INTERNET-DRAFT R. Housley
Intended Status: Proposed Standard Vigil Security
Expires: 4 March 2019 31 August 2018
Use of the HSS/LMS Hash-based Signature Algorithm
in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
Abstract
This document specifies the conventions for using the the HSS/LMS
hash-based signature algorithm with the Cryptographic Message Syntax
(CMS). The HSS/LMS algorithm is one form of hash-based digital
signature; it is described in [HASHSIG].
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. ASN.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. HSS/LMS Hash-based Signature Algorithm Overview . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Hierarchical Signature System (HSS) . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Leighton-Micali Signature (LMS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3. Leighton-Micali One-time Signature Algorithm (LM-OTS) . . 5
3. Algorithm Identifiers and Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Signed-data Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.1. Implementation Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.2. Algorithm Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Appendix: ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
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1. Introduction
This document specifies the conventions for using the HSS/LMS hash-
based signature algorithm with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
[CMS] signed-data content type. The Leighton-Micali Signature (LMS)
system provides a one-time digital signature that is a variant of
Merkle Tree Signatures (MTS). A Hierarchical Signature System (HSS)
built on top of the LMS system to efficiently scale for a larger
numbers of signatures. The HSS/LMS algorithm is one form of hash-
based digital signature, and it is described in [HASHSIG]. The
HSS/LMS signature algorithm can only be used for a fixed number of
signing operations. The HSS/LMS signature algorithm uses small
private and public keys, and it has low computational cost; however,
the signatures are quite large.
1.1. ASN.1
CMS values are generated using ASN.1 [ASN1-B], using the Basic
Encoding Rules (BER) and the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)
[ASN1-E].
1.2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
2. HSS/LMS Hash-based Signature Algorithm Overview
Merkle Tree Signatures (MTS) are a method for signing a large but
fixed number of messages. An MTS system depends on a one-time
signature method and a collision-resistant hash function.
This specification makes use of the hash-based algorithm specified in
[HASHSIG], which is the Leighton and Micali adaptation [LM] of the
original Lamport-Diffie-Winternitz-Merkle one-time signature system
[M1979][M1987][M1989a][M1989b].
As implied by the name, the hash-based signature algorithm depends on
a collision-resistant hash function. The hash-based signature
algorithm specified in [HASHSIG] currently uses only the SHA-256 one-
way hash function [SHS], but it also establishes an IANA registry to
permit the registration of additional one-way hash functions in the
future.
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2.1. Hierarchical Signature System (HSS)
The MTS system specified in [HASHSIG] uses a hierarchy of trees. The
Hierarchical N-time Signature System (HSS) allows subordinate trees
to be generated when needed by the signer. Otherwise, generation of
the entire tree might take weeks or longer.
An HSS signature as specified in specified in [HASHSIG] carries the
number of signed public keys (Nspk), followed by that number of
signed public keys, followed by the LMS signature as described in
Section 2.2. Each signed public key is represented by the hash value
at the root of the tree, and it also contains information about the
tree structure. The signature over the public key is an LMS
signature as described in Section 2.2.
The elements of the HSS signature value for a stand-alone tree can be
summarized as:
u32str(0) ||
lms_signature /* signature of message */
The elements of the HSS signature value for a tree with Nspk levels
can be summarized as:
u32str(Nspk) ||
signed_public_key[1] ||
signed_public_key[2] ||
...
sigend_public_key[Nspk-1] ||
signed_public_key[Nspk] ||
lms_signature_on_message
where, as defined in Section 7 of [HASHSIG], a signed_public_key is
the lms_signature over the public key followed by the public key
itself.
2.2. Leighton-Micali Signature (LMS)
Each tree in the system specified in [HASHSIG] uses the Leighton-
Micali Signature (LMS) system. LMS systems have two parameters. The
first parameter is the height of the tree, h, which is the number of
levels in the tree minus one. The [HASHSIG] specification supports
five values for this parameter: h=5; h=10; h=15; h=20; and h=25.
Note that there are 2^h leaves in the tree. The second parameter is
the number of bytes output by the hash function, m, which the amount
of data associated with each node in the tree. The [HASHSIG]
specification supports only the SHA-256 hash function [SHS], with
m=32.
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Currently, the [HASHSIG] specification supports five tree sizes:
LMS_SHA256_M32_H5;
LMS_SHA256_M32_H10;
LMS_SHA256_M32_H15;
LMS_SHA256_M32_H20; and
LMS_SHA256_M32_H25.
The [HASHSIG] specification establishes an IANA registry to permit
the registration of additional tree sizes in the future.
An LMS signature consists of four elements: the number of the leaf
associated with the LM-OTS signature, an LM-OTS signature as
described in Section 2.3, a typecode indicating the particular LMS
algorithm, and an array of values that is associated with the path
through the tree from the leaf associated with the LM-OTS signature
to the root. The array of values contains the siblings of the nodes
on the path from the leaf to the root but does not contain the nodes
on the path itself. The array for a tree with height h will have h
values. The first value is the sibling of the leaf, the next value
is the sibling of the parent of the leaf, and so on up the path to
the root.
