manufacturer.  The authentication of the EST-coaps server by the EST-coaps client is
   based on certificate authentication in the DTLS handshake.  The EST-
   coaps client MUST be configured with at least an Implicit TA database
   from its manufacturer which will allow for the authenticating the
   server the first time before updating its trust anchor (Explicit TA)
   [RFC7030].

   The authentication of the EST-coaps client is based on a client
   certificate in the DTLS handshake.  This can either be

   o  a previously issued client certificate (e.g., an existing
      certificate issued by the EST CA); this could be a common case for
      simple reenrollment of clients; clients.

   o  a previously installed certificate (e.g., manufacturer-installed
      IDevID (IEEE 802.1AR [ieee802.1ar] certificate or a certificate
      issued by some other party); the server is expected to trust the manufacturer's root
      previously installed CA certificate in this case.  IDevID's are
      expected to have a very long life, as long as the device, but
      under some conditions could expire.  In the latter case, the
      server MAY want to authenticate a client certificate against its
      trust store although the certificate is expired (Section 11).

   Client authentication via DTLS Client Certificate is mandatory.

5.  Protocol Design

   EST-coaps uses CoAP to transfer EST messages, aided by Block-Wise
   Transfer [RFC7959] to transport CoAP messages in blocks thus avoiding
   (excessive) fragmentation of UDP datagrams.  The use of "Block" for
   the transfer of larger EST messages is specified in Section 5.7.  The 5.5.
   Figure 1 below shows the layered EST-coaps architecture.

   +------------------------------------------------+
   |    EST request/response messages               |
   +------------------------------------------------+
   |    CoAP for message transfer and signalling    |
   +------------------------------------------------+
   |    DTLS for transport security                 |
   +------------------------------------------------+
   |    UDP for transport                           |
   +------------------------------------------------+

                    Figure 1: EST-coaps protocol layers

   The EST-coaps protocol design follows closely the EST design.  The
   actions supported by EST-coaps are identified by their message types:

   o  CA certificate retrieval, needed to receive the complete set of CA
      certificates.

   o  Simple enroll and reenroll, for CA to sign public client-identity
      key.

   o  Certificate Signing Request (CSR) Attributes request messages,
      informs the client of the fields to include in generated CSR.

   o  Server-side key generation messages, to provide a private client-
      identity key when the client choses for an external entity to
      generate its private key.

5.1.  Mandatory/optional EST Functions

   This specification contains a set of required-to-implement functions,
   optional functions, and not specified functions.  The latter ones are
   deemed too expensive for low-resource devices in payload and
   calculation times.

   Table 1 specifies the mandatory-to-implement or optional
   implementation of the est-coaps functions.

              +------------------+--------------------------+
              | EST Functions    | EST-coaps implementation |
              +------------------+--------------------------+
              | /cacerts         | Mandatory MUST                     |
              | /simpleenroll    | Mandatory MUST                     |
              | /simplereenroll  | Mandatory MUST                     |
              | /fullcmc         | Not specified            |
              | /serverkeygen    | Optional OPTIONAL                 |
              | /csrattrs        | Optional OPTIONAL                 |
              +------------------+--------------------------+

               Table 1: list Table 1: List of EST -coaps EST-coaps fuctions

5.2.  Payload format

   The content-format (media type equivalent)

   While [RFC7030] permits a number of these functions to be used
   without authentication, this specification requires authentication
   for all functions.

5.2.  Payload format

   The content-format (media type equivalent) of the CoAP message
   determines which EST message is transported in the CoAP payload.  The
   media types specified in the HTTP Content-Type header (section 3.2.2
   of [RFC7030]) are in EST-coaps specified by the Content-Format Option
   (12) of CoAP.  The combination of URI path and content-format used
   for CoAP in EST-
   coaps MUST map to an allowed combination of URI and media type as
   defined for in
   EST.  The required content-formats for these requests and response
   messages are defined in Section 10. 10.1.  The CoAP response codes are
   defined in Section 5.4.

   EST-coaps is designed for use between low-resource devices and hence
   does not need to send base64-encoded Base64-encoded data.  Simple binary is more
   efficient (30% smaller payload) and well supported by CoAP.

   The  Thus,
   the payload for a given media type follows the ASN.1 structure of the
   media-type and is transported as straight binary coding instead of
   the base64-encoded.  The binary is wrapped in a CBOR major type 2
   using h'xxx' notation (to assure compatibility with multipart).

   EDNote: suggestion to remove CBOR wrapping for not multipart.

   In the examples of Appendix A, the base16 diagnostic notation is used
   for CBOR major type 2, where h'450aafbb' represents an example binary
   payload.  The content formats specification in DER format.  Section 5.2.1
   specifies the payload structure when multiple media types are present
   in the payload.

5.2.1.  Content Format application/multipart-core

   A representation with content format ID TBD8 62 contains a collection of
   representations along with their respective content format.  The
   content-format identifies the media-type application/multipart-core
   specified in [I-D.ietf-core-multipart-ct].

   The collection is encoded as a CBOR array [RFC7049] with an even
   number of elements.  The second, fourth, sixth, etc. element is a
   binary string containing a representation.  The first, third, fifth,
   etc. element is an unsigned integer specifying the content format ID
   of the following consecutive representation.  For example, a collection
   containing two representations in response to a server-side key generation,
   generation request, could include a private key in PKCS#8 [RFC5958]
   with content format ID 284 (0x011C) and a certificate with content
   format ID 281, looks 281 (0x0119).  Such a collection would look like this
   [284,h'0123456789abcdef', 281,h'fedcba9876543210'] in diagnostic CBOR notation:
   [284,h'0123456789abcdef',281,h'fedcba9876543210'].
   notation.  The serialization of such CBOR content would be

      84                  # array(4)
      19 011C             # unsigned(284)
      48                  # bytes(8)
         0123456789ABCDEF # "\x01#Eg\x89\xAB\xCD\xEF"
      19 0119             # unsigned(281)
      48                  # bytes(8)
         FEDCBA9876543210 # "\xFE\xDC\xBA\x98vT2\x10"

                   Multipart /skg response serialization

   The PKCS#8 key and the X.509 certificate representations will be are ASN.1
   encoded in binary DER format.  An example is shown in Appendix A.4.

   In cases where the private key is further encrypted with CMS (as
   explained in Section 5.7) the content format ID is 280 (0x0118).

5.3.  Message Bindings

   The general EST CoAP message characteristics are:

   o  All EST-coaps messages expect a response from the server, thus the
      client MUST send the requests over confirmable CON COAP CoAP messages.

   o  The Ver, TKL, Token, and Message ID values of the CoAP header are
      not affected by EST.

   o  The CoAP options used are Uri-Host, Uri-Path, Uri-Port, Content-
      Format, and Location-Path in CoAP. Location-Path.  These CoAP Options are used to
      communicate the HTTP fields specified in the EST REST messages.

   o  EST URLs are HTTPS based (https://), in CoAP these will be are assumed to
      be transformed translated to coaps (coaps://)

   Appendix A includes some practical examples of EST messages
   translated to CoAP.

5.4.  CoAP response codes

   Section 5.9 of [RFC7252] specifies and Section 7 of [RFC8075] specify the
   mapping of HTTP response codes to CoAP response codes.  Every time
   the HTTP response code 200 is specified in [RFC7030] in response to a
   GET request, request (/cacerts, /csrattrs), in EST-coaps the equivalent CoAP
   response code 2.05 or 2.03 MUST be used.  Similarly, 2.01, 2.02 or
   2.04 MUST be used in response to HTTP POST EST requests. requests
   (/simpleenroll, /simplereenroll, /serverkeygen ).  Response code HTTP
   202 Retry-After that existed in EST has no equivalent in CoAP.
   Section 5.5 5.6 specifies how EST requests over CoAP handle delayed
   messages.

   Other HTTP response codes

   EST makes use of, are of HTTP 204 and 404 responses when a resource is not
   available for the client.  The equivalent COAP CoAP error code to use in
   an EST-coaps response is responses are 2.04 and 4.04.  Additionally, EST's HTTP
   401 error translates to 4.01 in EST-coaps.  Other EST HTTP error
   messages
   commonly used in EST are 400, 423 and 503.  Their equivalent COAP CoAP errors are
   4.00, 4.03 and 5.03 respectively.

5.5.  Delayed Responses

   Appendix B.2 shows an example of a server response that comes
   immediately after  In case a client request.  The example shows the flows of
   blocks as required COAP option
   (i.e Content-Format) is omitted, the large messages require fragmentation.  But server
   responses can sometimes be delayed.

   According is expected to section 5.2.2 of [RFC7252], return a slow server can
   acknowledge
   4.02.

5.5.  Message fragmentation

   DTLS defines fragmentation only for the request handshake and respond later with the requested resource
   representation.  In particular, a slow not for secure
   data exchange (DTLS records).  [RFC6347] states that to avoid using
   IP fragmentation, which involves error-prone datagram reconstitution,
   invokers of the DTLS record layer SHOULD size DTLS records so that
   they fit within any Path MTU estimates obtained from the record
   layer.  In addition, invokers residing on a 6LoWPAN over IEEE
   802.15.4 [ieee802.15.4] network SHOULD attempt to size CoAP messages
   such that each DTLS record will fit within one or two IEEE 802.15.4
   frames.

   That is not always possible in EST-coaps.  Even though ECC
   certificates are small in size, they can vary greatly based on
   signature algorithms, key sizes, and OID fields used.  For 256-bit
   curves, common ECDSA cert sizes are 500-1000 bytes which could
   fluctuate further based on the algorithms, OIDs, SANs and cert
   fields.  For 384-bit curves, ECDSA certs increase in size and can
   sometimes reach 1.5KB.  Additionally, there are times when the EST
   cacerts response from the server can include multiple certs that
   amount to large payloads.  Section 4.6 of CoAP [RFC7252] describes
   the possible payload sizes: "if nothing is known about the size of
   the headers, good upper bounds are 1152 bytes for the message size
   and 1024 bytes for the payload size".  Section 4.6 of [RFC7252] also
   suggests that IPv4 implementations may want to limit themselves to
   more conservative IPv4 datagram sizes such as 576 bytes.  Even with
   ECC certs, EST-coaps messages can still exceed MTU sizes on the
   Internet or 6LoWPAN [RFC4919] (Section 2 of [RFC7959]).  EST-coaps
   needs to be able to fragment messages into multiple DTLS datagrams.

   To perform fragmentation in CoAP, [RFC7959] specifies the "Block1"
   option for fragmentation of the request payload and the "Block2"
   option for fragmentation of the return payload of a CoAP flow.  As
   explained in Section 1 of [RFC7959], blockwise transfers SHOULD be
   used in Confirmable CoAP messages to avoid the exacerbation of lost
   blocks.  [RFC7959] defines SZX in the block option fields.  SZX is
   used to convey the size of the blocks in the requests or responses.
   The CoAP client MAY specify the Block1 size and MAY also specify the
   Block2 size.  The CoAP server MAY specify the Block2 size, but not
   the Block1 size.

   [RFC7959] also defines Size1 and Size2 options to provide size
   information about the resource representation in a request and
   response.  The Size1 response MAY be parsed by the client as a size
   indication of the Block2 resource in the server response or by the
   server as a request for a size estimate by the client.  Similarly,
   the Size2 option defined in BLOCK should be parsed by the server as
   an indication of the size of the resource carried in Block1 options
   and by the client as a maximum size expected in the 4.13 (Request
   Entity Too Large) response to a request.

   Examples of fragmented EST messages are shown in Appendix B.

5.6.  Delayed Responses

   Server responses can sometimes be delayed.  According to section
   5.2.2 of [RFC7252], a slow server can acknowledge the request with a
   2.31 code and respond later with the requested resource
   representation.  In particular, a slow server can respond to a enroll an
   enrollment request with an empty ACK with code 0.00, before sending
   the certificate to the server after a short delay.  Consecutively,  If the
   certificate response is large, the server will need more than one
   "Block2" blocks to respond if the
   certificate is large. transfer it.  This situation is shown in Figure 2
   where a client sends an enrollment request that uses more than one
   "Block1" blocks.  The server uses an empty 0.00 ACK to announce the
   delayed response which will be is provided later with 2.04 messages
   containing "Block2" options.  Having received the first 128 256 bytes in
   the first "block2" block, the client asks for a block reduction to
   128 bytes in all following "block2" blocks, starting with the second
   block (NUM=1).

   POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen (CON)(1:0/1/256) {CSR req} -->
          <-- (ACK) (1:0/1/256) (2.31 Continue)
   POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen (CON)(1:1/1/256) {CSR req} -->
          <-- (ACK) (1:1/1/256) (2.31 Continue)
                         .
                         .
                         .
   POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen (CON)(1:N1/0/256){CSR req} -->
          <-- (0.00 empty ACK)
                         |
          ...... short delay before certificate is ready....... ready ......
                         |
         <-- (CON) (1:N1/0/256)(2:0/1/256)(2.04 Changed) {Cert resp}
                                      (ACK)                     -->
   POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen (CON)(2:1/0/128)          -->
          <-- (ACK) (2:1/1/128) (2.04 Changed) {Cert resp}
                         .
                         .
                         .
   POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen (CON)(2:N2/0/128)          -->
          <-- (ACK) (2:N2/0/128) (2.04 Changed) {Cert resp}

               Figure 2: EST-COAP enrolment with short wait

   If the server is very slow (i.e. minutes) in providing the response (say minutes,
   possible
   (i.e. when a manual intervention is wanted), needed), the server SHOULD
   respond with an ACK containing response code 5.03 (Service
   unavailable) and a Max-Age option to indicate the time the client
   SHOULD wait to request the content later.  After a delay of Max-Age,
   the client SHOULD resend the identical CSR to the server.  As long as
   the server responds with response code 5.03 (Service Unavailable), Unavailable)
   with a Max-Age option, the client can resend the enrolment request
   until the server responds with the certificate or the client abandons
   for other reasons.

   To demonstrate this situation, scenario, Figure 3 shows a client sending an
   enrolment request that will use uses more than one "Block1" block blocks to send the
   CSR to the server.  The server needs more than one "Block2" blocks to
   respond, but also needs to take a long delay (minutes) to provide the
   response.  Consequently, the server will use uses a 5.03 ACK
   for the response. response with a
   Max-Age option.  The client can be requested to wait multiple times waits for a period of Max-Age. Max-Age as many
   times as he receives the same 5.03 response and retransmits the
   enrollment request until he receives a certificate.  Note that in the
   example below the server asks for a decrease in the block size when
   acknowledging the first Block2.

   Figure 5 can be compared with Figure 3 to see the extra requests
   after a Max-Age wait.

   POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen (CON)(1:0/1/256) {CSR req} -->
          <-- (ACK) (1:0/1/256) (2.31 Continue)
   POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen (CON)(1:1/1/256) {CSR req} -->
          <-- (ACK) (1:1/1/256) (2.31 Continue)
                         .
                         .
   POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen (CON)(1:N1/0/256){CSR req} -->
        <-- (ACK) (1:N1/0/256) (2:0/0/128) (5.03 Service Unavailable)
                                                            (Max-Age)
                         |
                         |
   Client tries one or more times after Max-Age with identical payload
                         |
                         |
   POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen (CON)(1:N1/0/256){CSR req} -->
        <-- (ACK) (1:N1/0/256) (2:0/1/128) (2.04 Changed){Cert resp}
   POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen (CON)(2:1/0/128)           -->
        <-- (ACK) (2:1/1/128) (2.04 Changed) {Cert resp}
                         .
                         .
                         .
   POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen (CON)(2:N2/0/128)          -->
          <-- (ACK) (2:N2/0/128) (2.04 Changed) {Cert resp}

                Figure 3: EST-COAP enrolment with long wait

5.6.

5.7.  Server-side Key Generation

   Constrained devices sometimes do not have the necessary hardware to
   generate statistically random numbers for private keys and DTLS
   ephemeral keys.  Past experience has also shown that low-resource
   endpoints sometimes generate numbers which could allow someone to
   decrypt the communication or guess the private key and impersonate as
   the device.  Studies have shown that the same keys are generated by
   the same model devices deployed on-line.

   EDNote: Is there a reference for these studies?

   Additionally, random number key generation is costly, thus energy
   draining.  Even though the random numbers that constitute the
   identity/cert do not get generated often, an endpoint may not want to
   spend time and energy generating keypairs, and just ask for one from
   the server.

   In these scenarios, server-side key generation can be used.  The
   client asks for the server or proxy to generate the private key and
   the certificate which is transferred back to the client in the
   server-side key generation response.

   [RFC7030] recommends for the private key returned by the server to be
   encrypted.  The specification provides two methods to encrypt the
   generated key, symmetric and asymmetric.  The methods are signalled
   by the client by using the relevant attributes (SMIMECapabilities and
   DecryptKeyIdentifier or AsymmetricDecryptKeyIdentifier) in the CSR
   request.  In the symmetric key case, someone to
   decrypt the key can be established out-
   of-band communication or alternatively derived by guess the established TLS connection as
   described in [RFC5705].

   The sever-side private key generation response is returned using a CBOR array
   Section 5.2.1.  The certificate part exactly matches and impersonate as
   the response
   from an enrollment response.  The private device [PsQs] [RSAorig].

   Additionally, random number key generation is placed inside of a
   CMS SignedData.  The SignedData is signed by costly, thus energy
   draining.  Even though the party random numbers that generated constitute the private key, which may or
   identity/cert do not get generated often, an endpoint may not be the EST server or the EST
   CA.  The SignedData is further protected by placing it inside of a
   CMS EnvelopedData as explained in Section 4.4.2 of [RFC7030].

5.7.  Message fragmentation

   DTLS defines fragmentation only for the handshake part want to
   spend time and not energy generating keypairs, and just ask for
   secure data exchange (DTLS records).  [RFC6347] states that to avoid
   using IP fragmentation, which involves error-prone datagram
   reconstitution, invokers of the DTLS record layer SHOULD size DTLS
   records so that they fit within any Path MTU estimates obtained one from
   the record layer. server.

   In addition, invokers residing on a 6LoWPAN over
   IEEE 802.15.4 network SHOULD attempt to size CoAP messages such that
   each DTLS record will fit within one or two IEEE 802.15.4 frames.

   That is not always possible.  Even though ECC certificates are small
   in size, they can vary greatly based on signature algorithms, these scenarios, server-side key
   sizes, and OID fields generation can be used.  For 256-bit curves, common ECDSA cert
   sizes are 500-1000 bytes which could fluctuate further based on  The
   client asks for the server or proxy to generate the
   algorithms, OIDs, SANs private key and cert fields.  For 384-bit curves, ECDSA
   certs increase
   the certificate which is transferred back to the client in size and can sometimes reach 1.5KB.  Additionally,
   there are times when the EST cacerts response from
   server-side key generation response.  In all respects, the server can
   include multiple certs that amount to large payloads.  Section 4.6 of
   CoAP [RFC7252] describes
   SHOULD treat the possible payload sizes: "if nothing CSR as it would treat any enroll or re-enroll CSR;
   the only distinction here is
   known about that the size of server MUST ignore the headers, good upper bounds public
   key values and signature in the CSR.  These are 1152 bytes
   for included in the message size and 1024 bytes
   request only to allow re-use of existing codebases for generating and
   parsing such requests.

   [RFC7030] recommends the payload size".
   Section 4.6 of [RFC7252] also suggests that IPv4 implementations may
   want private key returned by the server to limit themselves be
   encrypted.  This specification provides two methods to more conservative IPv4 datagram sizes
   such as 576 bytes.  From [RFC0791] follows that encrypt the absolute minimum
   value of
   generated key, symmetric and asymmetric.  The methods are signalled
   by the IP MTU for IPv4 client by using the relevant attributes (SMIMECapabilities and
   DecryptKeyIdentifier or AsymmetricDecryptKeyIdentifier) in the CSR
   request.  The symmetric key or the asymmetric keypair establishment
   method is as low as 68 bytes, which would leave
   only 40 bytes minus security overhead for out of scope of this specification.

   The sever-side key generation response is returned using a UDP payload.  Thus, even
   with ECC certs, EST-coaps messages CBOR array
   Section 5.2.1.  The certificate part exactly matches the response
   from an enrollment response.  The private key can still exceed sizes be in MTU unprotected
   PKCS#8 [RFC5958] format (content type 281) or protected inside of
   1280 for IPv6 CMS
   SignedData (content type 280).  The SignedData is signed by the party
   that generated the private key, which may or 60-80 bytes for 6LoWPAN [RFC4919] may not be the EST
   server or the EST CA.  The SignedData is further protected by placing
   it inside of a CMS EnvelopedData as explained in
   section 2 of [RFC7959].  EST-coaps needs to be able to fragment EST
   messages into multiple DTLS datagrams.  Fine-grained fragmentation Section 4.4.2 of
   EST messages
   [RFC7030].  In summary, the symmetricly encrypted key is essential.

   To perform fragmentation included in CoAP, [RFC7959] specifies
   the "Block1"
   option for fragmentation of encryptedKey attribute in a KEKRecipientInfo structure.  In the request payload and
   case where the "Block2"
   option asymmetric encryption key is suitable for fragmentation of transport
   key operations the return payload of generated private key is encrypted with a CoAP flow.

   The BLOCK draft defines SZX in
   symmetric key which is encrypted by using the Block1 client defined (in the
   CSR) asymmetric public key and Block2 option fields.
   These are used to convey is carried in an encryptedKey
   attribute in a KeyTransRecipientInfo.  Finally, if the size of asymmetric
   encryption key is suitable for key agreement, the blocks in generated private
   key is encrypted with a symmetric key which is encrypted by using the requests or
   responses.

   The CoAP
   client MAY specify defined (in the Block1 size CSR) asymmetric public key and MAY also specify the
   Block2 size.  The CoAP server MAY specify the Block2 size, but not
   the Block1 size.  As explained is carried in Section 1 of [RFC7959]), blockwise
   transfers SHOULD be used
   an recipientEncryptedKeys attribute in Confirmable CoAP messages to avoid a KeyAgreeRecipientInfo.

   [RFC7030] recommends the
   exacerbation use of lost blocks.

   The Size1 response MAY be parsed by the client as a size indication additional encryption of the Block2 resource in returned
   private key.  For the server response context of this specification, clients and
   servers that choose to support server-side key generation MUST
   support unprotected (PKCS#8) private keys (content type 281).
   Symmetric or by asymmetric encryption of the server as a
   request private key (CMS
   EnvelopedData, content type 280) SHOULD be supported for a size estimate by the client.  Similarly, Size2 option
   defined in BLOCK should deployments
   where end-to-end encryption needs to be parsed by provided between the server as client
   and a server.  Such cases could include architectures where an indication of
   the size of entity
   between the resource carried in Block1 options client and by the client
   as a maximum size expected in CA terminates the 4.13 (Request Entity Too Large)
   response to a request.

   Examples of fragmented messages are shown DTLS connection
   (Registrar in Appendix B. Figure 4).

5.8.  Deployment limits

   Although EST-coaps paves the way for the utilization of EST for by
   constrained devices on in constrained networks, some classes of devices
   [RFC7228] will not have enough resources to handle the large payloads
   that come with EST-coaps.  The specification of EST-coaps is intended
   to ensure that EST works for networks of constrained devices that
   choose to limit their communications stack to UDP/CoAP. UDP/DTLS/CoAP.  It is
   up to the network designer to decide which devices execute the EST
   protocol and which do not.

6.  Discovery and URI URIs

   EST-coaps is targeted to for low-resource networks with small packets.
   Saving header space is important and a short EST-coaps URI (see
   Table 2) is URIs are
   specified that is in this document.  These URIs are shorter than the EST URI specified ones in
   [RFC7030].  The individual EST-coaps well-known server URIs differ
   from the EST URI by replacing the scheme https by coaps and by
   specifying shorter resource path names: names are:

   coaps://example.com:<port>/.well-known/est/<short-est>
   coaps://example.com:<port>/.well-known/est/ArbitraryLabel/<short-est>

   The short-est strings are defined in Table 2.  The ArbitraryLabel
   Path-Segment, if used, SHOULD be of the shortest length possible (See sections
   (Sections 3.1 and 3.2.2 of [RFC7030].  Following [RFC7030] discovery
   is not needed when the client is preconfigured with the /.well-known/est /.well-known/
   est server URI and the coaps port 5684.

   The additional EST-coaps server URIs, obtained through discovery of
   the EST root resource(s) as shown below, are of the form:

   coaps://example.com:<port>/<root-resource>/<short-est>
   coaps://example.com:<port>/<root-resource>/ArbitraryLabel/<short-est>

   In the context of CoAP, the presence and location of (path to) the
   management data are discovered by sending a GET request to "/.well-
   known/core" including a resource type (RT) parameter with the value
   "ace.est" [RFC6690].  Upon success, the return payload will contain
   the root resource of the EST resources.  It is up to the
   implementation to choose its root resource; throughout this document
   the example root resource /est is used.

   The optional additional EST-coaps server URIs, obtained through discovery of the EST EST-
   coaps root resource(s) as shown below, are of the form:

   coaps://example.com:<port>/<root-resource>/<short-est>
   coaps://example.com:<port>/<root-resource>/ArbitraryLabel/<short-est>

   Figure 5 in section 3.2.2 of [RFC7030] enumerates the operations and
   corresponding paths which are supported by EST.  Table 2 provides the
   mapping from the EST URI path to the shorter EST-coaps URI path.

                     +------------------+-----------+
                     | EST              | EST-coaps |
                     +------------------+-----------+
                     | /cacerts         | /crts     |
                     | /simpleenroll    | /sen      |
                     | /simplereenroll  | /sren     |
                     | /csrattrs        | /att      |
                     | /serverkeygen    | /skg      |
                     +------------------+-----------+

                Table 2: Table 2: Short EST-coaps URI path

   The

   Clients and servers MUST support the short resource URIs MUST be supported. URIs.  The
   corresponding longer URIs specified in from [RFC7030] MAY be supported.

   When discovering

   In the context of CoAP, the presence and location of (path to) the
   management data are discovered by sending a GET request to "/.well-
   known/core" including a resource type (RT) parameter with the value
   "ace.est" [RFC6690].  Upon success, the return payload will contain
   the root path for resource of the EST resources, the resources.  The server MAY return all
   available resource paths and the used content types.  This is useful
   when multiple content types are specified for supported by the EST-coaps server and
   optional functions are available.  The example below shows the
   discovery of the presence and location of EST-coaps resources.
   Linefeeds are included only for readability.

     REQ: GET /.well-known/core?rt=ace.est*

     RES: 2.05 Content
   </est>; rt="ace.est",
   </est/crts>;rt="ace.est.crts";ct=281,
   </est/sen>;rt="ace.est.sen"ct=281
   </est/sen>;rt="ace.est.sen";ct=281 286,
   </est/sren>;rt="ace.est.sren"ct=281
   </est/sren>;rt="ace.est.sren";ct=281 286,
   </est/att>;rt="ace.est.att"ct=285,
   </est/skg>;rt="ace.est.skg"ct=280
   </est/att>;rt="ace.est.att";ct=285,
   </est/skg>;rt="ace.est.skg";ct=280 286 TBD8 62

   The first line of the discovery response above MUST be returned. included.  The
   five consecutive lines after the first MAY be returned. included.  The return
   of the content-types
   in the last four lines allows the client to choose the most appropriate
   one from multiple content types.

   Port numbers, not returned in the example, are assumed to be the
   default numbers 5683 and 5684 for coap and coaps respectively
   (sections
   (Sections 12.6 and 12.7 of [RFC7252]. [RFC7252]).  Discoverable port numbers MAY
   be returned in the <href> of the payload.

   It is up to the implementation to choose its root resource;
   throughout this document the example root resource /est is used.