The four elements of the LMS signature value can be summarized as:
u32str(q) ||
ots_signature ||
u32str(type) ||
path[0] || path[1] || ... || path[h-1]
2.3. Leighton-Micali One-time Signature Algorithm (LM-OTS)
Merkle Tree Signatures (MTS) depend on a one-time signature method.
[HASHSIG] specifies the use of the LM-OTS. An LM-OTS has five
parameters.
n - The number of bytes associated with the hash function.
[HASHSIG] supports only SHA-256 [SHS], with n=32.
H - A preimage-resistant hash function that accepts byte strings
of any length, and returns an n-byte string.
w - The width in bits of the Winternitz coefficients. [HASHSIG]
supports four values for this parameter: w=1; w=2; w=4; and
w=8.
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p - The number of n-byte string elements that make up the LM-OTS
signature.
ls - The number of left-shift bits used in the checksum function,
which is defined in Section 4.5 of [HASHSIG].
The values of p and ls are dependent on the choices of the parameters
n and w, as described in Appendix A of [HASHSIG].
Currently, the [HASHSIG] specification supports four LM-OTS variants:
LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W1;
LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W2;
LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W4; and
LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8.
The [HASHSIG] specification establishes an IANA registry to permit
the registration of additional variants in the future.
Signing involves the generation of C, an n-byte random value.
The LM-OTS signature value can be summarized as:
u32str(otstype) || C || y[0] || ... || y[p-1]
3. Algorithm Identifiers and Parameters
The algorithm identifier for an HSS/LMS hash-based signature is
id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig:
id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) alg(3) 17 }
When the id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig algorithm identifier is used for a
signature, the AlgorithmIdentifier parameters field MUST be absent
(that is, the parameters are not present; the parameters are not set
to NULL).
Note that the id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig algorithm identifier is also
referred to as id-alg-mts-hashsig. This synonym is based on the
terminology used in an early draft of the document that became
[HASHSIG].
The signature values is a large OCTET STRING. The signature format
is designed for easy parsing. Each format includes a counter and
type codes that indirectly providing all of the information that is
needed to parse the value during signature validation.
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4. Signed-data Conventions
As specified in [CMS], the digital signature is produced from the
message digest and the signer's private key. If signed attributes
are absent, then the message digest is the hash of the content. If
signed attributes are present, then the hash of the content is placed
in the message-digest attribute, the set of signed attributes is DER
encoded, and the message digest is the hash of the encoded
attributes. In summary:
IF (signed attributes are absent)
THEN md = Hash(content)
ELSE message-digest attribute = Hash(content);
md = Hash(DER(SignedAttributes))
Sign(md)
When using [HASHSIG], the fields in the SignerInfo are used as
follows:
digestAlgorithms SHOULD contain the one-way hash function used to
compute the message digest on the eContent value. Since the
hash-based signature algorithms all depend on SHA-256, it is
strongly RECOMMENDED that SHA-256 also be used to compute the
message digest on the content.
Further, the same one-way hash function SHOULD be used to
compute the message digest on both the eContent and the
signedAttributes value if signedAttributes are present. Again,
since the hash-based signature algorithms all depend on
SHA-256, it is strongly RECOMMENDED that SHA-256 be used.
signatureAlgorithm MUST contain id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig. The
algorithm parameters field MUST be absent.
signature contains the single HSS signature value resulting from
the signing operation as specified in [HASHSIG].
5. Security Considerations
5.1. Implementation Security Considerations
Implementations must protect the private keys. Compromise of the
private keys may result in the ability to forge signatures. Along
with the private key, the implementation must keep track of which
leaf nodes in the tree have been used. Loss of integrity of this
tracking data can cause an one-time key to be used more than once.
As a result, when a private key and the tracking data are stored on
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non-volatile media or stored in a virtual machine environment, care
must be taken to preserve confidentiality and integrity.
An implementation must ensure that a LM-OTS private key is used to
generate a signature only one time, and ensure that it cannot be used
for any other purpose.
The generation of private keys relies on random numbers. The use of
inadequate pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs) to generate these
values can result in little or no security. An attacker may find it
much easier to reproduce the PRNG environment that produced the keys,
searching the resulting small set of possibilities, rather than brute
force searching the whole key space. The generation of quality
random numbers is difficult. RFC 4086 [RANDOM] offers important
guidance in this area.
The generation of hash-based signatures also depends on random
numbers. While the consequences of an inadequate pseudo-random
number generator (PRNGs) to generate these values is much less severe
than the generation of private keys, the guidance in [RFC4086]
remains important.
When computing signatures, the same hash function SHOULD be used for
all operations. In this specification, only SHA-256 is used. Using
only SHA-256 reduces the number of possible failure points in the
signature process.
5.2. Algorithm Security Considerations
At Black Hat USA 2013, some researchers gave a presentation on the
current sate of public key cryptography. They said: "Current
cryptosystems depend on discrete logarithm and factoring which has
seen some major new developments in the past 6 months" [BH2013].