7.  DTLS Transport Protocol

   EST-coaps depends on a secure transport mechanism over UDP that can
   secure (confidentiality, authenticity)
   secures the exchanged CoAP messages.  DTLS is one such secure
   protocol.  When "TLS"  Where TLS is referred to used in the context of EST, it is understood
   that in EST-coaps, security is
   provided using EST-coaps uses DTLS instead.  No other changes are necessary
   regarding the secure transport of EST messages (all provisional modes
   etc. are the same as for in TLS).

   CoAP was designed to avoid fragmentation.  DTLS is used to secure
   CoAP messages.  However, fragmentation is still possible at the DTLS
   layer during the DTLS handshake when using ECC ciphersuites.  If
   fragmentation is necessary, "DTLS provides a mechanism for
   fragmenting a handshake message over several records, each of which
   can be transmitted separately, thus avoiding IP fragmentation"
   [RFC6347].

   CoAP and

   The DTLS can provide proof of identity for EST-coaps clients and
   server with simple PKI messages conformant to section 3.1 of

   [RFC5272]. handshake is authenticated by using certificates.  EST-coaps
   supports the certificate types and Trust Anchors (TA) that are
   specified for EST in section Section 3 of [RFC7030].

   Channel-binding

   CoAP and DTLS can provide proof-of-identity for EST-coaps clients and
   servers with simple PKI messages as descrbed in Section 3.1 of
   [RFC5272].  Moreover, channel-binding information for linking proof-of-identity proof-
   of-identity with connection-based proof-of-possession is optional OPTIONAL for
   EST-coaps.  When proof-of-possession is desired, a set of actions are
   required regarding the use of tls-unique, described in section 3.5 in
   [RFC7030].  The tls-unique information translates to consists of the contents of
   the first "Finished" message in the (D)TLS handshake between server
   and client [RFC5929].  The client is then supposed to add this "Finished"
   message as a ChallengePassword in the attributes section of the
   PKCS#10 Request [RFC5967] Info to prove that the client is indeed in
   control of the private key at the time of the TLS (D)TLS session when
   performing a /simpleenroll, for example.
   establishment.  In the case of EST-coaps, the same operations can be
   performed during the DTLS handshake.  For DTLS 1.2, in the event of
   handshake message fragmentation, the Hash of the handshake messages
   used in the MAC calculation of the Finished message

   PRF(master_secret, finished_label, Hash(handshake_messages))
      [0..verify_data_length-1]; MUST be computed
   as if each handshake message had been sent as a single fragment
   [RFC6347].  The Finished message is calculated as:

   PRF(master_secret, finished_label, Hash(handshake_messages))
      [0..verify_data_length-1];

   Similarly, for DTLS 1.3, the Finished message

   HMAC(finished_key,
       Transcript-Hash(Handshake Context,
       Certificate*, CertificateVerify*))

       * Only included if present. MUST be computed as if
   each handshake message had been sent as a single fragment following
   the algorithm described in 4.4.4 of [RFC8446].  The Finished message
   is calculated as:

   HMAC(finished_key,
       Transcript-Hash(Handshake Context,
       Certificate*, CertificateVerify*))

       * Only included if present.

   In a constrained CoAP environment, endpoints can't afford to
   establish a DTLS connection for every EST transaction.
   Authenticating and negotiating DTLS keys requires resources on low-
   end endpoints and consumes valuable bandwidth.  The DTLS connection
   SHOULD remain open for persistent sequential EST connections. transactions.  For example, an
   EST cacerts request that is followed by a simpleenroll request can
   use the same authenticated DTLS connection.  However, some additional
   security considerations apply regarding the use of the Implicit and
   Explicit TA database (Section 11.1)

   Given that after a successful enrollment, it is more likely that a
   new EST transaction will take place after a significant amount of
   time, the DTLS connections SHOULD only be kept alive for EST messages
   that are relatively close to each other.  In some cases, such as cases like NAT
   rebinding, keeping the state of a connection is not possible when
   devices sleep for extended periods of time.  In such occasions,
   [I-D.rescorla-tls-dtls-connection-id] negotiates a connection ID that
   can eliminate the need for new handshake and its additional cost.

8.  HTTPS-CoAPS Registrar

   In real-world deployments, the EST server will not always reside
   within the CoAP boundary.  The EST-server EST server can exist outside the
   constrained network in a non-constrained
   constrained network that supports TLS/
   HTTP. TLS/HTTP.  In such environments
   EST-coaps is used by the client within the CoAP boundary and TLS is
   used to transport the EST messages outside the CoAP boundary.  A
   Registrar at the edge is required to operate between the CoAP
   environment and the external HTTP network.
   The network as shown in Figure 4.

                                        Constrained Network
   .------.                         .----------------------------.
   |  CA  |                         |.--------------------------.|
   '------'                         ||                          ||
      |                             ||                          ||
   .------.  HTTP   .-----------------.   CoAPS  .-----------.  ||
   | EST coaps-to-HTTPS  |<------->|EST-coaps-to-HTTPS|<------->| EST Client|  ||
   |Server|over TLS |   Registrar     |          '-----------'  ||
   '------'         '-----------------'                         ||
                                    ||                          ||
                                    |'--------------------------'|
                                    '----------------------------'

       Figure 4: EST-coaps-to-HTTPS Registrar at the CoAP boundary.

   The EST-coaps-to-HTTPS Registrar MUST terminate EST-coaps and
   authenticate the client downstream
   and initiate EST connections over TLS upstream.  The Registrar SHOULD MUST
   authenticate and OPTIONALLY authorize the client downstream clients and it should MUST be
   authenticated by the EST server or CA upstream. CA.  The Registration
   Authority (re-)creates the secure connection from DTLS to TLS and
   vice versa.  A trust relationship SHOULD be pre-established
   between the Registrar and the EST servers to server SHOULD be able pre-established
   for the Registrar to proxy these connections on behalf of various
   clients.

   When enforcing Proof-of-Possession (POP) linking, the (D)TLS tls-
   unique DTLS tls-unique
   value of the (D)TLS session needs to be used to prove that the
   private key corresponding to the public key is in the possession of
   and was used to establish the connection by an end-entity or client.
   To do that the CSR the client is using needs to include information
   from the DTLS connection the client establishes with the server.  In
   EST, that information is the (D)TLS tls-unique value of the (D)TLS
   session.  In the presence of ESTcoaps-to-HTTPS Registrar, the EST-
   coaps client MUST be authenticated and authorized by the Registrar
   and the Registrar MUST be authenticated as an EST Registrar client to
   the EST server.  Thus the explained
   in Section 7).  The POP linking information is lost between the
   EST-coaps EST-
   coaps client and the EST server. server when a Registrar is present.  The EST
   server becomes aware of the presence of an EST a Registrar from its TLS
   client certificate that includes id-kp-cmcRA [RFC6402] extended key
   usage extension. extension (EKU).  As explained in Section 3.7 of [RFC7030], the
   EST server SHOULD apply an authorization policy consistent with a
   Registrar client.  For example, it could be configured to accept POP
   linking information that does not match the current TLS session
   because the authenticated EST client Registrar has verified this
   information when acting as an EST server.

   For some use cases, clients that leverage server-side key generation
   might prefer for the enrolled keys to be generated by the Registrar
   if the CA does not support server-side key generation.  In these
   cases the Registrar MUST support the random number generation using
   proper entropy and entropy.  Such Registrar is responsible for generating a new
   CSR signed by
   a new key which will be returned to the client along with the
   certificate from the CA.

   One possible use-case, shown in one figure below, is expected to be
   deployed in practice:

                                        Constrained Network
   .------.                         .----------------------------.
   |  CA  |                         |.--------------------------.|
   '------'                         ||                          ||
      |                             ||                          ||
   .------.  HTTP   .-----------------.  CoAPS   .-----------.  ||
   | EST  |<------->|ESTcoaps-to-HTTPS|<-------->| EST Client|  ||
   |Server|over TLS |   Registrar     |          '-----------'  ||
   '------'         '-----------------'                         ||
                                    ||                          ||
                                    |'--------------------------'|
                                    '----------------------------'

             ESTcoaps-to-HTTPS Registrar at signed by a new key which will be returned to the CoAP boundary. client along
   with the certificate from the CA.

   Table 2 contains the URI mapping mappings between the EST-coaps and EST that the
   Registrar SHOULD MUST adhere to.  Section 7 5.4 of [RFC8075] this specification and
   Section 5.4 7 of [RFC8075] define the mapping mappings between EST-coaps and HTTP
   response codes, that
   determines determine how the Registrar translates MUST translate CoAP
   response codes from/to HTTP status codes.  The mapping from CoAP
   Content-Type to media type HTTP Media-Type is defined in Section 10.  The 10.1.
   Additionally, a conversion from CBOR major type 2 to
   base64 Base64 encoding needs to
   MUST take place at the Registrar when server-side key generation is
   supported.  If CMS end-to-end encryption is employed for the private
   key, the encrypted CMS EnvelopedData blob should be done included in
   binary in CBOR type 2 downstream to the Registrar.  Conversion is
   possible because a TLS link exists between EST-coaps-to-HTTP
   Registrar and EST server and a corresponding DTLS link exists between
   EST-coaps-to-HTTP Registrar and EST client.

   Due to fragmentation of large messages into blocks, an EST-coaps-to-
   HTTP Registrar MUST reassemble the BLOCKs before translating the
   binary content to Base-64, Base64, and consecutively relay the message
   upstream.

   For the discovery of the EST server by the EST client in the coap CoAP
   environment, the EST-coaps-to-HTTP Registrar MUST announce itself
   according to the rules of in Section 6.  The available actions of the
   Registrars MUST be announced with as many resource paths.  The
   discovery of EST server in the http environment follow the rules
   specified in [RFC7030]. paths necessary.
   .

9.  Parameters

   This section addresses transmission parameters described in sections
   4.7 and 4.8 of the CoAP document [RFC7252].

            ACK_TIMEOUT       | 2 seconds     |
            ACK_RANDOM_FACTOR | 1.5           |
            MAX_RETRANSMIT    | 4             |
            NSTART            | 1             |
            DEFAULT_LEISURE   | 5 seconds     |
            PROBING_RATE      | 1 byte/second |

                  Figure 4: EST-COAP protocol parameters

   EST does not impose any unique parameters that affect the CoAP
   parameters in Table 2 and 3 in But the CoAP draft but the ones in CoAP could be affecting EST.  For example,
   the processing delay of CAs could be less then 2s, but in this case they
   the EST-coaps server should send be sending a CoAP ACK every 2s while
   processing.

   The main recommendation, based on experiments using Nexus Certificate
   Manager with Californium for CoAP support, communicating with a
   ContikiOS and tinyDTLS based client, from RISE SICS, experiments, is to start with follow the
   default CoAP configuration parameters.  However, depending on the
   implementation scenario, resending retransmissions and timeouts can also occur
   on other networking layers, governed by other configuration
   parameters.

   Some further comments about some specific parameters, mainly from
   Table 2 in [RFC7252]:

   o  DEFAULT_LEISURE: This setting is only relevant in multicast
      scenarios, outside the scope of the EST-coaps draft.

   o  NSTART: Limit the number of simultaneous outstanding interactions
      that a client maintains to a given server.  The default  EST-coaps clients
      SHOULD use 1, which is one,
      hence the default.  A EST-coaps client is not
      expected to interact with more than one servers at the risk same time.

   o  DEFAULT_LEISURE: This setting is only relevant in multicast
      scenarios, outside the scope of congestion or out-of-order messages already
      limited. EST-coaps.

   o  PROBING_RATE: A parameter which specifies the rate of re-sending
      non-confirmable messages.  The EST messages are defined to be sent
      as CoAP confirmable messages, hence the PROBING_RATE this setting is not
      applicable.

   Finally, the Table 3 parameters in [RFC7252] are mainly derived from the more
   basic Table 2 parameters.  If the CoAP implementation allows setting
   them directly, they might need to be updated if the
   Table 2.  Directly changing parameters on one table 2 would affect
   parameters are changed. on the other.

10.  IANA Considerations

10.1.  Content-Format Registry

   Additions to the sub-registry "CoAP Content-Formats", within the
   "CoRE Parameters" registry [COREparams] are specified in Table 3.
   These have been registered temporarily in the Expert Review range
   (0-255).

   +--------------------------+--------+-----+-------------------------+

   +-------------------------------+-----+-----------------------------+
   | HTTP Media-Type               | Encodi |  ID | Reference                   |
   |                          | ng     |     |                         |
   +--------------------------+--------+-----+-------------------------+
   +-------------------------------+-----+-----------------------------+
   | application/pkcs7-mime;       | -      | 280 | [I-D.ietf-lamps-rfc5751 [I-D.ietf-lamps-rfc5751-bis |
   | smime-type=server- smime-type=server-generated-  |     |     | -bis] ] [RFC7030]                 |
   | generated-key            | key                           |     |                             |
   | application/pkcs7-mime;       | -      | 281 | [I-D.ietf-lamps-rfc5751 [I-D.ietf-lamps-rfc5751-bis |
   | smime-type=certs-only         |     |     | -bis] ]                           |
   | application/pkcs7-mime;       | -      | 282 | [I-D.ietf-lamps-rfc5751 [I-D.ietf-lamps-rfc5751-bis |
   | smime-type=CMC-request        |     |     | -bis] ] [RFC5273]                 |
   | application/pkcs7-mime;       | -      | 283 | [I-D.ietf-lamps-rfc5751 [I-D.ietf-lamps-rfc5751-bis |
   | smime-type=CMC-response       |     |     | -bis] ] [RFC5273]                 |
   | application/pkcs8             | -      | 284 | [I-D.ietf-lamps-rfc5751 [I-D.ietf-lamps-rfc5751-bis |
   |                               |     |     | -bis] ] [RFC5958]                 |
   | application/csrattrs          | -      | 285 | [RFC7030] [RFC7231]         |
   | application/pkcs10            | -      | 286 | [I-D.ietf-lamps-rfc5751 [I-D.ietf-lamps-rfc5751-bis |
   |                               |     |     | -bis] ] [RFC5967]                 |
   +--------------------------+--------+-----+-------------------------+
   +-------------------------------+-----+-----------------------------+

                     Table 3: New CoAP Content-Formats

10.2.  Resource Type registry

   This memo registers a new Resource Type (rt=) Link Target Attributes
   in the "Resource Type (rt=) Link Target Attribute Values" subregistry
   under the "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Parameters"
   registry.

   o  rt="ace.est".  This EST resource is used to query and return the
      supported EST resources of a CoAP server.

   o  rt="ace.est.crts".  This resource depicts the support of EST get
      cacerts.

   o  rt="ace.est.sen".  This resource depicts the support of EST simple
      enroll.

   o  rt="ace.est.sren".  This resource depicts the support of EST
      simple reenroll.

   o  rt="ace.est.att".  This resource depicts the support of EST CSR
      attributes.

   o  rt="ace.est.skg".  This resource depicts the support of EST
      server-side key generation.

11.  Security Considerations

11.1.  EST server considerations

   The security considerations of Section 6 of [RFC7030] are only
   partially valid for the purposes of this document.  As HTTP Basic
   Authentication is not supported, the considerations expressed for
   using passwords do not apply.

   Given that the client has only limited resources and may not be able
   to generate sufficiently random keys to encrypt its identity, it is
   possible that the client uses server generated private/public keys to
   encrypt its certificate. keys.
   The transport of these keys is inherently risky.  A full probability analysis MUST  Analysis SHOULD be
   done to establish whether server side key generation enhances or
   decreases the probability of identity stealing.

   When a client uses the Implicit TA database for certificate
   validation, the client cannot verify that the implicit database can
   act as an RA.  It is RECOMMENDED that such clients include "Linking
   Identity and POP Information" Section 7 in requests (to prevent such
   requests from being forwarded to a real EST server by a man in the
   middle).

   It is also RECOMMENDED that the Implicit Trust Anchor database used
   for EST server authentication be carefully managed to reduce the
   chance of a third-party CA with poor certification practices from
   being trusted.  Disabling the Implicit Trust Anchor database after
   successfully receiving the Distribution of CA certificates response
   (Section 4.1.3 of [RFC7030]) limits any risk to the first DTLS
   exchange.  Alternatively, in a persistent DTLS connection where a
   /sen request follows a /crt in the same connection, a client MAY
   choose to keep the connection already authenticated by the Implicit
   TA open for efficiency reasons (Section 7) by assuming that the
   identity of the server is to be trusted.  In that case then the
   Explicit TA MUST be used starting from the next DTLS connection.

   In cases where the IDevID used to authenticate the client is expired
   the server MAY still authenticate the client because IDevIDs are
   expected to live as long as the device itself (Section 4).  In such
   occasions, checking the certificate revocation status or authorizing
   the client using another method is important for the server to ensure
   that the client is to be trusted.

   In accordance with [RFC7030], TLS cipher suites that include
   "_EXPORT_" and "_DES_" in their names MUST NOT be used.  More
   information about recommendations of TLS and DTLS are included in
   [RFC7525].

   As described in CMC, Section 6.7 of [RFC5272], "For keys that can be
   used as signature keys, signing the certification request with the
   private key serves as a POP on that key pair".  The inclusion of tls-
   unique in the certification certificate request links the proof-of-possession to
   the TLS proof-of-identity.  This implies but does not prove that only
   the authenticated client currently has access to the private key.

   Regarding the Certificate Signing Request (CSR), an adversary could
   exclude attributes that a server may want, include attributes that a
   server may not want, and render meaningless other attributes that a
   server may want.  The CA is expected to be able to enforce policies
   to recover from improper CSR requests.

   Interpreters of ASN.1 structures should be aware of the use of
   invalid ASN.1 length fields and should take appropriate measures to
   guard against buffer overflows, stack overruns in particular, and
   malicious content in general.

11.2.  HTTPS-CoAPS Registrar considerations

   The Registrar proposed in Section 8 must be deployed with care, and
   only when the recommended connections are impossible.  When POP
   linking is used the Registrar terminating the TLS connection
   establishes a new one with the upstream CA.  Thus, it is impossible
   for POP linking to be enforced end-to-end for the EST transaction.
   The EST server could be configured to accept POP linking information
   that does not match the current TLS session because the authenticated
   EST Registrar client has verified this information when acting as an
   EST server.

   The introduction of an EST-coaps-to-HTTP Registrar assumes the client
   can trust the registrar using its implicit or explicit TA database.
   It also assumes the Registrar has a trust relationship with the
   upstream EST server in order to act on behalf of the clients. clients.  When a
   client uses the Implicit TA database for certificate validation, he
   SHOULD confirm if the server is acting as an RA by the presence of
   the id-kp-cmcRA [RFC6402] EKU in the server certificate.  If the
   server certificate does not include the EKU, it is RECOMMENDED that
   the client includes "Linking Identity and POP Information"
   (Section 7) in requests.

   In a server-side key generation case, if no end-to-end encryption is
   used, the Registrar may be able see the private key as it acts as a
   man-in-the-middle.  Thus, the clients client puts its trust on the Registrar
   not exposing the private key.

   Clients that leverage server-side key generation without end-to-end
   encryption of the private key (Section 5.7 have no knowledge if the
   Registrar will be generating the keys private key and enrolling the
   certificates with the CA or if the CA will be responsible for
   generating the keys, key.  In such cases, the existence of a Registrar
   requires the client to put its trust on the registrar doing the right
   thing if it is generating they the private keys. key.

12.  Contributors

   Martin Furuhed contributed to the EST-coaps specification by
   providing feedback based on the Nexus EST over CoAPs server
   implementation that started in 2015.  Sandeep Kumar kick-started this
   specification and was instrumental in drawing attention to the
   importance of the subject.

13.  Acknowledgements

   The authors are very grateful to Klaus Hartke for his detailed
   explanations on the use of Block with DTLS and his support for the
   content-format specification.  The authors would like to thank Esko
   Dijk and Michael Verschoor for the valuable discussions that helped
   in shaping the solution.  They would also like to thank Peter
   Panburana for his feedback on technical details of the solution.
   Constructive comments were received from Benjamin Kaduk, Eliot Lear,
   Jim Schaad, Hannes Tschofenig, Julien Vermillard, and John Manuel.

13. Manuel, Oliver
   Pfaff and Pete Beal.

   Interop tests were done by Oliver Pfaff, Thomas Werner, Oskar
   Camezind, Bjorn Elmers and Joel Hoglund.

   Robert Moskowitz provided code to create the examples.

14.  References

13.1.

14.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-core-multipart-ct]
              Fossati, T., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "Multipart
              Content-Format for CoAP", draft-ietf-core-multipart-ct-02
              (work in progress), August 2018.

   [I-D.ietf-lamps-rfc5751-bis]
              Schaad, J., Ramsdell, B.,

   [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13]
              Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and S. Turner, "Secure/
              Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) N. Modadugu, "The
              Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version 4.0
              Message Specification", draft-ietf-lamps-rfc5751-bis-12
              1.3", draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-30 (work in progress), September
              November 2018.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC5272]  Schaad, J. and M. Myers, "Certificate Management over CMS
              (CMC)", RFC 5272, DOI 10.17487/RFC5272, June 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5272>.

   [RFC5967]  Turner, S., "The application/pkcs10 Media Type", RFC 5967,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5967, August 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5967>.

   [RFC6347]  Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
              Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347,
              January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>.

   [RFC6690]  Shelby, Z., "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Link
              Format", RFC 6690, DOI 10.17487/RFC6690, August 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6690>.

   [RFC7030]  Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed.,
              "Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7030>.

   [RFC7049]  Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
              Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049,
              October 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7049>.

   [RFC7252]  Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
              Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252>.

   [RFC7959]  Bormann, C. and Z. Shelby, Ed., "Block-Wise Transfers in
              the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7959,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7959, August 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7959>.

   [RFC8075]  Castellani, A., Loreto, S., Rahman, A., Fossati, T., and
              E. Dijk, "Guidelines for Mapping Implementations: HTTP to
              the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 8075,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8075, February 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8075>.

   [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3",

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 8446,
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.

13.2. 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

14.2.  Informative References

   [COREparams]
              IANA, "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE)
              Parameters", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/core-
              parameters/core-parameters.xhtml>.

   [I-D.ietf-lamps-rfc5751-bis]
              Schaad, J., Ramsdell, B., and S. Turner, "Secure/
              Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 4.0
              Message Specification", draft-ietf-lamps-rfc5751-bis-12
              (work in progress), September 2018.

   [I-D.moskowitz-ecdsa-pki]
              Moskowitz, R., Birkholz, H., Xia, L., and M. Richardson,
              "Guide for building an ECC pki", draft-moskowitz-ecdsa-
              pki-04 (work in progress), September 2018.

   [I-D.rescorla-tls-dtls-connection-id]
              Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., Fossati, T., and T. Gondrom,
              "The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Connection
              Identifier", draft-rescorla-tls-dtls-connection-id-02
              (work in progress), November 2017.

   [RFC0791]  Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC0791, September 1981,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc791>.

   [ieee802.15.4]
              Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "IEEE
              Standard 802.15.4-2006", 2006.

   [ieee802.1ar]
              Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "IEEE
              802.1AR Secure Device Identifier", December 2009.

   [PsQs]     Nadia Heninger, Zakir Durumeric, Eric Wustrow, J. Alex
              Halderman, "Mining Your Ps and Qs: Detection of Widespread
              Weak Keys in Network Devices", USENIX Security Symposium
              2012 ISBN 978-931971-95-9, August 2012.

   [RFC4919]  Kushalnagar, N., Montenegro, G., and C. Schumacher, "IPv6
              over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs):
              Overview, Assumptions, Problem Statement, and Goals",
              RFC 4919, DOI 10.17487/RFC4919, August 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4919>.

   [RFC5272]  Schaad, J. and M. Myers, "Certificate Management over CMS
              (CMC)", RFC 5272, DOI 10.17487/RFC5272, June 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5272>.

   [RFC5273]  Schaad, J. and M. Myers, "Certificate Management over CMS
              (CMC): Transport Protocols", RFC 5273,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5273, June 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5273>.

   [RFC5705]  Rescorla, E., "Keying Material Exporters for Transport
              Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5705, DOI 10.17487/RFC5705,
              March 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5705>.

   [RFC5929]  Altman, J., Williams, N., and L. Zhu, "Channel Bindings
              for TLS", RFC 5929, DOI 10.17487/RFC5929, July 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5929>.

   [RFC5958]  Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", RFC 5958,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5958, August 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5958>.

   [RFC6090]  McGrew, D., Igoe, K., and M. Salter, "Fundamental Elliptic
              Curve Cryptography Algorithms", RFC 6090,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6090, February 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6090>.

   [RFC6402]  Schaad, J., "Certificate Management over CMS (CMC)
              Updates", RFC 6402, DOI 10.17487/RFC6402, November 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6402>.

   [RFC7228]  Bormann, C., Ersue, M., and A. Keranen, "Terminology for
              Constrained-Node Networks", RFC 7228,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7228, May 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7228>.

   [RFC7230]  Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
              Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
              RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>.

   [RFC7231]  Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
              Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>.

   [RFC7251]  McGrew, D., Bailey, D., Campagna, M., and R. Dugal, "AES-
              CCM Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for
              TLS", RFC 7251, DOI 10.17487/RFC7251, June 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7251>.

   [RFC7525]  Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
              "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
              Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
              (DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May
              2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>.

   [RFC7925]  Tschofenig, H., Ed. and T. Fossati, "Transport Layer
              Security (TLS) / Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)
              Profiles for the Internet of Things", RFC 7925,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7925, July 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7925>.

   [RFC8422]  Nir, Y., Josefsson, S., and M. Pegourie-Gonnard, "Elliptic
              Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer
              Security (TLS) Versions 1.2 and Earlier", RFC 8422, 8422,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8422, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8422>.

   [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8422, 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8422>.
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.

   [RSAorig]  Petr Svenda, Matus Nemec, Peter Sekan, Rudolf Kvasnovsky,
              David Formanek, David Komarek, Vashek Matyas, "The
              Million-Key Question - Investigating the Origins of RSA
              Public Keys", USENIX Security Symposium 2016 ISBN
              978-1-931971-32-4, August 2016.

Appendix A.  EST messages to EST-coaps

   This section takes all shows similar examples from to the ones presented in
   Appendix A of [RFC7030], changes [RFC7030].  The payloads in the payload from Base64 to examples are the hex
   encoded DER binary, generated with 'xxd -p', of the PKI certificates
   created following [I-D.moskowitz-ecdsa-pki].  The payloads are shown
   unencrypted.  In practice the message content would be binary DER
   formatted and replaces transferred over an encrypted DTLS tunnel.  The
   hexadecimal representations in the http headers by
   their CoAP equivalents. examples below would NOT be
   transported in hex, but in binary DER.  Hex is used for visualization
   purposes because a binary representation cannot be rendered well in
   text.

   The message content breakdown is presented in Appendix C.

   The corresponding CoAP headers are only shown in Appendix A.1.
   Creating CoAP headers are is assumed to be generally known.

   Binary payload is a CBOR major type 2 (byte array), that is shown
   with a base16 (hexadecimal) CBOR diagnostic notation.

   [EDNOTE: The payloads of the examples need to be re-generated with
   appropriate tools and example certificates.]

A.1.  cacerts understood.

   These examples assume that the resource discovery, returned a short
   URL
   base path of "/est".

A.1.  cacerts

   In EST-coaps, a coaps cacerts IPv4 message can be:

   GET coaps://192.0.2.1:8085/est/crts

   The corresponding CoAP header fields are shown below.  The use of
   block and DTLS are worked out in Appendix B.