They encouraged preparation for a day when RSA and DSA cannot be
depended upon.
A post-quantum cryptosystem is a system that is secure against
quantum computers that have more than a trivial number of quantum
bits. It is open to conjecture when it will be feasible to build
such a machine. RSA, DSA, and ECDSA are not post-quantum secure.
The LM-OTP one-time signature, LMS, and HSS do not depend on discrete
logarithm or factoring, as a result these algorithms are considered
to be post-quantum secure.
Today, RSA is often used to digitally sign software updates. This
means that the distribution of software updates could be compromised
if a significant advance is made in factoring or a quantum computer
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is invented. The use of HSS/LMS hash-based signatures to protect
software update distribution, perhaps using the format described in
[FWPROT], will allow the deployment of software that implements new
cryptosystems.
6. IANA Considerations
SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)
registry, change the reference for value 64 to point to this
document.
In the SMI Security for S/MIME Algorithms (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.3)
registry, change the description for value 17 to
"id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig" and change the reference to point to this
document. Also, add the following note at the top of the registry:
Value 17, "id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig", is also referred to as
"id-alg-mts-hashsig".
7. Acknowledgements
Many thanks to Panos Kampanakis, Jim Schaad, and Sean Turner for
their careful review and comments.
8. Normative References
[ASN1-B] ITU-T, "Information technology -- Abstract Syntax Notation
One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation", ITU-T
Recommendation X.680, 2015.
[ASN1-E] ITU-T, "Information technology -- ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
(DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, 2015.
[CMS] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
.
[HASHSIG] McGrew, D., M. Curcio, and S. Fluhrer, "Hash-Based
Signatures", Work in progress.
[RFC2219] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI
10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, .
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[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in
RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI
10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, .
[SHS] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
FIPS Publication 180-3: Secure Hash Standard, October
2008.
9. Informative References
[BH2013] Ptacek, T., T. Ritter, J. Samuel, and A. Stamos, "The
Factoring Dead: Preparing for the Cryptopocalypse", August
2013.
[CMSASN1] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and S/MIME", RFC 5911,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5911, June 2010, .
[CMSASN1U] Schaad, J. and S. Turner, "Additional New ASN.1 Modules
for the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and the Public
Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 6268, DOI
10.17487/RFC6268, July 2011, .
[FWPROT] Housley, R., "Using Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) to
Protect Firmware Packages", RFC 4108, DOI
10.17487/RFC4108, August 2005, .
[LM] Leighton, T. and S. Micali, "Large provably fast and
secure digital signature schemes from secure hash
functions", U.S. Patent 5,432,852, July 1995.
[M1979] Merkle, R., "Secrecy, Authentication, and Public Key
Systems", Stanford University Information Systems
Laboratory Technical Report 1979-1, 1979.
[M1987] Merkle, R., "A Digital Signature Based on a Conventional
Encryption Function", Lecture Notes in Computer Science
crypto87, 1988.
[M1989a] Merkle, R., "A Certified Digital Signature", Lecture Notes
in Computer Science crypto89, 1990.
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[M1989b] Merkle, R., "One Way Hash Functions and DES", Lecture Notes
in Computer Science crypto89, 1990.
[PKIXASN1] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the
Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010, .
[PQC] Bernstein, D., "Introduction to post-quantum
cryptography", 2009.
[RANDOM] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005, .
Appendix: ASN.1 Module
MTS-HashSig-2013
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
id-smime(16) id-mod(0) id-mod-mts-hashsig-2013(64) }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN
EXPORTS ALL;
IMPORTS
PUBLIC-KEY, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, SMIME-CAPS
FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009 -- RFC 5911 [CMSASN1]
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) }
mda-sha256
FROM PKIX1-PSS-OAEP-Algorithms-2009 -- RFC 5912 [PKIXASN1]
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkix1-rsa-pkalgs-02(54) } ;
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--
-- Object Identifiers
--
id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) alg(3) 17 }
--
-- Signature Algorithm and Public Key
--
sa-HSS-LMS-HashSig SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig
PARAMS ARE absent
HASHES { mda-sha256 }
PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-HSS-LMS-HashSig }
SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig } }
pk-HSS-LMS-HashSig PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig
KEY HSS-LMS-HashSig-PublicKey
PARAMS ARE absent
CERT-KEY-USAGE
{ digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyCertSign, cRLSign } }
HSS-LMS-HashSig-PublicKey ::= OCTET STRING
--
-- Expand the signature algorithm set used by CMS [CMSASN1U]
--
SignatureAlgorithmSet SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::=
{ sa-HSS-LMS-HashSig, ... }
--
-- Expand the S/MIME capabilities set used by CMS [CMSASN1]
--
SMimeCaps SMIME-CAPS ::= { sa-HSS-LMS-HashSig.&smimeCaps, ... }
END
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Author's Address
Russ Housley
Vigil Security, LLC
918 Spring Knoll Drive
Herndon, VA 20170
USA
EMail: housley@vigilsec.com
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