     Ver = 1
     T = 0 (CON)
     Code = 0x01 (0.01 is GET)
     Token = 0x9a (client generated)
     Options
      Option1 (Uri-Host)
      Option           [optional]
        Option Delta = 0x3  (option nr = 3)  (option# 3 Uri-Host)
        Option Length = 0x9
        Option Value = 192.0.2.1
      Option2 (Uri-Port)
      Option           [optional]
        Option Delta = 0x4  (option nr = 3+4=7)  (option# 3+4=7 Uri-Port)
        Option Length = 0x4
        Option Value = 8085
      Option3 (Uri-Path)
      Option
        Option Delta = 0x4   (option nr = 7+4= 11)   (option# 7+4=11 Uri-Path)
        Option Length = 0x5
        Option Value = "est"
      Option4 (Uri-Path)
      Option
        Option Delta = 0x0   (option nr = 11+0= 11)   (option# 11+0=11 Uri-Path)
        Option Length = 0x6
        Option Value = "crts"
      Option5 (Max-Age)
      Option
        Option Delta = 0x3   (option nr = 11+3= 14)   (option# 11+3=14 Max-Age)
        Option Length = 0x1
        Option Value = 0x1    (1 minute)
     Payload = [Empty]

   A 2.05 Content response with a cert in EST-coaps will then be: be

   2.05 Content (Content-Format: 281)
      {payload}
      {payload with certificate in binary DER format}

   with CoAP fields
     Ver = 1
     T = 2 (ACK)
     Code = 0x45 (2.05 Content)
     Token = 0x9a   (copied from request by server)
     Options
       Option1 (Content-Format)
       Option
         Option Delta = 0xC  (option nr =12)  (option# 12 Content-Format)
         Option Length = 0x2
         Option Value = 281 (defined

     [ The hexadecimal representation below would NOT be transported
     in this document) hex, but in DER. Hex is used because a binary representation
     cannot be rendered well in text. ]

     Payload =
   h'30233906092a6206734107028c2a3023260201013100300b06092a6206734107018
   c0c3020bb302063c20102020900a61e75193b7acc0d06092a620673410105050030
   1b31193017060355040313106573744578616d706c654341204f774f301e170d313
   3303530393033353333315a170d3134303530393033353333315a301b3119301706
   0355040313106573744578616d706c654341204f774f302062300d06092a6206734
   10101050003204f0030204a022041003a923a2968bae4aae136ca4e2512c5200680
   358482ac39d6f640e4574e654ea35f48b1e054c5da3372872f7a1e429f4edf39584
   32efb2106591d3eb783c1034709f251fc86566bda2d541c792389eac4ec9e181f4b
   9f596e5ef2679cc321542b11337f90a44df3c85f1516561fa968a1914f265bc0b82
   76ebe3106a790d97d34c8c37c74fe1c30b396424664ac426284a9f6022e02693843
   6880adfcd95c98ca1dfc2e6d75319b85d0458de28a9d13fb16d620fff7541f6a25d
   7daf004355020301000130b040300f0603551d130101f10530030101fc1d0603551
   d0e04160414084d321ca0135e77217a486b686b334b00e0603551d0f0101f104030
   20106300d06092a62067341010505000320410023703b965746a0c2c978666d787a
   94f89b495a11f0d369b28936ec2475c0f0855c8e83f823f2b871a1d92282f323c45
   904ba008579216cf5223b8b1bc425a0677262047f7700240631c17f3035d1c3780b
   2385241cba1f4a6e98e6be6820306b3a786de5a557795d1893822347b5f825d34a7
   ad2876f8feba4d525b31066f6505796f71530003431a3e6bbfe788b4565029a7e20
   a51107677552586152d051e8eebf383e92288983421d5c5652a4870c3af74b9bdbe
   d6b462e2263d30f6d3020c330206bc20102020101300d06092a6206734101050500
   301b31193017060355040313106573744578616d706c654341204f774f301e170d3
   133303530393033353333325a170d3134303530393033353333325a301b31193017
   060355040313106573744578616d706c654341204e774f302062300d06092a62067
   3410101050003204f0030204a02204100ef6b677a3247c1fc03d2b9baf113e5e7e1
   1f49e0421120e6b8384160f2bf02630ef544d5fd0d5623b35713c79a7229283a790
   8751a634aa420a3e2a4b1f10519d046f02f5a5dd6d760c2a842356e067b7bd94338
   d1faa3b3ddd4813060a207b0a097067007e45b052b60fdbae4656e11562c4f5abb7
   b0cf87a79d221f1127313c53371ce1245d63db45a1203a23340ba08042c768d03b8
   076a028d3a51d87d2ef107bbd6f2305ce5e67668724002fb726df9c14476c37de0f
   55033f192a5ad21f9a2a71c20301000134b050300e0603551d0f0101f104030204c
   1d0603551d0e04160414112966e304761732fbfe6a2c823c301f0603551d2304183
   0165084d321ca0135e77217a486b686b334b00d06092a6206734101050500032041
   00b382ba3355a50e287bae15758b3beff63d34d3e357b90031495d018868e49589b
   9faf46a4ad49b1d35b06ef380106677440934663c2cc111c183655f4dc41c0b3401
   123d35387389db91f1e1b4131b16c291d35730b3f9b33c7475124851555fe5fc647
   e8fd029605367c7e01281bf6617110021b0d10847dce0e9f0ca6c764b6334784055
   172c3983d1e3a3a82301a54fcc9b0670c543a1c747164619101ff23b240b2a26394
   c1f7d38d0e2f4747928ece5c34627a075a8b3122011e9d9158055c28f020c330206
   bc20102020102300d06092a6206734101050500301b311930170603550403131065
   73744578616d706c654341204e774e301e170d3133303530393033353333325a170
   d3134303530393033353333325a301b31193017060355040313106573744578616d
   706c654341204f774e302062300d06092a620673410101050003204f0030204a022
   041003a923a2968bae4aae136ca4e2512c5200680358482ac39d6f640e4574e654e
   a35f48b1e054c5da3372872f7a1e429f4edf3958432efb2106591d3eb783c103470
   9f251fc86566bda2d541c792389eac4ec9e181f4b9f596e5ef2679cc321542b1133
   7f90a44df3c85f1516561fa968a1914f265bc0b8276ebe3106a790d97d34c8c37c7
   4fe1c30b396424664ac426284a9f6022e026938436880adfcd95c98ca1dfc2e6d75
   319b85d0458de28a9d13fb16d620fff7541f6a25d7daf004355020301000134b050
   300e0603551d0f0101f104030204c1d0603551d0e04160414084d321ca0135e7721
   7a486b686b334b01f0603551d230418301653112966e304761732fbfe6a2c823c30
   0d06092a6206734101050500032041002e106933a443070acf5594a3a584d08af7e
   06c295059370a06639eff9bd418d13bc25a298223164a6cf1856b11a81617282e4a
   410d82ef086839c6e235690322763065455351e4c596acc7c016b225dec094706c2
   a10608f403b10821984c7c152343b18a768c2ad30238dc45dd653ee6092b0d5cd4c
   2f7d236043269357f76d13f95fb5f00d0e19263c6833948e1ba612ce8197af650e2
   5d882c12f4b6b9b67252c608ef064aca3f9bc867d71172349d510bb7651cd438837
   73d927deb41c4673020bb302063c201020209009b9dda3324700d06092a62067341
   01050500301b31193017060355040313106573744578616d706c654341204e774e3
   01e170d3133303530393033353333325a170d3134303530393033353333325a301b
   31193017060355040313106573744578616d706c654341204e774e302062300d060
   92a620673410101050003204f0030204a02204100ef6b677a3247c1fc03d2b9baf1
   13e5e7e11f49e0421120e6b8384160f2bf02630ef544d5fd0d5623b35713c79a722
   9283a7908751a634aa420a3e2a4b1f10519d046f02f5a5dd6d760c2a842356e067b
   7bd94338d1faa3b3ddd4813060a207b0a097067007e45b052b60fdbae4656e11562
   c4f5abb7b0cf87a79d221f1127313c53371ce1245d63db45a1203a23340ba08042c
   768d03b8076a028d3a51d87d2ef107bbd6f2305ce5e67668724002fb726df9c1447
   6c37de0f55033f192a5ad21f9a2a71c20301000130b040300f0603551d130101f10
   530030101fc1d0603551d0e04160414112966e304761732fbfe6a2c823c300e0603
   551d0f0101f10403020106300d06092a620673410105050003204100423f06d4b76
   0f4b42744a279035571696f272a0060f1325a40898509601ad14004f652db6312a1
   475c4d7cd50f4b269035585d7856c5337765a66b38462d5bdaa7778aab24bbe2815
   e37722cd10e7166c50e75ab75a1271324460211991e7445a2960f47351a1a629253
   34119794b90e320bc730d6c1bee496e7ac125ce9a1eca595a3a4c54a865e6b623c9
   247bfd0a7c19b56077392555c955e233642bec643ae37c166c5e221d797aea3748f
   0391c8d692a5cf9bb71f6d0e37984d6fa673a30d0c006343116f58403100'
   3082027b06092a864886f70d010702a082026c308202680201013100300b
   06092a864886f70d010701a082024e3082024a308201f0a0030201020209
   009189bcdf9c99244b300a06082a8648ce3d0403023067310b3009060355
   040613025553310b300906035504080c024341310b300906035504070c02
   4c4131143012060355040a0c0b4578616d706c6520496e63311630140603
   55040b0c0d63657274696669636174696f6e3110300e06035504030c0752
   6f6f74204341301e170d3139303130373130343034315a170d3339303130
   323130343034315a3067310b3009060355040613025553310b3009060355
   04080c024341310b300906035504070c024c4131143012060355040a0c0b
   4578616d706c6520496e6331163014060355040b0c0d6365727469666963
   6174696f6e3110300e06035504030c07526f6f742043413059301306072a
   8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d03010703420004814994082b6e8185f3df
   53f5e0bee698973335200023ddf78cd17a443ffd8ddd40908769c55652ac
   2ccb75c4a50a7c7ddb7c22dae6c85cca538209fdbbf104c9a38184308181
   301d0603551d0e041604142495e816ef6ffcaaf356ce4adffe33cf492abb
   a8301f0603551d230418301680142495e816ef6ffcaaf356ce4adffe33cf
   492abba8300f0603551d130101ff040530030101ff300e0603551d0f0101
   ff040403020106301e0603551d1104173015811363657274696679406578
   616d706c652e636f6d300a06082a8648ce3d0403020348003045022100da
   e37c96f154c32ec0b4af52d46f3b7ecc9687ddf267bcec368f7b7f135327
   2f022047a28ae5c7306163b3c3834bab3c103f743070594c089aaa0ac870
   cd13b902caa1003100

   The hexadecimal dump breakdown of the CBOR payload looks like:

   59 09CD                                 # bytes(2509)
      30233906092A6206734107028C2A3023260201013100300B06092A62067341070
   18C0C3020BB302063C20102020900A61E75193B7ACC0D06092A62067341010505
   00301B31193017060355040313106573744578616D706C654341204F774F301E1
   70D3133303530393033353333315A170D3134303530393033353333315A301B31
   193017060355040313106573744578616D706C654341204F774F302062300D060
   92A620673410101050003204F0030204A022041003A923A2968BAE4AAE136CA4E
   2512C5200680358482AC39D6F640E4574E654EA35F48B1E054C5DA3372872F7A1
   E429F4EDF3958432EFB2106591D3EB783C1034709F251FC86566BDA2D541C7923
   89EAC4EC9E181F4B9F596E5EF2679CC321542B11337F90A44DF3C85F1516561FA
   968A1914F265BC0B8276EBE3106A790D97D34C8C37C74FE1C30B396424664AC42
   6284A9F6022E026938436880ADFCD95C98CA1DFC2E6D75319B85D0458DE28A9D1
   3FB16D620FFF7541F6A25D7DAF004355020301000130B040300F0603551D13010
   1F10530030101FC1D0603551D0E04160414084D321CA0135E77217A486B686B33
   4B00E0603551D0F0101F10403020106300D06092A620673410105050003204100
   23703B965746A0C2C978666D787A94F89B495A11F0D369B28936EC2475C0F0855
   C8E83F823F2B871A1D92282F323C45904BA008579216CF5223B8B1BC425A06772
   62047F7700240631C17F3035D1C3780B2385241CBA1F4A6E98E6BE6820306B3A7
   86DE5A557795D1893822347B5F825D34A7AD2876F8FEBA4D525B31066F6505796
   F71530003431A3E6BBFE788B4565029A7E20A51107677552586152D051E8EEBF3
   83E92288983421D5C5652A4870C3AF74B9BDBED6B462E2263D30F6D3020C33020
   6BC20102020101300D06092A6206734101050500301B311930170603550403131
   06573744578616D706C654341204F774F301E170D313330353039303335333332
   5A170D3134303530393033353333325A301B31193017060355040313106573744
   578616D706C654341204E774F302062300D06092A620673410101050003204F00
   30204A02204100EF6B677A3247C1FC03D2B9BAF113E5E7E11F49E0421120E6B83
   84160F2BF02630EF544D5FD0D5623B35713C79A7229283A7908751A634AA420A3
   E2A4B1F10519D046F02F5A5DD6D760C2A842356E067B7BD94338D1FAA3B3DDD48
   13060A207B0A097067007E45B052B60FDBAE4656E11562C4F5ABB7B0CF87A79D2
   21F1127313C53371CE1245D63DB45A1203A23340BA08042C768D03B8076A028D3
   A51D87D2EF107BBD6F2305CE5E67668724002FB726DF9C14476C37DE0F55033F1
   92A5AD21F9A2A71C20301000134B050300E0603551D0F0101F104030204C1D060
   3551D0E04160414112966E304761732FBFE6A2C823C301F0603551D2304183016
   5084D321CA0135E77217A486B686B334B00D06092A62067341010505000320410
   0B382BA3355A50E287BAE15758B3BEFF63D34D3E357B90031495D018868E49589
   B9FAF46A4AD49B1D35B06EF380106677440934663C2CC111C183655F4DC41C0B3
   401123D35387389DB91F1E1B4131B16C291D35730B3F9B33C7475124851555FE5
   FC647E8FD029605367C7E01281BF6617110021B0D10847DCE0E9F0CA6C764B633
   4784055172C3983D1E3A3A82301A54FCC9B0670C543A1C747164619101FF23B24
   0B2A26394C1F7D38D0E2F4747928ECE5C34627A075A8B3122011E9D9158055C28
   F020C330206BC20102020102300D06092A6206734101050500301B31193017060
   355040313106573744578616D706C654341204E774E301E170D31333035303930
   33353333325A170D3134303530393033353333325A301B3119301706035504031
   3106573744578616D706C654341204F774E302062300D06092A62067341010105
   0003204F0030204A022041003A923A2968BAE4AAE136CA4E2512C520068035848
   2AC39D6F640E4574E654EA35F48B1E054C5DA3372872F7A1E429F4EDF3958432E
   FB2106591D3EB783C1034709F251FC86566BDA2D541C792389EAC4EC9E181F4B9
   F596E5EF2679CC321542B11337F90A44DF3C85F1516561FA968A1914F265BC0B8
   276EBE3106A790D97D34C8C37C74FE1C30B396424664AC426284A9F6022E02693
   8436880ADFCD95C98CA1DFC2E6D75319B85D0458DE28A9D13FB16D620FFF7541F
   6A25D7DAF004355020301000134B050300E0603551D0F0101F104030204C1D060
   3551D0E04160414084D321CA0135E77217A486B686B334B01F0603551D2304183
   01653112966E304761732FBFE6A2C823C300D06092A6206734101050500032041
   002E106933A443070ACF5594A3A584D08AF7E06C295059370A06639EFF9BD418D
   13BC25A298223164A6CF1856B11A81617282E4A410D82EF086839C6E235690322
   763065455351E4C596ACC7C016B225DEC094706C2A10608F403B10821984C7C15
   2343B18A768C2AD30238DC45DD653EE6092B0D5CD4C2F7D236043269357F76D13
   F95FB5F00D0E19263C6833948E1BA612CE8197AF650E25D882C12F4B6B9B67252
   C608EF064ACA3F9BC867D71172349D510BB7651CD43883773D927DEB41C467302
   0BB302063C201020209009B9DDA3324700D06092A6206734101050500301B3119
   3017060355040313106573744578616D706C654341204E774E301E170D3133303
   530393033353333325A170D3134303530393033353333325A301B311930170603
   55040313106573744578616D706C654341204E774E302062300D06092A6206734
   10101050003204F0030204A02204100EF6B677A3247C1FC03D2B9BAF113E5E7E1
   1F49E0421120E6B8384160F2BF02630EF544D5FD0D5623B35713C79A7229283A7
   908751A634AA420A3E2A4B1F10519D046F02F5A5DD6D760C2A842356E067B7BD9
   4338D1FAA3B3DDD4813060A207B0A097067007E45B052B60FDBAE4656E11562C4
   F5ABB7B0CF87A79D221F1127313C53371CE1245D63DB45A1203A23340BA08042C
   768D03B8076A028D3A51D87D2EF107BBD6F2305CE5E67668724002FB726DF9C14
   476C37DE0F55033F192A5AD21F9A2A71C20301000130B040300F0603551D13010
   1F10530030101FC1D0603551D0E04160414112966E304761732FBFE6A2C823C30
   0E0603551D0F0101F10403020106300D06092A620673410105050003204100423
   F06D4B760F4B42744A279035571696F272A0060F1325A40898509601AD14004F6
   52DB6312A1475C4D7CD50F4B269035585D7856C5337765A66B38462D5BDAA7778
   AAB24BBE2815E37722CD10E7166C50E75AB75A1271324460211991E7445A2960F
   47351A1A62925334119794B90E320BC730D6C1BEE496E7AC125CE9A1ECA595A3A
   4C54A865E6B623C9247BFD0A7C19B56077392555C955E233642BEC643AE37C166
   C5E221D797AEA3748F0391C8D692A5CF9BB71F6D0E37984D6FA673A30D0C00634
   3116F58403100 is shown in Appendix C.1.

A.2.  csrattrs

   In the following valid /csrattrs csrattrs exchange, the EST-coaps client
   authenticates itself with a certificate issued by the connected CA.

   The initial DTLS handshake is identical to the enrollment example.
   The IPv6 CoAP GET request looks like: like
   REQ:
   GET coaps://[2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/att
   (Content-Format: 285)

   [ The hexadecimal representation below would NOT be transported
   in hex, but in DER. Hex is used because a binary representation
   cannot be rendered well in text. ]

   307c06072b06010101011630220603883701311b131950617273652053455
   420617320322e3939392e31206461746106092a864886f70d010907302c06
   0388370231250603883703060388370413195061727365205345542061732
   0322e3939392e32206461746106092b240303020801010b06096086480165
   03040202

   A 2.05 Content response contains should contain attributes which are relevant
   for the authenticated client.  In this example, authenticated client.  This example is copied from section
   A.2 in [RFC7030], where the base64 representation is replaced with a
   hexadecimal representation of the equivalent binary DER format.  The
   EST-coaps server returns two attributes that the client can ignore when if
   they are unknown to him.

A.3.  enroll / reenroll

   During the Enroll/Reenroll exchange, (re-)enroll exchange the EST-coaps client uses a CSR
   (Content-Format 286) request in the POST request payload.  As shown
   in Appendix C.2, the CSR contains a ChallengePassword which is used
   for POP linking (Section 7).

   POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen
   (token 0x45)
   (Content-Format: 286)

   [ The hexadecimal representation below would NOT be transported
   in hex, but in DER. Hex is used because a binary representation
   cannot be rendered well in text. ]

   308201853082012c0201003070310b3009060355040613025553310b3009
   06035504080c024341310b300906035504070c024c413114301206035504
   0a0c0b6578616d706c6520496e63310c300a060355040b0c03496f543112
   301006035504030c09436c69656e74205241310f300d0603550405130657
   74313233343059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d0301070342
   00041bb8c1117896f98e4506c03d70efbe820d8e38ea97e9d65d52c8460c
   5852c51dd89a61370a2843760fc859799d78cd33f3c1846e304f1717f812
   3f1a284cc99fa05a301b06092a864886f70d010907310e0c0c6461746e69
   65746465657274303b06092a864886f70d01090e312e302c302a0603551d
   1104233021a01f06082b06010505070804a013301106092b06010401b43b
   0a01040401020304300a06082a8648ce3d040302034700304402201f82c6
   868a654e2dec43cff50aebd6cbbe20dc8242a20a806684f2b8545d008902
   20668de2c306df1768105a781e49b1cdc42a2a7f41d6b71d928789547d61
   b2b7cf

   After verification of the CSR by the server, a 2.05 2.01 Content response
   with the issued certificate will be returned to the client.  As
   described in Section 5.5, 5.6, if the server is not able to provide a
   response immediately, it sends an empty ACK with response code 5.03
   (Service Unavailabel) Unavailable) and the Max-Age option.  See Figure 3 for an
   example exchange.

   [EDNOTE: When redoing this example, given that POP linking is also
   used, make sure it is obvious that the ChallengePassword attribute in
   the CSR is valid HMAC output.  HMAC-REAL.]
   POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen
   (token 0x45)
   (Content-Format: 286)
   h'30208530206d020100301f311d301b0603550403131464656d6f7374657034203
   1333638313431333532302062300d06092a620673410101050003204f0030204a
   022041005d9f4dffd3c5949f646a9584367778560950b355c35b8e34726dd3764
   54231734795b4c09b9c6d75d408311307a81f7adef7f5d241f7d5be85620c5d44
   38bbb4242cf215c167f2ccf36c364ea2618a62f0536576369d6304e6a96877224
   7d86824f079faac7a6f694cfda5b84c42087dc062d462190c525813f210a036a7
   37b4f30d8891f4b75559fb72752453146332d51c937557716ccec624f5125c3a4
   447ad3115020048113fef54ad554ee88af09a2583aac9024075113db4990b1786
   b871691e0f02030100018701f06092a620673410907311213102b72724369722f
   372b45597535305434300d06092a620673410105050003204100441b40177a3a6
   5501487735a8ad5d3827a4eaa867013920e2afcda87aa81733c7c0353be47e1bf
   a7cda5176e7ccc6be22ae03498588d5f2de3b143f2b1a6175ec544e8e7625af6b
   836fd4416894c2e55ea99c6606f69075d6d53475d410729aa6d806afbb9986caf
   7b844b5b3e4545f19071865ada007060cad6db26a592d4a7bda7d586b68110962
   17071103407553155cddc75481e272b5ed553a8593fb7e25100a6f7605085dab4
   fc7e0731f0e7fe305703791362d5157e92e6b5c2e3edbcadb40'

   RET:
   (Content-Format: 281)(token =0x45)
   2.01 Created
   h'3020f806092a62067341070283293020e50201013100300b06092a62067341070
   1830b3020c730206fc20102020115300d06092a6206734101050500301b311930
   17060355040313106573744578616d706c654341204e774e301e170d313330353
   0393233313535335a170d3134303530393233313535335a301f311d301b060355
   0403131464656d6f73746570342031333638313431333532302062300d06092a6
   20673410101050003204f0030204a022041005d9f4dffd3c5949f646a95843677
   78560950b355c35b8e34726dd376454231734795b4c09b9c6d75d408311307a81
   f7adef7f5d241f7d5be85620c5d4438bbb4242cf215c167f2ccf36c364ea2618a
   62f0536576369d6304e6a968772247d86824f079faac7a6f694cfda5b84c42087
   dc062d462190c525813f210a036a737b4f30d8891f4b75559fb72752453146332
   d51c937557716ccec624f5125c3a4447ad3115020048113fef54ad554ee88af09
   a2583aac9024075113db4990b1786b871691e0f020301000134b050300e060355
   1d0f0101f104030204c1d0603551d0e04160414e81d0788aa2710304c5ecd4d1e
   065701f0603551d230418301653112966e304761732fbfe6a2c823c300d06092a
   6206734101050500032041002910d86f2ffeeb914c046816871de601567d291b4
   3fabee0f0e8ff81cea27302a7133e20e9d04029866a8963c7d14e26fbe8a0ab1b
   77fbb1214bbcdc906fbc381137ec1de685f79406c3e416b8d82f97174bc691637
   5a4e1c4bf744c7572b4b2c6bade9fb35da786392ee0d95e3970542565f3886ad6
   7746d1b12484bb02616e63302dc371dc6006e431fb7c457598dd204b367b0b3d3
   258760a303f1102db26327f929b7c5a60173e1799491b69150248756026b80553
   171e4733ad3d13c0103100'

A.4.  serverkeygen

   During this valid /serverkeygen exchange, the EST-coaps client
   authenticates itself using the certificate provided by the connected
   CA.

   [ The initial DTLS handshake hexadecimal representation below would NOT be transported
   in hex, but in DER. Hex is identical to the enrollment example. used because a binary representation
   cannot be rendered well in text. ]

   3082028206092a864886f70d010702a08202733082026f0201013100300b
   06092a864886f70d010701a082025530820251308201f7a0030201020209
   00ce06119a0fd27ca9300a06082a8648ce3d040302305d310b3009060355
   040613025553310b300906035504080c02434131143012060355040a0c0b
   4578616d706c6520496e6331163014060355040b0c0d6365727469666963
   6174696f6e3113301106035504030c0a3830322e3141522043413020170d
   3139303130373130343832345a180f39393939313233313233353935395a
   3070310b3009060355040613025553310b300906035504080c024341310b
   300906035504070c024c4131143012060355040a0c0b6578616d706c6520
   496e63310c300a060355040b0c03496f543112301006035504030c09436c
   69656e74205241310f300d06035504051306577431323334305930130607
   2a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107034200041bb8c1117896f98e45
   06c03d70efbe820d8e38ea97e9d65d52c8460c5852c51dd89a61370a2843
   760fc859799d78cd33f3c1846e304f1717f8123f1a284cc99fa3818a3081
   8730090603551d1304023000301d0603551d0e04160414494be598dc8dbc
   0dbc071c486b777460e5cce621301f0603551d23041830168014d344161b
   ff1fa5343015958577dd33507be6b29b300e0603551d0f0101ff04040302
   05a0302a0603551d1104233021a01f06082b06010505070804a013301106
   092b06010401b43b0a01040401020304300a06082a8648ce3d0403020348
   003045022100a8073d6c1f9abb40739fc85a3773378568544036d8cd24f0
   1d4b34cb61d9602c022008cc77f8dd5ca7c2fcf95ffc94fdc341e2b61080
   118a9576c09e88d2fbd8a921a1003100

   The breakdown of the request and response is shown in Appendix C.2.

A.4.  serverkeygen

   In a serverkeygen exchange the CoAP GET request looks like:

   [EDNOTE: same comment as HMAC-REAL above applies.]

   [EDNOTE: Suggestion to have only one example with complete encrypted
   payload (the short one) and point out the different fields.  Update
   this example according to the agreed upon solution from Section 5.6.
   ] like
   POST coaps://192.0.2.1:8085/est/skg
   (token 0xa5)
   (Content-Format: 286)(Max-Age=120)

   h'302081302069020100305b313e303c060355040313357365727665724b6579476
   56e2072657120627920636c69656e7420696e2064656d6f207374657020313220
   3133363831343139353531193017060355040513105049443a576964676574205
   34e3a3130302062300d06092a620673410101050003204f0030204a02204100f4
   dfa6c03f7f2766b23776c333d2c0f9d1a7a6ee36d01499bbe6f075d1e38a57e98
   ecc197f51b75228454b7f19652332de5e52e4a974c6ae34e1df80b33f15f47d3b
   cbf76116bb0e4d3e04a9651218a476a13fc186c2a255e4065ff7c271cff104e47
   31fad53c22b21a1e5138bf9ad0187314ac39445949a48805392390e78c7659621
   6d3e61327a534f5ea7721d2b1343c7362b37da502717cfc2475653c7a3860c5f4
   0612a5db6d33794d755264b6327e3a3263b149628585b85e57e42f6b3277591b0
   2030100018701f06092a6206734109073112131064467341586d4a6e6a6f6b427
   4447672300d06092a620673410105050003204100472d11007e5a2b2c2023d47a
   6d71d046c307701d8ebc9e47272713378390b4ee321462a3dbe54579f5a514f6f
   4050af497f428189b63655d03a194ef729f101743e5d03fbc6ae1e84486d1300a
   f9288724381909188c851fa9a5059802eb64449f2a3c9e441353d136768da27ff
   4f277651d676a6a7e51931b08f56135a2230891fd184960e1313e7a1a9139ed19
   28196867079a456cd2266cb754a45151b7b1b939e381be333fea61580fe5d25bf
   4823dbd2d6a98445b46305c10637e202856611'

   [ The hexadecimal representation below would NOT be transported
   in hex, but in DER. Hex is used because a binary representation
   cannot be rendered well in text. ]

   3081cf3078020100301631143012060355040a0c0b736b67206578616d70
   6c653059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107034200041b
   b8c1117896f98e4506c03d70efbe820d8e38ea97e9d65d52c8460c5852c5
   1dd89a61370a2843760fc859799d78cd33f3c1846e304f1717f8123f1a28
   4cc99fa000300a06082a8648ce3d04030203470030440220387cd4e9cf62
   8d4af77f92ebed4890d9d141dca86cd2757dd14cbd59cdf6961802202f24
   5e828c77754378b66660a4977f113cacdaa0cc7bad7d1474a7fd155d090d

   The response would follow [I-D.ietf-core-multipart-ct] and could
   looke like
   RET:
   2.01 Content (Content-Format: TBD8) 62)
   (token=0xa5)

   [284,
   h'30213e020100300d06092a6206734101010500042128302124020100022041003
   c0bc2748f2003e3e8ea15f746f2a71e83f585412b92cf6f8e64de02e056153274
   dd01c95dd9cff3112aa141774ab655c3d56359c3b3df055294692ed848e7e30a1
   1bf14e47e0693d93017022b4cdb3e6d40325356152b213c8b535851e681a7074c
   0c6d2b60e7c32fc0336b28e743eba4e5921074d47195d3c05e43c527526e692d5
   45e562578d2d4b5f2191bff89d3eef0222764a2674637a1f99257216647df6704
   efec5adbf54dab24231844eb595875795000e673dd6862310a146ad7e31083010
   001022041004e6b3f78b7791d6377f33117c17844531c81111fb8000282816264
   915565bc7c3f3f643b537a2c69140a31c22550fa97e5132c61b74166b68626704
   260620333050f510096b6570f5880e7e1c15dc0ca6ce2b5f187e2325da14ab705
   ad004717f3b2f779127b5c535e0cee6a343b502722f2397a26126e0af606b5aa7
   f96313511c0b7eb26354f91b82269de62757e3def807a6afdf83ddcbb0614bb7c
   542e6975d6456554e7bd9988fbd1930cd44d0e01ee9182ca54539418653150254
   1ad1a2a11e5021040bfce554b642c29131e7d65455e83c5406d76771912f758f5
   ee3ee36af386f38ffa313c0f661880c5a2b0970485d36f528e7f77a2e55b4ad76
   1242d1c2f75939c8061217d31491d305d3e07d6161c43e26f7de4477b1811de92
   33dc75b426302104015bf48ac376f52887813461fc54635517bcb67293837053e
   8ce1a33da7a35565a75a370dc14555b5316cb55742380350774d769d151ff0456
   0214389a232a2258326163167504cfce44cd316f63bb8a52da53a4cb74fd87194
   c0844881f791f23b0813ea0921325edd14459d41c8a1593f04316388e40b35fef
   7d2a195a5930fa54774427ac821eee2c62790d2c17bd192af794c611011506557
   83d4efe22185cbd83368786f2b1e68a5a27067e321066f0217b4b6d7971a3c21a
   241366b7907187583b511102103369047e5cce0b65012200df5ec697b5827575c
   db6821ff299d6a69574b31ddf0fbe9245ea2f74396c24b3a7565067e41366423b
   5bdd2b2a78194094dbe333f493d159b8e07722f2280d48388db7f1c9f0633bb0e
   173de2c3aa1f200af535411c7090210401421e2ea217e37312dcc606f453a6634
   f3df4dc31a9e910614406412e70eec9247f10672a500947a64356c015a845a7d1
   50e2e3911a2b3b61070a73247166da10bb45474cc97d1ec2bc392524307f35118
   f917438f607f18181684376e13a39e07',
   281,
   h'3020c506092a62067341070283363020f20201013100300b06092a62067341070
   183183020d430207cc20102020116300d06092a6206734101050500301b311930
   17060355040313106573744578616d706c654341204e774e301e170d313330353
   0393233323535365a170d3134303530393233323535365a302c312a3028060355
   0403132173657276657273696465206b65792067656e657261746564207265737
   06f6e7365302062300d06092a620673410101050003204f0030204a022041003c
   0bc2748f2003e3e8ea15f746f2a71e83f585412b92cf6f8e64de02e056153274d
   d01c95dd9cff3112aa141774ab655c3d56359c3b3df055294692ed848e7e30a11
   bf14e47e0693d93017022b4cdb3e6d40325356152b213c8b535851e681a7074c0
   c6d2b60e7c32fc0336b28e743eba4e5921074d47195d3c05e43c527526e692d54
   5e562578d2d4b5f2191bff89d3eef0222764a2674637a1f99257216647df6704e
   fec5adbf54dab24231844eb595875795000e673dd6862310a146ad7e310830100
   0134b050300e0603551d0f0101f104030204c1d0603551d0e04160414764b1bd5
   e69935626e476b195a1a8c1f0603551d230418301653112966e304761732fbfe6
   a2c823c300d06092a620673410105050003204100474e5100a9cdaaa813b30f48
   40340fb17e7d6d6063064a5a7f2162301c464b5a8176623dfb1a4a484e618de1c
   3c3c5927cf590f4541233ff3c251e772a9a3f2c5fc6e5ef2fe155e5e385deb846
   b36eb4c3c7ef713f2d137ae8be4c022715fd033a818d55250f4e6077718180755
   a4fa677130da60818175ca4ab2af1d15563624c51e13dfdcf381881b72327e2f4
   9b7467e631a27b5b5c7d542bd2edaf78c0ac294f3972278996bdf673a334ff74c
   84aa7d65726310252f6a4f41281ec10ca2243864e3c5743103100']
   Without the DecryptKeyIdentifier attribute, the response has no
   additional encryption beyond DTLS.

   [ The response contains first hexadecimal representations below would NOT be transported
   in hex, but in DER. Hex is used because a preamble that can binary representation
   cannot be ignored. rendered well in text. ]

   84                                   # array(4)
   19 011C                              # unsigned(284)
   58 8A                                # bytes(138)
   308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30
   6b02010104200b9a67785b65e07360b6d28cfc1d3f3925c0755799deeca7
   45372b01697bd8a6a144034200041bb8c1117896f98e4506c03d70efbe82
   0d8e38ea97e9d65d52c8460c5852c51dd89a61370a2843760fc859799d78
   cd33f3c1846e304f1717f8123f1a284cc99f
   19 0119                              # unsigned(281)
   59 01D3                              # bytes(467)
   308201cf06092a864886f70d010702a08201c0308201bc0201013100300b
   06092a864886f70d010701a08201a23082019e30820143a0030201020208
   126de8571518524b300a06082a8648ce3d04030230163114301206035504
   0a0c0b736b67206578616d706c65301e170d313930313039303835373038
   5a170d3339303130343038353730385a301631143012060355040a0c0b73
   6b67206578616d706c653059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d
   030107034200041bb8c1117896f98e4506c03d70efbe820d8e38ea97e9d6
   5d52c8460c5852c51dd89a61370a2843760fc859799d78cd33f3c1846e30
   4f1717f8123f1a284cc99fa37b307930090603551d1304023000302c0609
   6086480186f842010d041f161d4f70656e53534c2047656e657261746564
   204365727469666963617465301d0603551d0e04160414494be598dc8dbc
   0dbc071c486b777460e5cce621301f0603551d23041830168014494be598
   dc8dbc0dbc071c486b777460e5cce621300a06082a8648ce3d0403020349
   003046022100a4b167d0f9add9202810e6bf6a290b8cfdfc9b9c9fea2cc1
   c8fc3a464f79f2c202210081d31ba142751a7b4a34fd1a01fcfb08716b9e
   b53bdaadc9ae60b08f52429c0fa1003100

   The EST-
   coaps server can use breakdown of the preamble to include additional explanations,
   like ownership or support information request and response is shown in Appendix C.3

Appendix B.  EST-coaps Block message examples

   Two examples are presented: (1) presented in this section:

   1.  a cacerts exchange shows the use of Block2 and the block headers, and (2) a headers

   2.  an enroll exchange shows the Block1 and Block2 size negotiation
       for request and response payloads.

   The payloads are shown unencrypted.  In practice the message contents
   would be binary DER formatted and transferred over an encrypted DTLS
   tunnel.  The corresponding CoAP headers are only shown in
   Appendix B.1.  Creating CoAP headers are assumed to be generally
   known.

B.1.  cacerts block example

   This section provides a detailed example of the messages using DTLS
   and BLOCK option Block2.  The minimum PMTU is 1280 bytes, which is
   the example value assumed for the DTLS datagram size.  The example
   block length is taken as 64 which gives an SZX value of 2.

   The following is an example of a valid /cacerts cacerts exchange over DTLS.  The
   content length of the cacerts response in appendix A.1 of [RFC7030] is 4246 bytes using base64.  This leads to a length of 2509
   contains 639 bytes in binary.  The CoAP message adds around 10 bytes,
   the DTLS record 29 bytes.  To avoid IP fragmentation, the CoAP block
   option is used and an MTU of 127 is assumed to stay within one IEEE
   802.15.4 packet.  To stay below the MTU of 127, the payload is split
   in 39 9 packets with a payload of 64 bytes each, followed by a last
   tenth packet of 13 63 bytes.  The client sends an IPv6 packet containing
   the UDP datagram with the DTLS record that encapsulates the CoAP Request 40
   request 10 times.  The server returns an IPv6 packet containing the
   UDP datagram with the DTLS record that encapsulates the CoAP
   response.  The CoAP request-response exchange with block option is
   shown below.  Block option is shown in a decomposed way (block-option:NUM/M/size) (block-
   option:NUM/M/size) indicating the kind of Block option (2 in this case because used in
   the response)
   case) followed by a colon, and then the block number (NUM), the more
   bit (M = 0 in lock2 Block2 response means it is last block), and block size
   with exponent (2**(SZX+4)) separated by slashes.  The Length 64 is
   used with SZX= 2 SZX=2 to avoid IP fragmentation.  The CoAP Request is sent
   with confirmable (CON) option and the content format of the
   Response response,
   even though not shown, is 281 (application/pkcs7-mime; smime-
   type=certs-only).  The transer of the 11 blocks with partially filled
   block NUM=10 is /application/cacerts. shown below

      GET /192.0.2.1:8085/est/crts   (2:0/0/64)    -->
                    <--   (2:0/1/64) 2.05 Content
      GET /192.0.2.1:8085/est/crts   (2:1/0/64)    -->
                    <--   (2:1/1/64) 2.05 Content
                            |
                            |
                            |
      GET /192.0.2.1:8085/est/crts    (2:39/0/64)    (2:10/0/64)  -->
                    <--   (2:39/0/64)   (2:9/0/64) 2.05 Content

   40 blocks have been sent with partially filled block NUM=39 as last
   block.

   For further detailing the CoAP headers, the first two blocks are
   written out.

   The header of the first GET request looks like: like
     Ver = 1
     T = 0 (CON)
     Code = 0x01 (0.1 GET)
     Token = 0x9a    (client generated)
     Options
      Option1 (Uri-Host)
      Option           [optional]
        Option Delta = 0x3  (option nr = 3)  (option# 3 Uri-Host)
        Option Length = 0x9
        Option Value = 192.0.2.1
      Option2 (Uri-Port)
      Option           [optional]
        Option Delta = 0x4   (option nr = 3+4=7)   (option# 3+4=7 Uri-Port)
        Option Length = 0x4
        Option Value = 8085
      Option3 (Uri-Path)
      Option
        Option Delta = 0x4    (option nr = 7+4=11)    (option# 7+4=11 Uri-Path)
        Option Length = 0x5
        Option Value = "est"
      Option4 (Uri-Path)
        Option Delta = 0x0    (option nr = 11+0=11)    (option# 11+0=11 Uri-Path)
        Option Length = 0x6
        Option Value = "crts"
     Payload = [Empty]

   For further detailing the CoAP headers, the first two and the last
   blocks are written out below.  The header of the first Block2
   response looks like: like
     Ver = 1
     T = 2 (ACK)
     Code = 0x45 (2.05 Content)
     Token = 0x9a     (copied from request by server)
     Options
       Option1 (Content-Format)
       Option
         Option Delta = 0xC  (option nr =12)  (option# 12 Content-Format)
         Option Length = 0x2
         Option Value = 281
       Option2 (Block2)
       Option
         Option Delta = 0xB  (option 23 = 12 + 11)  (option# 12+11=23 Block2)
         Option Length = 0x1
         Option Value = 0x0A (block number = 0, (block#=0, M=1, SZX=2)

     [ The hexadecimal representation below would NOT be transported
     in hex, but in DER. Hex is used because a binary representation
     cannot be rendered well in text. ]

     Payload =
   h'30233906092a6206734107028c2a3023260201013100300b06092a6206734107018
   c0c3020bb302063c20102020900a61e75193b7acc0d06092a6206734101'
   3082027b06092a864886f70d010702a082026c308202680201013100300b
   06092a864886f70d010701a082024e3082024a308201f0a0030201020209
   009189bc

   The second Block2:

     Ver = 1
     T = 2 (means ACK)
     Code = 0x45 (2.05 Content)
     Token = 0x9a     (copied from request by server)
     Options
       Option1 (Content-Format)
       Option
         Option Delta = 0xC  (option nr =12)  (option# 12 Content-Format)
         Option Length = 0x2
         Option Value = 281
       Option2 (Block2)
       Option
         Option Delta = 0xB  (option 23 = 12 + 11) 12+11=23 Block2)
         Option Length = 0x1
         Option Value = 0x1A (block number = 1, (block#=1, M=1, SZX=2)

     [ The hexadecimal representation below would NOT be transported
     in hex, but in DER. Hex is used because a binary representation
     cannot be rendered well in text. ]

     Payload =
   h'05050030
   1b31193017060355040313106573744578616d706c654341204f774f301e170d313
   3303530393033353333315a170d3134303530393033353333315a'
   df9c99244b300a06082a8648ce3d0403023067310b300906035504061302
   5553310b300906035504080c024341310b300906035504070c024c413114
   30120603
   The 40th 11th and final Block2:

     Ver = 1
     T = 2 (means ACK)
     Code = 0x45      (2.05 Content)
     Token = 0x9a     (copied from request by server)
     Options
       Option1 (Content-Format)
       Option
         Option Delta = 0xC  (option nr =12)  (option# 12 Content-Format)
         Option Length = 0x2
         Option Value = 281
       Option2 (Block2)
       Option
         Option Delta = 0xB  (option 23 = 12 + 11)  (option# 12+11=23 Block2 )
         Option Length = 0x2
         Option Value = 0x272 (block number Value = 39, 0x92 (block#=9, M=0, SZX=2)

     [ The hexadecimal representation below would NOT be transported
     in hex, but in DER. Hex is used because a binary representation
     cannot be rendered well in text. ]

     Payload = h'73a30d0c006343116f58403100'
   2ec0b4af52d46f3b7ecc9687ddf267bcec368f7b7f1353272f022047a28a
   e5c7306163b3c3834bab3c103f743070594c089aaa0ac870cd13b902caa1
   003100

B.2.  enroll block example

   In this example the requested block2 Block2 size of 256 bytes, required by
   the client, is transferred to the server in the very first request
   message.  The request/response consists of two parts: part1
   containing the CSR transferred to the server, and part2 contains the
   certificate transferred back to the client.  The block size 256=(2**(SZX+4)) which gives SZX=4.  The
   notation for block numbering is the same as in Appendix B.1.  It is
   assumed that CSR takes N1+1 blocks and Cert the cert response takes N2+1
   blocks.  The header fields and the payload are omitted to show the block exchange.  The type of
   payload is shown within curly brackets. for brevity.

   POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen (CON)(1:0/1/256) {CSR req} -->
          <-- (ACK) (1:0/1/256) (2.31 Continue)
   POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen (CON)(1:1/1/256) {CSR req} -->
          <-- (ACK) (1:1/1/256) (2.31 Continue)
                         .
                         .
                         .
   POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen (CON)(1:N1/0/256){CSR req} -->
          <-- (ACK) (1:N1/0/256) (2:0/1/256) (2.04 Changed){Cert resp}
   POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen (CON)(2:1/0/256)           -->
          <-- (ACK) (2:1/1/256) (2.04 Changed) {Cert resp}
                         .
                         .
                         .
   POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen (CON)(2:N2/0/256)          -->
          <-- (ACK) (2:N2/0/256) (2.04 Changed) {Cert resp}

             Figure 5: EST-COAP enrolment with multiple blocks

   N1+1 blocks have been transferred from client to the server and N2+1
   blocks have been transferred from server to client.

Appendix C.  Message content breakdown

   This appendix presents the breakdown of the hexadecimal dumps of the
   binary payloads shown in Appendix A.

C.1.  cacerts

   Breakdown of cacerts response containing one root CA certificate.

   Certificate:
       Data:
           Version: 3 (0x2)
           Serial Number:
               91:89:bc:df:9c:99:24:4b
       Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
           Issuer: C=US, ST=CA, L=LA, O=Example Inc,
                   OU=certification, CN=Root CA
           Validity
               Not Before: Jan  7 10:40:41 2019 GMT
               Not After : Jan  2 10:40:41 2039 GMT
           Subject: C=US, ST=CA, L=LA, O=Example Inc,
                    OU=certification, CN=Root CA
           Subject Public Key Info:
               Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
                   Public-Key: (256 bit)
                   pub:
                       04:81:49:94:08:2b:6e:81:85:f3:df:53:f5:e0:be:
                       e6:98:97:33:35:20:00:23:dd:f7:8c:d1:7a:44:3f:
                       fd:8d:dd:40:90:87:69:c5:56:52:ac:2c:cb:75:c4:
                       a5:0a:7c:7d:db:7c:22:da:e6:c8:5c:ca:53:82:09:
                       fd:bb:f1:04:c9
                   ASN1 OID: prime256v1
                   NIST CURVE: P-256
           X509v3 extensions:
               X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
   24:95:E8:16:EF:6F:FC:AA:F3:56:CE:4A:DF:FE:33:CF:49:2A:BB:A8
               X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
                   keyid:
   24:95:E8:16:EF:6F:FC:AA:F3:56:CE:4A:DF:FE:33:CF:49:2A:BB:A8

               X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
                   CA:TRUE
               X509v3 Key Usage: critical
                   Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
               X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
                   email:certify@example.com
       Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
            30:45:02:21:00:da:e3:7c:96:f1:54:c3:2e:c0:b4:af:52:d4:
            6f:3b:7e:cc:96:87:dd:f2:67:bc:ec:36:8f:7b:7f:13:53:27:
            2f:02:20:47:a2:8a:e5:c7:30:61:63:b3:c3:83:4b:ab:3c:10:
            3f:74:30:70:59:4c:08:9a:aa:0a:c8:70:cd:13:b9:02:ca

C.2.  enroll / reenroll

   The breakdown of the request is
   Certificate Request:
       Data:
           Version: 0 (0x0)
           Subject: C=US, ST=CA, L=LA, O=example Inc,
                    OU=IoT, CN=Client RA/serialNumber=Wt1234
           Subject Public Key Info:
               Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
                   Public-Key: (256 bit)
                   pub:
                       04:1b:b8:c1:11:78:96:f9:8e:45:06:c0:3d:70:ef:
                       be:82:0d:8e:38:ea:97:e9:d6:5d:52:c8:46:0c:58:
                       52:c5:1d:d8:9a:61:37:0a:28:43:76:0f:c8:59:79:
                       9d:78:cd:33:f3:c1:84:6e:30:4f:17:17:f8:12:3f:
                       1a:28:4c:c9:9f
                   ASN1 OID: prime256v1
                   NIST CURVE: P-256
           Attributes:
               challengePassword        :datnietdeert
           Requested Extensions:
               X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
                   othername:<unsupported>
       Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
            30:44:02:20:1f:82:c6:86:8a:65:4e:2d:ec:43:cf:f5:0a:eb:
            d6:cb:be:20:dc:82:42:a2:0a:80:66:84:f2:b8:54:5d:00:89:
            02:20:66:8d:e2:c3:06:df:17:68:10:5a:78:1e:49:b1:cd:c4:
            2a:2a:7f:41:d6:b7:1d:92:87:89:54:7d:61:b2:b7:cf

   The CSR contained a ChallengePassword which is used for POP linking
   (Section 7)

   The breakdown of the issued certificate response is
   Certificate:
       Data:
           Version: 3 (0x2)
           Serial Number:
               ce:06:11:9a:0f:d2:7c:a9
       Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
           Issuer: C=US, ST=CA, O=Example Inc,
                   OU=certification, CN=802.1AR CA
           Validity
               Not Before: Jan  7 10:48:24 2019 GMT
               Not After : Dec 31 23:59:59 9999 GMT
           Subject: C=US, ST=CA, L=LA, O=example Inc,
                    OU=IoT, CN=Client RA/serialNumber=Wt1234
           Subject Public Key Info:
               Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
                   Public-Key: (256 bit)
                   pub:
                       04:1b:b8:c1:11:78:96:f9:8e:45:06:c0:3d:70:ef:
                       be:82:0d:8e:38:ea:97:e9:d6:5d:52:c8:46:0c:58:
                       52:c5:1d:d8:9a:61:37:0a:28:43:76:0f:c8:59:79:
                       9d:78:cd:33:f3:c1:84:6e:30:4f:17:17:f8:12:3f:
                       1a:28:4c:c9:9f
                   ASN1 OID: prime256v1
                   NIST CURVE: P-256
           X509v3 extensions:
               X509v3 Basic Constraints:
                   CA:FALSE
               X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
   49:4B:E5:98:DC:8D:BC:0D:BC:07:1C:48:6B:77:74:60:E5:CC:E6:21
               X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
                   keyid:
   D3:44:16:1B:FF:1F:A5:34:30:15:95:85:77:DD:33:50:7B:E6:B2:9B

               X509v3 Key Usage: critical
                   Digital Signature, Key Encipherment
               X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
                   othername:<unsupported>
       Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
            30:45:02:21:00:a8:07:3d:6c:1f:9a:bb:40:73:9f:c8:5a:37:
            73:37:85:68:54:40:36:d8:cd:24:f0:1d:4b:34:cb:61:d9:60:
            2c:02:20:08:cc:77:f8:dd:5c:a7:c2:fc:f9:5f:fc:94:fd:c3:
            41:e2:b6:10:80:11:8a:95:76:c0:9e:88:d2:fb:d8:a9:21

C.3.  serverkeygen

   The followng is the breakdown of the request example used.

   Certificate Request:
       Data:
           Version: 0 (0x0)
           Subject: O=skg example
           Subject Public Key Info:
               Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
                   Public-Key: (256 bit)
                   pub:
                       04:1b:b8:c1:11:78:96:f9:8e:45:06:c0:3d:70:ef:
                       be:82:0d:8e:38:ea:97:e9:d6:5d:52:c8:46:0c:58:
                       52:c5:1d:d8:9a:61:37:0a:28:43:76:0f:c8:59:79:
                       9d:78:cd:33:f3:c1:84:6e:30:4f:17:17:f8:12:3f:
                       1a:28:4c:c9:9f
                   ASN1 OID: prime256v1
                   NIST CURVE: P-256
           Attributes:
               a0:00
       Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
            30:44:02:20:38:7c:d4:e9:cf:62:8d:4a:f7:7f:92:eb:ed:48:
            90:d9:d1:41:dc:a8:6c:d2:75:7d:d1:4c:bd:59:cd:f6:96:18:
            02:20:2f:24:5e:82:8c:77:75:43:78:b6:66:60:a4:97:7f:11:
            3c:ac:da:a0:cc:7b:ad:7d:14:74:a7:fd:15:5d:09:0d

   The following is the breakdown of the private key content of the
   server-side key generation response payload.

   Private-Key: (256 bit)
   priv:
       0b:9a:67:78:5b:65:e0:73:60:b6:d2:8c:fc:1d:3f:
       39:25:c0:75:57:99:de:ec:a7:45:37:2b:01:69:7b:
       d8:a6
   pub:
       04:1b:b8:c1:11:78:96:f9:8e:45:06:c0:3d:70:ef:
       be:82:0d:8e:38:ea:97:e9:d6:5d:52:c8:46:0c:58:
       52:c5:1d:d8:9a:61:37:0a:28:43:76:0f:c8:59:79:
       9d:78:cd:33:f3:c1:84:6e:30:4f:17:17:f8:12:3f:
       1a:28:4c:c9:9f
   ASN1 OID: prime256v1
   NIST CURVE: P-256

   The following is the breakdown of the certificate of the second part
   of the server-side key generation response payload.

   Certificate:
       Data:
           Version: 3 (0x2)
           Serial Number: 1327972925857878603 (0x126de8571518524b)
       Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
           Issuer: O=skg example
           Validity
               Not Before: Jan  9 08:57:08 2019 GMT
               Not After : Jan  4 08:57:08 2039 GMT
           Subject: O=skg example
           Subject Public Key Info:
               Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
                   Public-Key: (256 bit)
                   pub:
                       04:1b:b8:c1:11:78:96:f9:8e:45:06:c0:3d:70:ef:
                       be:82:0d:8e:38:ea:97:e9:d6:5d:52:c8:46:0c:58:
                       52:c5:1d:d8:9a:61:37:0a:28:43:76:0f:c8:59:79:
                       9d:78:cd:33:f3:c1:84:6e:30:4f:17:17:f8:12:3f:
                       1a:28:4c:c9:9f
                   ASN1 OID: prime256v1
                   NIST CURVE: P-256
           X509v3 extensions:
               X509v3 Basic Constraints:
                   CA:FALSE
               Netscape Comment:
                   OpenSSL Generated Certificate
               X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
   49:4B:E5:98:DC:8D:BC:0D:BC:07:1C:48:6B:77:74:60:E5:CC:E6:21
               X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
                   keyid:
   49:4B:E5:98:DC:8D:BC:0D:BC:07:1C:48:6B:77:74:60:E5:CC:E6:21

       Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
            30:46:02:21:00:a4:b1:67:d0:f9:ad:d9:20:28:10:e6:bf:6a:
            29:0b:8c:fd:fc:9b:9c:9f:ea:2c:c1:c8:fc:3a:46:4f:79:f2:
            c2:02:21:00:81:d3:1b:a1:42:75:1a:7b:4a:34:fd:1a:01:fc:
            fb:08:71:6b:9e:b5:3b:da:ad:c9:ae:60:b0:8f:52:42:9c:0f

   The private key in the response above is without CMS EnvelopedData
   and has no additional encryption beyond DTLS (Section 5.7).

Authors' Addresses

   Peter van der Stok
   Consultant

   Email: consultancy@vanderstok.org
   Panos Kampanakis
   Cisco Systems

   Email: pkampana@cisco.com

   Sandeep S. Kumar
   Philips Lighting Research
   High Tech Campus 7
   Eindhoven  5656 AE
   NL

   Email: ietf@sandeep.de

   Michael C. Richardson
   Sandelman Software Works

   Email: mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca
   URI:   http://www.sandelman.ca/

   Martin Furuhed
   Nexus Group

   Email: martin.furuhed@nexusgroup.com

   Shahid Raza
   RISE SICS
   Isafjordsgatan 22
   Kista, Stockholm  16440
   SE

   Email: shahid@sics.se